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ABSTRACT
THE SMUGGLERS’ LANDSCAPE:
GEOGRAPHY, ROUTE SELECTION AND THE GLOBAL HEROIN TRADE
James Dallis Medler
Old Dominion University, 2004
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

This study focuses on transnational smuggling, and puts forth an analytical
framework from the smugglers’ perspective with respect to route selection, focusing
primarily on aspects of economic, political, and human geography. It is predicated on
three interconnected decision-making domains that constitute the smuggler’s operational
landscape, namely access, risk and connectivity, which interact to drive the smugglers’
perceptions of route attractiveness. The first two domains operate reciprocally, primarily
at the national level of analysis, and together both shape and are shaped by the third at the
transnational level to form a feedback loop. With respect to connectivity, the convention
of the smuggling vector is also introduced.
As a benchmark commodity, heroin is used to demonstrate the utility o f this
approach with the primary aim of applying and validating the generic geographic
smuggling model, meant to be extensible in terms of space, time and commodity. A
review of the literature, focusing on the range of smuggled commodities, the nature and
evolution of smuggling actors, the complex relationship between smuggling networks
and nation-states, and potential modes of transportation by land, water and air. A
discussion of the spatial parameters of the global heroin trade itself, with specific
reference to the geography of supply and demand, is also undertaken.
For case studies, Afghanistan has been chosen as one of the two largest opium
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cultivators worldwide, as well as by virtue of its recent and dramatic history. In addition
to established cocaine smuggling routes and methods, Colombia has also become a
primary heroin source country with respect to the U.S. market. Finally, Nigeria is a
known transit hub without being a center of production, demonstrating that factors other
than mere proximity can be decisive.
Each case study first examines those geographic and historical factors that shape
heroin smuggling at the national level, focusing on the themes of terrain, tradition and
domestic turmoil, before considering the various sets of smuggling vectors that proceed
outward via various modes and points of transit to their final destinations. This
methodology not only highlights data gaps inherent in analyzing black markets, but also
optimizes extant sources of information.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11) cast the need for the global
community to effectively deal with organized criminal activity that transcends national
borders into sharp relief. Given the ongoing reaction to this event, with regard to both the
nation-state itself and the wider international system, the post-Cold War era may now be
truly seen as a time when concern over transnational security threats has reached parity
with the more traditional state-versus-state calculus of power. In this context, the term
“transnational” is used to refer to the movement of information, money, physical objects,
people, or other tangible or intangible items across national boundaries, when at least one
of the actors involved in this movement is non-governmental.1
While terrorism has become most prominent aspect of such transnational criminal
activity, it is intertwined with a number of related phenomena and enabling factors.
Similarly, though perhaps prosaic by comparison, the ability of various types of groups to
successfully engage in smuggling, namely the illegal movement of goods across
international borders or jurisdictions, nonetheless lies at the heart of many of these non
state actors’ capabilities. For instance, in addition to providing logistical support for
terrorist and other armed groups, the movement of various proscribed commodities across
international borders for profit is both globally endemic and highly lucrative.

This paper follows the format requirements o f Kate L. Turabian, A Manual fo r Writers o f Term Papers,
Theses, and Dissertations, 6th ed., rev. John Grossman and Alice Bennett (Chicago: University o f Chicago
Press, 1996).
1 This definition comes from Phil Williams and Ernesto U. Savona, “The United Nations and Transnational
Organized Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), 4-5.
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Moreover, smuggling forms an essential component of numerous other
transnational criminal enterprises, ranging from intellectual property and copyright
violations to illegal immigration, and from the fencing of stolen property to the potential
placement of weapons of mass destruction.2 According to Robert Mandel, among the
most pressing transnational concerns within this issue area are the smuggling of drugs,
arms, migrants and hazardous materials. These also parallel what Moise Naim refers to
as the “five wars of globalization,” namely the challenges of controlling the illegal trade
in drugs, arms, intellectual property, migrants and money at the global level.4 Finally, a
host of other illegal activities often support smuggling in turn, including bribery, forgery,
money laundering, and both the threat and use of violence.
Much of this activity takes place at the direction, or at least under the auspices, of
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), the nature and evolution of which are
discussed at greater length in the next chapter.5 Incidentally, alternative labels

2 The various manifestations o f this activity are discussed at greater length in Appendix A, “Typology o f
Smuggled Goods.”
3 Robert Mandel, “Deadly transfers, national hypocrisy, and global chaos,” Armed Forces & Society 25, no.
2 (Winter 1999), 307-31.
4 Moises Naim, “The five wars o f globalization,” Foreign Policy, January-February 2003, 28-37. For a
more extensive overview o f this phenomenon, see also Edgardo Rotman, “The globalization o f criminal
violence,” Cornell Journal o f Law and Public Policy 10, no. 1 (Fall 2000), 1-42.
5 The concept o f TCOs will be referred to prominently throughout this study. As such, it is useful to put
forth a working definition o f the term from the outset. To begin with, the U.S. law enforcement community
considers any “continuing and self-perpetuating criminal conspiracy, having an organized structure, fed by
fear and corruption, and motivated by greed” as a criminal organization. This definition comes from U.S.
Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: GPO, December
2000), Ch. I, 4, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/Dub45270index.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
Furthermore, the same source notes the follow ing as common characteristics o f most TCOs: seeking

financial gain; requiring member loyalty through ethnicity and family considerations; pursuing the
corruption o f government officials; a hierarchical structure; diversity in terms o f types o f crimes; an
organizational maturity that transcends individual personalities; and multi-jurisdictional activities.
However, one o f the most succinct definitions o f TCOs as “organized crime groups that have a home base
in one state but operate in one or more host states where there are favorable market opportunities,” comes
from Williams and Savona, 6. This definition will be taken as a point o f departure, with aspects o f its
underlying concepts discussed at length within the context o f this analysis. For more on this issue, see also
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encompassing this issue include international, global or multinational organized crime, as
well as the more disconcertingly nonjudgmental “gray-area phenomenon.”6 However, at
this juncture it is sufficient to note, as does Peter Andreas, that while such groups engage
in numerous types of illegal activity, “the cross-border dimension of their business
largely involves smuggling in one form or another.”
While most studies of illegal activity tend to approach issues from the law
enforcement point of view, in this instance the analysis is consciously skewed toward
assessing the most logical course of action in specific operational environments from the
smugglers’ perspective. This dissertation examines how, in an age of increasing
globalization and logistical sophistication, the actual routes and methods by which black
market commodities make their way from supply to demand areas shift in accordance
with the smugglers’ perceptions of how, and where, such business can be most
expeditiously and profitably transacted. As such, this activity may be seen as following
the paths of least resistance, or those routes that are the most attractive to the relevant
smuggling actor in terms of offering the highest profits with the least risk of compromise.

Phil Williams, “Organizing Transnational Crime: Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” Transnational
Organized Crime 4, no. 3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 60-6.
6 Peter A. Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime Versus the Nation-State,” Transnational Organized
Crime 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 21-48. Broadly speaking, this issue can become very taxonomically
confusing if one chooses. As an example, by one definition, transnational criminals are those based in one
country who cross international borders to commit crimes before returning home. Alternately, international
criminals are characterized as tending to establish ongoing illegal enterprises in two or more countries.
David L Carter, “International Organized Crime: Emerging Trends in Entrepreneurial Crime,” in
Understanding O rganized Crime in G lobal P erspective, ed. Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush (Thousand

Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), 139. To avoid this, throughout this study the term “TCO” will be
used generically to delineate a relatively wide range o f actors, with the specific context set forth as
necessary. For instance, it is the author’s contention that many terrorist groups in fact can fit the definition
o f a TCO, provided they extend their operations across national borders to undertake various types o f
illegal activities, particularly with respect to funding.
7 Peter Andreas, “Smuggling Wars: Law Enforcement and Law Evasion in a Changing World,”
Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 76.
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The focus of this study is on the parameters of this geographic attractiveness as it
influences smuggling route selection, both at the national and transnational levels of
analysis. As such, in some ways the responsive behavior of smuggling actors resembles
the type of two-level game described by Robert Putnam.8 Similarly, in framing this issue
with respect to legitimate commerce, Toby B. Gooley notes the four main factors
determining route selection are physical infrastructure, proximity to suppliers and
consumers, political and tax considerations, and international trade conditions.9
However, as smuggling actors engage in their operations, additional dimensions must be
taken into account in assessing the path of least resistance.
For instance, in his excellent book on the global drug trade, Paul B. Stares cites
the need for an understanding not only of illegal economic activity itself, but also the
forces that shape it. These factors include, but are not limited to, economic liberalization,
globalization, political developments in key countries, and geographic advantages and
constraints.10 An added dimension is the sheer growth of world trade as a complicating
factor. In response to higher volumes of import and exports in which contraband can be
concealed, national governments are also under pressure to lower trade barriers and
streamline customs procedures. This in turn helps to multiply the number of unmonitored
international transactions that can be exploited.
In general, there are three overriding themes that emerge from the analysis of the
smugglers’ landscape. The first is that, while smuggling can be found across the globe,
8 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic o f two-level games,” International
Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), 427-60.
9 Toby B. Gooley, “The Geography o f Logistics,” Logistics Management & Distribution Report 37, no.l
(January 1998), 63-5.
10 Paul B. Stares, Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1996), passim. Incidentally, numerous others have also noted the impact o f these factors, all o f
which will be examined at further length in the next chapter.
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the terrain, traditions and domestic turmoil of certain nations can make them particularly
attractive to smugglers. This notion of attractiveness becomes more readily apparent in
the context of the case studies, and forms the crux of the national level of analysis. A
second and related observation is that despite their often greater resources, in geographic
terms national actors are more highly circumscribed in their actions than transnational
ones, while at the same time the level of cooperation between states necessary to
effectively counter smuggling at the transnational level is generally lacking. Finally, the
degree to which various black markets are interrelated at all levels, often in fact directly
linked by various forms of illegal transactions, must be recognized and taken into
account.
As Shona Morrison points out, among other rationales for a strategic approach to
the analysis of smuggling is to more effectively allocate limited national resources, as
such decisions are often made more in response to immediate threats than in
consideration of less tangible future activity. The natural result of this tendency is that
most models tend to focus strictly on the routes that are being used at any given point in
time, rather than the dynamics that either shape these routes or their potential successors.
As such, a deeper understanding smuggling route attractiveness, or the reasons why
smugglers exhibit a preference for one route over another, as well as how these
perceptions change over time, is necessary.11
More broadly, in addition to calling for more sophisticated methodologies that are
not necessarily predicated on a rigid preoccupation with numbers, Phil Williams observes
that an important endeavor of data collection and analysis relating to transnational
11 Shona Morrison, “The Dynamics o f Illicit Drug Transshipment and Potential Transit Points for
Australia,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 1-2.
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organized crime should be anticipating developments and even, potentially, detecting
anomalies in predicted outcomes. Echoing Morrison, he also stresses the need to put
particular emphasis on the dynamics of illegal activity. In particular, this includes, but is
not limited to, the possible redistribution of criminal activity from one region to another;
the efforts of TCOs to co-opt legitimate political and economic actors; their expansion
into new market niches; and the formation of cooperative relationships.12
The various manifestations of transnational smuggling phenomena are determined
to a high degree by an exceedingly complex set of physical, political, economic and
human factors that shape the parameters of smugglers’ decision-making, particularly at
the national level of analysis.13 Given the spatial component inherent to each of these
dimensions, the common interface among these discrete sets of variables can be seen as
geographic in nature. Collectively, this template of the smugglers’ operational
environment is referred to throughout this analysis as the smugglers’ landscape. To
illustrate the dynamics that shape this landscape, the specific benchmark commodity
under scrutiny throughout this study is heroin, though trade interactions with other illegal
goods are also addressed as they arise.
As David G. Hansen notes in discussing the strategic utility of geographic
analysis, “The ageographical quality of our world causes many of us to overlook the
geographical motives for behavior.”14 As such, an important aim of this study is to

12 Williams, “Organizing Transnational Crime,” 82-5.

13 The concept o f complexity, or how discrete elements organize themselves into complicated structures
that emerge with apparent spontaneity and adapt over time, has itself evolved into a subject o f study. In the
context o f the philosophy o f science, for instance, parallels among complex systems ranging from
ecosystems and economies to physics and meteorology are drawn in M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity:
The Emerging Science at the Edge o f Order and Chaos (New York: Touchstone / Simon & Schuster,
1992).
14 David G. Hansen, “The Immutable Importance o f Geography,” Parameters XXVII (Spring 1997), 59.
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demonstrate the utility of spatial analysis or explaining observable patterns of black
market activity, in this case the transportation of illicit goods. Rather than a categorical
distribution, such as those seen in statistical analyses, spatial analysis centers on
variations spread out along a surface. The inherent challenge is to meaningfully elaborate
upon those factors that constitute the dominant selection criteria used by international
criminal organizations, either deliberately or by default, to determine the attractiveness of
a particular transnational smuggling route.
An important precedent for a geographical approach to the analysis of black
market logistics can be found in various reports issued previously by the now-defunct
Paris-based Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues (OGD), specifically with reference to
the issue area of drug trafficking.15 However, there are two distinct differences between
those efforts and this one. First, an attempt has been made to develop a more systematic
framework for the analysis of smuggling trends and patterns than those found previously.
Second, this framework is not, in theory, limited to the smuggling of drugs, but rather
consciously designed as an open architecture able to accommodate a wide range of
contraband.
This study is predicated upon the idea that transnational smuggling route selection
is a function of smugglers’ spatial perceptions regarding the relative attractiveness of
available routes, filtered through the decision-making domains of access, risk and
connectivity. While the various aspects and interactions of these decision-making
domains are discussed below, the overriding goal is to develop a means of sorting diverse
15 As o f this writing, the final report put out by this organization was Observatoire Geopolitique de Drogues
(OGD), The World Geopolitics o f Drugs 1998 /1 9 9 9 (Paris: OGD, April 2000). Since then, its work has
been superseded by that o f the Association d’Etudes Geopolitique des Drogues (AEGD, or Centre for
Geopolitical Drug Studies).
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data points, observations, trends and events that shed light on the phenomenon of
transnational smuggling. As such, this smuggling template is developed first in its
generic form without reference to a specific commodity, and then applied to the global
trade in heroin.

The Smugglers ’ Perspective: Initial Assumptions
Before expanding upon the conceptual framework that underpins this study, it is
first necessary to place transnational smuggling phenomena in context to circumscribe
and more meaningfully address the issue. To facilitate this task, a number of assumptions
must be made in advance. Despite being initially put forth in this section, however, many
of these themes are expanded upon in greater length in the context of subsequent
chapters.
As noted above, within this conceptualization the cornerstone of the smugglers’
landscape is geography. From this perspective, the unifying principle among those
physical, economic, political and human factors that have a direct impact upon the
smuggling landscape is their spatial elements. Thus, in order to navigate through their
complex landscape, smugglers must rely either consciously or subconsciously on an
underlying framework of geographic logic in order to select among possible routes to
determine which is the most attractive.
This assertion itself rests upon two main assumptions. The first and most basic of
these is that there in fact exists a fundamental link between these various aspects of
geography and transnational smuggling activity that is analogous in many ways to that
between geography and more legitimate commercial activity. The second is that, ceteris
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paribus, smuggling route selection tends tend to follow the path of least resistance, as
noted above, with respect to the overall smuggling landscape as contraband moves from
point of origin to final destination.
As such, it is taken as a given that black market economic activity, as well as licit
commerce, is inextricably connected to physical geography.16 As evidence of this, in
many respects transnational smuggling patterns seem to correspond geographically to
those of legitimate trade. Similarly, globalization in its many manifestations has greatly
increased opportunities for both licit and illicit trade. As a result, policies of economic
liberalization, such as the removal of trade barriers, can be seen as facilitating the
movement of smuggled goods as well. With respect to economic geography, smuggling
can certainly be seen to follow those spatial conduits that ensure the highest relative rate
of return, even if that route is not the most direct one available. Thus, the trade-offs
between profitability and risk in determining the attractiveness of a given route become
readily apparent.
Moreover, the geography of transnational smuggling is obviously shaped by the
international political landscape as well. The interaction between economics and politics
within this issue area are readily apparent, given nation-states’ desires to control their
borders. In particular, the variable porosity exhibited by the world’s many borders
testifies to the wide range of capabilities among nation-states in this respect.17 Finally,

16 With respect to the interaction between econom ics and geography, Paul Krugman notes that “the subject

o f economic geography is important in itself; it sheds light on international economics, and it is a valuable
laboratory o f understanding economics in general.” Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade, Gaston Eyskens
Lecture Series (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Leuven, Belgium: Leuven Universtiy Press, 1991), xi.
17 This issue will be discussed at much greater length in the next chapter. However, for a more traditional
analysis o f logistics within the realm o f legitimate commerce, see Gooley, 63-6; and, more
comprehensively, Donald F. Wood and James C. Johnson, Contemporary Transportation, 3rd ed. (New
York: Macmillen Publishing Company, 1989).
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human factors such as demographic and migration patterns also have a definite and
discernible impact on transnational smuggling activity.
As this proposed geographic smuggling framework has been consciously
designed as an open architecture that is both functional and extensible in nature, it can in
theory accommodate any illicit commodity. Thus, a corollary assumption is that, in the
illegal movement of disparate goods, certain analogous dynamics exist that transcend the
specific attributes of the commodities themselves. The smugglers’ decision-making
process can thus be analyzed regardless of the commodity in question, given the
appropriate parameters. In its broadest application, such a generic analytical framework
can serve as the basis for the generation of various permutations depicting the movement
of a wide range of illegal goods, given the geospatial and other data inputs of supply and
demand as dictated by the relevant black markets.
The final assumption to be made is that the transnational smuggling activity is
question be primarily motivated by profit, which is incidentally almost always
commensurate with risk. While it is by no means accurate to say that such enterprises are
never undertaken for other than economic purposes, there are a number of reasons for
circumscribing the discussion in this manner. To begin with, in both conceptual and
practical terms, this allows the actions of smugglers to be characterized more
homogeneously as those of relatively rational economic actors, as opposed to those
underpinned by potentially idiosyncratic and diverse political agendas.
For instance, as mentioned at the outset, smuggling is often linked both explicitly
and implicitly to terrorism, in many respects a valid association that is assessed further in
the next chapter. Despite obvious commonalties, however, by its nature smuggling is
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qualitatively different from terrorism. For instance, terrorist acts tend to be singular and
dramatic occurrences, generally devastating in intent and, when successful, in execution,
and usually involving perpetrators, victims and some sort of message or demand directed
toward a larger target and a wider audience.
By contrast, smuggling activity can be functionally represented most accurately as
an ongoing activity represented by a series of discrete iterations. As such, it is best
conceptualized as more of a process than as an event, and in this respect has more in
common with other economically motivated crimes such as for-profit extortion, hostagetaking or piracy. In turn, the goal of the nation-state in countering terrorism is geared
toward total threat elimination, while smuggling countermeasures generally serve to raise
the risk threshold of doing business in a given venue above acceptable limits and to thus
increase the probability of an unsuccessful transaction. While smuggling can certainly
form an adjunct to crimes motivated primarily by politics rather than economics, in
nearly every instance and particularly where middlemen are involved, there is almost
always some form of profit incentive at work as well.18
However, an excellent example of politically motivated smuggling can be found
in the various scenarios of terrorist groups moving weapons of mass destruction into a

18 This issue will be dealt with at greater length in next chapter. However, the following passage, though
somewhat lengthy, illustrates the convergence o f these different types o f organizations: “With the
substantial decrease in state-sponsored support, many insurgencies and extremist groups reach out to
criminal networks to acquire arms and supplies that cannot be obtained through more traditional or
legitimate channels. Unlike insurgent groups, criminal groups are well connected to outside gray market

arms merchants, transportation coordinators, money launderers, and other specialists who can provide the
weapons and other logistics support once given by state sponsors. Organized crime groups are also more
likely than armed illegal political, ideological, or religious movements to have stables o f corrupt contacts in
customs, immigration, and other law enforcement authorities to facilitate the smuggling o f weapons and
other contraband to extremist and insurgent groups. Armed groups are also turning to criminals to acquire
high-technology items, like encryption software or global positioning equipment, that are otherwise
unobtainable.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 6-7.
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target country via established commercial channels.19 Though for the most part such
cases fall beyond the bounds of this discussion, an assessment of the ulterior motives
involved in transnational criminal activity that encompasses smuggling as a constituent
element can serve to sharpen the analytical approach set forth herein. While both the
confluence and divergence between economic and political agendas definitely exists, the
focus here remains on the former, though the latter is addressed as it arises in context.
Under this set of assumptions, the smuggler is thus best seen as an opportunist
responding to the conditions inherent to a specific operational landscape, working under a
framework of bounded rationality, and filling a niche left vacant by more conventional
economic entities. Most often, the smuggling of particular commodities is presented in
terms of a security threat, a purely economic activity or a development issue, as is
discussed in the next chapter. However, an analytical framework based on geography
can encompass the most pertinent elements of each approach onto a common template in
order to model the landscape that smuggled commodities must move through.

The Smugglers ’ Landscape: Access, Risk and Connectivity
To begin developing a generic geographic smuggling model, there are several
issues that need to be addressed from the outset. The first is to set the initial context of
the discussion with respect to the broader dimensions of geographic analysis. The second
is to conceptualize access, risk and connectivity as they apply to the smugglers’ decision
making processes with respect to route selection and the resultant accrual of expected

19 As o f this writing, this issue has become increasingly more prominent. See, for instance, Michael
Richardson, “Countries join with the U.S. to screen cargo for terrorist shipments,” International Herald
Tribune, 23 September 2002,3.
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profits. Finally, the analytical framework representing the parameters of the smugglers’
landscape must be fully rendered, taking into account both decision-making domains that
shape the smugglers’ perceptions of the relative attractiveness for a given route.
As a point of departure, the diagram below highlights the three primary
conceptual axes of geographic analysis, namely those relating to space, time and
perspective. In terms of the spatial axis, although the smuggling route selection criteria
can be applied across various levels of analysis, the explicit focus is on smuggling routes
originating in one nation and then crossing international borders. The temporal axis
highlights changes to the smuggling landscape over time. Finally, the perspectives of
various geographic disciplines form the fundamental parameters of black market
logistics, and as such are critical to the furtherance of this analysis:

TEMPORAL
SPATIAL
Transnational
National

Past
Present
Future

Regional
Local

GEOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE
Physical / Economic / Political / Human
Fig. 1. Dimensions of geographic analysis20
20 This diagram is adapted from Bruce Mittchell, Geography and Resources Analysis, 2nd ed. (New York:
Longman Scientific and Technical, 1989), 6. As originally presented, it represents an attempt to describe
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Building upon these three axes, the generic spatial model put forth to assess the
decision-making process governing smuggling route selection falls into three distinct,
though interrelated, domains. As mentioned previously, these are access, risk and
connectivity. Each of these three decision-making domains can be seen to have a distinct
spatial dimension with respect to physical, economic, political and human geography.
However, having returned to the framework implied by these discrete decision-making
domains, a clarification of terms becomes necessary.
To begin with, in this context access is most simply defined as the smugglers’
degree of confidence in and control of a smuggled commodity throughout the logistical
process, determined primarily at the national level. This has been modified slightly from
traditional logistical usage, that of a nodal attribute that measures the effort necessary to
reach all other nodes or certain nodes from a given node within a network. Rather than a
more common, static formulation, such as the various methods that topographically
examines the number of links between point A and point B, in this representation a more
dynamic process serves to illustrate this basic attribute of the smugglers’ decision-making
criteria.21 However, as Eugene Van Cleef notes, “Access should not be confused with
mere distance. It does not necessarily imply nearness.”22
In this conceptualization, access encompasses all the potential efforts that a
smuggling actor can take to maximize operational efficiency in moving contraband

an analytical framework in three dimensions for the analysis o f natural resources in terms o f factors such as

dispersal, allocation, demand and distribution. In that context, it may be seen as an ancillary tool for
resource management and development.
21 Examples o f standard accessibility measures with respect to a given network include the beta index,
which compares the number o f links in a network with the number o f available nodes; the gamma index,
which compares the actual number o f links with the maximum number; and the Shimbel index, which
measures the minimum number o f links necessary to connect one node with all nodes in the network.
22 Eugene Van Cleef, Trade Centers and Trade Routes (New York: D. Appleton - Century Co., 1937), 13.
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through a logistical network linking points of origin to final destinations, by extension
increasing the probability of a successful transaction and the its resultant profits. As
such, it represents a highly divergent set of factors that the transnational smuggling can at
least attempt to control, and that in turn can actively cause a given route to be perceived
as more or less attractive.
By contrast, those factors that serve to impede access, often referred to as friction
of distance, fall under the heading of risk. As such, with respect to smuggling, risk may
be defined as the probability that the use of a given smuggling route will result in a
successful transaction, with the implication that there are forces at work that may either
intentionally or unintentionally be working to reduce that probability. In terms of the
path of least resistance, risk is resistance. Moreover, the inverse correlation between risk
and profit in practical terms is also worth reiterating at this juncture.
In his extensive study of the evolution of risk as a concept, Peter L. Bernstein
writes, “The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we have
some control over the outcome while minimizing the areas where we have no control
over the outcome and the linkage between cause and effect is hidden from us.”23 Risk
may be thought of as the consequences of an undesirable event, multiplied by the
probability of its occurrence. In even simpler terms, risk may be thought of as the set of
factors that tend to “push” smuggling activity toward different routes by making a given
route relatively less attractive, as opposed to those that serve to “pull” such activity to the

23 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story o f Risk (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1996), 197.
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given route by enabling smugglers’ access and thus increasing that route’s
attractiveness.24
Risk management for smuggling actors, as well as other entities, is the process of
avoiding controllable risks and planning for uncontrollable risks. Though not the sole
extant factor, interference emanating from the nation-state can be seen as the primary
source of smugglers’ risk, as noted above, though an unsuccessful smuggling transaction
could also be the result of accident, natural disaster or the actions of other non-state
actors. However, it is interesting to note that risks that can be surmounted may serve to
make the resultant reward that much greater in terms of profit margin. After all, the
Chinese character for risk is composed of two distinct components, one denoting
“danger” and the other “opportunity.”
Finally, connectivity may be defined with respect to the decision-making process
related to the actual modes of transportation and methods of concealment used to
transport smuggled commodities across international borders. The traditional usage of
the term refers to the attribute of a network that measures the number of links necessary
to reach all nodes from all other nodes. It is always an aggregate characteristic that refers
to the network as a whole rather than a single node. In other words, connectivity is the
level of effort needed to reach across a given network.
In practical terms, and as a dynamic concept, connectivity can only be assessed
via observation of the various routes taken during smuggling transactions across multiple
iterations. Intuitively speaking, the adage of one’s reach exceeding their grasp is

24 A concise introduction to risk concepts can be found in U.S. Coast Guard, “Risk 101” (Washington, DC:
USCG, December 1999), available at http://www.uscg.mil/ha/gm/risk/old%5Fsite/about/risk%5F101.htm.
accessed 15 July 2004. For a more extensive discussion, see also Bernstein, passim.
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germane, if one thinks of access as representing a given smuggling actor’s grasp, while
access minus risk stands for their reach. In this context, connectivity is the geographic
manifestation of this balance and empirically represents the path of least resistance. The
systemic interaction among these three decision-making domains can be seen in the
following diagram:

Access

Risk

(Maximize)

(Minimize)

Connectivity
(Optimal)

Fig. 2. Generic smuggling model: domains of decision-making

The underlying rationale for this generic smuggling model is that, for a given
smuggling event, smuggling route selection is primarily dependent on the smugglers’
attempt to maximize access and minimize risk, in an effort reach optimal connectivity,
which as noted above is analogous to the path of least resistance. Furthermore, decisions
regarding connectivity will in turn effect future perceptions of both access and risk,
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depending on the success of the route selected, in a form of feedback that serves to close
the loop and pave the way for subsequent decision-making. To continue this train of
thought, the following diagram serves to delineated the most relevant levels of analysis,
as well as some of the key factors that allow smuggling to flourish, a set of issues
addressed further in the next chapter:

Access

Risk

(Maximize)

(Minimize)
Factors:
Terrain
Tradition
Turmoil

National Level
of Analysis
Transnational
Level of Analysis

Connectivity

Factors:
Globalization
Porous Borders
Lack of Cooperation

(Optimal)

Fig. 3. The smugglers’ landscape: a functional schematic

From the smuggler’s point of view, the balance between maximization of access
and minimization of risk are the key determinants of specific geographic routes and
modes of transportation at the national level. Simultaneously, connectivity reflects the
transnational business climate facing a given smuggling actor, as reflected in the dynamic
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interaction between access and risk across all national territories situated along the route
from point of origin to destination.
Furthermore, as the relevant smuggling event occurs the attempt is made to
optimize connectivity at the transnational level, as assessed in terms of such factors as
success, speed and volume delivered. This assessment, in turn, serves as feedback into
the smuggler’s perceptions of access and risk. Application of this set of decision-making
processes underpins the evolution of the smugglers’ perceptions of a given route’s
attractiveness over time, with the resulting decision being to continue using the same
route, or either modifying or replacing that route with another more viable alternative.

Outline o f Study and Chapter Overview
Thus far, this chapter has introduced the topic of transnational smuggling as an
issue with global relevance, outlined a number of initial assumptions that further the
development of an analytical framework for smugglers’ decision-making with respect to
route selection, and put forth such a model in conceptual terms. Moving forward,
Chapter II expands upon many of the themes noted thus far by way of a review of the
relevant literature relating to smuggling as a security issue. As such, it examines in
greater detail the range of smuggled commodities, the nature and evolution of smuggling
actors, the complex relationship between smuggling networks and nation-states, and the
potential modes of transportation offered by land, water and air.
As noted previously, to narrow the scope of study to manageable proportions, a
single commodity is used to demonstrate the utility of geographical analysis in this
context. Due to the global prominence of the international trade in illicit drugs as well as
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other factors, heroin has been selected as the benchmark commodity. In some ways
serving as a second review of the literature with specific respect to drug trafficking,
Chapter III addresses the geography of the international heroin trade in detail. Due to the
interconnected nature of both money laundering and the black market in the chemical
precursors used to process heroin, these issues are also addressed in this context.
Chapter IV serves to outline the methodology that is employed in the case studies,
as well as to highlight the various data gaps inherent to the analysis of black markets.
With respect to access and risk, the definitions put forth in the previous section are
operationalized at the national level, most saliently with reference to aspects of physical,
economic, political and human geography. Similarly, at the transnational level the issue
of how to meaningfully address connectivity is also discussed at length.
In particular, to more empirically measure connectivity the convention of the
smuggling vector is introduced in order to illustrate the dynamic nature of transnational
smuggling activity. Briefly, for each transaction involving contraband, a vector exists,
consisting of the specific route, which can be separated into path segments or legs and
transitional nodes, as well as the associated human element. By analyzing sets of both
observed and expected smuggling vectors, certain trends emerge whereby the utility of
the model itself may be assessed in terms of its capacity to identify the divergences
between theory and reality. In turn, these divergences may be used to gain deeper insight
into the behavior of black market logistics in response to various changes in the
smuggling landscape.
Chapters V through VII comprise three case studies related to the global heroin
trade, respectively focusing on Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria. Not only is each a
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major hub of heroin smuggling activity, but also illustrative of the truly worldwide nature
of this activity by virtue of their locations in separate regions. Furthermore, despite a
high degree of divergence at first glance, all three countries share a number of common
traits. For instance, a number of themes relating to terrain, tradition and domestic turmoil
emerge as key factors allowing smuggling activity to flourish at the national level.
Afghanistan has been chosen by virtue of the fact that, together with Burma, the
two countries account for roughly 90% of world opium production. Furthermore, in
recent years, Colombia has become a major supplier of heroin to the U.S. market, though
as yet production is not as proportionally significant in global terms. Flowever, the
smuggling routes and methods established to move large quantities of Latin American
cocaine have been adapted to smuggle heroin, a phenomenon that represents the ways in
which different smuggled commodities can be handled in similar ways. Finally, Nigeria
represents an interesting case in that it has become a well-documented transit hub without
being a major drug producing area, demonstrating that factors other than mere proximity
can play a determining role in smuggling route selection.
Each case study involves an examination of the country in question at the national
and transnational levels of analysis. In as systematic a manner as possible, given the gaps
in available data, the format is to first establish the physical, political, economic and
human geographic factors that have played in shaping the relevant domestic smuggling
landscape at the national level. Then, the movement of heroin outward from the country
in question and the corresponding smuggling vectors and proceeding outward via various
modes and points of transit to their respective final destinations are examined. Finally, an
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assessment of this empirical data using the models, conventions and parameters that have
been previously introduced is conducted.
At each level of analysis, the aim is to meaningfully apply the generic smuggling
model to the country in question and its relevant smuggling vectors. Taken together,
these represent an attempt to validate the analytical framework of the smugglers’
landscape though empirical observation by assessing how closely the two types of
smuggling vector sets, observed and expected, overlap for each case study. The final
chapter, Chapter VIII, serves not only to summarize the results of this analysis, but also
to point the way toward further applications of this theoretical approach and
methodology.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW: SMUGGLING, STATES AND SECURITY

Ever since the human animal first engaged in economic activity recognizable as
such, political entities have sought to regulate this behavior, to various degrees and with
mixed success. As Andreas points out, “Smuggling is an extraordinarily diverse form of
trade that is as old as trade itself.”1 In some respects, smuggling is the concrete
manifestation of the ongoing and often fundamental tension between economics and
politics at any given point in space and time.
Furthermore, it appears abundantly clear that if demand is not met through licit
market activity, black markets will emerge and be serviced in relation to their profit
potential.2 Not only is this an age-old phenomenon, but a truly international one as well.
Wherever and whenever opportunity exists, such opportunism naturally arises. As these
profit incentives collide with the interests of nation-states, the resultant friction serves to
shape the smugglers’ decision-making processes and operational landscape.
On its own merits, the relevance of illicit economic activity in global terms seems
self-evident. For instance, one projection puts forth a range of between $500 billion and
$1.5 trillion, or 5% of the gross world product, which is laundered every year as a profit

1 Andreas, 76.
2 Put another way, “The iron law o f capitalism is that where there is a demand there will be a supplier if the
profit is high enough.” Alan Block and W illiam J. Chambliss, O rganizing Crim e (N ew York: Elsevier,

1982), 32. While the authors are writing with specific reference to the growth in demand for narcotics and
the subsequent rise in organized criminal activity in the United States between the 1930s and 1950s, this
appears to be a truism across a wide range o f regions and eras. For more analysis o f the interaction
between supply and demand in the context o f the illicit drug market, see also Fernando Garcia Arganaras,
“The drug war at the supply end: the case o f Bolivia,” Latin American Perspectives 24, no. 5 (September
1997), 59-80; and, with specific reference to the Canadian market, “Heroin seizures do not limit drug
supply,” United Press International, 21 January 2003, 1008020w9101.
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on illegal activities.3 It may be further assumed that aggregate black market revenues,
which would include a certain portion that is not laundered and yet another portion that is
carried out under a barter system, represent an even larger share of the world economy.4
As noted previously, this chapter focuses on the most salient category of
smuggling actors, TCOs. The first section deals with the nature and evolution of these
groups, as well as the observable range of smuggled commodities. The second addresses
the complex relationship between smuggling actors and nation-states, the latter being the
primary source of risk with regard to the operations of the former.5 Finally, the various
aspects of land, water and air modes of international transportation that shape the
manifestations of connectivity are examined with respect to transnational smuggling
activity.
However, before moving into a discussion of smuggling actors per se, a
preliminary overview of transnational issues with the field of international security is in
order. As of this writing, the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks has yet to resound fully
3 “Crime without punishment,” The Economist, 28 August 1999, 17. The U.S. Office o f National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) puts forth the slightly lower but still impressive figure o f $300 billion per year as
the proceeds o f international organized crime. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, “The Department o f Defense’s Role in U.S. Drug
Control Policy, ” Testimony o f Barry McCaffrey, Director, ONDCP, 27 April 1999, 7. As a third and final
representative estimate, Jessica T. Matthews notes the estimate o f $750 billion per year globally, “o f which
$450-500 billion is in narcotics.” Jessica T. Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” New
Perspectives Quarterly 14, no. 2 (Spring 1997), 11.
4 For instance, with particular reference to sub-Saharan Africa, OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000),
19-20, notes that, “drug money buys other goods with a high value-added that serve the purpose o f a hard
currency. These goods - gold, diamonds, non-ferrous metals, as well as cash crops like coffee and cocoa have long been part and parcel o f the informal exchanges that generate large profits, and their well-oiled
networks are often under the protection o f states, highly place individuals, and even geopolitical interests
outside o f Africa.” In particular, this source offers specifics relating to black market diamonds, a subject
also addressed in Appendix A.
5 Other potential sources o f smugglers’ risk, such as those posed by competing criminal elements or from
internal elements within a particular TCO, must be mentioned at this juncture. From the smugglers’ point
o f view, as was said o f the British Empire in the nineteenth century, there are no friends but only interests.
However, for the most part this aspect o f risk will not be addressed directly due to the various obstacles
inherent to systematic data collection within this area. The exception will be where such competition
comes to prominence via relatively reliable sources.
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through the field. However, there can be little doubt that a wide range of security issues
relating to non-state actors that were formerly seen as peripheral has finally, and by broad
consensus, come into the mainstream. Similarly, various pressures stemming from
globalization and related worldwide trends can be seen as having a distinct impact upon
once unassailable assumptions regarding the primacy of the nation-state within the
international system.
While in hindsight the point may seem almost moot, it is worth revisiting the
debate that existed within the realm of international security regarding what should be
rightfully included under its purview. In the past, specialists in the field have tended to
focus on the security threat inherent in the dealings among nation-states, understandably
so given the field’s roots in classical realism and focus on the nation-state as its primary
unit of analysis.6 Such analytical frameworks reflect the intellectual dominance of the
realist school of thought that has held sway since the end of the Second World War.7
However, even prior to 9/11, within the field a number of key questions were
being asked, primarily revolving around the issue of security from what, and for whom.
While this first set of issues is involved with expanding the scope of inquiry, the second
is more directly concerned with levels of analysis. One particularly notable example of

6 The essential elements o f classical realism can be found in Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations:
The Struggle fo r Power and Peace, 6th ed., rev. by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1985). These include the aforementioned focus on the nation-state as the primary unit o f analysis, as w ell

as assumptions relating to the structural anarchy o f the international system and the relative capabilities o f
actors within this system.
7 Comprehensive discussion o f realism and both related and competing schools o f thought can be found in
Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neoliberal
Challenge, (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995); David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The
Contemporary Debate (NY: Colombia University Press, 1993); and Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism
and its Critics (NY: Colombia University Press, 1986).
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an effort to meaningfully engage both of these sets of issues can be found in the work of
Barry Buzan.8
With respect to expanding the scope of inquiry within the field of international
security even further, others have also previously attempted to steer this debate in new
directions. For instance, Simon Dalby discusses the range of issues generally considered
as “non-traditional” and even irrelevant during the Cold War period.9 Other proposed
additions to the international security agenda include ecological issues, feminist analyses,
and a renewed focus on the security of previously marginalized groups.10 Even the study
of terrorism, despite the issue’s recent rise in prominence, tends to be framed in terms of

8 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda fo r International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War
Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 1991). Vertically, Buzan’s analysis moves along the axis from
individual to national to regional to international, while horizontally he addresses the spectrum o f military
to economic to political threats. In particular, he also notes the often-overlooked aspect o f the nation-state
as a source o f threat, most significantly with respect to the security o f the individual. This view,
contrasting state and individual sovereignty, is also echoed in Kofi Annan, “Two concepts o f sovereignty,”
The Economist, 18 September 1999,49-50.
9 Simon Dalby, “Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas o f Post-Cold War Security Discourse,”
Alternatives 17 (1992), 95-134.
10 Within respect to the environment, see Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental
Changes as Causes o f Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991), 76-116; Norman
Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis o f Political Stability (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1993); and Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape o f Global Conflict (New York: Henry
Holt & Co., 2001). As a counterpoint that highlights the debate in question, an opposing viewpoint is put
forth in Marc A. Levy “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” International Security 20, no. 2
(Fall 1995), 35-62. In particular, while conceding that environmental issues can pose a direct physical
threat to state interests, the author argues that the parallel and more indirect political threat, “is at once both
the weakest substantive threat. . . and the strongest intellectual challenge in the field o f security studies.”
For more on feminist interpretations o f international relations, see Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and
Bases: Making Feminist Sense o f International Politics (London: Pandora Press, 1989); V. Spike Petersen,
Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions o f International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1992); J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global
Security (N ew York: Colombia University Press, 1992); and Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and
International Relations in the Post-Modern Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Finally,
examples o f work focusing on marginalized ethnic groups include Eric Wolfe, Europe and the People
Without History (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1982); Marc S. Miller, ed., State o f the Peoples:
A Global Human Rights Report on Societies in Danger (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993); and Michael Renner,
Fighting fo r Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict and the New Age o f Insecurity (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1996), which directly links these challenges with the aforementioned issues involving the
environment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

the impact on and threat to the nation-state rather than as a legitimate subject in its own
right.11
With respect to the latter, and with relevance to the focus of this study, is the
apparent trend toward the increasing convergence between TCOs and terrorist groups.
For instance, as one U.S. government report notes:
One of the most significant developments since the end of the Cold War has been
the growing involvement of insurgent, paramilitary, and extremist groups - whose
crimes are primarily against the state - in criminal activities more associated with
traditional organized crime groups and drug trafficking syndicates. Although
various insurgent and extremist groups have been involved in traditional criminal
activities before, particularly the drug trade, their role typically was more a
subsidiary one of extorting or offering protection to drug trafficking and crime
groups operating in the areas they controlled. Partnerships that some of these
insurgent or extremist groups had with drug traffickers and other criminal
organizations were often fleeting, but sometimes longer-standing symbiotic
arrangements based on a coincidence of interests. In either case, the relationship
was often marked by mutual suspicion and wariness.12
As state sponsorship of terrorism began to wane along with the bipolar Cold War
paradigm, logically enough alternate means of funding were found, with drug trafficking
being arguably the most visible such manifestation of this phenomenon at the global
level. However, while this theme is expanded upon as it arises, particularly with respect
to the case studies, the focus will remain on economically motivated smuggling actors

11 For instance, explicitly making this connection as a major assumption for her study, Annamarie Oliverio
notes that, “terrorism and the state are assumed to be symbiotically related. Thus, the discourse o f
terrorism is inextricably related to the art o f statecraft.” Annamarie Oliverio, The State o f Tenor, SUNY
Series in Deviance and Social Control, ed. Ronald A. Farrell (Albany: State University o f New York Press,
1998), 19-20. See also “What is terrorism?” The Economist, 2 March 1996, 23-5; and Martha Crenshaw,
“Thoughts Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw
(University Park, PA: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 3-24.
12 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 6. This linkage is also
made by, among others, Stephen Blank, “Narcoterrorism as a threat to international security,” World and I
16, no. 12 (December 2001), 265-79; Alex P. Schmid, “The Links Between Transnational Organized Crime
and Terrorist Crimes,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 4 (Winter 1996), 40-82; and Richard
Clutterback, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies (London: Routledge, 1990), 89.
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rather than organizations with a political agenda that turn to criminal activity as means to
an end.
Similarly, in geographic terms the operational areas between TCOs and terrorists
often coincide, logically enough given the fact that, at the national level, the same types
of factors relating to terrain, tradition and domestic turmoil allow both to flourish. As
one U.S. official puts it, “Terrorists tend to live, operate, and derive support from the
lawless comers of the world . . . Narcotraffickers and drug producers, like international
criminals, also seek out those comers of the world where their behavior will not be
subject to government control or punishment. So it is not surprising that there is often an
overlap between those that engage in terrorism and those engaged in other internationally
unacceptable behavior.”13
Despite a long-standing and direct relevance, however, the place of TCOs within
the international security literature has been relatively ambiguous in the past, as have
issues related to organized crime in general. Emblematic of this debate, Louise Shelley is
able to ask whether or not transnational organized crime presents an imminent threat to
the nation-state itself.14 At roughly the same time, official U.S. interest in TCO activity
had risen to the point that it was being put forth as a potential replacement for the Cold
13 U.S. Congress, House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Statement o f Michael A. Sheehan,
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department o f State, 13 December 2000. Incidentally, not only
does this testimony predate the events o f 9/11, it also holds up both Afghanistan and Colombia as prime
examples o f this phenomenon. For more recent analyses, see also U.S. Department o f Justice (DOJ), Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Africa Strtaegic Unit, “Drugs and
Terrorism: A New Perspective,” Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA-02039 (Washington, DC: DEA, September
2002), available at http.7/w w w.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02039/02039.htm l. accessed 15 July 2004; and
U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government
Information, “International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism,” Testimony o f Asa Hutchinson, DEA
Administrator, 13 March 2002. Incidentally, both also discuss Afghanistan and Colombia to illustrate their
points, while the former also includes Turkey and the latter Peru. Aspects o f all o f these examples will be
addressed as they arise in context.
14 Louise I. Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?” Journal o f
International Affairs 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995), 463-89.
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War as a focus for international security concerns.15 However, even earlier the issue of
TCOs had become significant enough to be addressed directly by Boutros Boutros Ghali
during his tenure as Secretary-General of the United Nations.16
At present, it suffices to say that non-state actors capable of sustaining and even
escalating transnational activities detrimental to the interests of nation-states have
demonstrable relevance to the field of international security, even beyond the context of
terrorism. Specifically, Williams and Savona cite the various types of threat presented by
TCOs to sovereignty, to societies, to national stability and state control of territory, to
democratic values and public institutions, to economies and financial institutions, to
democratization and privatization, to development efforts, and to global regimes and
codes of conduct.

17

Moving more directly to the issue of levels of analysis, the concept of the nation
state as the key building block of the international system traditionally dates from the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. With the waning of bipolarity as the prevailing Cold Warera paradigm, there has been a major effort to articulate the parameters of potential
successors. As such, a major issue within the field of international relations is whether or
not the nation-state will even continue to hold sway, or in turn be unseated by its various
15 See R. T. Naylor, “From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New ‘National Security’ Threat,”
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 37-56. As a tangible example o f this school o f
thought, in February 1996, the Clinton administration for the first time publicly recognized international
organized crime as a national security issue facing the United States in its National Security Strategy
presented to Congress. See U.S. President, Office o f the White House, A National Strategy o f Engagement
and Enlargement (Washington, DC: GPO, February 1996), 25, available at
http://www.fas.org/spp/militarv/docops/national/1996stra.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.

16 Boutros Boutros Ghali, “Transnational Crime: The Market and the Rule o f Law,” Vital Speeches 61, no.
5 (15 December 1994), 130-2.
17 Williams and Savona, 32-9. For more on the security implications o f organized criminal activity for
various types o f military operations, see also Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., “The Organized Crime Dimension
o f Regional Conflict and Operations Other Than War,” in Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability:
Implications fo r U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions, ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H.
Schultz, Jr. (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1993), 125-46.
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challengers, including international organizations, multinational corporations and a range
of other sub- and supra-national actors. As a potential threat to the global status quo, the
growing relevance of smuggling actors falls squarely within the realm of the much wider
ongoing debate regarding the so-called “end of the nation-state.”

1o

Though the actual death-knell is decidedly premature, the nation-state as the basic
unit of the international system is in the process of becoming less dominant, less
independent and less separate, due to a range of economic, military and technological
developments. As such, various transnational, extra-national and sub-national entities are
becoming more prominent vis-a-vis the nation-state, though they by no means set to
replace it.19 While the entire breadth of this debate extends well beyond the purview of
this study, there are several aspects that are directly germane.
To begin with, the accelerating pace of globalization and economic liberalization
is rightly held up as one of the most salient factor shaping international change in the
post-Cold War era.20 The conceptualization of a “borderless world” that some see on the
horizon, if not already at hand, almost by definition will lead to the relative diminution of
18 While by no means encompassing the issue in its entirety, the parameters o f this debate are concisely laid
out in “The nation-state is dead. Long live the nation-state,” The Economist, 23 December 1995, 15-8. For
an analysis o f these issues based more on political than economic grounds, see also Grant T. Hammond and
Bryant P. Shaw, “Conflict, the Rise o f States, and the Decay o f Nations,” Journal o f Conflict Studies 15,
no. 1 (Spring 1995), 5-29, and, with specific reference to the European context, Gurutz Jauregua
Bereciartu, Decline o f the Nation-State, trans. William A. Douglas (Reno: University o f Nevada Press,
1994).
19 This more moderate view is supported by Peter Marden, among others, who astutely notes that, “rather
than championing the demise o f the statist project as signifying a historical shift in the position and power
o f the state, emphasis should be put on the ‘reconstituted state’ and the contradictory tensions implicit in
such a transformation.” Peter Marden, “Geographies o f Dissent: Globalization, Identify and the Nation,”
Political G eography 16, no. 1 (1997), 58.

20 For an overarching view o f the globalization process and its ramifications that is both comprehensive and
accessible, see Thomas Freidman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).
Friedman also provides a useful definition o f globalization as well, “the inexorable integration o f markets,
nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before - in a way that is enabling individuals,
corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever
before, and in a way that is enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporations and nation-states
farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.” Freidman, 9.
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the nation-state. For instance, coming from a relatively extreme perspective with respect
to this phenomenon, Kenichi Ohmae points to the speed and volume of international
transactions, the global flow of information and the nation-state’s shifting role from
creating wealth to destroying it. Of these, it is the last of these observations that is the
most telling in this context.
In general, Ohmae contends that nation-states lack the will, incentive, credibility,
tools and political base to play and effective role in the evolving global economy. Quite
pointedly, he notes that, “By heritage and by experience, nation-states are comfortable
with the market’s invisible hand only when they can control or regulate it.”

91

As such,

some types of smuggling activity can be seen in certain respects as being illegal merely
because certain states or groups of states consider them so.
One criticism that can be made of this view is that it does not fully take into
account the continuing roles for types of power other than economic and the underlying
•

need for strategic stability.

22

•

This point has been both well made and reiterated in various

works by Joseph Nye, who posits three levels within the international system. These are
the military, the economic, and the transnational, with the latter being largely beyond the
control of any single government. Incidentally, under this conceptualization transnational
smuggling activity as an issue area falls squarely within the latter category, where
hegemonic policies are least effective. However, Ohmae is correct to note that one effect
21 Kenichi Ohmae, “Putting Global Logic First,” Harvard Business Review 73, no. 1 (January-February
1995), 120. Specifically, the author sees regions, at both the inter-state and sub-state levels, as the primary

building blocks o f the new borderless economy, an earlier exposition o f which can be found in Ohmae,
“The Rise o f the Region State,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993), 78-87. For a relatively more
balanced view o f the globalization process, see also “Unfinished battle,” The Economist (web edition), 10
April 1999.
22 See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f American Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1990); and, more recently, The Paradox o f American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower
C an ’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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of globalization is to empower increasingly nimble competitors, rather than just large
ones. Such organizations are increasingly enabled to challenge the nation-state, which in
turn may be seen as adapting as well.
With respect to this issue, David C. Jordan notes that drug trafficking and other
transnational issues highlight the divergence of opinion with respect to the globalization
of the market economy. In particular, while some see this phenomenon as too large for
the nation-state, and thus requiring supranational institutions and mechanisms, others
hold that it is too small for the nation-state, and is thus best addressed via sub-state or
non-state actors.24 In fact, Jessica T. Matthews cuts to the heart of the matter by asking
whether, in the post-Cold War era of globalization, networks are in fact more efficient
than nation-states.25
The germaneness of this dichotomy is addressed at greater length below, as
transnational networks serve as the basic structure for most TCOs. However, at this
juncture it is sufficient to note that it is this asymmetry between the organization of
national and non-state actors that has posed a major conceptual challenge in the past to
the inclusion of a number of transnational security issues under the aegis of international
security. The next section examines in greater detail both the nature and evolution of the
actors behind much of the observed transnational activity at the global level, as well as
the range of goods moved in this manner.

23 For instance, with respect to the evolution o f the nation-state in response to these pressures, see Richard

Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York:
Basic Books, 1986).
24 David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies (Norman, OK: University o f Oklahoma,
1999), 3. However, the author continues by citing the indispensable role o f nation-states ruled by
democratically accountable governments resistant to various types o f related corruption in curbing the
expansion o f TCOs.
25 Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 10-13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

Smuggling Actors and Smuggled Commodities
To begin to examine the issue of smuggling actors and smuggled commodities, it
is useful to return to the initial assumptions of the overarching motives for such activity.
As noted at the outset, despite their linkages in general a distinction can be made between
economically motivated actors on the one hand, and politically or ideologically motivated
actors on the other.

9(\

For instance, weighing in from its own organizational perspective,

the U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan for 1997 goes so far as to note that “financial
gain remains the motivating factor behind most smuggling activity.”27 As such, rather
than a social psychological or other explanation of smuggling activity, this analysis
remains predicated upon profit as the primary stimulus, to include both monetary and
non-monetary or barter transactions.

98

26 While the relationships between transnational organized crime and terrorism are well documented and
have already been touched upon, for the purposes o f study consideration o f profit motives will remain the
primary focus o f analysis. However, as such linkages become germane within a specific context or case
study, they will be dealt with at that point. The motivational distinctions between these two types o f groups
is highlighted by Phil Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations: Strategic Alliances,” The
Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995), 59-60, as is the potential skewing o f threat assessment by
failing to differentiate in this respect. Interestingly, from a security point o f view, it is worth reiterating the
trend toward convergence o f international organized crime and international terrorism. Paradoxically, this
may actually serve to make at least some potential terrorist targets within the transportation sector less
viable, since the relevant branches o f such criminal enterprises may opt for targets that will not have a
direct negative impact on their own bottom line.
27
U.S. Department o f the Treasury (DOT), Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan
(Washington, DC: USCS, 1997), 20. The relevant passage continues by noting that, “while there are no
reliable estimates o f the size o f the problem, various analysts have estimated that criminal activity
generates proceeds o f $100-200 billion annually,” reiterating both the scope o f and uncertainty surrounding
this issue.
28 The literature supporting this point o f view is outlined in Block and Chambliss, 3-10. Alternative
analyses range from Marxist to Freudian, and generally characterize criminal activity as either a political
statement or a psychological disorder. While other approaches may be more fitting for the examination o f
certain types o f illegal acts, the thrust o f this study lends itself most readily to the use o f profit as the key
motive. However, as smuggling activity analyzed in the case studies that does not appear to readily
conform to this model, these exceptions will be noted.
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However, even among profit-seeking criminal actors, despite commonalties of
motivation a great diversity exists among smuggling actors in terms of organization.29
While not all smuggling is particularly organized, smuggling is a distinct function of
nearly all developed transnational criminal enterprises, and the level of this development
with respect to operational capabilities constitutes one possible analytical delineation of
smuggling activity. As such, this variation can be most easily conceptualized as a
spectrum. 30
At the lower end there are, understandably enough, the petty forms of smuggling
that tend to utilize more mundane methods to move less exotic commodities, and operate
with a greater reliance on opportunity than planning. However, at the upper end, there
exists a level of sophistication that rivals that of any successful, legitimate multinational
corporation (MNC), a parallel that is discussed at greater length below.31 The following
diagram illustrates this conceptualization:

29 Highlighting this diversity, Louise Shelly offers four different methods o f categorizing TCOs, namely by
their relationship the legitimate economy; by structure, product and membership; by political and terrorist
links; and by assets, revenues and cost o f their activities. Louise Shelly, “Identifying, Counting and
Categorizing Transnational Criminal Organizations,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring
1999), 18.

30 Andreas, 80-1, underlines this point with the following: “Smuggling organizations come in all forms and
sizes. While smugglers are often lumped together under the banner o f ‘organized crime,’ this is highly
misleading because o f the extreme variation in the levels o f organization and degree o f criminality.
Smuggling is an illegal transnational enterprise, but how organized and how criminal depends on what is
being smuggled and the intensity and form o f state control efforts.”
31 Though a rather common comparison, it is handled particularly well by Williams, “Transnational
Criminal Organizations,” 57-72, who takes it as his main theme.
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Fig. 4. Spectrum of transnational smuggling activity

While petty smuggling may logically account for a greater number of smuggling
events, in terms of both potential volume and range of smuggled goods it is the better
organized groups that are poised to service black markets on a more meaningful scale.32
Petty smuggling certainly has a distinct and measurable impact, and may in fact comprise
a far greater share of international smuggling activity than most would realize. However,
at present it does not appear that any authoritative study exists examining the full range
of transnational smuggling activity to include the lower end of this spectrum.
Conversely, at the upper end of this spectrum are transnational criminal actors
with varying degrees of efficiency and areas of specialization. In general, common
characteristics of such organizations include: a lack of ideology; an organized hierarchy;
continuity over time; a willingness to threaten or use force; relatively restrictive

32 For example, in theory anyone who passes through U.S. Customs with the odd box o f Cuban cigars or an
extra bottle o f liquor is technically a smuggler, albeit on a petty scale. Similarly, the combination o f loose
border control and high import duties has led to situations o f endemic low-level smuggling throughout
various parts o f the world. Certain aspects o f this issue are discussed further in the context o f Appendix A.
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membership; profits gained through criminal activity; the provision of illegal goods and
services to segments of the general population; neutralization of some public officials and
politicians by corruption or intimidation; seeking monopolies of specific goods or
services; assigning specialized activities to gang members; a code of secrecy; and careful
planning to meet long-term goals.33
Though certainly not synonymous with smuggling actors per se, TCOs appear to
account for a large portion of observable smuggling activity and as such have come to
represent the archetypal smuggling actor as this activity approaches the upper bound of
the spectrum. Thus, the focus of this study remains on TCOs, as by their nature they tend
to engage in transactions involving illegal commodities that require extensive economies
of scale, special handling, higher risk or an enhanced degree of operational planning and
coordination in order to make them profitable.34
As such, inherent to this conceptualization of transnational smuggling activity is
the issue of what is being smuggled. The expansion of smuggling activity at the global
level may be clearly seen by the very diversity of commodities involved. Ranging from
the mundane to the exotic, smuggling actors deal in everything and anything that will

33 Brian Sullivan, “International Organized Crime: A Growing National Security Threat,” Strategic Forum,
no.74 (March 1996), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF 74/forum74.html. accessed 15 July
2004. Moreover, with respect to the focus o f this study, the author continues by noting that, “The most
important factor in the growth o f organized crime has been the development o f a global network for illegal
drug trafficking that produces multi-billion dollar profits.” However, while drugs remain the most
important smuggled commodity worldwide, for many countries the importance o f smuggling extends well
beyond this issue area. For instance, although Madagascar is a very marginal actor in terms o f legitimate
global trade, with respect to the transnational trade in endangered species it is a major player. See Andreas,
79.
34 Categorizations o f smuggled commodities are discussed at further length below, and outlined more fully
in Appendix A. However, looking forward to the next chapter, at this juncture it is worth noting the
following: “Large-scale international movements o f cocaine and heroin are almost entirely controlled by
transnational organized crime groups, for whom drugs are consequently a primary source o f revenue. Thus
the illicit drug economy and organized crime are more or less interdependent.” United Nations Drug
Control Programme (UNDCP), World Drug Report {Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 133.
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turn a profit. However, in general illicitly traded commodities may be divided into three
categories, despite a certain degree of overlap. First, there are goods that are de facto
illegal or at a minimum strictly controlled, merely by their nature. Most often, some form
of broad international consensus underlies this designation. Among the more salient
examples within this category are narcotics, endangered animal parts and fissile
materials.
Second, there are de jure illegal commodities, the possession of which may or
may not actually be illegal, depending on the circumstances. These may include
instances where import or export is dependent on such factors as authorization of
recipient or consignee, or official notification to the relevant authorities regarding point
of origin and intended destination. This category can potentially encompass a wide range
of goods, including gemstones, artifacts, gasoline, cigarettes, and, in the context of illegal
immigration, even human beings.
Often these first two categories are subject not only to national controls but also to
multinational agreements with varying degrees of scope and effectiveness. Moreover,
while the lack of broad agreement can undermine efforts to address transnational
smuggling, even in cases where consensus exists the variation in law enforcement at the
national level remains significant.35 However, there are two principal inducements to the
formation and promotion of such multilateral prohibition regimes.

35 For instance, “As the trend toward market liberalization and an increasingly open global trading system
continues, prohibitions rather than tariffs and quotas increasingly drive the business o f smuggling. For, at
the same time as there has been a general liberalization o f trade, there has also been an increase in the
selective criminalization o f trade through prohibitions.” Andreas, 77-8. The author continues to by
pointing out that, while some prohibitions, such as those against heroin and cocaine, are virtually universal,
others are more nation-specific.
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The first is the inadequacy of unilateral and bilateral law enforcement measures in
the face of criminal activities that transcend national borders. The second is the role of
moral and emotional factors related to neither political nor economic advantage but
instead involving religious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, fears, prejudices,
paternalism, faith in universalism, the individual conscience, and the compulsion to
proselytize. Ultimately, the success or failure of an international prohibition regime in
effectively suppressing a particular activity depends, however, not only on the degree of
commitment to its norms or the extent or resources devoted to carrying out its goals but
also on the vulnerability of the activity to enforcement measures.36
As the third and final category of smuggled goods, there are otherwise legitimate
commodities that are smuggled predominantly in an effort to avoid duties or related
taxation, which may in fact overlap with the category of de jure smuggled commodities
noted above. In such cases, often there exists some form of state or functionally
analogous monopoly control that serves to artificially restrict supply, and as such
diversion to meet pent-up demand is common in these instances. Generally speaking,
wherever a situation of differential pricing exists and the resultant profit potential offers
incentives beyond the threshold of the associated risk, some form of arbitrage naturally
arises, generally facilitated by smuggling activity in cases where the trade in question has
been deemed illegal.37
However, it is important to note that the legality or illegality of trade in a given
commodity not only depends on where such transactions are conducted, but when and by

36 Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global prohibition regimes: the evolution o f norms in international society,”
International Organization 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1990), 479-526.
37 For a more extensive examination o f these categories, see Appendix A.
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whom. Two historically salient examples can be found in the slave trade and the opium
trade, the latter directly germane to the focus of this study and discussed at greater length
in the next and subsequent chapters.

-5 0

Moreover, globalization further complicates the

nation-state’s task of distinguishing between legal and illegal trading activity. To return
to Andreas, “Depending on the political winds and dominant social norms of the day,
what is illegitimate trade in one era may be legitimate trade in another.”39
As the result of the globalization process, the parameters of which have been
already described, the trend toward both the convergence and integration of black
markets also appears to be growing more prominent. Furthermore, the two-way nature of
illegal trade is all too easily overlooked, particularly in analyses predicated solely upon
threat. This phenomenon can be seen most readily in the convergence of such
overlapping black market activities as small arms traded for illicit diamonds, stolen
artwork traded for contraband cigarettes and even cocaine traded for heroin. Similarly,
law enforcement pressure with respect to one commodity may lead smuggling actors use
established routes to expand into new market segments and areas of specialization.40
As Patrick Clawson and Renssalaer W. Lee III note, “transnational criminal
alliances are essentially fungible - they can be used to transport virtually any
38 For more on the slave trade, see Hugh Thomas, The Slave Trade: The Story o f the Atlantic Slave Trade,
1440-1870 (New York: Touchstone, 1999); and, for more on this issue’s historical manifestations in the
Islamic context, Ronald Segal, Islam ’s Black Slaves: The Other Black Diaspora (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2001). Modem manifestations o f this phenomenon, particularly as it relates to sexual slavery
and prostitution, are also discussed in Appendix A in the context o f illegal immigration.
39 Andreas, 78.
40For instance, som e analysts trace the explosive growth o f human sm uggling to the international
crackdown on drugs over the last twenty years, using established drug smuggling networks. As further
evidence o f this phenomenon, the United Nations estimates that this trade generated between $1.5 and $2
million annually at the beginning o f the 1990s. A more recent estimate for human trafficking at the global
level ranges from eight to nine billion dollars, with much o f this activity associated with the sex industry.
See “World faces deluge o f human trafficking,” CNN.com, 31 August 2000. This subject is also examined
at greater length in Appendix A. Similarly, the next chapter will discuss linkages between various black
markets as they relate to the global heroin trade.
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commodity.”41 Moreover, for any given smuggling route and method, the ability of
transnational smuggling networks to simultaneously move various types of illegal goods
can be seen as a testament its overall effectiveness. Given the assumption that smuggling
activity is predicated upon turning a profit, the market forces of supply and demand may
be seen as paramount, particularly in terms of their spatial dimensions as characterized
within the context of the smugglers’ landscape. However, as these parameters change
over space and time, the corresponding routes may be seen to shift as well.
As such, the smugglers’ operational landscape itself continues to evolve over
time, largely in conjunction with the numerous trends relating to issues of globalization
and law enforcement. In response, the dramatic growth of TCOs is also demonstrably
apparent.42 As Peter A. Lupshka points out, “Transnational organized crime is not a new
phenomenon. Cross-national organized crime and contraband have existed since time
immemorial along adjacent borders. What is new is the scale of the activity and the fact
that organized crime now possesses tools once reserved for nation-states.”43
Such criminal actors serve to facilitate a widening range and volume of smuggled
goods throughout an increasingly interconnected world economy, as discussed at length
41 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998), 89. The authors also point out that the resultant smuggling routes created “by agreement”
between TCOs can be harnessed to facilitate the movement o f items not generally considered as marketrelated, such as weapons o f mass destruction. See also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 12,
which notes that “all illicit commodities are intimately linked. Once it has proven its profitability, no
network, no trafficking connection restricts itself to an individual territory or product.”
42 An excellent table o f global and regional trends encouraging the growth and diversification o f
transnational organized crime can be found in John McFarlane, “Transnational Crime, Corruption, and
Crony Capitalism in the Twenty-First Century: An Asian-Pacific Perspective,” Transnational O rganized

Crime, 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 2-3. See also Jordan, 71-98.
43 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 23. For a concise overview o f the historical growth o f
TCOs in this context, see also Williams and Savona, 7-10. Moreover, the projected future o f such
organizations is discussed in Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution: Potentials and
Consequences,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 55-74. In particular, the authors
assess the evolution o f drug cartels from hierarchical organizations to networked criminal actors capable o f
challenging the legitimacy and solvency o f nation-states.
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above. Furthermore, paralleling this rise of TCO activity, the study of organized crime
itself has also evolved from assumptions that all such activity was monolithic in nature,
to a growing realization that criminals can be observed in conflict as often as in
cooperation.44 As a result, in recent years there has been something of a return to this
view, albeit often in a more sophisticated form.45

44 See Block and Chambliss, 10-13. In the United States, for instance, for years the dominant assumptions
were that organized crime was not only centrally directed but also primarily o f Italian-American lineage.
Despite the facile surface appeal o f this proposition, much explanatory value was lost in applying this
relatively simplistic model. Similarly, a primary feature o f early studies on organized crime is a focus on
domestic rather than transnational manifestations. An example o f both these tendencies, dating from the
late 1960s, can be found in Donald R. Cressey, “The Functions and Structures o f Criminal Syndicates,” in
Ryan and Rush, 3-15. However, this latter work does exhibit a fairly advanced analysis o f the functional
division o f criminal labor. P. Williams and C. Florez, “Transnational criminal organizations and drug
trafficking,” U.N. Bulletin on Narcotics, 2-003 (1994), also notes the need to meaningfully address the
issue o f transnational criminal linkages without falling into the trap o f seeing a monolithic conspiracies at
every turn. For instance, examples o f criminal groups preying upon one another abound. One recent
example o f this can found within the immigrant smuggling market, in which reports have surfaced o f
groups kidnapping each other’s “clients” in order to both maximize profits and stifle competition.
“Smugglers o f illegal immigrants face threat from other smugglers,” CNN.com, 8 September 2000. Alan
Block, Space, Time and Organized Crime, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), 33-4, also
discusses not only outright violence between groups but also the strategic utility o f informing to law
enforcement authorities on competitors’ activities. For more on the broadening scope o f criminological
perspectives with respect to levels o f analysis, see also William F. McDonald, “The Globalization o f
Criminology: The New Frontier is the Frontier,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 1-

22 .
45 Examples utilizing variations on this thesis include: Claire Sterling, Octopus: How the Long Reach o f the
Sicilian Mafia Controls the Global Narcotics Trade (New York: Touchstone / Simon & Schuster, 1990),
positing the continuing primacy o f the Sicilian Mafia in the international narcotics trade; Claire Sterling,
Thieves ’ World: The Threat o f the New Global Network o f Organized Crime (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1994), expanding on a putative strategic alliance between the Sicilian Mafia and Russian
organized crime; taking a slightly different focus, Martin Booth, The Triads: the Growing Global Threat
From the Chinese Criminal Societies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); and Jeffery Robinson, The
Merger: The Conglomeration o f International Organized Crime (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press,
2000). By contrast, Naylor, “From Cold War to Crime War,” 37-56, is particularly critical o f Sterling’s
work as a vast oversimplification o f the types o f complex interaction taking place among various TCOs. A
more moderate stance, involving a “criminal mosaic” evolving in the United States as an alternate model,
can be found in William Kleinknecht, The N ew Ethnic M obs: The Changing Face o f O rganized Crime in

America (New York: The Free Press, 1996). This view is also underlined in U.S. Intergency Working
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 5, which notes that, “Much more than in the past,
criminal organizations are networking and cooperating with one another, enabling them to merge expertise
and to broaden the scope o f their activities.” For an overview o f the competing schools o f thought
regarding models o f organized criminal activity, see also Boronia Halstead, “The Use o f Models in the
Analysis o f Organized Crime and Development o f Policy,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 1
(Spring 1998), 1-24.
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For instance, Phil Williams warns that treating TCOs as “part of a single global
challenge is not only misleading conceptually, but could encourage policy response that
is as ineffective as it is undifferentiated.” Echoing the aforementioned network
metaphor, he further notes that while large, fixed, hierarchical organization may present
an easier target, the more prevalent “looser, less formal network structures” actually
present a greater challenge.46 This in turn corresponds with Lupshka’s observation that
“loose cross-group alliances and ‘marriages of convenience’ are increasingly occurring
between different nationally rooted organized crime groups.”47
However, even without resorting to the debatable proposition of monolithically
conceptualizing transnational organized crime, the sophistication of and cooperation
among TCOs does appear to be growing. For instance, Michael Lane writes that, “In the
global economy, domestic criminal organizations seize on new opportunities to link with
international criminal organizations, often resulting in international money laundering,
narcotics trafficking and other international cartels.”

Similarly, as John Kerry

succinctly puts it, “Crime was a natural for globalization.”49 Robert J. Bunker and John

46 Williams, “Transnational Criminal Organizations,” 60-1. Furthermore, the author continues by noting
that, “The notion that there is a relatively small number o f global conglomerates linked in a vast criminal
conspiracy also underestimates the threat. . . The reality is not only more messy but also more unsettling and less susceptible to easy solutions.” This view is echoed in Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,”
488-9. Moreover, in the context o f the transnational drug trade, there also appears to be a trend toward
putting profits and mutual gain at the forefront. For instance, as noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 6, “Traffickers from many countries increasingly are
eschewing traditional preferences for criminal partnerships within single ethnic groups and collaborating in
the purchase, transportation and distribution o f illegal drugs. Nontraditional trafficking groups - including
rebel armies and extremist organizations

have also turned to the drug trade as a means o f raising

revenue.”
47 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 23.
48 Michael H. Lane, Customs Modernization and the International Trade Superhighway (Westport, CT:
Quorum Books, 1998), 19.
49 John Kerry, The New War: The Web o f Crime That Threatens Am erica’s Security (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1997), 20. At the global level, the author continues by noting the “Big Five” international
criminal organizations at present as the Italian Mafia, the Russian mobs, the Japanese yakuza, the Chinese
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P. Sullivan also note that, being essentially borderless, networks established by TCOs
“display a remarkable capacity to flow around legal or geographic boundaries.”50 The
next section examines the ramifications of globalization in this context, particularly with
respect to the nation-state.
In the spatial context, the ability to control or, at a minimum, observe the
movement of contraband at each step in the transnational logistical process is an essential
capability for the smuggling actor. From this perspective, among other positive attributes
the network structure serves to maximize access and thus optimize connectivity along the
length of a given smuggling route. As such, in terms of their organization TCOs are
prominent among the various types of non-state actors that have embraced the
transnational network model.
As Matthews notes, the growing efficacy of networked organizations in the
international arena, as opposed to the more traditional hierarchies found within nation
states, is demonstrable with respect to non-state actors. To use her definition, “In a
network, individuals or groups link together for joint action without building a physical,
formal institutional presence.”51 In general, criminal activity, constrained by the threat of
legal action and other operational grounds to a relatively high degree of secrecy, naturally
tends toward this type of structure.

triads and the Colombian cartels, as well as a number o f smaller, more specialized groups centered on such
countries as Nigeria, Poland, Jamaica and Panama. While by no means authoritative, and o f course subject
to change over time, this characterization appears essentially valid. On the subject o f structural changes in

the organization o f criminal activity over time, see also Block, 53.
S0Bunker and Sullivan, 56.
51Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 11. Furthermore, as noted in U.S. Interagency Working
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 3, “The dynamics o f globalization . . . particularly
the reduction o f barriers to movement o f people, goods, and financial transactions across borders, have
enabled international organized crime groups to expand both their global reach and criminal business
interests.” See also Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 74-8.
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The case can certainly be made that traditional and often domestically-based
organized crime hierarchies are giving way to more fluid and task-specific decision
making entities which allow for greater flexibility in such matters as asset allocation and
risk management. In embracing this updated operational model, TCOs can be seen as
becoming even more tenacious in their own right and serving as umbrellas for various
affiliated criminal activities.52 In fact, the term TCO itself implies at least a minimal
degree of horizontal and vertical integration. As such, smuggling actors must be
considered at the forefront of Ohmae’s “nimbler competitors” vis-a-vis the nation-state.
Regarding terminology, it is interesting to note the distinction between “illegal
networks” and “illegal practices.” As Josiah McC. Heyman and Alan Smart write,
“Illegal networks specifically indicates a ordered web of people centered on an illegal
activity, and implies [though it does not necessarily require] an alternative social world to
the formal, legal state.” While opting for the looser “illegal practices” in order to
encompass the intentional or unintentional involvement of nation-states in various types
of criminal activity, the authors do highlight the additional insight gained by a focus on
the network concept: “Networks rest on the human capacity for mutuality, trust and
exchange in relationships.”53
A formulation that serves to underline this aspect of TCO structure is put forth by
Peter Marden, who characterizes non-state actors of this type as networks of economic,
social and cultural relations occupied by conscious association in separate locations that

52 The decentralization o f decision-making within smuggling organizations is exceedingly difficult to
assess. However, for a perceptive overview o f the phenomenon in this context, as well as a comparison
between international criminal organizations and multinational corporations, see Williams and Florez, 1-11.
53 Josiah McC. Heyman and Alan Smart, “States and Illegal Practices: An Overview,” in States and Illegal
Practices, ed. Josiah McC. Heyman (New York: Oxford Press, 1999), 17.
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link themselves for specific political and social ends.54 With reference to this definition,
ethnic ties or some analogue appear to be the most common organizing principle and
substantially serve to at least somewhat mitigate these issues of trust, without which the
resort to violence would be that much more common. This is, of course, not an
especially modem phenomenon; for instance, in the 14th century, the Islamic historian Ibn
Khaldun wrote, “Group feeling results only from blood relationship or something
corresponding to it.” [emphasis added]55
In short, there usually exists some sort of feeling which underlies the
commonality of group purpose, often based on such actual or assumed bonds as kinship,
culture, religion or language, that underpins trust among members of a transnational
network.56 It should also be mentioned that, historically, examples of ethnically-based
transnational trading activities organized along these lines have been quite common.57 In

54 Incidentally, the basis o f Marden’s analysis is geographical, with an emphasis on issues o f identity and
the control o f territory within the evolving international system. While the author makes this
characterization primarily with reference to a range o f non-governmental organizations and ethno-cultural
groups, it is also particularly apt in describing international criminal organizations. Marden, 41.
55 Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed.
N. J. Dawood (Princeton: Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press, 1989), 98. The range o f theories
involving ethnicity and ethnic identity is extensive, and includes primordial, contextual and functional
approaches. Similarly, models o f inter-ethnic relations primarily aim at addressing issues o f conflict,
cooperation and coexistence. While somewhat beyond the direct scope o f this study, some key general
works dealing with these subjects include Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., Ethnicity: Theory
and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in
Conflict (Berkeley, CA: University o f California Press, 1985); Urs Bitterli, Cultures in Conflict (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1989); and Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacekeeping in Multiethnic
Societies (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991).
56 This conceptualization forms the basis o f Harold R. Isaacs’s classic treatment o f the subject, Idols o f the
Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).
57 Extended studies o f this phenomenon include Joel Kotkin, Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity
D eterm ine Success in the New G lobal Econom y (N ew York: Random House, 1992), and Philip D. Curtin,

Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Edward R.
Kleemans and Henk G. van de Bunt, “The Social Embeddedness o f Organized Crime,” Transnational
Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 19-36, also examines this phenomenon in its criminal
manifestations using data from the Netherlands. For more on issue in the African context, see also Janet
MacGaffey and Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on the Margin o f the Law
(Oxford, UK: International African Institute, in association with James Currey and Indiana University
Press, 2000), 12-16. The next chapter also addresses this topic with particular respect to money laundering.
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the context of TCOs, Lupshka notes, “At present most transnational organized crime
groups have a single ethic character or national identity root, with cells inserted into
nation-states where aspects of their criminal enterprises take place.”58 In particular, from
a geographic point of view, organized crime often develops where states are weak, such
as in border areas, less accessible regions and economically depressed territories.59
As will be seen in the various case studies, group cohesion among members of
TCOs is crucial to maintaining organizational control and achieving common goals. In
the context of this study, the primary spatial application of organizing principles
predicated on solidarity ties fall within the realm of human geography. As such, a
number of ongoing trends serve to facilitate the spread of this phenomenon. For
example, as with the globalization of trade, international travel and tourism have also
become increasingly easy.60
Moreover, the sheer volume of people crossing international borders both
voluntarily and involuntarily as either political or economic refugees is also
accelerating.61 Patterns of migration and demography are thus extremely relevant as they
allow these smuggling actors to increase their scope both geographically and
operationally. While the vast majority of immigrants are law-abiding, increasing
international migration has enormous value for TCOs that have an ethnic basis by
facilitating the spread of network structures and providing enclaves that serve as

58 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 22.

59 This issue is examined at length in Frank Bovenkerk, “Organized Crime and Ethnic Minorities: Is There
a Link?” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 109-26. Furthermore, the
author also notes that ethnic specialization is often to be found among criminal organizations.
60 For a concise overview o f this phenomenon’s historical context, see “Humanity on the move,” The
Economist (web edition), 31 December 1999.
61 A broad-ranging survey o f recent migration trends can be found in “The longest journey: A survey o f
migration,” The Economist, 2 November 2002, 3-16.
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recruiting grounds.62 These transnational ties also provide access to supplies of
contraband goods, potential clients, new and existing markets, and other sources of
operational support.63
Finally, to return to a theme introduced earlier, TCOs may also be seen as
functionally analogous to MNCs, though with certain specific features that obviously
distinguish their activities from licit trade. Most significantly, there is the common
driving motivation between legitimate corporations and ongoing smuggling enterprises,
namely the pursuit of profit maximization. In particular, operations that do not generate
sufficient marginal revenue will be the least likely to continue. The exception to this rule
would be where ideology or some other non-commercial interest underlies such activity.
As noted above, another parallel with legitimate multinational corporations can be
seen in TCOs’ response to wider trends of globalization. For instance, as Matthews
notes, “Precisely the same forces that are shaping the legitimate global economy are
nourishing another new non-state actor, globally-integrated crime,” transforming local
operations into global enterprises.64 Extending this observation further, Andreas points

62 Williams and Savona, 9-10. See also “A world o f exiles,” The Economist, 4 January 2003, 41-3; “There
is another country . . The Economist, 19 August 2000, 26-7, dealing with migrant communities in the
U.S; and, for more on the security dimensions o f the issue, Khachig Tololyan, “The Impact o f Diasporas on
US Foreign Policy,” in Pfaltzgraff and Schultz, 147-60. However, with respect to the U.S., perhaps the
most salient historical example linking immigration to organized crime is that o f the southern Italy, and
specifically Sicily, following a period o f mass emigration to not only the United States, but also Canada,
South America and Australia. The opportunity for transnational linkages among the branches o f organized
crime affiliated with this ethnic group came in 1943, when the U.S. government released a number o f jailed
Mafia figures, notably Salvatore “Lucky” Luciano, in order to facilitate the Allied invasion o f Sicily. The
impact o f this wartime expediency is addressed in Alison Jamieson, “The Transnational Dim ension o f

Italian Organized Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 152-6.
63 Kleemans and van de Bunt, 25. However, the authors do rightly note that ethnic homogeneity is not the
sole determinant o f criminal associations. In particular, their research from the Netherlands also appears to
indicate that more ethnic diversity can be found toward the final end o f the smuggling distribution chain.
64 Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 11-2. Among the specific aspects o f globalization
noted by the author are dramatic increases in the volume o f goods and people crossing borders, competitive
pressures to keep trade flowing, deregulation and privatization o f government owned businesses, growing
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out that, “The economic importance of smuggling suggests that there is not just a formal,
above-ground dimension of regional and global interdependence, but an informal,
underground dimension as well. For some countries, it is the smuggling-based part of the
economy that is most responsive to (and integrated into) US and global markets.”65
However, the most salient differences between MNCs and TCOs lie in the latter’s
relative lack of constraints. This distinction can be seen as part of a wider comparison
made by James Rosenau between sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors.66
While the legitimate multinational corporation’s activities are sanctioned by the nation
state, despite occasional invective from the dispossessed, the disgruntled and the
politically motivated, smuggling actors are those that engage in illegal transactions, as
defined by consensus among nation-states. As such, it is in the very use of the term
“legitimate” that a key difference lies. In simplest terms, one type of organization
adheres to the rules laid out by the powers that be within the international system, while
the other does not.
Specifically, despite certain parallels with MNCs, illegality has compelled TCOs
to be much more fluid in structure and functionally cooperative as situations arise.67
Specifically, Lupshka notes a number of factors that constitute the “competitive edge”
enjoyed by TCOs vis-a-vis MNCs. These include access to vast amounts of capital, a
lack of jurisdictional and other boundaries, the ability to use corruption as a means of
ease o f communication, rapidly shifting commercial alliances and the emergence o f global financial
systems. This view is also echoed in U .S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat

Assessment, Ch. I, 1, which notes that, “International criminal networks have been quick to take advantage
o f the opportunities resulting from the revolutionary changes in world politics, business, technology and
communications that have strengthened democracy and free markets.”
65 Andreas, 79.
66 See James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991),
passim.
67 William and Savona, 29-30.
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leverage, recourse to the threat and use of violence, organizational flexibility, a wide
latitude to eliminate unproductive components, organizational secrecy and an emerging
/TO

global network.

However, as Pino Arlacchi points out, “The cost of doing business

within the illegal economy is much higher than in the legal economy - which is reflected
in the market price of most illegal goods. This largely is due to additional costs incurred
in the attempt to minimize the risks of being caught.”69
Organizational aspects relating to group affinities among members of TCOs have
already been addressed. However, barring the sanction of the nation-state, issues of trust
that are taken for granted in the course of legitimate commercial activities occur in the
absence of formalized legal structures, such as those enforcing contracts via torts and
associated regulation of business relationships. As a result, both the threat and use of
violence serve to fill the void and underlie the activities of organized crime in their
•

operational context.

1C\

•

This in turn further threatens the long-standing Westphalian

monopoly on organized violence that nation-states have formally reserved for themselves
dating back to 1648, as is discussed at length in the next section.
In spite of these many differences, Morrison makes a strong case for potential
qualitative changes among TCOs in response to various pressures that may impel them
toward evolutionary paths more closely paralleling the MNC model than their
predecessors. Specifically, she notes that:

68 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 34-8.
69 Pino Arlacchi, “The Dynamics o f Illegal Markets,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 3/4 (Autumn /
Winter 1998), 8.
70 For a wealth o f recent anecdotal evidence in support o f this assertion, see Roy Godson and William J.
Olsen, “International Organized Crime,” Society 32, no. 2 (January-February 1995), 18-30. The authors
discuss examples ranging from Colombia to Italy to Burma in context, as well as the trends behind the
growth o f such activity.
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. . . a cloak of legitimacy rather than a cloak of secrecy will be required to take
full advantage of the trafficking opportunities afforded by free trade agreements
and investment in privatized services - whereas in the past, political weakness
and social disruption were the foundations of trafficking. This is not to deny that
social and political disruption will continue to play a role in drug transshipment
but simply to argue that subtler methods of operation will be required in order to
avoid the attention that violence and intimidation attracts from the international
business community, foreign governments and local law enforcement.71
Functionally speaking, she further points out that, as traffickers become more
sophisticated and establish a veneer of legitimacy, they are better able to diversify their
business interests and become multi-commodity providers. In particular, they may
become less focused on maintaining direct links to various supply areas, and instead
specialize in providing support services, transportation expertise and protection for
shipments of a wider variety of contraband.72
To summarize, the following passage serves to succinctly illustrate the nature and
evolution of TCOs into actors capable of effectively challenging nation-states within the
bounds of certain issue areas:
International criminal networks . . . have taken advantage of the dramatic changes
in technology, world politics, and the global economy to become sophisticated
and flexible in their operations. They have extensive worldwide networks and
infrastructure to support their criminal operations; they are inherently flexible in
their operations, adapting quickly to challenges to rivals and from law
enforcement; they have tremendous financial resources to draw upon; and they
are completely ruthless.73
As such, although the topic has been tangentially addressed already, at this juncture the
complex relationship between TCOs and nation-states needs to be examined in much
greater detail.

71 Morrison, 16-7
72 Ibid.
73 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 5. See also Andreas,
81-2.
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Smuggling Networks and Nation-States
This chapter began with an overview of the debate surrounding the nation-state’s
primacy vis-a-vis non-state actors as the pace of globalization continues to increase. As
noted at the outset, an understanding of the transnational network structure found among
most smuggling actors is essential to assessing the various states of conflict and
coexistence that exist between TCOs and nation-states. Most saliently in this context, a
key advantage of the former is the fact that international logistical systems are also
arranged as networks, a topic that is addressed in the next section. However, in general
nation-states are not organized in this manner, and are furthermore constrained
geographically by their international borders. Finally, levels of cooperation among these
discrete actors do vary widely across issue areas.
As such, two inextricably connected aspects, the structural and the spatial,
delineate the primary arena for interaction between these disparate types of actors. While
TCOs are capable by definition of operating beyond the jurisdiction of any individual
nation, the actions of nation-states are circumscribed in terms of jurisdiction while at the
same time being called upon to implement international law.74 Thus, nation-states are in
some ways at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis smuggling actors, despite their numerous
other advantages.

74 See UNDCP, W orld D rug R eport (1997), 157. Further underlining this inherent asymmetry between

nations and criminal networks, U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment,
Ch. 1 ,9 observes that, “while globalization has allowed international criminals to operate virtually without
regard to borders, government and law enforcement agencies remain limited by national boundaries.” This
report continues by noting, “National sovereignty concerns and jurisdictional restrictions are impediments
to targeting criminal activities that cross international boundaries. Unlike criminals, governments and law
enforcement agencies must respect other nations’ sovereignty and legal statutes in law enforcement
operations.”
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In terms of both issue area and geographic area, smuggling may be seen as
presenting a distinctly asymmetrical challenge to the nation-state. With respect to this
prevailing asymmetry between nation-states and TCOs, Bunker and Sullivan point out
that as longstanding assumptions of struggles between nation-states or their coalitions
over the preservation and extension of national sovereignty are challenged and in danger
of becoming irrelevant, “At national levels the adversary will not necessarily be an
emerging peer competitor.”75
In consideration of the structural differences between TCOs and nation-states,
from the smuggler’s perspective the nation-state’s primary function is ostensibly that of
imposing risk and deterring access. However, the relationship between smuggling actors
on the one hand and the nation-state on the other is much more complex that may appear
at first glance. As such, it defies a simplistic “us-versus-them,” “good-guys-against-bad
guys” analysis.
Along these lines, Heyman and Smart rightly observe that, “State law inevitably
creates its counterparts, zones of ambiguity and outright illegality . .. Having grown in
necessary connection, state law and evasion of state law must be studied together.”76
There is a need to take such symbiosis into account when analyzing topics falling within

75Bunker and Sullivan, 57. However, the authors continue by noting that, with respect to activity below the
nation-state threshold, “At sub-national levels, organized criminals and gangs will not necessarily be the
usual suspects.”

76Heyman and Smart, 1. The question o f who defines various types o f activity as illegal, and the
underlying legitimacy for so doing, has been a theme in the study o f organized crime over the past several
decades. For a synopsis o f this literature, see Block and Chambliss, 4-15. For a concrete example o f this
type o f interaction between nation-state and TCO, note the tacit agreement between the government and the
yakuza in Japan, by which criminal activity is unofficially tolerated as long as it takes place within certain
parameters. Calvin Sims, “Gangster Shoot-Out in Tokyo Violates an Unspoken Pact,” New York Times
(web edition), 9 August 2000.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

this issue area, rather than taking all nation-state pronouncements to the contrary at face
value.
Paradoxically, in a borderless world smuggling would not exist. As Andreas
notes, “The state-smuggler relationship is a paradoxical one, defined by irony and
contradiction: the smuggler is pursued by the state, but at the same time kept in business
by the state. The smuggler is dependent on the state in a multitude of ways.”
Specifically, nation-states tacitly or openly contribute to the creation of markets and de
facto price supports, facilitate the emergence of more efficient smuggling groups by
counter the less efficient, and tolerate or otherwise allow corruption to flourish. He
continues by noting that smuggling activities “reveal both the power and limits of the
state: even as the state fails to deter smuggling, there is no smuggling without the state.
Laws, and the selective nature of their enforcement, are what make smuggling
possible.”77
According to Lupshka, there are three distinct stages of TCO interaction with
nation-states. These are the predatory, when the group is circumscribed within a
particular geographic area, focused primarily on immediate rewards, subject to the
prevailing political and economic sectors, and easily disciplined by law enforcement
authorities; the parasitical, as the group develops a corruptive interaction with legitimate
political entities, and melds control of a territorial base with the provision of illicit goods
77 Andreas, 82-7. Moreover, not only can smugglers’ assets be directly allocated to the state via various
forms o f forfeiture, those involved in such illegal activity constitute a major source o f primary information

used by law enforcement agencies to control smuggling. The author even goes a far as to note that, in some
respects, smuggling keeps law enforcement in business by underlining its continued relevance in an era o f
constrained resources. In the context o f drug trafficking, as will become more salient in the next section,
Jordan also notes the ambiguous relationship between governments and TCOs: “The economic model alone
does not include an awareness o f governmental support o f and protection for drug trafficking.
Furthermore, it impedes an enhanced understanding o f the embedded nature o f criminal activity within the
political system.” Jordan, 55-6.
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and services to those holding power within the nation-state; and the symbiotic, when
there becomes a separate but equal bond of mutuality between organized criminal actors
and the political system of the nation-state.78
Similarly, manifestations of illegal activity, even in the face of at least nominal
deterrence on the part of nation-states, may be seen in terms of the following typology:
market persistence, predicated on continued demand for a good or service proscribed by
the authorities; ambiguous persistence, where activity is de facto illegal but generally
tolerated due to a significant degree of social legitimacy; managed persistence, where
significant profits accrue to the state as the result of a given activity despite its illegality;
rebellious persistence, where internal political actors, opposed to the government in
question, have control over either the region or the activity itself; and subversive
persistence, where an outside political actor supports an illegal economic activity.79
It has been previously noted that the behavior of TCOs is generally unpinned by
both the threat and use of violence, which in turn challenges the nation-state’s monopoly
on the legitimate use o f force.80 Interestingly, in the modem era this monopoly is the
subject of widespread consensus throughout the international system in all but the most
circumscribed of situations, and serves as a primary pillar of the current international
system.

78 This typology is laid out in Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 30-2.

79 This terminology and taxonomy comes from Alan Smart, “Predatory Rule and Illegal Economic
Practices,” in Heyman, 103-5.
80 As noted in UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 130, “Lack o f recourse to legal redress . . . implies
higher transaction costs, because new entrants are liable to be coerced by better established, more powerful
organizations or individuals. In other words, entry into a market place and to market position have to be
fought for in ways that lie outside legitimate business practice.” See also Lupshka, “Transnational
Organized Crime,” 29-30.
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However, not only can extralegal actors employing the use or threat of violence
be readily observed throughout history and often coexisting with a wide range of other
political structures, a strong case can be made for their essential role in the rise of the
•

•

nation-state itself in its present form.

81

At an even more fundamental level, Joshua

Charap and Christian Harm even go so far as to posit that nations themselves may have
developed as the hegemonic results of gang warfare.
As with a wide range of other illegal endeavors, in the smuggling context the use
of the carrot complements that of the stick. The smuggling process thus may also be
characterized as highly dependent on the facilitation of corruption, particularly with
respect to the commercial transport of contraband. With reference to the generic
smuggling model, the access decision-making domain is integrally tied to the smuggler’s
ability to control the smuggling process, and represents a key component of risk
mitigation and avoidance.
The ability to co-opt the agents of the nation-state, if not the nation-state in toto,
serves as a key element in a TCO’s operational success. Functionally speaking, in the
absence o f corruption the movement of contraband via commercial methods would
become virtually impossible. Most often, such corruption is manifest in various forms of

81 Examples o f this range from the use o f mercenaries, both medieval and modem, to the various types o f
sanctioned and non-sanctioned private organizations such as the British and Dutch East India Companies.
Although this theme runs through a number o f works, for a focused analysis see Janice E. Thomson,
Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 21-41, 69-105;
Thomas W. Gallant, “Brigandage, Piracy, Capitalism and State-Formation: Transnational Crime from a
Historical World-Systems Perspective,” in Heyman, 25-61; Block and Chambliss, 221-8; and Michael

Howard, War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 20-53.
82 See Joshua Charap and Christian Harm, “Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State,” IMF
Working Paper WP/99/91 (July 1999), 12. Incidentally, this hypothesis is underpinned by the assumption
that the relevant geographic landscape favored either offensive or defensive military action, which then
defined the limits o f spatial control. As such, these proto-nations represented the optimal reach o f a given
hegemonic hierarchy, while borders arose as the result o f an anarchical equilibrium o f cooperation as
neighbors realized that mutual conquest was not an option.
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bribery, with intimidation used as necessary in a supporting role. As this section’s focus
is on TCO interaction with the nation-state, the issue of public sector corruption is of the
essence.

O')

Like smuggling, corruption is a complex phenomenon that can be found in many
forms throughout history and in every part of the world. In general, the question is not
whether corruption exists at a given time and place, but rather to what degree. However,
there does appear to be an important distinction to be made in terms of scale between
systemic corruption and corruption on the part of individuals or small groups. While the
task of meaningfully measuring corruption is admittedly difficult, there does appear to be
a consensus regarding the root causes of public sector corruption.84 In particular, the

83 The majority o f the literature on corruption tends to be confined to consideration o f the public sector.
For instance, even while acknowledging the difficulty o f defining the phenomenon, Vito Tanzi writes, “The
most popular and simplest definition o f corruption is that is the abuse o f public power for private benefit.”
Vito Tanzi, “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures,” IMF Working
Paper WP/98/63 (December 1998), 8. The impact o f corruption on international trade is discussed at
length in Shang-Jin Wei, “Natural Openness and Good Government,” NBER Working Paper W7765 (June
2000), available at www.nber.org/papers/w7765. accessed 15 July 2004. See also Nikos Passas, “A
Structural Analysis o f Corruption: The Role o f Criminogenic Asymmetries,” Transnational Organized
Crime 4, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 42-55, which does note the general failure o f regional and multinational
efforts to meaningfully address corruption within the private sector. While the public sector serves as a
solid point o f departure, this study will attempt whenever possible to incorporate a consideration o f the
private sector into the analysis as well. While recognizing that the climate for endemic corruption is
generally set by the public sector, the rationale for this decision rests on the importance o f the private sector
in carrying out smuggling transactions. Consideration o f potential corruption should not exclude anyone in
a position to enable criminal activity. One precedent for this broader definition may be found in the U.S.
RICO (Racketeering-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) statutes, which are targeted almost exclusively
toward the private sector. The following section will address private sector corruption more directly, with a
focus on international logistical networks.
84 Within the literature, economic and political analyses o f corruption are among the most common
approaches. For instance, Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste use an “equilibrium” analogy by which
the size o f a country’s illicit economy may be positively correlated to factors such as high levels o f
government regulation, weak rule o f law and large discretionary corporate and personal tax burdens.

Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste, “Shadow Economies Around the World: Size, Causes and
Consequences,” IMF Working Paper WP/00/26 (February 2000), 19-26. Similarly, Tanzi notes that the
causes o f public sector corruption may be broken down into those that affect demand, such as regulations,
tax systems, spending decisions and the provision o f goods and services at below-market prices, and those
that affect supply, such as bureaucratic traditions, public sector wages, penalty systems, institutional
controls, government transparency and leadership examples. Tanzi, 3. See also Paolo Mauro, “Why
Worry About Corruption?” IMF Economic Issues no. 6 (1997), 1-19, specifically focusing on the
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same types of social solidarity networks that characterize TCOs find a parallel in
motivating corruption.

oe

Furthermore, as with other types of criminal activity, levels of corruption
demonstrably higher than acceptable global norms may be seen as inimical to good
governance, defined as the management of a nation’s economic and social resources in
ways that maximize the public good.86 Generically speaking, in political systems with
ineffective or unregulated systems of institutional checks and balances where corrupt
elites are allowed to flourish, access to political office tends to be limited to a relatively
small group and officeholders are able to avoid, undermine or otherwise circumvent
•

measures entailing transparency or accountability.

07

opportunities for corruption stimulated by governmental economic intervention in terms o f rents and rentseeking; and Steven N. S. Chung, “A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory o f Corruption,”
Contemporary Economic Policy 14, no. 3 (July 1996), 1-5, which puts forth the notion o f public officials as
constrained self-maximizers, and as such hypothesizes that in much o f the developing world, regulations
and controls are formulated in order to open and maintain opportunities for corruption; the danger in
transitioning to a free market system without the benefit o f solid private property rights is that corruption
becomes integrally entrenched. However, one o f the most comprehensive treatments o f the subject can be
found in Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
85 For instance, Tanzi, 8-9, notes that, “In several cases o f corruption, the abuse o f public power is not
necessarily for one’s private benefit but it can be for the benefit o f one’s party, class, tribe, friends, family
and so on.” As corruption is anything but a monocausal phenomenon, its socio-cultural aspects need to be
fully addressed. While this may be seen as something o f a gap in the literature, many o f the available
corruption indices do in fact take this dimension into account. These will be discussed further in the next
chapter. Rose-Ackerman, 130-2, also notes the detrimental impact o f public sector corruption via
patronage systems within ethnically divided societies.
86 The negative effects on a given nation-state include, but are not limited to, the erosion o f political
legitimacy, the loss o f investor confidence, and the erosion o f international efforts across issue areas
ranging from trade to public health to development. See G. Shabbir Choma, “Corruption - And How It
Affects the Legitimacy o f the State,” UN. Chronicle 35, No. 11 (Spring 1998), 88-90; Robert S. Leiken,
“Controlling the Global Corruption Epidemic,” Foreign Affairs 105 (Winter 1996), 55-73; Andrei Shleifer
and Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption,” Q uarterly Journal o f Econom ics 108, no. 3 (August 1998), 599-618.
For discussion o f a practical set o f strategies aimed at explicitly linking anti-corruption efforts and good
governance, see also McFarlane, 17-24. However, dissenting views specifically those holding that
corruption may have some redeeming features, may be found. For example, see Gordon Tullock,
“Corruption Theory and Practice,” Contemporary Economic Policy 14, no. 3 (July 1996), 6-14. While this
sentiment may not resonate with the general international consensus, as an extant and divergent point o f
view it is worth mentioning.
87 Jordan, 37-8.
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While not the sole entities engaging in or taking advantage of these behaviors,
TCO activity is inextricably intertwined with the issue of corruption, the existence of
which in a specific operational context constitutes a distinct force multiplier.

oo

Within

the public sector, leverage gained either by corruption or intimidation allows these groups
to gain high level protection for themselves and their activities, access insider
information on potential and ongoing investigations, and influence legislation or
regulations that could affect their interests.
For their part, corrupt officials may opt to participate to secure financial rewards,
avoid pressure and reprisals, and gain either political or personal favors from criminal
groups.

OQ

<

As Susan Rose-Ackerman notes, “Corruption is often embedded in the

hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy. Low-level officials collect bribes and pass a
share to those at higher levels - perhaps in the form of an up-front payment for the job
itself. Conversely, higher-ups may organize and rationalize the corrupt system to avoid
wasteful competition between low-level officials.”90 However, corruption not only in
government, but also in business and throughout society, is necessary to fully enable
transnational smuggling.
From the smugglers’ perspective, there appears to be an optimal level of political
corruption and overall instability that will best facilitate their activities. For instance, as
Morrison notes, rather than the outright chaos that is found in war zones, a lower level of
88 Illustrative o f this, Leiken notes that the range o f nontraditional threats rising to prominence in the postCold War era, in particular terrorism and sm uggling activity, have little in common analytically “except

that all are aided at critical junctures by official corruption.” Leiken, 56. The author also notes the growth
o f TCOs as prime movers in exploiting these opportunities.
89 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 7-8. In addition to
echoing many o f the points noted above, this source also observes that, “Criminal groups are most
successful in corrupting high-level politicians in countries that are their home bases.” This phenomenon
will be discussed at greater length in the case studies.
90 Rose-Ackerman, 49.
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civil disorder may in fact be more desirable from the smugglers’ perspective in terms of
their ability to control their operational environment by maximizing access and
minimizing risk. Conversely, political systems that allow high levels of corruption to
flourish are also magnets for smuggling.91
Moving on the consideration of the spatial, in terms of geography one defining,
perhaps the defining, characteristic of the nation-state is the control of certain territorial
borders.

Nearly the entire surface of the earth is organized along such lines, and, under

the international system, governments purport to hold political sway in the form of
national sovereignty within their respective borders. However, as Matthews notes, a
distinct divide exists between “the essence of statehood, which is a fixed and precisely
defined territory, and the amorphous geography of the resources and threats.”93
As the edges of the nation-state, international borders and their relevant crossing
points can be seen as focal points for both smuggler and the nation-state. The relative
porosity of international borders can be seen largely as a function of the physical terrain
in question, the nature of the relevant national actors’ border control policies, and the
effectiveness of the specific law enforcement entities charged with implementing those
policies.

91 Morrison, 2-4. Methods o f assessing the various types o f relevant political risk factors at the national
level will be discussed further in Chapter IV.
92 For instance, Buzan, 60-6, makes use o f the terminology o f “physical base” to differentiate this concept

from both the idea o f the state and its institutional expression. In noting the common usages o f the concept
o f security, Dalby also highlights the spatial dimensions o f the nation-state’s duties, namely the social
contract that calls for the state to “provide order within its boundaries.” In making the case for “anti
geopolitics” and questioning the traditional approach to security and its various levels o f analysis, the
author frames the issue o f transnational threats primarily in an ecological context. However, an analogous
critical framework using smuggling as a test case may also be made. Dalby, 97-8, 107-10.
93 Matthews, “Are Networks Better Than Nations?” 10.
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In general, as noted at the outset of this study, national boundaries are
increasingly subject to a wide range of political, economic and social pressures. For
instance, regional integration of existing national territories, particularly with respect to
trade, is occurring in tandem.94 The enhanced ease with which not only goods, but
people as well, can cross international borders, while serving as the engine of
globalization and associated economic growth, also offers immense opportunities for
illicit activity.95
Similarly, there has been a marked increase of sovereign territorial entities, as
well as an even greater number of aspirants to nationhood, which also serves to
complicate the issue. While many factors have helped to facilitate this upward trend,
overall it can be traced in turn back to the sheer number of nation-states that have come
into being over the past fifty years.96 As a result, “There has probably never been a
period where more governments on Earth have codified what is right and what is wrong,
94 The most salient example o f this may be found in the case o f the European Union, in both its widening
and deepening efforts. Interestingly, it may be argued that regional economic integration does not negate
national borders, but rather redefine them without lessening their significance. See “Good fences,” The
Economist, 19 December 1998, 19-22.
95 The international transportation o f goods will be the focus o f the following section. However, continuing
with the E.U. example, under the terms o f the Schengen Agreement, citizens o f those countries opting to
join no longer require passports. In addition to concerns regarding illegal immigration, the proliferation o f
cross-border crime within the region implies the need for a higher degree o f coordination among the
relevant law enforcement, legislative and judicial entities. For a more in-depth analysis o f these challenges,
see “European borders: melting,” The Economist, 24 August 1998, 40; “A single market in crime,” The
Economist (web edition), 16 October 1999; and, focusing on a particularly active segment o f the immigrant
smuggling market, Carlotta Gall, “China’s Migrants Find Europe’s Open Back Door,” New York Times
(web edition), 22 April 2000.
96 For instance, there have been three distinct waves o f nation-state creation during the twentieth century.
These have come in the wake o f World War I, with the various post-war settlements; o f World War II,
particularly with respect to decolonization in Africa and Asia; and o f the Cold War, which not only gave
rise to the Soviet successor states but in many respects reconfigured the international consensus regarding
the nature o f sovereignty and the inviolability o f natural borders. Recent illustrations o f this continuing
trend can be seen in the Balkans with the former Yugoslavia, in sub-Saharan Africa with the case o f
Eritrea, and in the Indonesian archipelago with the case o f East Timor. A holistic view o f this phenomenon
is offered in Graham E. Fuller, “Redrawing the World’s Borders,” World Policy Journal 14, no. 1 (Spring
1997), 11-21. In the African context, see also Ali Mazrui, “The bondage o f boundaries,” The Economist,
11 September 1993,28-30.
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or when there were more organizations operating beyond these established norms and
standards.”97
Moreover, as Williams and Savona note, uneven criminal justice and law
enforcement capabilities among nation-states mean that degrees of risk vary considerably
according to the location of the organization and its associated jurisdiction.
Consequently, transnational criminal organizations tend to have operational bases in
areas where risks are low and to engage in providing illicit goods and services to markets
where the profits are very high.98
Furthermore, smuggling actors have shown a marked willingness to exploit any
areas of potential vulnerability, and, in keeping with the principle that such activity
opportunistically follows the path of least resistance, will continue to do so in the future.
Taking this idea further and underlining the symbiosis between smuggling actor and
nation-state, Andreas posits that, “Just as some countries and regions have a special niche
in legal trade, so too do different countries and regions have a niche in illegal trade. The
industrialized countries dominate legal trade; illegal trade is an area of significant
comparative advantage for many developing countries.”99
Thus, it is hardly surprising that one Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) study
found that, “Crime groups typically target regions experiencing economic or social
97 Leonard Sullivan Jr., Meeting the Challenges o f Regional Security, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. War College, 1994), 1. In support o f this view on a regional scope, see “A goat, a rug,
special price?” The Economist, 3 December 1999, 38-9. Interestingly, the latter article underlines not only
the endemic movem ent o f outright contraband throughout the Middle East but also, and even more

commonly, “everyday household goods subject to high tariffs or stiff regulation” on the part o f various
national governments.
98 Williams and Savona, 5.
99 Andreas, 78. While is demonstrable across a wide range o f issue areas, in the context o f drugs this study
will elaborate further on the issue o f heroin production. However, another excellent example o f a regional
specialization can be found in the competitive advantage o f the Andean countries o f South America with
respect to cocaine, certain aspects o f which will be addressed in Chapter VI.
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turmoil to take advantage of burgeoning black markets for consumer and other goods.”100
With respect to the economic turmoil, Morrison also notes the impact of insecure
commodities markets or transitional economies, whereby disruptions or fluctuations of
the market for a commodity on which a nation or region depends, or movement from
centralized to market control of economies, can serve to stimulate smuggling activity.101
In its more extreme forms, such organized criminal activity can even undermine
the very fabric of national institutions and control of territory, albeit most often when
other pressures are already extant. With particular reference to the focus of this study,
Stares notes that, “Not only does drug traffickers’ presence and behavior undermine the
authority of government, but in some cases they prevent it from being properly
established. The vital process of nation building becomes stalled, if not derailed, in the
process.”

102

In this respect, states that have failed or are in the process of failing can be

seen as particularly at risk.
Expanding on this dimension, Larry Goodsen makes the added distinction
between developed and developing states, with the former influenced by the forces of
integration and the latter by those of fragmentation. Under this conceptualization, the ex100 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), “International Organized
Crime and Cargo Theft,” CNC 99-10007D (Washington, DC: CNC, December 1999), iii. See also “War
and money: The business o f conflict,” The Economist (web edition), 4 March 2000, which notes the
prevalence o f such profiteering, as well as the economic incentives paradoxically imparted by efforts at
imposing international sanctions.
101 Morrison, 5-6
102 See Stares, 97. However, even among more developed nations, there is a growing awareness o f the
seriousness o f this issue. At a recent symposium on NATO and European security, the narcotics and
organized crime issue figured prominently in the discussion o f future threats. Winston W iley, Associate

Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “Transnational Threats to NATO in 2010,”
presented at 1998 European Symposium, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 10-11 February
1998. Moreover, the issue o f the increasing power and influence o f criminal organizations over the
political and economic structure o f nation-sates is also worrisome, particularly in a scenario where such
countries become safe havens where criminals can operate with virtual impunity, protected by the concept
o f sovereignty under international law. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat
Assessment, Ch. IV, 4-5.
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Communist and newly industrialized states are being pulled in both directions
simultaneously. In this light, he notes that, “It is not just a question of whether
governments hold onto their territory, but whether governments increasingly become
meaningless or at least less meaningful actors within their society, and which factors
constrain their sovereignty.”103 Along these lines, H. Richard Friman also posits a direct
linkage between a state’s territorial integrity and potential involvement in smuggling.104
As such, various types of vulnerable areas, or “interspaces,” exist within the
international system that are highly susceptible to smuggling, as well as other criminal
activity, since monitoring and enforcement assets dedicated to these places are notably
lacking. Major types of interspaces would include extended and unprotected national
land and water borders, the territories of failed or failing states, and the high seas.105
Within the context of the international system, the phenomenon of states that, for a

103 Larry Goodsen, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics and the Rise o f the Taliban
(Seattle: University o f Washington Press, 2001), 185. The author also includes a table o f variables,
including the geostrategic position o f the state in question, the economic well-being o f the society, the
strength o f state institutions, and the stability o f the population, with respect to hypothesized impacts on
state failure. Incidentally, these variables roughly parallel the aspects o f physical, economic, political and
human geography put forth in this study. Another depiction o f a world divided into three discrete groups
can be found in Jeffrey Sachs, “A new map o f the world,” The Economist, 24 July 2000, 81-3. Here, the
distinction is made between the technology innovators, the technology adapters and the technology
excluded. In general, this framework appears much more optimistic in its underlying assumption that
technology can be a panacea for development.
104 H. Richard Friman, “Just Passing Through: Transit States and the Dynamics o f Illicit Shipment,”
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 73.
105 The concept o f these “interspaces” is put forth admirably, though primarily with respect to the maritime
context, by Kevin Burke, “Waterway and Port Security,” Proceedings o f the Marine Safely Council 56, no.
4 (October -December 1999), 61-2. While somewhat beyond the scope o f this study, a related discussion
o f the analogous case both on the high seas and along littoral areas where piracy flourishes can be found in
“Those in peril on the sea,” The Economist (web edition), 9 August 1997. For a land-based example o f this
phenomenon, see Ian Fisher, “Somali Business Stunted By Too-Free Enterprise,” New York Times (web
edition), 10 August 2000. Moreover, Bunker and Sullivan, 56, also note the sub-national aspects o f this
phenomenon, even down to the neighborhood level, where residents are place at risk by breakdowns in
public safety, endemic violence and inter-gang warfare, with the resulting “failed community” being the
local analogue o f the failed state.
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variety of reasons, are unable or unable to control their borders is crucial to the ability of
the smuggling actor to flourish.106
In the post-Cold War era of global economic integration, a definite bifurcation
exists between the imperatives of opening borders to commerce and limiting the direct
economic roles of states on the one hand, and of controlling prohibited types cross-border
transactions. As Andreas notes, “The regulation and monitoring of cross-border flows is
■I f\n

central to the modem state’s claims of territorial sovereignty.”

While the industrially

developed countries may be relatively better able to deal with the pressures inherent to
this issue area, nation-states as a class may be seen as ceding a certain degree of
sovereignty almost by default, as it is nearly impossible for even the most to even
monitor all such activity.
In most cases, a wide range of law enforcement entities may be seen as having a
role in enforcing national laws and international agreements with respect to border
control. However, as a segue into the next section, a discussion of the singular role of
customs administrations as the most salient concrete interface with respect to this issue
area is in order. As the primary organizations charged with regulating legitimate crossborder commercial activity, customs administrations throughout the world are at the
forefront of the nation-states efforts to counter smuggling activity.
Unlike other government organizations, customs administrations are neither
wholly domestically nor internationally focused, but rather charged looking both inward

106 In a holistic sense, this is a major component o f the thesis put forth by Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming
Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly, 273, no. 2 (February 1994), 44-6, 48, and expanded further in To the Ends
o f the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers o f Anarchy (New York: Vintage, 1996), and The Coming Anarchy:
Shattering the Dreams o f the P ost Cold War (New York: Vintage Books, 2000).
107 Andreas, 75.
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and outward simultaneously. As Lane notes, “Customs organizations throughout the
world hold a unique position within a country’s government and within the international
community. Protection of a nation’s borders, collection of duties and taxes, and the
operation of a customs administration are uniquely sovereign responsibilities”108
The challenges faced by customs administrations are abundantly clear, and
growing more complex. For instance, as Lane continues by pointing out, “Transnational
criminal trafficking in weapons, munitions, and drugs is familiar to all customs
organizations. Today, transnational criminal organizations are adding money laundering,
fraud, child pornography, environmental crimes, and terrorism to the list of traditional
customs violations.”109 In the wake of 9/11, the last of these in particular has taken on a
particularly heightened urgency.
The range of responses to smuggling on the part of customs organizations
includes the monitoring of shipments, country of origin certification and various other
forms of administrative controls.110 Flowever, worldwide these entities are subject to a
fundamental paradox, specifically that of balancing the demand for speedier, cheaper and
less intrusive clearance of goods and people with the need for more effective law
enforcement, regulation and compliance assurance. Furthermore, these conflicting
imperatives must be addressed as the volume of trade continues to increase across the
global economy,

108 Lane, 4, 16. For more on this topic with respect to the E.U, see also “Anything to declare?” The
Economist, 21 September 2002, 52-3.
109 Lane, 101.
110 These responses on the part o f the nation-state are addressed more extensively in Friman, “Just Passing
Through,” 66-8.
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Despite the mixed success of customs organizations in meeting these challenges,
risk mitigation measures taken by smuggling measures are increasingly prevalent. For
instance, as Morrison notes, “transit points may increasingly be chosen, not for the
protection that internal chaos or corruption provides, but because they have no known
involvement in the illicit trade in drugs and therefore less likely to arouse the suspicion of
Customs Services.”111 Furthermore, while customs operations are greatly enhanced by
new technology and the application of data analysis techniques, as discussed in the
previous section smugglers are also growing more sophisticated, employing much of the
same, and sometimes better, technology in more innovative ways.112 Such criminal
groups are also able to leverage a wide range of talent in support of their operations.113
The resultant pressures of sustaining legitimate economic activity while at the
same time controlling black market transactions is the key challenge facing nation-states
and their agents. From just a cursory survey, it is obvious that even the most effective of
organizations cannot cover every point of entry, particularly when unofficial means of

111 Morrison, 9. Furthermore, adding to the inherent obstacles to effective control o f borders, the author
also points out that in many cases the only information that custom’s services will have available relates to
a given shipment’s last port o f call.
112 Lane, 117. A recent CIA report also notes that international organized crime groups appear quite able to
tap into information-sharing networks related to transportation as necessary to carry out their activities.
U.S. CIA, CNC, “International Organized Crime and Cargo Theft,” iii.
113 According to U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 5,
“Globalization has bred a more professional criminal element. International criminals make use o f the
latest commercial and technological developments to expand and improve the efficiency o f their
operations, and they have the financial resources to obtain whatever access, know-how, and technology

they may need or desire. Many criminal groups employ individuals with specific access to facilitate their
operations. As a result, they are able to quickly identify and adapt to market conditions.” In particular,
“Major drug smuggling and other international criminal groups use transportation specialists and legal
experts to research commercial flows and learn about tariff laws and administrative procedures in the
world’s major commercial ports. With such information, they are able to exploit international air, sea, and
land shipping to move drugs, arms, other contraband, illegal aliens, and even money past law enforcement
and customs.”
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access are added to official ones.114 Consequently, the gap between custom’s resources
and missions will continue to widen for all nation-states.
Even within these constraints, at any given border crossing security measures
represent the effort to balance expedience and efficiency with respect to both economic
and security considerations. However, “perfect” security would virtually eliminate or at
least irrevocably delay most legitimate transnational commercial activity as well.115
While the nation-state is not becoming irrelevant by any means, it has rather been given
the choice of participating in and shaping the process of globalization, or fighting what
appears to be a losing battle against market forces.
In many ways, smuggling graphically illustrates the divergence between the
interests of state and those of non-state actors. With respect to international borders,
smuggling route selection follows the path of least resistance by capitalizing on various
political factors such as corruption, internal stability, external conflict and economic
policies, which serve to increase the vulnerability of a given country to such activity.
Conversely, from the smuggler’s point of view, a primary source of operational risk
comes from the efforts of nation-states to stem the flow of contraband. It is the

114 This issue is not only outlined well but also constructively engaged by Colin Vassarotti, National
Director, Office o f Business Systems, Australian Customs Service, “Customs 2000: Risk Analysis in the
N ew Millennium,” presented at Risk Management in the New Millennium Conference, Stockholm, Sweden,
1-3 December 1999. Interestingly, a reverse engineering o f the proposed customs risk management process
may serve to highlight areas o f potential criminal exploitation. This topic will be addressed further in
Chapter IV.
115 At present, m ost customs organizations’ levels o f scrutiny seldom make this an issue. For instance, in

the United States, which may be expected to have one o f the highest inspection rates given the scope o f its
resources, less than 2% o f import and 1% o f export cargo using the maritime mode o f transportation is
physically inspected. U.S. Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (ICCSS),
Report o f the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, Fall 2000, 87, available at
http://www.securitvmanagement.com/librarv/seaport 1200.pdf. accessed 15 July 2004. However, in the
wake o f 9/11 this issue has taken on an even more pressing aspect and it is reasonable to expect inspection
rates to rise.
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mechanics of this flow, and its supporting logistical networks, that constitute the focus of
the next section.

Potential Modes o f Transnational Smuggling
The transnational movement of both goods and people is obviously an integral
function of the world economy. In particular, the transshipment of both licit and illicit
commodities continues to become increasingly cheaper and easier. The growth of
international trade, as noted above, has also resulted in a correspondingly enhanced
window of opportunity for transnational smuggling. In this context, criminal elements
vie for operational access to various forms of transnational logistical networks, while
nation-states attempt to impose risk upon such activities. The resultant equilibrium
between access and risk is manifest in the potential modes of transportation, which in the
generic smuggling model is captured as connectivity via the path of least resistance.
Up to this point, the approach to these issues has been largely theoretical in
nature, focusing on the concept of smuggling rather than its more concrete physical
manifestations. While the case studies further illustrate how theory becomes practice,
this section serves to delineate the various modes of transportation available to smuggling
actors, namely by land, by water, and by air, as well as the interaction between licit and
illicit uses of these commercial channels.116 Moreover, an additional dimension of

116 Paralleling his taxonomy with respect to the development o f trade centers, Van Cleef, 6-15, also
delineates modes o f transportation in a similar manner. However, given the date o f publication (1937), the
analysis o f air routes is understandably the least developed among the three modes.
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modem logistics is the intermodal connectivity that serves to link these networks into a
seamless whole.117
Before moving on to a direct consideration of these transnational logistical
linkages, however, it is necessary to introduce a third major set of actors into the calculus
of smuggling, along with smuggling actors and nation-states, namely those within the
private sector. In particular, the cross-border activities of commercial entities are often
the subject of the nation-state’s scrutiny, generally via customs administrations as noted
in the previous section and largely with respect to the subversion of legitimate transport
networks for criminal ends. As an example, Petrus C. Van Duyne and Michael Levi
point out that the transport business is frequently targeted by TCOs and often bears the
stigma of being highly vulnerable to such infiltration.118
As Andreas notes, “while the methods of smuggling are as diverse as the
commodity being smuggled, most smuggling parallels the methods and routes of legal
commerce.”119 In general, commercial transportation appears to lend itself more readily
to the movement of large amounts of contraband. By contrast, the smuggling of smaller

117 For an overview o f trade globalization from the logistical perspective, to include discussion of
intermodality, see “Delivering the goods,” The Economist (web edition), 15 November 1997. As noted in
U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 2, “The advent o f
intermodal commercial shipping - including standardized cargo containers, computerized cargo tracking,
and automated cargo-transfer equipment - enables shippers to securely and efficiently transfer containers
delivered by sea to other ships for onward shipment or to commercial railroads and trucks for overland
transportation. Criminals are able to exploit the complexity o f the intermodal system to hide drugs or other
contraband or to conceal the true origin and ownership o f [the] cargo within which the contraband is
hidden.” These trends and their impact on the various modes o f transportation will be discussed at greater
length below .

118 See Petrus C. Van Duyne and Michael Levi, “Criminal Financial Investigation: A Strategic and Tactical
Approach at a European Level,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 50-2.
Furthermore, with specific reference to the maritime context but applicable across all transportation sectors,
U.S. DOT, Office o f Intelligence and Security, Port Security: A National Planning Guide (Washington,
DC: DOT, 1997), 11, available at http://www.uscg.mil/hQ/g-m/nmc/securitv/portDlan.htm. accessed 15 July
2004, notes that “Smugglers are utilizing front companies or exploiting legitimate shippers in the process.”
119 Andreas, 80.
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amounts of contraband becomes more attractive as the value of the contraband increases
in relation to its volume.
Legitimate trading activity also tends to be concentrated through official border
crossings such as road and rail checkpoints, seaports and airports, while non-commercial
border crossings tends to be more dispersed and may not necessarily utilize the same
points of access. However, such movement of both people and goods certainly constitute
viable and parallel windows of opportunity to smugglers, and will be discussed as they
arise in relation to the potential methods of smuggling by land, water and air, and in the
context of the case studies. If relatively less attention is paid at this point to such private
activity, it is not because it is less important as a phenomenon, but rather because it is
more difficult to meaningfully assess than analogous commercial activity.
With regard to the flow of international trade, the following passage outlines the
tensions between the private sector and national governments that naturally arise from
their divergent interests:
The . . . private sector typically considers maintaining the unimpeded flow of
cargo to be paramount and expects government law enforcement agencies to
assert the principle [sic] role in countering criminal exploitation of the
transportation system. Governments, on the other hand, increasingly expect the
commercial industry to assume more responsibility for preventing crimes against
their transportation and logistic systems, particularly in such crimes as cargo theft.
Governments also expect companies to cooperate with law enforcement agencies
to prevent such crimes as drug smuggling in commercial cargo, which serves the
public interest, and to comply with governmental efforts to collect revenues from
international trade and protect the integrity of its borders from transnational

120 U.S. DOT, Maritime Administration (MARAD), “OAS Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on Port
Security: A Multilateral Initiative to Develop a Common Strategy to Devise Basic Guidelines and
Minimum Standards to Improve Port Security in the Western Hemisphere,” Maritime Security Report (May
2000), 7. Similarly, “A government-only approach [to transportation security] depends on regulatory and
law enforcement capabilities and mechanisms . . . However, criminal exploitation o f commercial industries
manifests in illicit enterprises which victimize or mimic legitimate business activities. In the absence o f
industry involvement, these circumstances tend to place government in an adversarial position with the
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Despite their differing agendas vis-a-vis nation-states, the private sector has a
considerable ability to influence the transnational flow of contraband. Moreover, it
appears self-evident that smuggling issues cannot be meaningfully addressed without the
cooperation of commercial actors.
For the nation-state, the challenge lies in convincing firms involved in
transportation and logistics that their interests lie in embracing measures to counter
smuggling. These include, but are not limited to, enhanced safety considerations, a
concern for public image, and the desire to mitigate operational losses arising from
criminal activities. Furthermore, knowing that they can be threatened with substantial
fines or prison terms, and that their assets can be seized as well, provides addition
incentives for owners and operators involved in shipping to maintain vigilance and avoid
any directly involvement in illegal activity.121
For instance, various efforts on the part of U.S. Customs to work more closely
with shippers are predicated on the latter’s agreement to enhance security measures and

private sector, which may [work to the] advantage o f organized crime.” U.S. DOT, MARAD, “The U.S.
International Crime Control Strategy - A Foundation for Substantially Improving the Security o f
International Maritime Trade Corridors and Reducing Cargo Crime,” Maritime Security Report (October
1998), 7. More concisely, Lane notes that, “As a result o f its history as a protectionist organization and a
barrier to trade, customs’ relationship with the international trade community has often been acrimonious
and adversarial.” Lane, 96.
121 Within this context, the issue o f bribery as a business practice is particularly salient. Despite being
common worldwide, U.S.-based firms and any foreign companies either registered in the U.S. or quoted on
one o f its stock exchanges are legally constrained by the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which bans
the bribery o f foreign government officials. For an overview o f this legislation’s genesis, see John T.
Noonan, Jr., Bribes (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 676-80. Another important multilateral initiative within
this issue area, adopted in Novem ber 1997, is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), “Convention o f Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions,
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/gov/2001/eng/091801 .htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
Furthermore, as o f early 2001, British legislation paralleling that o f the U.S. was also under discussion. For
discussion o f the competitive advantage offered by a lack o f such controls on bribery, see also John J.
Fialka, War By Other Means (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 94-5; Julie B. Nesbit, “Transnational
bribery o f foreign officials: a new threat to democracy,” Vanderbilt Journal o f Transnational Law 31, no. 5
(November 1998), 1273-91; and “The short arm o f the law,” The Economist, 2 March 2002, 63-5.
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the exchange of information, while in return the government will in most cases reduce or
dismiss fines for involvement in smuggling that can range into the millions of dollars.
However, more can be done to encourage these “best practices” among such commercial
actors.122 Furthermore, other private sector entities such as insurance companies also
have a concrete economic interest in exerting their available leverage to meaningfully
address the nexus of smuggling activity.
At this juncture it is necessary to turn to a more direct discussion of the relevant
logistical networks. Overall, decision-making processes related to connectivity represent
a key component in the movement of both legitimate goods and contraband. As such, a
number of principles can be applied to the analysis of the supporting logistical networks.
Within the field of geography, there is “friction of distance” concept. Similarly, from the
business perspective, “least-cost routing” comes into play, as well as the avoidance of
“detour costs.” However, none of these concepts fully take into account the nature of the
risk imposed by the nation-state on black market logistics, which may be considered as
resistance if the analogy of electricity is used.

122 Illustrative o f the range o f these efforts to facilitate government-private sector cooperation in the U.S.,
programs such as the Carrier Initiative Program (CIP), the Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), the
Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), and, most recently, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) and Container Security Initiative (CSI) have been instituted, all operating under the
auspices o f the USCS. See also Stephen E. Flynn, “Globalization and the Future o f Border Control,”
Council on Foreign Relations Online Study Group, 11 January 2000, which makes the case for expanding
these types o f programs. Shipping industry best practices are also outlined at length in U.S. DOT, National
Science and Technology Council, Office o f Science and Technology Policy, Intermodal Cargo
Transportation: Industry B est Security P ractices, (Washington, DC: John A. Volpe National

Transportation Systems Center, 1999); and Lou Tyska, ed., Guidelines fo r Cargo Security and Loss
Control (Annapolis, MD: National Cargo Security Council, n.d.). See also Michael Fabey, “Drug Transit
Zone: Carriers, shippers beef up security as GAO reports U.S. falling short in war on drug traffic,” Traffic
World, 16 March 1998, 44. Moreover, various proposals to merge the U.S. Customs Service, once part o f
the Department o f the Treasury, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, previously a component
o f the Department o f Justice, and perhaps elements o f other agencies, all under the auspices o f the newlyformed Department o f Homeland Defense, recently culminated in a reorganization along these lines.
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To begin with, in the case of transnational smuggling there will always be at a
minimum both a source country and an arrival country, with a transit zone that
encompasses at least one international border. The diagram below represents the notional
movement of smuggled commodities from the contraband’s source into a given arrival
country, via the potential types of official and unofficial land, water and air portals
available for entry:123
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Fig. 5. Potential modes of transnational smuggling

As discussed in the previous section, in spatial terms smuggling actors are able to
exploit areas where nation-states are unable or unwilling to exercise authority and to
subvert the agents of the nation-state either directly or indirectly. Thus, in deciding
123 The arrows representing these notional smuggling routes are further conceptualized as smuggling
vectors in Chapter IV.
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where, when and how such shipments will be made, the smuggler is able to exploit gaps
in national border controls and to largely determine the character of illicit trade. This is
in sharp contrast to the various and largely reactive efforts of nation-states to thwart such
transactions. Whereas the nation-state must be strong everywhere at all times, or at a
minimum extremely well informed and coordinated, the smuggler must only succeed in
the instance of the given smuggling event.
TCOs are demonstrably able to reach into the various mechanisms of the
legitimate global trading system in ways that nation-states find difficult to counter. The
readily available range of contraband that can be found the world over is a measure the
latter’s overall operational success. In the smuggling context it is not the most direct
route that prevails, but rather the path of least resistance between areas of supply and
demand. As Clawson and Lee note, the improvement and diversification of routes and
methods is an important way for smugglers to increase their profits, which leads directly
to the key issue of transshipment.124
Transshipment refers specifically to the shipment of goods via a third party en
route to a final destination. Although this practice can be either licit or illicit, in moving
contraband shippers often seek to evade various types of trade restrictions by indirectly
shipping contraband in order to either hide the activity entirely or otherwise disguise its
point of origin. Efforts at outright concealment of such activity in toto most commonly
take place in the context of prohibition regimes, while the evasion of sanctions,

124 Clawson and Lee, 11. The authors continue by pointing out that, using cocaine as an example, “the
sheer diversity o f vehicles that modem smugglers use to move bulk cocaine - cargo jets, merchant
shipping, tractor trailers, camouflaged small boats, and even (as in the case o f Colombia) specially
produced submersible vessels - represents a daunting challenge to law enforcement officials.”
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embargoes, or quantitative restrictions more often motivate smuggling of otherwise licitly
traded products.
As Friman notes, “Despite this longstanding dynamic, the challenge of the transit
trade remains severely understudied by the prominent literature on the political economy
of trade. Moreover, although the practice of transit trade is often noted in the literature
on transnational crime under the broad category of ‘smuggling,’ the nature and dynamics
of ‘intermediate countries’ remains largely unexplored.”126 As trends relating to
globalization accelerate, determining the origins of international cargoes will continue to
become more difficult, particularly when smuggling actors have a definite interest in
camouflaging the country of origin for a particular shipment.

1 77

When only two nation-states are involved, the literature on interdependence
suggests that economic linkages between them would tend to increase the opportunities
for smuggling by offering a broader flow of goods within which illicit commodities can
•

also be shipped.

10S

Lupshka also observes that, “Organized crime has always prospered

where international boundaries meet, but any nation whose standard of living is higher
than its neighbors must recognize this threat. In any border or port situation where
economic inequities at the point of entry or the adjacent countries are extreme . . . one has
a natural incubator in which transnational organized crime can grow and prosper.”129
This tendency is also accelerated when border restrictions are minimized or eliminated.

125 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 66.
126 Ibid., 65.
127 See Morrison, 5, 10-4.
128 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 70.
129 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 27.
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Observing that traditional geopolitical arguments stress the impact of land and sea
access, Friman continues by pointing out that, “Extending this focus to the analysis of
transshipment suggests the importance of location dynamics. Those countries that border
the target - especially those that serve as coastal access points for a landlocked target - or
those countries located in the target’s access region would appear to be prime candidates
for transit points due primarily to the relatively low cost of transporting goods from
transit to target state.” However, as the number of transshipment countries increases,
“All things being equal, exporters are likely to seek transit points close to the target.” As
such, the extent of restrictions on such countries as well as other factors facilitating
access are likely to decrease the importance of location dynamics.130
In the case of routing through multiple countries, a high level of international
coordination on the part of nation-states must be achieved to successfully interdict
contraband.

1 T1

At present, however, such cooperation is the exception rather than the

rule. From the smugglers’ perspective, the task is relatively more straightforward: “To
smuggle . . . via a third country requires the smuggling organization to establish reliable
transfer points within the in-transit countries, as well as the source country. This involves
subverting the law enforcement establishment and corrupting other parts of the
government and citizenry.”132 As noted above, such opportunities for corruption are
never entirely absent.

130 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 69. Furthermore, the nature o f the good being shipped can also have
an impact, with the bulkier the good and the lower its price by volume, the greater the importance o f
geographic proximity in this respect.
131 As noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 18,
“Routing contraband through a transit country helps to conceal the true country o f origin on merchandise
that is controlled or restricted by the importing country.”
132 U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 18.
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For any given country, Friman posits that its potential as a transit state is a dual
function of openness to transit and access to target, with the former focusing on the
source country and the latter on the final destination. In this conceptualization, openness
to transit can be defined as the extent to which exporters are able to obtain passage
through the potential transit state, while access to target refers to the extent to which the
potential transit state can gain entry to the intended final market sought by the exporter.
The benefits to the transit state from choosing to engage in illicit transshipment include
accelerated revenue and employment gains as well as access to distribution networks and,
in come cases, technology. However, there can also be significant economic, political
and social costs associated with allowing illicit transshipment to flourish.133
Overall, concealment of smuggled goods in commercial cargo is quite common,
particularly with respect to the movement of contraband in large volumes. Most often,
such activity is facilitated either by physical concealment of the illicit goods or by a
fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts.134 In terms of the actual methods of physical
concealment involved in transnational smuggling, the variation is literally bounded only
by the imagination, an issue that is discussed further in the context of drugs in the next
chapter.135 However, a similar function is served by altering shipping documents at

133 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 68-74.
134 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 18. While the concept
o f physical concealment is relatively straightforward, the mechanics o f fraud are more opaque. The

primary methods involved are false invoicing, and the over or under valuation o f smuggled goods. While
the under valuation o f goods allows smugglers to avoid tariffs or excise taxes, overvaluation is used either
to disguise the true identity o f the item or to launder illicitly derived proceeds.
135 For instance, as Andreas points out, “Literally anything that crosses a national border can be used for
smuggling, ranging from the most common and conventional (such as car trunks and luggage) to the most
desperate and dangerous (human ingestion) to the most ingenious (stuffing cocaine into jalapeno peppers)
to the most unstoppable (the airwaves).” Andreas, 80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

intermediate transshipment points and using counterfeit customs seals to avoid inspection
and thus facilitate the passage of illicit shipments through any inspection process.

1^

Moreover, by their nature nearly all smuggling events involve both a specific
buyer and seller, with any transfers of control along the way made by some sort of
intermediary agents except in the case of a direct exchange. In general, illegal
transactions utilizing commercial logistical channels can be categorized as either
consignee shipments, in which contraband is actually delivered to the nominal recipient
or some other intended agent, or internal conspiracies, in which contraband is removed at
some intermediary point in the transportation process.
To clarify further, a consignee shipment of contraband travels though the
logistical system to its intended destination precisely as if it were licit cargo. Consignee
shipments may also fall under the heading of “deep concealment,” with the emphasis
being on avoidance of detection all along the route via camouflaging the smuggling
activity as legitimate. Those involved in such transactions may be either witting or
unwitting of the criminal activity in question, and involvement could include anyone with
the ability to control the transaction in question, from crew to cargo handler to freight
forwarder to shipping agent.

136 The range o f recent documented drug smuggling methods is discussed in U.S. DOJ, DEA, National
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report 1997: The Supply o f Illicit Drugs to the United States
(November 1998), 6, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agencv/doi/dea/product/nnicc97.htm. accessed 15

July 2004. Incidentally, this report is also commonly referred to as the NNICC. Furthermore, as noted in
U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 18, “Most contraband
smuggling is facilitated by physical concealment o f the illicit goods or by a fraudulent misrepresentation o f
the facts.” While the concept o f physical concealment is relatively straightforward, the mechanics o f fraud
are more opaque. The primary methods involved are false invoicing, and the over or under valuation o f
smuggled goods. While the under valuation o f goods allows smugglers to avoid tariffs or excise taxes,
overvaluation is used either to disguise the true identity o f the item or to launder illicitly derived proceeds.
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Though more specifically dependent on physical access to the shipment in transit,
internal conspiracies in particular raise the issue of corruption and its variants, both
directly in the case of the commercial entities and more indirectly within the public sector
as noted previously. In particular, the insertion and extraction of contraband into
otherwise legitimate cargo or otherwise concealed in the conveyance itself can take place
at any point along the cargo handling process.
Involvement in this type of smuggling activity would not necessarily be limited to
cargo handling personnel but could encompass the involvement of the transiting vessel’s
crewmembers as well. Unsupervised access to the cargo is crucial for the success of this
type of activity, also known as “rip-and-run,” with the alternate label basically outlining
the most common modus operandi. An interesting composite case occurs when there is a
passenger-crew conspiracy in the passenger transportation setting.
The nature o f the shipment itself also serves to determine the parameters for
smuggling activity. Within the cargo sector, the most prominent types of operations
include bulk, break bulk and containerized shipping activities. Bulk cargo refers to the
movement of material that is generally without form or shape that tends to be moved in
large quantities and handled by scooping or pumping. By contrast, break bulk usually
refers to mixed types of cargoes that may be divided up into smaller parcels at some point
in the logistical process, as with a load of boxed goods where certain numbers of boxes
will be sent to different destinations. However, in terms of the international movement of
cargo containerization has increasingly become the standard method of shipment.
The standard cargo container is the TEU, or twenty-ton equivalent unit. First
used by the military, their commercial usage expanded in the mid-1960s due to greater
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operating efficiency.

1T7

Not only can the space within the container be overtly used to

move contraband, but either the structure of the container itself or otherwise legitimate
cargo within can serve as concealment. The ability of nation-states to effectively screen
containers in a timely manner is one of the major challenges facing customs services
worldwide.138
However, this is not to say that other types of cargo do not offer significant
smuggling potential. For instance, with respect to break bulk cargoes which may or may
not be containerized, contraband can be concealed both within the diversity of goods or
even inside modified pallets. However, liquid and solid bulk cargoes appear to offer a
relatively narrower scope for direct smuggling activity. Finally, other types of cargo,
such as perishable cargo that must move through customs rapidly in order to remain
commercially viable, or hazardous material that may not be scrutinized as heavily as
other cargoes due to safely considerations, may also serve to reduce the odds that any
contraband concealed within will be detected.
Furthermore, in all types of conveyances, land, water and air, smuggled goods
may be secreted within the structure of the vehicle, vessel or plane itself.139 As noted

137 Henry I. DeGeneste and John P. Sullivan, Policing Transportation Facilities (Springfield, IL: Charles
Thomas, 1994.), 40-1. For more on the efficiencies offered by containerized cargo, see also “Bobbing
bytes,” The Economist (web edition), 23 May 1998.
138 Although this issue will be address further below, it has become increasingly more salient in the wake o f
9/11 and subsequent threats involving the smuggling o f weapons o f mass destruction. See “When trade and
security clash,” The Economist, 6 April 2002, 59-62
139 The multinational character o f certain forms o f conveyance further increases the difficulty o f even
tracking potential contraband. Registration o f oceangoing vessels in particular tends to flow to flags o f

convenience. At present, for instance, Panama and Liberia have the biggest fleets in the world, accounting
for about a quarter o f total global tonnage. It is not at all out o f the ordinary to have a vessel owned by
nationals o f one country, registered in a second, served by a crew o f diverse citizenship and carrying cargo
with its own complicated provenance. See “Shipping: Follow the flag o f convenience,” The Economist
(web edition), 22 February 1997; and, for more on international pressure to reform this often chaotic
system in the current climate o f heightened security concerns, see also “Brassed off,” The Economist, 18
May 2002, 65.
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above, economic imperatives require that loading and unloading be done as quickly as
possible, a goal that can interfere with contraband detection countermeasures. As the
spatial nature of these conveyances is essentially transitory, this dimension is easily
underestimated. Considering the complex structure of and the resultant number of
potential hiding places within an international airliner or an oceangoing vessel,
enforcement efforts may be even further hampered.
The various private and public sector personnel involved in the transportation
process similarly have a potential involvement in smuggling, in various capacities to
differing degrees. The key here, as noted with respect to the various forms of
concealment, lies in access to the place of concealment. With respect to a given
conveyance, most opportunities for smuggling are predicted upon access to the place of
concealment, as with the crew or some non-crew conspirator with a legitimate reason for
boarding.
In cases where contraband is secreted within cargo, workers directly involved in
cargo handling such as drivers or loading operators have considerable latitude to
potentially either remove, reroute or otherwise facilitate its movement. Furthermore,
customs personnel or other on-site law enforcement authorities may at a minimum also
be subverted to the extent of overlooking certain shipments, if not actually involved in
such activity directly.
Moreover, in conveyances relating to tourism or other forms of mass
transportation across borders, often passengers as well as crew serve to actually move the
contraband in question. This would include such phenomena as transfer via body
carrying, to include the physical swallowing of high value items such as drugs or
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gemstones, as well as illegal goods secreted in clothes or luggage, a subject that is
discussed at further length in the next chapter with respect to drugs. Finally, the various
types of body carrying of contraband, as well as its concealment within both cargoes and
conveyances, find parallels in the non-commercial sector, with luggage often serving as
the functional analogue for cargo.
Of the three primary sets of logistical modes, land modes may be considered the
most static. Land-based logistical networks tend to involve the most capital investment,
generally on the part of the nation-state or some other public entity. As such, these actors
are generally responsible for the supporting infrastructure, such as highways, bridges and
rail lines, and hold key decision-making for both improvement and new projects, which
may in turn have an enormous impact on both legitimate and illicit trade flows.
In general, land border crossings occur via primary road and rail lines, along
secondary routes that may or may not be monitored, or overland.140 The levels of
scrutiny involved at these border crossings understandably vary by the volume and type
of traffic, the amount of resources allocated to border control by the nation-state at any

140 Though not common, underground transportation does exist in both overt and covert forms. The most
salient international underground conduit is the Channel Tunnel linking the United Kingdom to the
European continent. As noted in Martin Booth, Opium: A History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996),
322, shortly after its opening British authorities were making almost daily heroin seizures along this
conduit. However, more informal efforts also exist, particularly across the southwest border o f the United
States. As noted in U.S. DOJ, Bureau o f Justice Statistics, Office o f Justice Programs, Drugs, Crime, and
the Justice System: A National Report, NCJ-133652 (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1992), 44, more than a
ton o f drugs was moved through a concrete-reinforced tunnel linking a house in Agua Prieta, Mexico, to a
warehouse in Douglas, Arizona. While the tunnel itself was five feet high, four feet wide and thirty feet
under ground, the house itself had a system o f hydraulic jacks to actually raise and lower the floor at the

entrance to the tunnel. Another makeshift tunnel was found linking the border towns o f Nogales, Mexico
and Nogales, Arizona, used by drug smugglers to move both cocaine and marijuana have also been
detected. See Michael Janofsky, “Drug Runners’ Tunnels Test the Agents in a Border Town,” New York
Times (web edition), 1 March 2001. Even more recently, a tunnel found in Tierra Del Sol, California,
across the U.S.-Mexican border, served for several years as a conduit for a significant amount o f
contraband. Kevin Sullivan, ‘“ Billions’ Worth o f Drugs Entered U.S. by Tunnel,” Washington Post, I
March 2002, A -1,22.
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given access point, and by the efficiency of the relevant customs institutions and
mechanisms.
However, it should be kept in mind that, in addition to rail cars and various types
of motor carriers, in many parts of the world the movement of contraband involves
transportation by either human or animal means. While some of this latter type of
activity may be undertaken commercially, much of it is private, particularly in parts of
the world where borders are particularly porous, extended or otherwise unprotected.
The various dynamics discussed previously are captured in the following diagram, which
illustrates the basic parameters of smuggling by land:
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Fig. 6. Potential smuggling methods by land

By contrast, water modes of smuggling offer a high degree of flexibility in terms
of cross-border movement, provided the natural features of the country in question are
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suitable. Moreover, as Andreas points out, “Historically, waterways have provided the
primary channel for smuggling.”141 The various types of waterborne modes of transit
may be generally divided into those that utilize oceanic or deep water on the one hand,
and those that utilize both natural and man-made inland waterways.
Generally speaking, oceanic movement may be though of as including both the
open sea and directly adjacent areas, as in the case of cabotage.142 By contrast,
movement via inland waterways may include riverine, interlacustrine and canal modes of
transit. Moreover, while surface methods of delivery are understandably the most
common, the added though relatively uncommon issue of sub-surface smuggling activity
must also be considered.143 Finally, opportunities for smuggling offered by the diversity
among the various types of commercial and private vessels that may be using a given
body of water at any point in time is an issue that nation-states need to take into account.
The following diagram delineates these aspects in further detail:

141 Andreas, 80. Supporting this view, Mandy Bentham notes that during the 1970s and the first half o f the
1980s the vast majority o f marijuana and cocaine, as well as a sizable portion o f heroin, was transported
globally by sea. “Since the transportation o f the illicit drugs occurred along the same routes as legitimate
trade and recreational vessels, efforts at interdiction have had a profound effect on the evolution o f the law
o f the sea, in negotiation during the same period.” Mandy Bentham, The Politics o f Drug Control (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 13. An overview o f common maritime smuggling characteristics can be
found in U.S. Department o f Defense (DoD), Joint Counterdrug Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.4
(Washington, DC: GPO, 17 February 1998), 11-12.
142 This term, though generally referring to domestic coastal trade, has been expanded to include the
movement o f cargo and passengers across international borders where free trade agreements exist or
maritime border controls are minimal. It may also be used in the context o f domestic air transportation.
143 Not all that long ago, given the technical and economic barriers involved, inclusion o f the undersea
mode o f transportation might have been regarded as somewhat tongue-in-cheek. However, in 1997,
Miami-based Russian organized crime elem ents tried unsuccessfully to broker the sale o f a surplus Soviet

Piranha-class sub to transport cocaine from Latin America to the United States. Owen Matthews, “Sex,
Drugs and a Soviet Submarine in the Ports o f Miami,” St. Petersburg (Florida) Times (web edition), 24-30
March 1997. More recently, a partially built submarine o f a relatively high degree o f technological
sophistication was found in the remote Colombian hinterland. Its carrying capacity was estimated at 200
tons. “Submarine found in the Colombian Andes,” CNN.com, 7 September 2000. This article also notes
two previously detected instances o f the use o f “mini-subs,” as well as the refitting o f both used
commercial airliners and oceangoing freighters to smuggle drugs.
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Fig. 7. Potential methods of smuggling by water

To begin with, the interaction between waterborne trade and the supporting
landside seaport infrastructure is readily identifiable in geospatial terms. Seaport
facilities also provide an important interface between separate modes of transportation.
As the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration (MARAD) notes:
International maritime trade corridors consist of three main logistical components
- ports, ocean vessels, and the landside modes of transport. Functioning as
pivotal nodes in a system of trade routes, the seaports provide intermodal
interface to the international maritime shipping cycle . . . Consequently, seaports
and the freight movements through their landside accesses are viewed by cargo
crime groups as marine intermodal choke points of commerce.144
144 U.S. DOT, M ARAD, “The U.S. International Crime Control Strategy,” 5. Further testifying to the

complexity o f the seaport environment, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) concluded
in an internal assessment that its proposals to more effectively manage their efforts to counter illegal
immigration using maritime modes o f transit were not being optimized at present. The reasons for this
include insufficient collection, analysis and sharing o f data; incomplete or inaccurate inspection
information; record keeping that does not lend itself to such analysis; and regulations that do not allow
seaports to share or exchange data easily. See U.S. DOJ, Office o f the Inspector General, “Identifying
Current Challenges To INS’s Plans For Using Risk Management in the Seaport Environment,” 1-2000-015
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Moreover, in addition to cargo operations, seaports also encompass various types of
service vessel activity, such as tugboats, pilots and other working boats, and may
sometimes provide the infrastructure for cruise and other passenger activity, such as
ferries.
As Douglas Keh and Graham Farrell note, “Trends in shipping are significant
because of the impracticality of stopping and investigating all incoming shipments at a
given port.”145 In particular, as volumes of maritime container traffic increase, random
inspections become statistically less likely to detect concealed narcotics shipments. The
review of shipping documentation by customs investigators, though somewhat limited by
high volumes of trade, continue to become an increasingly effective tool. Moreover, such
predictive operational intelligence can provide explicit information usable at the tactical
level.”146
As discussed previously, in addition to any goods it may be carrying, a ship’s
structure itself may conceal a wide range of contraband. This is greatly facilitated by
such factors as the intricate layout of most vessels, which offer numerous concealment
possibilities including not only the various storage spaces on board. Furthermore,
structural modifications to the vessel such as additions to or construction of hidden

(Washington, DC: DOJ, March 2000), available at http ://www.usdoi .go v/oig/insnection/IN S/0015/.
accessed 15 July 2004.

145 Douglas Keh and Graham Farrell, “Trafficking Drugs in the Global Village,” Transnational Organized
Crime 3, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 62.
146 See U.S DOT, MARAD, “Cocaine Smuggling From Bolivia To Atlantic Ports May Exploit Commercial
Trade On Mercosur Hidrovia, Lacking A Waterways Management Strategy,” Maritime Security Report
(October 1997), 3. Similarly, as the DEA observes, “Traffickers continued to use intermodal means o f
transport, frequently concealing larger shipments in commercial maritime containerized or bulk cargo.”
U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 3.
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compartments, most notably within fuel or ballast tanks, have also been detected and are
likely to see continued usage.147
In short, methods of concealment both within cargo and aboard ships are limited
only by the smugglers’ imagination. Making the task of detecting contraband even more
difficult for law enforcement entities comes from the various temporal parameters
imposed by commercial logistics.

For instance, less official scrutiny may be taken in

cases when relatively short times are allotted to offload and take on cargo while in port,
such as with urgent or perishable shipments or when volumes of traffic at the facility are
particularly heavy.
Yet another potential area of smuggling related to seaports lies in tourism. In
particular, as a trend cruise ships are growing increasingly prominent for the smuggling
of contraband. For instance, an industry journal article, quoting an unnamed USCS
official, notes that, “it is clear that both passengers and crew members are smuggling
more drugs via passenger ships.”

i 4o

Given the exponential growth of the cruise industry

and the subsequently more numerous windows of opportunity, this is hardly surprising.
A similar observation could most likely be made regarding commercial land and air
modes of travel where large passenger volumes are involved.

147 B. R. Aune, “Maritime drug trafficking: an underrated problem,” UN. Bulletin on Narcotics 1990 - 1,
no. 7 (1990), 5. Concrete examples o f more recently used methods o f concealment can be found in U.S.
DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 6-7. In a particularly salient example o f structural concealment, it is worth
noting that during the recent seizure o f $23 million in cocaine aboard four Haitian barges on the Miami

River, the drugs were found within in both the keels and the hulls o f the ships. Arnold Markowitz, “Ships
yield cocaine haul,” Miami Herald (web edition), 8 February 2000. A parallel within the airport context
can be found in the recent arrests o f airline employees smuggling drugs from Bogota, Colombia to Miami
inside the walls o f airplane galleys. The drugs were generally offloaded only after a follow-on domestic
flight to avoid countermeasures. Richard Willing, “Airline drug smugglers getting ever more
sophisticated,” USA Today, 1 August 1997, A-4.
148 Teresa Anderson, “Cruise Control,” Security Management 44, no. 3 (March 2000), 39.
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On the other hand, cruise operations appear to have the potential to more easily
facilitate the movement of smaller amounts of contraband, carried either on passengers
themselves or in their luggage in a situation more akin to that encountered by airport
security personnel.149 However, as cruise lines specialize almost solely in the movement
of people and their luggage rather than large-scale cargo operations, relatively less
scrutiny vis-a-vis airport security may serve to foster this trend.
Adding yet another dimension to an already complex environment, depending on
the level of security various types of private vessels may also have access to a seaport’s
operational areas as well. As an alternative, however, both private and commercial
vessels may call at either private facilities or along nearly any point on an unmonitored
coastline. Various types of “drops” of contraband may also be utilized, in which the
goods in question are put overboard from a generally larger ship to be picked up at a later
time, often by a smaller, faster vessel, in an effort to avoid official scrutiny. As will be
discussed below, with respect to air modes of transit, similar arrangements can be made
in which an airdrop functions in the place of the larger ship.
Finally, trends related to the growth of international air travel increasingly have
served to functionally link geographically non-contiguous parts of the world. However,
these modes of transportation, while offering a high degree of potential flexibility in
theory, are circumscribed by a number of factors. First, commercial air transportation,
paralleling the situation with seaports, is generally funneled through specialized facilities.

149 While little direct evidence appears forthcoming, the potential is highlighted by a 1994 Border Patrol
investigation (Operation Seacruise), which found that one-day excursions from Florida to the Bahamas
were being used to smuggle both drugs and illegal immigrants into the U.S. Joel Brinkley, “For Aliens, a
Bahamas Cruise is an Easy Way Into the U.S.,” New York Times, 29 November 1994, A l. In general, cruise
activity’s association with smaller volumes o f contraband may be contrasted with larger parcels more
commonly found in cargo operations.
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Perhaps even more significantly, due primarily to safety concerns both private and
commercial airline activity is among the most regulated of activities, particularly at the
international level.150 The following diagram highlights the various potential
manifestations of smuggling via air modes of transit:
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Fig. 8. Potential smuggling methods by air

As with seaports in the maritime context, airports represent the hubs of this
commercial activity. As with land and water transportation, the air mode is used to carry
cargo as well as passengers, though the latter tends to be more prominent in the mind of
the public. Heavy passenger volumes provide enormous opportunities for smuggling
using body carry methods, as noted above. Generally speaking, air cargo operations tend
150 See Keh and Farrell, 62-3. For a pre-9/11 overview o f international airlines as a business sector, see
“Flying visits,” The Economist (web edition), 10 January 1998, focusing on the issues o f deregulation,
industry consolidation and the future o f nationally-based carriers operating in a global economy. However,
recently more pressing concerns over the security o f air facilities have understandably come to the fore.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90

toward break bulk and the transport of parcels and related freight, rather than bulk or
containerized loads. Interestingly, it should be noted that, in the Untied States, airlines
themselves fund a large portion of counter-smuggling programs.151
Nonetheless, as with an unprotected coastline, unofficial landing strips may be
improvised, despite the fact that they may be subject to discovery. The practice of
merely passing over a prearranged area and dropping contraband may also be employed,
thereby obviating the need for even rudimentary ground preparations. With specific
respect to counter-drug operations, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) considers any
airdrop of contraband, as well as the movement of a suspect aircraft, as an air smuggling
event. Finally, the relatively higher overall costs associated with air operations can make
t CA

regular service more dependent on demand.
As mentioned at the opening of this section, the dimension of intermodality in the
context of transnational logistical networks is becoming increasingly more salient. The
increasing use of intermodal transportation, combining land, maritime and air
conveyances for a single shipment, represents a long-term trend toward greater cost
efficiency. For instance, a cargo container may travel by rail to a seaport, loaded on an
ocean-going vessel and then transshipped via barge to a secondary destination, and then
finally set on a truck chassis for the final leg of its journey. The growth in volumes of

151 Specifically, passenger user fees levied by airlines, and determined by use o f specific airport facilities,
are a primary funding source for individual programs. U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service
Strategic Plan (1997), 19. By contrast, recent intelligence sources estimate that criminal groups control

ground cargo handling at airports in Russian and the former Soviet states, to the extent that 34% o f
shipments passing through these facilities were either stolen or not delivered. U.S. CIA, CNC,
“International Organized Crime and Cargo Theft,” 3.
152 As Krugman notes, ‘a railway or a highway represents indivisible investments, while the frequency o f
air service and the ability to use large, efficient planes depends on the volume o f demand.’ Krugman,
Geography and Trade, 24-5. For an overview o f common air smuggling characteristics, see also DoD,
Joint Counterdrug Operations, II-11.
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containerized cargo can be taken as the most concrete example of this trend, and may be
readily correlated to globalization and its associated competitive pressures.
The efficiency of this intermodal connectivity also represents a key characteristic
of a given transportation network, and can enhance its potential volume of trade
immensely. However, this aspect can similarly serve to facilitate the influx of contraband
via the same conduits as legitimate trade unless proper security measures are employed,
both at transportation nodes proper and along the connected infrastructure. This
consideration is reiterated in Henry I. DeGeneste and John P. Sullivan’s concept of
“softer targets,” by which criminal activity exploits the weakest link in a given logistical
chain.153
While this chapter has focused on the nature and evolution of smuggling actors,
their complex relationships with nation-states, and the potential modes of transnational
smuggling, the next continues by discussing the utility of heroin as the selected
benchmark commodity for this study. In particular, an understanding of the geographic
parameters of supply and demand as they relate to the global trade in heroin are essential
to setting the stage for further analysis via the relevant case studies. As such, the
following serves as something of a secondary review of the relevant literature, illustrating
a number of the dynamics put forth to this point.

153 DeGeneste and Sullivan, 41. This idea and the assumptions regarding the path o f least resistance are

quite compatible. The authors also make the important point that enhanced physical security and access
control measures designed to reduce cargo theft at transportation facilities, particularly those aimed at
securing warehouses and staging areas, will have a similar deterrent effect on the movement o f contraband.
Ibid., 37-8. In the maritime context, the introduction to the ICCSS report notes that, “criminal activity
associated with the cargo that comes into the seaport does not always occur on the seaport grounds or is not
detected until after the cargo leaves the port.” U.S. ICCSS, Report, “Commission Structure Introduction.”
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CHAPTER III
NETWORKS, NODES AND NARCOTICS:
THE TRANSNATIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF HEROIN

Up to this point, discussion has centered primarily on the development of a
geographic smuggling framework that transcends commodity specificity. However, this
generic approach can only be taken so far. The remainder of this study focuses on heroin
as a benchmark commodity, with this chapter addressing the parameters of heroin
movement at the global level. In particular, it examines the geographic organization of
this trade, the impetus behind its growth and development, and the primary factors
relating to supply and demand that serve to shape this phenomenon, both in geospatial
and temporal terms. As such, the historical context of this trade, and the various efforts
to control it, are addressed, as are more recent trends with respect to both supply and
demand, as drawn from the relevant literature and most current data available.
It seems indisputable at present that the transnational drug trade and its associated
political, economic and social consequences will continue to pose a major challenge to
the interests of nation-states.1 At the most fundamental level, the cultivation, processing,
transport, and distribution of narcotics constitute the greatest single generator of political
violence and crime in the world. Its profits are used to finance and arm rural guerrillas,
urban terrorists, and criminal gangs; to facilitate and expand the trade itself by

1 For example, as noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 8, “it cannot be denied that illegal
drugs play a leading role in economic matters (Italy, Spain, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, Burma), local
conflicts (Afghanistan, Central Asia, India, Turkey, Kosovo, Colombia, Congo), and the “criminalization”
o f state institutions (Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Argentina).”
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intimidation and corruption; and to avoid or subvert the nation-state’s military and police
forces.2 In fact, the OGD has calculated that drugs play a role at various levels in some
thirty conflicts worldwide.
To establish the order of magnitude for this issue in global terms, the United
Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) estimated in 1998 that the international drug
trade as being approximately $400 billion per year. If reliable, this figure would be
equivalent to 8% of total international trade, and approximately the same size as the
international market for oil and gas, as well as those for both textiles and tourism. It
would also be significantly larger than the international trade in iron and steel, as well as
in motor vehicles, and nearly double the global turnover of legitimate pharmaceutical
companies.4 Accounting for roughly half of this market, and with its wide geographic
dispersion, the worldwide trade in heroin forms an integral part of this activity.5

2 As discussed in the previous chapter, numerous sources have made this linkage. However, this trend is
well encapsulated by the following quote from Robert Charles, a former U.S. House o f Representatives
staff member well versed in drug issues: “Today, international drug traffickers and international terrorists
are in a hedonistic marriage o f design. Drug funds are financing terrorists whose aim is to overthrow
governments; in the meantime, those terrorists are providing wide-ranging protection for drug operations.
These groups are now linked at the hip, and extremely wealthy.” Quoted in John G. Roos, “The Enemy
Next Door,” Arm ed Forces Journal International, March 2000, 40.
3 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 11. Moreover, it is further noted that over half o f these
conflicts can be found in Africa. Moreover, in the context o f issues discussed in the previous chapter
regarding the future o f the nation-state, as pointed out in “The global menace o f local strife,” The
Economist, 24 May 2003,23-5, at present almost all ongoing wars are civil wars.
4 See UNDCP, “Economic and Social Consequences o f Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking,” UNDCP
Technical Series, no. 6 (New York: UNDCP, 1998), 3, available at
http://www.undcD.org/technical series 1998-01-01 l.html. accessed 15 July 2004. This figure is also
close to Interpol’s independent estimate. While the process o f estimation is hampered by a number o f
factors, not least o f which is the clandestine nature o f drug trafficking, most estimates fall within the $300
to $500 billion range. An earlier estimate puts the value o f the international trade in illicit drugs as

exceeding even that in oil, and only itself being surpassed only by the global arms trade. LaMond Tullis,
Handbook o f Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic: Socioeconomic and Political Consequences (New York:
Greenwood Press / United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1991), xvii.
5 Ron Chepesiuk, H ard Target: The United States War Against International Drug Trafficking, 1982-1997
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 1999), 39. Specifically, the author breaks down the global illicit drug
market as heroin accounting for roughly half o f all profits, cocaine one quarter, and marijuana, hashish and
various psychotropic drugs together constituting the remaining quarter.
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As discussed in Chapter II, access to these levels of funding have allowed TCOs
to become increasingly empowered vis-a-vis the nation-state by factors such as the
globalization of financial systems, the rapid growth of cross-border trade, the increasing
dependence of certain states on drug profits to service debts, and the expanding
population of drug users worldwide.6 In this context, Jordan posits that:
A dynamic structural model stressing the merging of government and organized
crime suggests that the political systems of certain countries are in partial civil
war. While elements within the government seek to control drug trafficking,
other elements of the government form an alliance with the traffickers. The
complex relation between elites and traffickers may corrupt both the democratic
and authoritarian state. Narcostatization does not respect political systems.7
However, with particular respect to both democratic countries and those transitioning to
democracy, he also notes that, “In order to eliminate false claims of democracy, the
understanding of the democratic regime needs to be extended beyond the procedural
definition. It should take into account the potential symbiotic relationship between ruling
elites, organized crime, and the globalized financial system.”
Moreover, by transcending national borders, the drug trade not only challenges
assumptions separating domestic and foreign policy considerations, it also necessitates

6 These conditions have not only transformed the illicit drug trade but also undermined the viability o f
international drug control regimes. Keh and Farrell, 50-2. Moreover, the authors continue by noting that,
“Documented increases in the geographical scope o f drug trafficking are testimony to a robust, worldwide
industry that shows no sign o f bucking under the would-be pressures o f official intervention.”
Furthermore, both heroin and cocaine demonstrated rapid and consistent spatial distribution, more than

doubling their geographic reach during the 1980s and 1990s.
7 Jordan, 6-7.
8 Ibid, 19. The author also notes that if a state cannot meet the definitional requirements o f democracy, it is
also removed from inclusion in the democratic peace thesis. This concept holds that democracies by and
large do not fight other democracies, and is an important rationale for encouraging this form o f
government. For more on the interaction between ideology and alliance formation, see Stephen M. Walt,
The Origins o f Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 33-40.
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multilateral cooperation between governments.9 As the UNDCP noted its 1997 World
Drug Report, however:
Political tensions, incompatibilities between legal systems concerning extradition
or the transfer of evidence, delays in processing requests for judicial assistance,
agency rivalries and language problems all work in favour of the criminal and
against the slower bureaucratic mechanisms of international cooperation. The
geographical terrain covered by drug distribution networks cannot be kept under
constant surveillance, while the wealth of the drug trafficking organizations is
such that all around the world, corruption and intimidation permit shipments to
escape customs and police controls.10
While borders are not necessarily obstacles to smuggling actors, and in fact can serve
both to enable some activities and shield others from scrutiny, in most cases discrete
nation-states cannot effectively project their will across competing sovereignties. As
such, the present level of international cooperation within this issue area cannot be seen
as a sufficient deterrent to smuggling activity.
Taken with the more straightforward imperatives of supply and demand, these
factors highlight the challenges posed to nation-states by the complex landscape of the
drug trade. In particular, this analysis leads into subsequent case studies by focusing on
particular drug nexus regions, or those areas with a high concentration of potential or
observed smuggling vectors involving the transnational movement of drugs. It should be
noted, however, that as these case studies develop there is an inherent difficulty in
isolating the various aspects of physical, economic, political and human geography the
constitute the smugglers’ landscape, given the often high degree of interaction among

9 For instance, as noted in Bentham, 5, “As with environmental concerns such as air and marine pollution,
drug trafficking does not conform to political boundaries and cannot be controlled by a single state acting
in isolation.”
10 UNDCP, World Drug Report ( 1997), 231.
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these factors. However, wherever possible the relationships both between and among
these spatial dimensions are also highlighted.

Heroin as a Benchmark Commodity
Heroin is particularly suited to function as a benchmark commodity for a number
of reasons. To begin with, it moves thought a truly worldwide market, allowing for
meaningful interregional comparison. In this respect, both by its ubiquity and its
geographic scope, heroin trafficking is perhaps most akin to the international black
market in small arms. However, unlike the small arms trade, where production is highly
decentralized, the vast bulk of heroin production tends to originate in specific regions.
As Bentham points out, “Drugs are the archetypal free-market commodity . ..
they are easy to produce, easy to transport, easy to conceal and, due to their illegality,
have a high added value at each stage of the trading chain.”11 Even relative to other
drugs, by weight heroin is an extremely lucrative commodity in comparison to other
black market goods. As such, it is economically feasible to transport even in small
amounts.

12

Furthermore, as a widely traded commodity, heroin can be seen responding to

trends in globalization in a manner similar to that of other legitimate natural resources.13
Heroin can even be seen as having its own transnational commodity chain as it
moves from raw material to final product, an arrangement that “tends to encourage the

11 Bentham, 48.

12 As a form o f portable wealth, relatively few other high value commodities surpass heroin. However, one
example o f a similarly lucrative smuggled commodity by weight would be diamonds. See Appendix A for
more on this issue, while heroin profit margins will be discussed at greater length below.
13 For instance, see “Commodities get big,” The Economist (web edition), 28 August 1999. Parallels
include falling prices for raw materials, the consolidation o f producers where the market was once
fragmented, and a transnational alliance system to facilitate distribution. In the criminal context, see also
Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 465-7; and Booth, Opium, 339-43.
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development of a series of supplier relationships as well as the emergence of links with
companies providing ancillary services.”14 As Stephen Flynn notes:
In essence, drug trafficking is a form of commodities trade conducted by
transnational consortiums. Acquiring chemicals to produce drugs, transporting
the drugs to wholesale distributors, and laundering the profits require interacting
with and blending into legitimate markets. The size and complexity of these
operations mandate that the drug industry pattern itself after the modem
multinational corporation. Yet unlike traders in oil, automobiles, or microchips,
traders in illicit drugs must outwit a dynamic enforcement environment designed
to defeat them. Consequently, over the past two decades the dmg trade has
undergone something of a Darwinian evolution, the survivors of which have
developed into sophisticated and highly flexible organizations.15
As such, developments that foster international commerce, and in particular the removal
of trade barriers, have served to markedly aid the smugglers’ ease of transport.16 In
practical terms, this translates directly into an enhanced flexibility in terms of smuggling
route selection.
In keeping with the trends outlined in Chapter II, TCOs are very active in the
global movement of heroin, particularly in instances where such groups are capable of
mobilizing vast resources and moving large quantities of dmgs, allowing them to
dominate both key production areas and markets. As Booth notes, “The heroin trade is
superbly organized: if such acumen was applied to some legitimate produce, it could
increase profits severalfold.”17

14 Williams, “Strategic Alliances,” 62. In the business context, this term and its usage are discussed in Gary
Gereffi and Miguel Koreniewicz, ed., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (London: Praeger, 1994).
15 Stephen Flynn, “W orldwide Drugs: The Expanding Trade,” Current, no. 352 (May 1993), 30-1.

16 In particular, as noted in the previous chapter, “Multinational economic agreements reducing trade
barriers in North America, Europe, Asia, and other regions o f the world have substantially increased the
volume o f international trade . . . Criminal groups have taken advantage o f the high volume o f legitimate
trade to smuggle drugs, arms and other contraband across national borders.” U.S. Interagency Working
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 2. For more on recent trends in logistics, see also “A
moving story,” The Economist, 1 December 2002, 65-6.
17 Booth, Opium, 329-30.
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As a business model, an article in Fortune characterizes the international trade in
illicit narcotics in unequivocal terms: “Think of it as a huge, multinational commodity
business with a fast-moving top management, a widespread distribution network, and
price insensitive customers.”18 Though the generic comparison with MNCs has already
been made in the preceding chapter, in the context of the drug trade Sidney Jay Zabludoff
points out that, “The key difference, of course, is that narcotics traffickers sell an illicit
product. This distinction is important in entrepreneurial terms because sizable risks arise
in the form of potential loss of product, confiscation of assets, incarceration and death.
These risks drive up prices and create the huge profits which constantly attract new
individuals who are willing to take the risk.”19
Moreover, with respect to this latter aspect, there remains a widespread and
continuing involvement of large numbers of individuals drawn to the drug trade by the
lure of its immense profits. As UNDCP notes, “A seemingly endless stream of willing
recruits for the most menial tasks provides the industry with a key input for its near
constant growth - inexpensive labour. In addition, the industry requires a wide range of
specialized personnel including chemists, chemical engineers, pilots, communications
specialists, money launderers, accountants, lawyers, security guards and ‘hit men.’”20
Finally, and somewhat paradoxically, it is the very complexity of the international
heroin trade, intertwined as it is with a number of other illicit market activities, which

18 Louis Kraar, “The Drug Trade,” Fortune 117, no. 113 (20 June 19S8), 26-35. Other sound business

practices that the author notes in this context include: awareness o f and responsiveness to changing market
conditions; constant evolution o f operating methods; investment o f earnings in other businesses; creation o f
new demand through creative marketing and price-point management; and both vertical and horizontal
business integration.
19 Sidney Jay Zabludoff, “Colombian Narcotics Organizations as Business Enterprises,” Transnational
Organized Crime 2, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 20.
20 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 123.
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makes it a particularly fitting test case for a geographic approach. 21 From a policy point
of view, the linkages between drug trafficking and wider issues relating to transnational
organized crime are also relevant.

O')

As Bentham points out, “the ‘drug problem’ can be

seen as not a single issue at all, but an amalgamation of a variety of separate issues
involving various actors and various stakes in distinct issue systems, within a similar
»

*

context of what can be described as drug-related activity.”

OQ

Before moving too far into other issues, however, it is necessary to outline the
nature and characteristics of heroin itself.24 Heroin is an opiate, one of the three main
classes of natural drugs and their derivatives grown commercially and traded on a global
scale.25 The drug, more formally known as either diacytlmorphine or simply
diamorphine, is a semi-synthetic product derived from the complete acetylation of

21 For instance, even compared to the analogous challenges o f cocaine control, note the following: “Widely
dispersed growing areas, multiple trafficking organizations and diversified routes and concealment methods
make heroin supply reduction particularly difficult.” U.S. Congress, House Committee on International
Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, “Anti-Narcotics Efforts in the Western Hemisphere
and Implementation on the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act,” Statement by Thomas J. Umberg,
Director o f Supply Reduction, Office o f National Drug Control Policy, 3 March 1999, 6.
22 In addition to earlier discussions relating to drugs as a source o f funding for terrorist and other criminal
organizations, see also Raphael F. Perl, “United States Foreign Narcopolicy: Shifting Focus to International
Crime?” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 33-46.
23 Bentham, 25.
24 This section draws from information found in National Institute on Drug Abuse, Heroin Abuse and
Addiction (Washington, DC: NIDA Research Report Series, 2000), 1-2; James A Inciardi, The War on
Drugs II: The Continuing Epic o f Heroin, Cocaine, Crack, Crime, AIDS, and Public Policy (Mountain
View, CA: Mayfield Publishing, 1992), 63-81; Mary H.Cooper, The Business o f Drugs (Washington, DC:
Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1990), 47-71; and Customs Co-operation Council / International Association
o f Ports and Harbors (CCC / IAHP), CCC / 1APH Guidelines on Co-operation Between Customs
Administrations and Port Aimed at the Prevention o f Drug Smuggling (Tokyo, Japan: CCC / IAHP, 1987),
15-8.
25 The other two primary categories o f natural drugs cultivated on a large scale for profit are the
cannaboids, such as marijuana and hashish, and the coca derivatives, though other types o f natural drugs

also have their own niches. Furthermore, though outside the realm o f this discussion, it should be kept in
mind that such generally accepted drugs as alcohol, nicotine and caffeine also fall under this heading. By
contrast, synthetic drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), barbiturates and MDMA (Ecstasy),
as well as a wide range o f prescription medicines, form the other major class o f controlled substance. For
more on the range o f available drugs, see Appendix A. Though not directly germane in this context, it is
interesting to note that, taxonomically, the UNDCP lists prescription drug used illicitly as a separate
category.
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morphine, which is in turn chemically processed from the opium poppy, papaver
somniferum. 26 While the stages of this process are outlined in more detail in Appendix
C, it is worth noting that it takes approximately ten kilograms of opium to make one
kilogram of morphine, which in turn yields slightly more than that quantity of heroin.

'yn

The opium poppy itself can be grown in a wide variety of locations, though for
the most part its cultivation on a commercial scale is relatively circumscribed in
geographic terms at present, as is discussed below. In addition to its relative profitability,
as an agricultural commodity opium stores easily for extended periods of time, does not
spoil, can be grown in high terrain without fertilizer or extensive irrigation, and can be
harvested without machinery.

Raw opium, generally harvested from the milky sap of

the poppy bulb, starts as thick, brown, viscous substance that hardens over time into a
dark brown, slightly sticky mass known as opium gum. However, the stalk of the poppy

26 The opium trade itself has a long and turbulent history, even before the advent o f its various chemical
distillations. For a concise survey o f this commercial activity from its emergence, thought to be under the
auspices o f Turkish traders in the eighth and ninth centuries, up to the nineteenth century and the heyday o f
European colonialism, see Block and Chambliss, 19-29. The Portuguese appear to have been the first
Europeans to realize that opium could serve as a viable and valuable trading commodity. It served not only
to conserve their relatively scarce precious metals, the standard measure o f national wealth at the time, but
also to turn a very respectable profit in exchange for Asian spices, tea, silk, pottery and many other
products then in demand throughout Europe. The British opium trade in the Far East eventually led to the
First Opium War (1839-42), precipitated by Chinese efforts to stem the outflow o f silver for opium, in
which the Chinese military was thoroughly defeated. The Second Opium War (1856) ended much the same
way. The authors also note a parallel incident in 1852, when King Rama II o f Thailand, still nominally
independent, was forced to accede to British military pressure and grant an opium monopoly. With respect
to the British official involvement in the opium trade during this period, Jordan, 55-62, who specifically
notes that, “This pattern o f government-granted monopoly or direct government management has become a
model for organized crime.” For an even more extensive overview o f this trade and its ramifications, see

Booth, Opium, 106-37; and John Newsinger, “Britain’s opium wars,” Monthly Review 49, no. 5 (1997), 3543.
27 By definition, any medicinal compound containing more than 0.1% opium by weight or volume may be
considered an opiate. For more on the processing o f opium into heroin, see U.S. DOJ, Bureau o f Justice
Statistics, Office o f Justice Programs, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System, 43, as well as Appendix C,
“Heroin Activity Model.”
28 Bentham, 45.
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plant, known as poppy straw, can also be processed to produce opium, though generally
for licit medical uses.
As opium gum is exposed to air, it becomes “cured,” and can be smoked or
otherwise consumed if desired. As it will lose considerable potency, and hence value, if it
dries out, it is usually wrapped in some sort of waterproof material for storage and
transport. In addition to heroin, various other alkaloids, notably codeine and morphine,
can also be obtained from opium. In particular, raw opium can be converted to morphine,
heroin’s immediate chemical precursor, in a relatively simple process that usually takes
place in makeshift laboratories near the poppy fields.
Morphine itself was discovered in 1805 and subsequently named for Morpheus,
the Greek god of sleep. However, German chemist Heinrich Dreser, working under the
auspices of the Bayer drug company, first produced heroin in 1898 as further distillation
of morphine. Heroin was originally intended as more powerful pain reliever that would
have fewer side effects than its predecessors. Its trade name, stemming from the German
adjective heroisch, or “heroic,” indicates the high hopes pinned to its anticipated
therapeutic potential. Prior to the realization of its own deleterious effects, for a time
heroin was even used as a treatment for morphine addiction.30
Heroin has since become the common name for preparations containing diacetyl
morphine base or its salts. It has a quicker, more intense effect on users than morphine,

29 For its part, morphine in pure form consists o f white crystals, and is most often adulterated, or “cut,” with

substances ranging from sugar, starch and powdered milk to chalk, baby powder and strychnine. Most
often it is found in to form o f a powder, pill or ampoule. Another common derivative o f opium is codeine,
often found in various prescription cough syrups. Finally, entirely synthetic opiates such as methadone,
pethidine and dipipanone have also been developed.
30 See Ian Scott, “A hundred year habit,” History Today 48, no. 6 (June 1998), 6-9. Incidentally, in 1899
Bayer also introduced a second acetyl derivative from a plant-based painkiller. This was salicylic acid,
better known under the now-generic trade name “Aspirin.”
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and is characterized by strong psychological and physical addiction, as well as an
increasing physical tolerance among users. Known under a variety of slang names, it is
generally found on the street as an odorless powder, or, less commonly, in either pill,
o 1

capsule or ampoule forms.
As the true addictive nature of the drug became more apparent, the international
backlash against its medical usage gained momentum, with the Hague Opium Convention
of 1912 being the first of a series of agreements setting the framework for the relevant
prohibition regime.32 During this period, a notable exception among nation-states was
the case of Japan in the 1930s, which continued to produce heroin for the Chinese market
up the end of the Second World War.33 In institutional terms, most efforts at

31 While the number o f street terms to denote heroin even in the United States are too numerous to fully
delineate, some o f the more common ones include “horse,” “H,” “junk,” “smack,” and “white lady.” For a
more complete list o f slang words, including those to various types o f heroin, combinations o f heroin with
other drugs and related phenomena, see Marla Schalaffer, “Street Terms: Drugs and the Drug Trade, Part
2,” The Narc Officer, July-August 1997, 89-90. While intravenous administration o f the drug is the most
common, in recent years higher purity levels have led to an increase in both the smoking and sniffing o f
heroin. For more on drug abuse patterns in general, to include heroin, see also U.S. DOJ, Bureau o f Justice
Statistics, Office o f Justice Programs, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System, 20-8.
32 Other international conventions brokered under the League o f Nations auspices were to follow in 1925,
1931 and 1936. For more detail on international drug control efforts under the League’s auspices, see
Block, 95-105. Following the Second World War and continuing up the late 1980s, the difficulties of
implementing international controls brokered through the United Nations became increasingly apparent, as
was seen in both 1953 and 1961. Greater detail o f these proceedings can be found in Catherine Lamour
and Michel R. Lamberti, The International Connection: Opium from Growers to Pushers, trans. Betty and
Peter Ross (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 238-47. For a fiirther overview o f the trade during this period, see
also Alvin Moscow, Merchants o f Heroin: An In-depth Portrayal o f Business in the Underworld (New
York: Dial Press, 1968).
33 A comprehensive analysis on the econom ic role o f opiates within the East Asian region during this

period can be found in John M. Jennings, The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking
in Asia, 1895-1945 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). The author dates official Japanese involvement in the
opium trade to the annexation o f Taiwan following the Sino-Japanese War o f 1895, and the subsequent
need to formulate policy in order to deal with that island’s existing addict population. This trend continued
under military oversight with imperial expansion into Korea and Manchuria, and later into Southeast Asia.
The continuing involvement o f Europeans in the Far Eastern opium trade during this period is also
discussed in Block, 113-7.
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international drug control begun under the auspices of the League of Nations have
continued under those of its successor, the United Nations.34
Since that time, by global consensus the production, distribution and consumption
of heroin has been largely relegated to the criminal sphere of activity.35 As such, the
challenge of regime building on the part of nation-states within the drug control issue
area continues to reflect a wide range of international pressures and concerns. In recent
years, there has been a proliferation in both the number and scope of international
agreements, not only on drug trafficking per se but on related issues as well. To date, the
most prominent and comprehensive such agreement to date is the 1988 U.N. Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.36
Offering a less traditional view of consensus building within this the issue area,
Bentham posits that while the literature on regimes implies a specific issue that is being
regulated, the complexity of drug control and its related political, economic, social and
health dimensions mitigates against simplistic analysis and necessitates further
conceptual clarification. Furthermore, noting the primacy of the traditional Realist
school of thought since the end of the Second World War, she further points out that,

34 Bentham, 89-118. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the author also sees the U .N .’s focus on
trafficking as significantly impeding the development o f an effective and holistic global drug control
regime. For a fuller chronological outline o f these international drug control efforts, see Appendix B,
“Heroin - A Timeline.”
35 See Kathryn Meyer and Terry Parssinen, Webs o f Smoke: Smuggler, Warlords, Spies, and the History o f
the International Drug Trade (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), which puts many o f these
developments in context while focusing on East Asia throughout the first half o f the twentieth century. For
a contemporary overview o f the trade during the early stages o f its global expansion, see also M oscow ,
passim.
36 The issue o f an international “war on drugs” was also the topic o f a special session o f the U.N. General
Assembly in June 1998, which included thirty heads o f state and representatives from 150 countries.
Unfortunately, as reported at the time, “The predictable result was ponderous speeches on ‘our common
global challenge,’ multilingual chaos in the corridors . . . a few unrealistic pledges, the distant but
unmistakable sound o f the buck being passed from one government to another, and the looming question o f
who is going to pay for it all.” See “Tremble, Medellin, tremble,” The Economist, 13 June 1998, 45-6.
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“The rigidity of the Cold War gave the discipline of International Relations an excuse for
not taking into account the advances, concepts and methods from alternative disciplines,
such as sociology, philosophy, anthropology, and history, with their concepts of identity,
values and community.”
However, despite such conceptual impediments, multilateral cooperation on this
issue continues to develop, more often than not with the United States taking what has
become a traditional lead in this respect. Specifically, the annual U.S. drug certification
process represents the most salient ongoing unilateral evaluation process, as embodied in
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) put out under Department
of State auspices.38 In general, U.S. efforts at international drug control continue to put it
at the forefront within this issue area, as in many others, and thus will form a touchstone
for the discussion that follows.

37 Bentham, 2. As an alternative to realism, the author puts forth an approach to the drug issue based on the
paradigm variously known as global politics, pluralism, multi-centrism or issue-politics, which attempts to
synthesize literature within the field on interdependence, international regimes, foreign policy analysis and
transnationalism. Ibid, 15.
38 Specifically, the INCSR is compiled by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau o f International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), with one o f the more recently published iterations being INL,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2001 (Washington, DC: Department o f State, March
2002), available at http://www.state.gOv/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/. accessed 15 July 2004. Generally
speaking, it is used to provide a factual basis for the drug certification process’ impact on foreign assistance
to specific drug producing and transit countries. Its intent is to exert leverage within the issue area o f
international drug control by identifying the so-called “majors,” or those countries considered prone to
either significant production or trafficking activities within their territory. The criteria for certification is
whether or not the countries in this category are seen to be both cooperating fully with the U.S. in this issue
area and complying with the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances. As to the genesis o f this particular initiative, the process was mandated by
legislative action in 1986 via an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act o f 1961, during the height o f
fears regarding the crack-cocaine epidemic. At present, the threshold criteria for being considered a major
drug producing nation is having at least 1,000 hectares o f illicit opium or cocaine, or 5,000 hectares o f

cannabis, under cultivation. This process links U.S. bilateral aid, as well as support within such
international bodies as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to cooperation with the U.S.
on this issue. Countries listed among the majors can be certified either by demonstrable cooperation or in
the name o f vital U.S. national interests. However, this is not to say that the process is not influenced by
political considerations or overridden by the imperatives o f issue areas perceived as having a greater
precedence, as will be seen below. While the United Nations does carry out its own parallel evaluation
process, this does not carry any analogous tangible sanctions.
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The loss of trading legitimacy, coupled with an enduring demand, has cemented
heroin’s role as a key component of global black markets. While all economic
transactions, licit or illicit, imply reciprocity, heroin’s capacity as a readily bartered
commodity has been well documented. Moreover, given the unregulated nature of
transnational black markets, drugs often serve as collateral in deals involving a wide
range of actors and contraband, and thus may be seen as playing an often-pivotal role in
'i Q

that respect.

The various types of interaction between the global trade in heroin and

various other black markets are explored more fully in the context of the case studies.
However, there are two black markets in particular that have a direct role in
supporting the transnational heroin trade, and as such must be highlighted in order to
fully understand this phenomenon. The first is the illegal trade in the precursor chemicals
necessary to process opium into heroin, while the second involves the various money
laundering mechanisms that recycle, reinvest and otherwise conceal the profits accrued
by the drug trade. As in the case of international drug control, both of these issue areas
have emerged as focal points of broad-based efforts in their own right.
To begin with, the control of the chemical precursors necessary to process opium
first into morphine, and then into heroin, is increasingly the subject of international
agreements. Incidentally, those chemicals commonly used to produce synthetic drugs
such as amphetamines are also generally covered under such agreements.40 In the case of

39 Some specific examples include explicit links with illegal arms trafficking, as noted in T. M.
Oppenheimer, “Projections for the future development o f international drug control policies,” UN. Bulletin
on Narcotics, no. 1-001 (1990), 8. See also Appendix A, in which nearly every type o f contraband listed is
known to have some sort o f market relationship with illegal drugs.
40 To establish the scope o f this issue at the global level, between 1990 and 1994 the U.N. estimated that
four billion “potential dose units” o f precursor chemicals were seized annually. UNDCP, World Drug
Report (1997), 29. Interestingly enough, progress on precursor chemical controls is less likely to have an
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heroin, the most prominent such precursor is acetic anhydride. However, both the
number of producers in the global marketplace and the essential fungibility of these
products exponentially increase the difficulty of achieving this goal.
Furthermore, while the chemicals in question certainly have legitimate purposes
as well, in response to economic incentives their diversion to illicit uses continues in any
number of forms. These include the siphoning off of supplies from domestic chemical
production; the legal importation and subsequent misappropriation of chemicals for
illegal transshipment; the legal importation of chemicals into a neighboring country for
transshipment to the drug-producing country; and the use of shipping routes via countries
that do not have any form of precursor chemical control. Furthermore, drug traffickers
involved in the processing phase are very resourceful, even going so far as developing
techniques to extend the functional usage of such chemicals or replace them with more
easily available alternatives.41
Unsurprisingly, consensus on this issue, as on so many others, is often under
intense pressure from narrower national interests. However, in 1991 the G-7 established
the Chemical Action Task Force (CATF), establishing an important milestone in
international understanding among the major allies. By December 1992, the European
Community had introduced new legislation covering extra-European trade in precursor
chemicals.42

effect on refining coca into cocaine, which can be done with materials as common as kerosene. For a

detailed table o f these chemicals and both their licit and illicit uses, see Keh and Farrell, 56-7.
41 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Chemical Control.” This issue is also discussed in the
maritime context in U.S. DOT, Office o f Intelligence and Security, Port Security, 11. However, these
observations remain valid across other modes o f transportation as well.
42 As an example, early U.S. adherence to the control o f such chemicals, many o f which had legitimate
uses, put definite constraints on the U.S. chemical industry. For a time, German exports appeared to be
filling the gap, leading to U.S. accusations that the German government was either unwilling or unable to
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That would be nearly the end of the problem if large-scale production of precursor
chemicals were confined to Europe and the United States, which it is not. In a more
wide-ranging effort to stem the flow of these chemicals, there have been significant
recent efforts through the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB).43 However, the most comprehensive initiative to date is the U.S.-sponsored
Multilateral Chemical Reporting Initiative (MCRI), first put forth in 1997.44
As with precursor chemicals on the front end of the transnational drug trade,
money laundering plays an integral role by recycling and reinvesting the profits resulting
from such transactions using various methods to make them appear to be the proceeds of
legitimate business activity.45 As John J. Fialka notes, “New financial instruments, the

stand up to its own chemical industry. Under continuing U.S. pressure, in July 1992 Germany amended its
system o f voluntary export controls, while stressing the need for a uniform standard across Europe. These
restrictions brought the issue to a resolution that the U.S. found satisfactory, resulting in a marked
improvement in relations within this issue area. See H. Richard Friman, NarcoDiplomacy: Exporting the
U.S. War on Drugs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 110-1. More recently, in May 1998 the U.S.
and the European Union signed a chemical control agreement laying down the formal basis for increased
cooperation. More details on the CATF effort can be found in U.S. Department o f State, “Fact Sheet:
Controlling Chemicals Used in Drug Trafficking,” U.S. Department o f State Dispatch 3, no. 9 (2 March
1992), 164-5.
43 The relevant international statute on chemical control under U.N. auspices is Article 12 o f the 1988 U.N.
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. A subsequent annex
currently lists 22 chemicals as those most necessary to drug manufacture and thus the primary targets for
international control. For more on this issue, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 227-30.
44 For an overview o f MCRI, see U.S. DOJ, DEA, Diversion Control Program, Program Report, “The
Diversion o f Drugs and Chemicals” (Washington, DC: DEA, December 1999), available at
http://www.deadiversion.usdoi.gov/pubs/program/activities/index.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
45 For instance, as Douglas I. Keh notes, “Anecdotal evidence suggests that illicit drug revenues represent a
substantial proportion o f the financial reserves available to criminal organizations.” Douglas I Keh, “Drug
Money in a Changing World: Economic Reform and Criminal Finance,” U.N. Drug Control Programme
Technical Series no. 4 (1996), available at http://www.undcp.org/technical series 1996-01-01 2.html.
accessed 15 July 2004. In analytical terms, there are several methods o f dissecting this phenomenon. A
prominent example can be in U.S. Department o f State, INL, International N arcotics Control Strategy

Report 1999 (Washington, DC: Department o f State, March 2000), “Money Laundering and Financial
Crimes,” available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics law/1999 narc report/index.html.
accessed 15 July 2004. This document puts forth three distinct steps to the laundering o f illegal profits,
namely “placement,” “layering,” and “integration.” In the first, the currency is introduced into a financial
services institution. In the second, these funds are moved from institution to institution in order to hide
their source and ownership. Finally, the cycle is concluded when the funds are reinvested in an ostensibly
legitimate business.
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globalization of money markets, and the removal of trade barriers to cross-border
transactions have changed the geography o f money.” Moreover, the speed and fluidity of
money laundering mechanisms, underpinned by the wider criminalization of the
international financial system, are exceedingly difficult for nation-states to curtail.46
Most significantly, the cross-border nature of most such investigations, as well as related
interpretations of the relevant local laws, also makes enforcement within this issue area
especially problematic.
Broadly speaking, money laundering control regimes place an emphasis on both
the identification of money laundering centers and on international efforts to isolate and
confiscate ill-gotten assets. For instance, in parallel with, the various initiatives on
chemical controls, the G-7 established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989,
since expanded to include twenty-six members.47 On an even wider level, in December
1999, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 54/109, the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, specifically mentioning
drug trafficking in its preamble.
Flowever, in the U.S., the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) leads
bilateral dialogue within this issue area.48 As far as the U.S. is concerned, tracking the
money involved in drug trafficking cannot be separated from wider related issues 49 This

46 Fialka, 139. For more on this issue with specific respect to drugs, see also Bentham, 140-66; and Jordan,
99-116. Furthermore, a list o f the criteria to be used in assessing the vulnerability o f a given financial
system or institution to m oney laundering can be found in U .S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001,
“Money Laundering.”
47 See U.S. Department o f State, “Fact Sheet: Combating Drug Money-Laundering,” U.S. Department o f
State Dispatch 3, no. 9 (2 March 1992), 163-4; and “Shell games,” The Economist, 26 October 2002, 69.
48 An overview o f this organization’s activity and scope can be found in U.S Department o f State, INL,
INCSR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
49 A comprehensive treatment o f the evolution o f American policy on this issue area, domestic as well as
foreign, can be found in Robert E. Powis, The Money Launderers (Chicago: Probus, 1992). Current U.S.
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is actually quite a logical stance, given the absolute necessity of such assets to initiate and
sustain nearly every type of illicit activity. Following the events of 9/11, the issue has
also taken on an even greater significance in light of the imperatives to track the funding
of international terrorism. In particular, nation-states that allow very strict banking
privacy have become targets for U.S.-led international pressure advocating a greater
transparency for transactions.50
More often than not, the focus of these efforts to curb transnational money
laundering is on the monitoring the electronic transfer of funds.51 As mentioned

policy requires that deposits o f more than $10,000 be reported to federal banking authorities, resulting in a
subsequent proliferation o f deposits o f $9,999. This in turn has given rise to the practice o f breaking large
sums o f illicit money into chunks small enough to evade federal detection, known colloquially as
“smurfing.” During the late 1980’s, the U.S. strove to negotiate similar reporting mechanisms with the
banking regulators o f other countries. At the time other governments generally interpreted these endeavors
to mean that cash deposits o f U.S. $10,000 would have to be reported to the U.S. government, which were
seen as highly intrusive to national sovereignty. For instance, at the time the U.S. relied on a variety o f
unilateral pressures to force even allies to prohibit their banking institutions from doing business with
international drug trafficking organizations. These types o f leverage have included revoking visa rights in
the U.S., targeting o f suspect bank’s North American operations and threatening to publicly expose
particularly unsavory clients. As written, foreign banks would not have been expected to notify the U.S. of
such transactions but merely to record them. In practice, unfortunately, the most daunting task was found
to be the backlog involved in recording this class o f transaction due to their sheer volume. It was not until
other nations came to appreciate the linkage between this complex o f issues that international progress
became feasible. See also “That infernal washing machine,” The Economist, 26 July 1997, 19-20; David A.
Andelman, “The Drug Money Maze,” Foreign Affairs, 73, no. 4 (July-August 1994), 15; and “Through the
wringer,” The Economist, 14 April 2001, 64-6. Furthermore, the issuing o f Executive Order 12978 in
October 1995, allowed the U.S. federal authorities to either freeze or block all assets held in the U.S. by
known foreign nationals engaged in international narcotics trafficking. U.S. President, Office o f the White
House, “Executive Order 12978 - Blocking Assets and Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics
Traffickers,” Weekly Compilation o f Presidential Documents 31, no. 43 (30 October 1995) 1907.
50 For more recent developments within this issue area in the wake o f 9/11, see “Follow the money,” The
Economist, 1 June 2002, 67-8; “The needle in the haystack,” The Economist, 14 December 2002, 69; and,
for a broader assessment, Kimberley L. Thachuksee, “Terrorism's Financial Lifeline: Can It be Severed?”
Strategic Forum, no. 191 (May 2002), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF 191 /sfl 91 .htm.
accessed 15 July 2004. For the time being the most effective mechanism appears to be the FATF,
especially in terms o f the mutual evaluation provisions among members. However, holding countries that
harbor known or suspected money laundering operations accountable for their actions or inactions remains
an area o f contention. For instance, even prior to 9/11, U.S. Senator John Kerry even went so far as to
advocate economic war against countries that refused to take action on this issue. Kerry, 150-68.
51 Generally speaking, the ability to effectively engage in computerized money laundering is part o f a wider
trend toward the greater use o f high-tech skills on the part o f criminal organizations. Among other
advantages, the ability to conduct business remotely allows for a higher degree o f insulation from law
enforcement agencies, particularly in the transnational context where multiple jurisdictions are involved.
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previously, despite being an important issue in its own right, the transnational movement
of illegal non-tangible assets such as those constituted by money laundering via wire
transfer falls somewhat beyond the scope of this study. However, other options used by
money launderers include sending the money abroad or using an underground banking
network, and may involve the cross-border physical movement of legal tender in various
amounts.52
In particular, bulk transport of currency is becoming increasingly more prevalent,
particularly in cases where money is physically shipped to locations from which it can
enter the international banking system more easily, in itself another manifestation of
illegal activity following the paths of least resistance. For instance, the USCS notes that,
“One by-product of tightening up . . . U.S. financial institutions has been an increased
reliance by criminal organizations on the physical transportation of currency.”

This

issue is be discussed further in the context of Colombian TCOs in Chapter VI.

See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 28-9, for a more
complete discussion o f growing criminal capabilities in this respect, as well as efforts to address these
challenges.
52 The most singular commonalties among all o f these transnational mechanisms involve trust-based
networks. For instance, throughout the Middle East hawala banking systems play a vital function in the
absence o f other economic channels, particularly with respect to remittances from overseas workers. As for
the nature o f these networks, “no money moves physically between locations; it is transferred by means o f
a telephone call or fax between dealers in different countries. N o legal contracts are involved, and
recipients are given only a code number or simple token, such as a low-value bank note tom in half, to
prove the money is due. Over time, transactions in opposite directions cancel each other out, so physical
movement o f funds is minimized. If an imbalance builds up, cash or jewelry is carried across the borders,
trade invoices are adjusted, or conventional banks are uses. Trust is the only capital that the dealers have.”
[emphasis added] See also “Still flush,” The Economist, 1 September 2002, 66; and “Cheap and trusted,”
The Economist, 24 November 2001, 71, which notes the historical role o f hawala networks in smuggling
gold from Europe to India, primarily through Dubai. Incidentally, the long distance movem ent o f funds

significantly predates the modem era. This is demonstrated by the fe i qian or flying money system
developed in the latter half o f the Tang dynasty in China, medieval Jewish trading networks, the Knights
Templar with respect to the funding o f Crusaders, and the Hanseatic League in facilitating commerce
among its members. For a historical overview o f this phenomenon, see Curtain, 1-14, while more recent
manifestations are discussed in Kotkin, 3-35.
53 U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 20. See also U.S. DOT, Office
o f Intelligence and Security, P ort Security, 12. The latter document in particular notes the following
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On a number of levels, money laundering constitutes a serious challenge to
national interests. This can be seen not only in the context of drug trafficking, but also
with respect to the sales of illicit arms, the financing of terrorism, the evasion of
sanctions, the movement of weapons of mass destruction and the smuggling of a wide
range of contraband.54 As with access to precursor chemicals, the ability of TCOs to
engage in money laundering is crucial to facilitating the transnational heroin trade, as
well as numerous other illegal market activities. These themes will be found throughout
the remainder of this analysis, particularly with respect to the case studies.
For the nation-state, the common thread of all these issues is the need for
international cooperation to meet transnational challenges. The following two sections
shift the focus to recent trends relating to global heroin supply and demand, respectively,
in an effort to establish the geographical parameters involved. Moreover, intertwined
with these market imperatives is a consideration of the various types of efforts that
nation-states can take to address the spatial aspects of this illegal activity.
As a point of departure, any consideration of the transnational heroin trade, and
by extension the smugglers’ landscape with respect to this commodity, must be
predicated upon the exigencies of supply and demand. Furthermore, the various

potential for currency smuggling via containerized freight: “$18 million o f U.S. currency in $20denominations consists o f 9,000,000 bills, weighting 2,000 pounds and amounting to approximately 40
cubic feet in volume (one measurement ton). The interior space o f a standard twenty-foot freight container
measures 1,100 cubic feet, which can accommodate 27.5 measurement tons.” Furthermore, in some parts
o f the world the majority o f all legal tender in circulation can be infused with detectable amounts o f drugs.
In South Florida, this has even resulted in court cases where drug-sniffing police dogs have pointed to
money rather than actual drugs being dismissed for lack o f evidence. See Carolyn J. Keough, “Drugstained cash widespread in South Florida,” Miami Herald (web site), 9 September 2000.
54 The prospects for cooperation on the issue o f money laundering control remain good so long as the
United States continues to not only push forward unilaterally but to encourage the building o f international
consensus as well. For a comprehensive overview o f global efforts to control money laundering, see U.S.
Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
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strategies employed by nation-states to curb such activity is salient in this context, as
these represent the primary forms of leverage by which risk can be imposed upon the
smuggler. In fact, the major differentiation among counter-drug policies is between those
that seek to disrupt supply and those that attempt to lessen demand.

Parameters o f Global Heroin Supply
While demand reduction is discussed in the following section, supply-side
strategies can be characterized as either “top-down,” those that focus on the upper
echelons of TCOs, and “bottom-up,” which aim to disrupt the relationship between
distributors and consumers.55 In general, while supply-side issues tend to be framed in
international terms, those involving demand most often fall under the aegis of domestic
policy. It should also be noted that, though addressed here as a separate topic, in general
the transit stage is treated as a component of the supply side, as are the processing and
cultivation stages.
In spatial terms, Paul Krugman puts forth a generic geographical trade model
positing that economic concentration relies on increasing returns, transportation costs and
demand.56 As with legitimate commodities, this framework can also be applied the
heroin trade. However, with respect to the illicit drug trade in general, Francisco Thoumi
notes that:
From a purely economic perspective the narrow geographical distribution of
illegal drugs is quite puzzling, since the industry’s extremely high p ro fits p ro v id e
very strong incentives to produce wherever possible and lead to expectations of a
more disperse production pattern that that of legal goods. It must also be noted

55 See UNDCP, World Drug Report { 1997), 230-1.
56 Krugman, Geography and Trade, 14-5.
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that although production and trafficking patterns of illicit drugs are significantly
more concentrated than those of licit goods, they are spreading across the globe.57
To begin with, as they relate to supply these dynamics can be vividly seen in the complex
issue of opium cultivation.
It is worth noting that potential world heroin production has increased by
approximately 60% over the past decade, while opium poppy cultivation itself has
doubled.58 For decades, the main opium producing areas were limited to two regions,
which remain the most important in global terms. These are the Golden Crescent,
centered on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, and the Golden Triangle, centered on Burma,
Thailand and Laos.59 In recent years, Afghanistan and Burma alone have accounted for
the vast majority of world cultivation and production, and as such consideration of
Southwest Asian and Southeast Asian heroin have dominated the analysis of supply at the
global level.60

37 Francisco Thoumi, “The Role o f the State, Social Institutions and Social Capital in Determining
Competitive Advantage in Illegal Drugs in the Andes,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no. 1 (Spring
1999), 72.
58 The first figure comes from U.S. DOJ, DEA, National Heroin Conference Report, Reston, VA: DEA, 3-6
February 1997, while the second comes from U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives - Central and
Southwest Asia” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, 25 January 2000). It should also be noted that when
discussing estimates o f drug cultivation and production, large discrepancies often exist, particularly
between U.S. and U.N. figures. Though much o f this may be attributed to differences in methodology, this
issue will become more apparent as this study progresses and relates directly to the data gaps discussed in
the next chapter.
59 UNDCP, “Supply o f and Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs,” 6-8. The primacy o f these two regions in world
opium production dates back at least the early 1970s, as evidenced in Lamour and Lamberti, 154. In
particular, Shelley characterized both Afghanistan and Burma (Myanmar) as “one crop illicit economies,”
defined as countries where organized crime is based on one area o f criminal activity, in this case the
cultivation o f opium poppies and the processing o f heroin. Shelley, “Identifying, Counting and
Categorizing,” 5-6.

60 However, it should also be noted that while Burmese poppy cultivation may outstrip that o f Afghanistan
in acreage, the corresponding yield o f Southeast Asian opium per acre is only about one-fourth that o f
Southwest Asia due to substantial differences in potency. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International
Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 25. This issue is also discussed at length in OGD, World Geopolitics o f
Drugs (2000), 27-30. In addition to the methodological hurdles already discussed, this report also notes
that, “in mountainous countries like Afghanistan and Burma the rugged terrain makes it hard to interpret
accurately the color spectrum o f the panchromatic photographs taken by satellite because it is affected by
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Compared to the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle, other regions have
had a more circumscribed overall impact. For instance, Latin American opium
production, centered in Colombia and Mexico, has never achieved the same economies of
scale despite expansion in recent years.61 Overall, that region is responsible for only 4%
of the total global opium supply, according to 1997 U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) statistics, though in 2000 the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) put the figure for Colombia and Mexico together at 11%.
However, the same DEA report also notes that 75% of the heroin seized in the
U.S. was of South American origin, while a further 14% came from Mexico.
Furthermore, the ONDCP source points out that Latin America’s heroin production
capacity of 11 tons now exceeds the estimated U.S. demand of 10 tons per year.62
Prominence within this key market has understandably tended to magnify perceptions of
regional production from absolute to relative terms, particularly within the realm of U.S.
drug policy-making.
Other areas continue to have a vast potential for poppy production, though as yet
these remain largely remained untapped. Within the former Soviet Union, for instance, in
addition to large tracts of land dedicated to poppy cultivation in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the Ukraine and southern Russia, there is also a pool of

slopes, shades, etc.” As such, a series o f ground checks are in order, which may or may not be feasible at
any given point in time. While Afghan opium production will be discussed at greater length in the context
o f Chapter V, for more on the impact o f Burmese drug cultivation, see American University, Trade

Environmental Database, “Opium Trade and Environment,” Case 435, available at
http://www.american.edu/TED/opium.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
61 It should be noted that the U.S. Department o f Defense sometimes refers to the Latin American drug
nexus region, comprised primarily o f Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, as the “Silver Triangle.” Though this
term’s derivation most likely comes from the region’s association with cocaine, its usage does not appear to
have entered popular parlance. See U.S. DoD, Joint Counterdrug Operations, GL-18.
62 See U.S DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 9,40; and U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives.”
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talented chemists able to turn out a wide range of natural and synthetic opium
derivatives.63 Moreover, the impact of other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, as
cultivation centers remains negligible.64
Writing three decades ago, Catherine Lamour and Michel R. Lamberti note that,
“It should not be forgotten, however, that in the poppy growing countries national
interests are also involved. Here the drug problem is by no means confined to its medical
or criminal aspects, since opium represents a means, if not the sole means, of subsistence
for large sections of the peasant population and is in addition a source of foreign currency
for the State.”65 Where poppy cultivation is deeply entrenched, attempts at eradication or
crop substitution run into hurdles involving not only economic, but also social and
developmental issues as well.66
A number of observers have also noted the predominance of marginalized ethnic
groups or other social classes in relatively underdeveloped areas with respect to opium

63 Chepesiuk, 178-9. See also Rensselaer W. Lee III, “Drugs in Communist and Former Communist
States,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 199-203; Booth, Opium, 317-9; and
OGD, Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 37-41.
64 For an historic overview o f world heroin production trends, see Jara Krivanek, Heroin: Myths and
Reality (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 105-13; and Booth, Opium, 295-338.
65 Lamour and Lamberti, vii-viii. An excellent analysis o f the interaction between these factors can be
found in UNDCP, “Drugs and Development,” ONDCP Technical Series no. 1, UNDCP/TS.l (New York:
UNDCP, May 1996), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/technical series 1994-06-01 l.html.
accessed 15 July 2004. For a less optimistic view o f the related international efforts along these lines, see
also Graham Farrell, “A Global Empirical Review o f Drug Crop Eradication and United Nations’ Crop
Substitution and Alternative Development Strategies,” Journal o f Drug Issues 28, no. 2 (1998), 395-436.
Incidentally, in 1993 an ironic manifestation o f alternatives to drug cultivation came about in Colombia,
where coca farmers from the town o f Argelia interested in participating in UNDCP extension programs
requested opium poppy seeds as a substitute crop. Clawson and Lee, 143-4.
66 In a few cases, drug eradication measures can actually be damaging to the environment. For instance, as

noted in Bentham, 45, “In the Chu valley in Kazakhstan, cannabis is the only plant which grows in the
sand. Its immediate eradication would result in an ecological disaster, transforming the valley into a
desert.” However, it would be incorrect to imply that drug crop eradication never succeeds. As an
example, the Bekaa Valley o f Lebanon has traditionally been a major source for both opium and cannabis.
As o f 1998, eradication effort had largely reached fruition due to cooperation between the Lebanese and
Syrian security forces. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” International Criminal Police Review,
no. 472-473 (1998), 1.
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cultivation.

cn

Moreover, involvement in such activities can be further linked to the

subsequent smuggling of opiates as well. The reasons for this often extend back to a
more fundamental lack of other viable socio-economic opportunities, while the ethnic
dynamics involved may serve to facilitate various smuggling venues as discussed in the
previous chapter. For instance, as Andreas points out, “smuggling provides an alternative
avenue for upward mobility for entrepreneurial but marginalized social groups that have
/TO

little access to legitimate business opportunities.”

Similarly, as Bovekerk notes,

“Wherever national borders traverse settlement regions of this kind, the conditions are
perfect for smuggling.”69
As a result, international supply reduction efforts, or the attempt to present
ongoing and systematic obstacles to the heroin trade at its various production and
logistical stages, remain exceedingly problematic. With respect to the issue of national
interests alluded to above by Lamour and Lamberti, this dimension ties directly into the
complex interaction between smuggling actors and nation-states discussed in the previous
chapter. By virtue of this relationship, the latter or its agents may have vested interests in
allowing drug cultivation or trafficking to flourish under its auspices.
Specifically, Jordan delineates four main reasons for governments to support drug
trafficking and consumption, particularly in other countries. These are to receive a
portion of the enormous profits involved, to bolster their relevant national agricultural
and commercial sectors, to support intelligence operations by gaining access to sources of

67 For instance, see Lamour and Lamberti, 253-4; and Andrew Ball, “Indigenous peoples and substance
abuse,” World Health 48, no. 4 (July-August 1995), 8. In the context o f the Golden Triangle, see also John
Bray, “Ethnic groups and the future o f Burma,” The World Today 48, no. 8-9 (August-September 1992),
144-7. This theme will be examined in greater detail in the context o f the case studies.
68 Andreas, 79.
69Bovenkerk, 117.
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information and alternative funding, and for strategic reasons such as the destabilization
of enemies.70 All of these motivations are at least touched upon in the context of this
analysis.
As noted above, the role of the United States in international drug control remains
pivotal, and is particularly salient in light of its early and concerted involvement in what
would later become seen as problem of global dimensions. In this respect, the case of
Turkey illustrates a number of the hurdles involved in stemming global drug supplies.
Once a major producer of opium, and still a major conduit for heroin flowing from the
Golden Crescent into Western Europe, Turkey’s move away from illicit opium
cultivation, and U.S. involvement in that evolution, represents in some ways the opening
shots in an escalating transnational struggle.
The sweep of U.S. counter-drug strategy first expanded on a massive scale under
the Nixon administration. In fact, the Nixon-era approach to this issue is sometimes
referred to as the “first war on drugs.” Despite its status as a vital Cold War ally and
fellow member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Turkey soon became the
primary target o f these early attempts to control the supply of opium and its derivatives.
Such was the growing perception of the threat posed by rising addiction levels that an
unnamed U.S. senator is cited as publicly threatening that the U.S. would bomb Istanbul
if Turkish opium growers continued to supply heroin via the well-known French
Connection.71

70 Jordan, 69-70.
71 Matheo Falco, “Passing Grades: Branding Nations Won’t Resolve the U.S. Drug Problem,” Foreign
Affairs 1A, no. 5 (September-October 1995), 16. The French Connection, subject o f numerous books and
movies, was a French-Corsican venture that ran from Turkey through the French port o f Marseilles, and
then beyond to New York, Montreal and other destinations. Following an international law enforcement
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In policy terms, the Nixon administration made an abortive attempt in 1971 to
allocate $35 million in “aid” to Turkey for the purpose of wiping out all but a tiny portion
of its opium harvest, the remainder being reserved for legitimate medical uses.72
However, while the U.S. initially conceived of this sum as a one-time payment, for its
part Turkey saw the potential for a recurring annual payment. As other opium producing
countries expressed interest in similar arrangements, the U.S. quietly dropped the plan
and returned to more traditional crop eradication and substitution efforts.73 However,
within a few years Turkey had largely eradicated illicit opium cultivation on its own via
strict law enforcement measures, while cultivation and smuggling patterns merely shifted
accordingly.
Support for such programs has remained a mainstay of U.S. counter-narcotics
strategy ever since.74 Moreover, with the end of the Cold War the U.S. was freed from
the compelling national security constraints of the past half-century via the dissolution of
its primary threat, the Soviet Union. The most singular immediate effect of this
development was the flexibility to more actively enlist Department of Defense assets in
the so-called “war on drugs” proper.

effort, this conduit was largely eliminated in the mid-1970s. It should be noted, however, that successful
routes and methods often exhibit eventual resurgence once the nation-state’s attention has shifted
elsewhere. For more detail, see also Lamour and Lamberti, 17-35.
72 However, as in the case o f India discussed below, Turkey’s licit opium production has also been
allegedly diverted to illegal uses. See OGD, W orld G eopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 30-2.
73 Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics o f Failure (New York: Little, Brown
and Co., 1996), 61. For more on Nixon-era drug policies in general, and the case o f Turkey in particular,
see also Chepesiuk, 59-62; and Booth, Opium, 206-9.
74 For instance, from 1981 to 1991, the period o f the Reagan and Bush administrations, spending on
interdiction efforts rose from $350 million to $2 billion, while support for programs to curtail drug
production and trafficking from source countries increased from less than $67 million to more than $660
million. Falco, 17.
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Interestingly, the final decade of the Cold War coincided with the rise of cocaine
use, especially in American cities. Due to the geography of the transnational cocaine
trade, centering on Latin America and bounded for the most part by the greater Caribbean
basin, there came to be a growing reliance on the interdiction of drugs on their way into
ne

the U.S., often through military means.

This development is addressed further in

Chapter VI, with particular reference to Colombian TCOs.
According to Jordan, the U.S. war on drugs is predicated on five assumptions, all
of which have been the grounds for debate. First, there is a relatively straightforward
conceptualization of the issue in economic terms of supply and demand, with an
emphasis on the former. Second, TCOs based on various ethnic or national groups are
identified as the major culprits. Third, the financial system is generally depicted as being
either unwitting or actually victimized by the influx of drug money. Fourth, despite the
certification process, other government’s drug control efforts are viewed optimistically
despite being undermined by corruption and intimidation. Finally, there is the
assumption that strong societal forces both within the United States and throughout the
world are fundamentally opposed to the production, distribution and consumption of
illegal drugs.76
Furthermore, at this juncture it is worth pointing out that, while the United States
is by far the most prominent smuggling destination in the world, in general nation-states
tend to be more concerned with illegal goods entering their territory than leaving it.
Thus, for instance, Mexican concerns over weapons coming into its territory from the
75 For an overview o f U.S. supply-side counter-drug policies during the 1980s, see Cooper, 107-25. The
seaborne aspects o f this regional interdiction activity are also addressed in Charles M. Fuss, Jr., Sea o f
Grass: The Maritime Drug War, 1970-1990 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996).
76 Jordan, 15-8.
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United States generally receive less attention in Washington than issues considered more
relevant, namely drugs and immigration moving northward across the common border.77
Even within the arena of supply-side strategies, in recent years the trend in U.S.
counter-narcotics policy has been to focus more attention on cultivation areas relative to
interdiction efforts at the national borders. As the INCSR 1997 unequivocally states, “We
cannot reduce the flow of drugs to the United States unless we strike as close as possible
to the source.” Thus, the U.S. government’s “international drug control programs target
the first three links of the chain: cultivation, processing and transit.”78 As mentioned
above, for the U.S., the cornerstone of targeting the global supply of drugs remains the
annual process of certification.
As a snapshot of this process, the 1997 iteration is illustrative of the gulf between
theory and practice. In the case of Nigeria, which was consistently decertified over a
period of several years throughout the 1990s for its failure to stem not only drug
trafficking but money laundering as well, the Clinton administration proved slightly more
rigorous in its application of standards. However, many of the countries listed in
previous years were taken off the decertification list, under the logic that they were
making good faith efforts and that a failure to certify them would produce more harm
than good.79

77 See Andreas, 76-7. Other major illegal U.S. exports include cigarettes and stolen automobiles. In fact,
the author goes as far with this train o f thought as to note that, given the magnitude o f contraband leaving
the country, were the U .S. to rigorously apply the certification criteria to itself a rather poor grade would

result, particularly if the evaluation focused on smuggling in general. For a ground-level perspective on the
issue o f illegal Mexican immigration to the U.S., see also Ted Conover, Coyotes: A Journey Through the
Secret World o f Am erica’s Illegal Aliens (New York: Vintage Departures, 1987).
78 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1997, “Executive Summary,” 3. See also Falco, 17.
79 For instance, during the administration o f Bush senior, sanctions related to narcotics production and
trafficking were for the most part limited to countries with which the U.S. had limited or at least
problematic relations, such as Iran, Burma, Laos, Afghanistan, and Syria, as well as Panama under Noriega
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Furthermore, Colombia, Paraguay, Pakistan and Cambodia were waived despite
failing to meet the stated standards and received certification only due to their standing
with respect to unrelated issue areas, justified in terms of their importance to vital U.S.
national interests. As U.S. aid was previously restricted on other grounds in the case of
Afghanistan, Burma and Iran, only Nigeria was both eligible to otherwise receive aid and
subsequently denied due to its government’s chronic failure in this specific issue area.80
This type of behavior underlines the OGD’s observation that, “The contradictions
between the promises of states and international institutions to fight the ‘drug scourge’
and the concessions made to narco-states when they are clients or allies are as clear as
ever.”81
Overall, criticism of the certification process tends to center on finding fault with
its allegedly vague and subjective criteria, inconsistent mechanisms, hollow punishments

in 1988 and 1989. All other countries were annually certified, including the Andean countries accounting
for all o f the world’s cocaine supply. As such, during this period the process could be characterized as both
“predictable and largely unnoticed.” Falco, 18.
80 For 1997, fourteen o f the thirty countries identified as “majors” were listed pertaining primarily to
heroin, and located outside the Western Hemisphere: Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong,
Laos, India, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. The remaining 16 nations on
the list were Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. U.S. President, Office o f the White House, “Memorandum
for the Secretary o f State, Subject: Certification o f Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug Transit
Countries,” Presidential Determination No. 98-15 (Washington, DC: Office o f the Press Secretary, 26
February 1998). Incidentally, for 2000, Nigeria received full certification, as did Pakistan and Paraguay,
while Cambodia and Haiti were certified via national interest waivers. Afghanistan and Burma were the
only countries not granted certification. Iran was no longer on the list. See U.S. Department o f State,
“2000 Narcotics Certification Determinations,” Remarks at Special Briefing Randy Beers, Assistant
Secretary for Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department o f State, and Robert Brown, Deputy
Director, ONDCP (Washington, D.C.: Department o f State, 1 March 2001), available at

http://www.state.gOv/g/inErls/rm/2001/ian apr/101 l.htm. accessed 15 July 2004. For a complete listing o f
the relevant countries, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Introduction.”
81 OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 14. Paralleling a number o f the themes put forth in Chapter II,
at a more fundamental level Jordan, 9, notes that, “Three interrelated phenomena work synergistically to
produce the narcostate: organized crime, governmental policy, and transnational capitalism.” In particular,
states transitioning economically from statism to capitalism, or from authoritarianism to democracy, can
also be seen as especially vulnerable.
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and blunt application.

More pointedly, in an Economist editorial, the somewhat tongue-

in-cheek notion is put forth that the various countries regularly decertified may be within
their rights to decertify the U.S., given that “the iron law of the market is that demand
breeds supply.”83
Perhaps in response to these types of arguments, the 2000 iteration of the
certification process in fact listed the United States as both a major precursor chemical
source country and a major money laundering country.84 This lends a certain degree of
balance to the ofiten-paternalistic pragmatism the U.S. may show in dealing with
supposed partners in the global struggle against transnational drug trafficking, and as
such must be taken as a positive sign.
In general, too much adherence to the unilateral approach, as exemplified by the
“big stick” of the certification process, not only serves to undermine multilateral efforts
but also to negatively skew important bilateral relations as well.85 While the U.S.
certainly remains “bound to lead” in this issue area, as many others, in the future the
balance between unilateral and multilateral approaches becomes even more crucial.86

82 See Council on Foreign Relations, Rethinking International Drug Control (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 1997), 5-6.
83 “Motes, beams and drugs,” The Economist, 9 March 1996, 18. However, until recently these were not
points that the United States is inclined to acknowledge. However, consider the comments o f U.S.
Secretary o f State Madeleine Albright, inclining in some ways toward a new approach to the process: “We
make our certification decisions not to stand above other countries in judgment, but to hold them up to the
same public scrutiny to which we hold ourselves.” U.S. Department o f State, Department o f the Office o f
the Spokesman, “Remarks on the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 1997,” (Washington,
DC: Department o f State, 26 February 1998).
84 See U .S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Introduction.”

85 As even the text o f one INCSR notes, “Though many countries understandably resent the process, most
governments try to ensure that they receive full certification the following year.” U.S. Department o f State,
INL, INCSR 1999, “Executive Summary,” 5.
86 See Nye, both Bound to Lead and The Paradox o f American Power, passim. For an overarching analysis
o f the United States’ role in underpinning the international system as necessary but in and o f itself not
sufficient, see also Joshua Muravchik, The Imperative o f American Leadership: A Challenge fo r NeoIsolationism (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1996). However, as o f this writing the
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Moreover, as supply only represents half of the equation, a parallel emphasis on
controlling domestic demand for drugs is also a public policy imperative. As such, the
next section examines this reciprocal issue in terms of the primary global markets and the
efforts of various governments to meet these challenges.

Parameters o f Global Heroin Demand
In many ways, the demand for drugs can be seen as providing the necessary
incentives that drive the engine of supply, particularly in terms of profit motive. As
noted above, demand-side counter-drug policies tend to fall within the arena of domestic
policy and may be characterized as relating primarily to either the treatment of drug
addicts or law enforcement measures taken against those participating in the distribution
end of the trade.
With respect to the stances of individual nation-states and their relevant legal
statutes, exceedingly harsh penalties for drug offences can be found in a number of
•

countries.

87

•

This may be contrasted with a relatively high degree of tolerance and even,

in a limited number of cases, legalization, in others, particularly in Europe. For its part,
the U.S. seems generally loath to proceed conspicuously down this path, preferring for

option o f the U.S. failing to engage with the rest o f the world appears largely moot, with the current debate
centering more on the nature o f such engagement.
87 For instance, OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 16, notes that drug possession can be a capital
crime in a number o f countries, including China, Iran, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Russia.
Furthermore, merely possessing drug paraphernalia is in itself an offense in many places. This report also
discusses the selective use o f the drug control policies by repressive regimes to quell political opposition
and otherwise infringe on human rights.
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the most part to criminalize the problem. However, despite the various strategies that
have been implemented, demand for illegal drugs persists.88
From a policy point of view, focusing on supply-side counter-drug strategies,
particularly with respect to external sources, is often a much easier course of action for
QQ

national governments in that it obviates the need to make difficult internal decisions.
While this is less problematic in countries with repressive political systems, in the case of
democracies the impact of such efforts not only directly affects a certain segment of the
voting populace, but also opens up a fundamental debate on a wide range of issues.
While the tendency to blame one’s problems on others is hardly atypical to human nature,
it does serve to skew the assumptions underlying the formulation of policy by only
encompassing half of the problem.
Moreover, this emphasis on foreign blame is certainly not a new phenomenon.
For instance, by international agreement the 1912 Hague Opium Convention committed
signatory nations to restrict production rather than consumption, an early instance of
putting a supply-side strategy over its demand-side counterpart in order to facilitate
consensus building. However, it is worth noting a 1994 RAND study determining that
$34 million invested in treatment programs in the U.S. would reduce drug use by the

88 Competing explanations for this persistence abound, though a distinction can be made between the
experimental use o f drugs and actual addiction to these substances, whereby rational decision-making is
largely superseded. With specific reference to heroin addiction, see Inciardi, 69-79. Not only does the
author note the various schools o f thought on this issue, he also quotes several actual users commenting on
their personal experiences with heroin. See also UNDCP, World Drug Report { 1997), 45-69, for more on
theories and interpretations o f illegal drug abuse; and “Just say maybe,” The Econom ist, 5 April 2003, 72-3,

for a discussion o f the parameters o f the legalization debate.
89 For instance, see Falco, 15-16. Characteristic o f this attitude, quite prevalent in U.S. policy-making
regarding this issue area, is the following statement: “From a domestic perspective, in is increasingly clear
that we cannot sustain a reduction in drug use without attacking foreign supplies.” U.S. Department o f
State, “Narcotics Control in Asia,” Statement o f Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary o f State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, U.S. Department o f State Dispatch 6, no. 27 (3 July 1995),
540.
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same amount as $336 million invested in interdiction efforts or $783 million in source
country programs.90
Generally speaking, the most significant end-user markets have been, and will
most likely remain for the foreseeable future, Western Europe and North America. From
the perspective of the mid-1970s, Lamour and Lamberti observe that, “For many years
America was the only consumer of heroin, and today she remains the chief market.”91
However, while the United States continues to exert its leadership on international drug
control efforts, according to the ONDCP, as of 1999 the U.S. itself consumed only 11%
of the world’s drugs, and an even less significant 3% of opium products.92 While the
U.S. still contains a large number of heroin users, by one estimate Europe as a whole has
over ten times as many.

90 This study cited in Falco, 20.
91 Lamour and Lamberti, 50. Writing from the European point o f view, the authors furthermore note the
“veritable psychosis” o f Americans on the subject o f illegal drugs. In the U.S., heroin use can be seen to
have reached a plateau following the First World War, leveling o ff following the Second World War, and
then resuming its rise again in the 1960s. From the vantage point o f the mid-1970s, the authors continue by
saying, “Obviously the United States are more affected than any other country by the new wave o f drug
addiction, since they hold the world record where addicts are concerned. But in 1972 their position was no
longer as lonely as it had been three years earlier. The demand for narcotics is steadily increasing, with a
corresponding expansion o f the market available to international characters.” Lamour and Lamberti, 7-9.
For the most part, demand trends have continued to be extrapolated along these lines. See also Chepesiuk,
44-50; and Block and Chambliss, 31-9.
92 Used to support a policy focus on Latin American cocaine, these statistics are cited in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Testimony o f Barry R. McCaffrey (27 April 1999). For a more recent
overview o f the domestic U.S. heroin market, as well as various other trends, see U.S. DOJ, National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment 2002 (Johnstown, PA: December 2001),
available at http://www.usdoi.gov/ndic/pubs07/716/index.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
93 As elsewhere within this issue area, statistics vary widely. However, Chepesiuk, 39-40, cites estimates
o f 40,000 heroin users in the U.S., and between 500,000 and a million users in Europe. However, ONDCP
estimates that the U.S. has around 600,000 heroin users, as opposed to 1.5 million in Europe, only two and
a half tim es as many. U.S. ONDCP, “Drug P olicy Perspectives.” Regardless o f the exact number o f

addicts, the fact remains that heroin constitutes a major public health issue throughout Europe. For
instance, U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 4, reports that
heroin is the drug most cited in European studies o f drug-related crime, deaths, demand for treatment and
HIV infection. For more on drugs in Europe, see also Bentham, 36-9; and E.U, European Monitoring
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), “2002 Annual Report on the State o f the Drugs
Problem in the E.U. and Norway” (Brussels, Belgium: EMCDDA, 3 October 2003), available at
http://ar2002.emcdda.eu.int/en/home-en.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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From the policy point of view, among European nations there exists a
traditionally broad cooperation on drug control, especially in the related areas of
chemical control and money laundering. As the union grew closer, however, there was
the perception early on of the need for European Union countries to harmonize their
counter-drug policies, not only in the context of law enforcement but in terms of
treatment and other forms of demand reduction.94
Overall, the lobby in favor of legalization appears to have more support in Europe
than in the United States.95 In particular, it appears that lenient policy stances on soft
drugs, or those considered less addictive such as cannabis, serves to attract criminal
dealers in both soft and hard drugs. The position of the Netherlands in this regard is
particularly germane.96 As such, even as early as the 1970s, the country had been
considered a major heroin trafficking hub.97

94 Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990),
191-3. As an aside, illustrating how much the international situation has changed since this work’s
publication, Clutterbuck advocates not only the use o f both NATO and Warsaw Pact assets for interdiction
efforts but also a joint U.S.-Soviet combined command for a “world war on drugs,” under U.N. auspices.
95 However, this attitude may be changing. For instance, “Although Europeans historically have tended to
take a liberal view toward drug use, viewing drug abuse as a medical and social problem, E.U. governments
have become increasingly concerned about abuse trends and have taken a more aggressive stand toward
narcotics trafficking.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 4.
For more on the international debate among the options o f the legalization, regulation or prohibition o f
drugs, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 184-99. Interestingly, this source also points out that,
in addition to shifting criminal operations to other venues, there would almost certainly be a residual
market for illegal drugs if certain categories where excluded or if only some countries exercised this option.
See also Patrick Lloyd Hatcher, “The Unwinnable War on the Drug Trade,” ORBIS 41, no. 4 (Fall 1997),
653-8.
96 By the mid-1990s, French President Jacque Chirac was reported as being particularly annoyed that the
Netherlands had become something o f a drug haven within the E.U. See “Drug dealers? What drug
dealers?” The Economist, 12 October 1996, 58.
97 Moreover, Block and Chambliss, 127, note that, “In addition, there is little effort by either law

enforcement agencies or Government bureaucrats in stopping the traffic. The Dutch are, it seems, content
to let it continue as long as it is perceived to be a foreign or nonwhite problem.” In particular, the authors
list the role o f Chinese criminal organizations in the transshipment o f heroin via Amsterdam, and the
involvement o f local Chinese, Mollucan and Surinamese elements as both distributors and consumers. For
more recent analysis o f the drug trade in the Netherlands, including the rise in the production o f ATS and
other types o f synthetic drugs, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central
Asia - Netherlands.”
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Thus, with the loosing of intra-E.U. border controls in the late 1990s, it was
reported that nearly 90% of the LSD, amphetamines and Ecstasy seized in Germany
during 1998 either originated in or transited via the Netherlands.98 As such, a
standardization of drug policy must be high on the E.U. agenda for the new millennium.
Furthermore, it is in the U.S. interest not only to do all it can to facilitate such efforts but
to move beyond such regional regimes to more comprehensive multilateral efforts to
address drug trafficking and related issues.99
While the European Union, and its constituent membership, remains the United
States’ closest partner within this issue area, as on so many others, at times divergences
of interest certainly occur. For instance, patterns of domestic drug use in Germany
encouraged broad support for the U.S. drug control agenda up to the 1980s, when the
U.S. focus shifted to cocaine while Germany remained more interested in controlling
heroin trafficking.
By the early 1990s, German officials were becoming increasingly concerned with
low-priced, high-purity heroin entering the country from the Middle and Far East, as
reflected in greater volume of seizures and arrests, as well as the rise in drug-related
deaths due primarily to heroin overdose. The continuation of unilateral German aid to
opium-producing nations regardless of U.S. certification or even an analogous German or
European process can be alternatively considered either practical and flexible or self-

98 Eduard Lintner, “Germany: A strict approach,” W orld an d 1 13, no. 10 (October 1998), 73. See also

Saskia Sissons, “Liberal Drug Policy Angers EU Neighbors,” The European, July - August 1996, 21.
99 For instance, note the establishment o f the Trevi Group, comprised o f various Western European nations,
the U.S. and Canada, as an international coordination group against drug trafficking and terrorism. For
more on the apparent hardening o f the European Union’s stance, see Rory Watson, “New Crackdown on
Drug Menace,” European Voice, 30 November 1995, 1. Flowever, despite these efforts at policy
coordination, definite differences o f opinion exist among E.U. members, as noted above. For more on
regional and sub-regional drug control efforts, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 176-80.
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serving and short-sighted. However, it should be noted that, in the case of Germany,
efforts are taken to separate international development programs from its internal law
enforcement policies, which remain strict.100
Illustrative o f the fact that demand-side issues are not necessarily region-specific,
even before the end of the Cold War an important component of the Soviet illicit drug
market were a variety of home-brewed opium derivatives. These appear to have
accounted for a significant proportion of drug use, given the relative scarcity of refined
narcotics vis-a-vis the West. Thus, upon the opening of the Russian economy, the market
was actually quite developed and receptive to new products.101 According to Russian law
enforcement officials, drug use in 1992 was fifteen times a high as in 1987.102 More
recently, the OGD noted that the number of addicts in the county is over three million,
with one Russian citizen in five having some sort of relationship with drugs.103
In terms of domestic drug control, in 1986 the Soviets launched a series of
biannual mak (poppy) eradication programs in Central Asia, which continued to grow
until 1991. Since then, successor programs have also been implemented, often at least

100 Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 88, 106-8.
101 Vincenzo Ruggiero, Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe (London: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996),
113-4. Incidentally, as o f 1991 a principal foreign drug supplier to Russia was North Korea, with opium
brought in by forestry workers entering the country via intergovernmental contracts. Others involved in
servicing the growing Russian drug market included Afghanistan, Vietnam, Iran, Hungary and Romania.
102 Chepesiuk, 178. By one estimate, there were one-and-a-half million narcotics users in the former Soviet
Union in 1991. That number had risen to between five and seven million by 1993. Lesser, though still
impressive, figures were reported by Russian officials in 1999, specifically o f 350,000 registered drug users
and 175,000 registered drug addicts. However, both the Russian Ministry o f Interior and Health Ministry
estimate that the true numbers are ten times greater, approximately 3 million users and nearly 2 million
addicts. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 12.
103 OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 112-3. This report also notes that the structure o f the Russian
drug market also underwent a drastic change in 1999, with pre-existing demand for poppy straw
derivatives, hashish and marijuana being replaced by both refined heroin and synthetic drugs.
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partially funded by the UNDCP.104 While few would minimize the challenge that
Russian economic reform poses for the allocation of increasingly scarce resources, the
need for effective drug control measures seems self-evident. Moreover, the former
Soviet republics of Central Asia remain highly vulnerable to drug-related organized
criminal activity, as discussed below and in the context of Chapter V.105
Globally, as the spatial demand patterns for heroin continue to evolve, other
countries not previously pressured by the challenges of drug abuse also increasingly have
to make similarly difficult decisions as their own levels of domestic drug use expand.
For instance, Australia recorded the most significant rise in volume of heroin seized in
the world for 1998.106 In a further example of the blurring of lines between global
supply and demand, countries which have been traditionally been strictly producers or
transshipping conduits are increasingly encountering higher numbers of or drug addicts,
along with all the other related social ills.107

104 Unfortunately, these operations have led to fears that such undertakings have become too similar to
counter-insurgency operations. With the danger o f the Peruvian and Colombian narco-terrorism models in
mind, the search for sustainable goals and the offer o f alternative development plans will hopefully
preclude an over-reliance on security forces. Mark Galeotti, “The Drugs War in Central Asia,” Jan e’s
Intelligence Review, October 1994,461-2. See also Peter Fuhrman, “Lethal Harvest,” Forbes 150, no. 1 (6
July 1992), 45.
105 See, for instance, Rensselaer W. Lee III, “Russia’s New Drug Threat,” Eurasian Reports: A Report by
the Center fo r American-Eurasian Studies and Relations, Winter 1994-1995, 33-50; and “Deadly traffic,”
The Economist, 29 March 2003, 38-9. The latter source also notes that, since the late 1990s, the region has
experienced the fastest growing rates o f heroin addiction in the world.
106 This was predominantly o f Southeast Asian origin, which is understandable given the regional proximity
and trading patterns. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1. See also Morrison, 9-14. For a more
recent incident illustrative o f this trend, see Jamie Tarabay, “Australia Charges N. Korean Ship’s Crew in
Drug Case,” Washington Post, 22 April 2003, A15.
107 See U .S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessm ent, Ch. II, 6, which notes

that, “Countries that today are major narcotics producing or transit areas have significant drug addiction
problems that grew with their involvement with the drug trade.” As an example o f this trend, ONDCP cites
an Interpol estimate that Pakistan has 3 million addicts, while Thailand has at least 600,000. U.S. ONDCP,
“Drug Policy Perspectives.” This report also notes that while China, India and Iran also report growing
heroin addict populations, hard statistics are lacking. Though only recently recognized in some policy
making circles, this is not a particularly new phenomenon, as discussed in Lloyd Garrison, “Let them shoot
smack: Heroin, once mostly an export, is now a scourge at home,” Time, 19 March 1984, 35.
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Similarly, as new routes appear this phenomenon can become even more
pronounced. It is not too much to consider the correlation between the geography of
trafficking routes and levels of drug use as almost axiomatic, especially in cases where
growers and couriers are paid not only in cash but also in kind. In such instances, the
drugs used for payment in kind tends to remain within the local area and in turn stimulate
local drug use.

108

Moreover, various other tangential effects related to increased drug use

may become manifest as well.109 The next section serves to further develop the concept
of global heroin supply chains and their ramifications.

The Transnational Movement o f Heroin
While the supply of and demand for heroin obviously serve to shape the
transnational movement of this commodity, as discussed previously the trends relating to
globalization and economic liberalization also have relevance in this respect. Putting this
issue into context, as well as reiterating the challenges posed to the nation-state, the
UNDCP notes that:
The growth of international trade - while a welcome development that augers
well for the livelihood of the global market - have also made the interdiction of
illicit drugs difficult. Free trade agreements in different parts of the world,
designed to increase trade and reduce border regulation, are also likely to have
inadvertently provided opportunities for illicit drug trafficking. As it is not
desirable to turn back the tide of free trade, it will be increasingly important to
increase efforts to reconcile two seemingly contradictory aims, namely trade
liberalization and the effective control of the illicit drug trade.110

108 For instance, the health and social consequences o f drug abuse are discussed at length in UNDCP,
World Drug Report { 1997), 70-109.
109 An excellent example o f this can be found in the rise o f documented HIV infections in prolific drug
trafficking areas. For instance, with respect to Southeast Asia see Charles W. Henderson, “Drug Routes In
Asia See HIV Increase,” AIDS Weekly, 13 March 2000, page not available.
110 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 25.
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While the spatial parameters already discussed are certainly crucial to understanding the
smugglers’ landscape, it is the logistical linkage between supply and demand that
constitutes the crux of this study.
As one U.S. drug enforcement official notes, “From the perspective of drug law
enforcement, DEA views drug trafficking as a seamless continuum. The domestic and
international aspects of the trafficking organizations are inextricably woven together.”111
While this indicates a certain logical and cohesive pattern of behavior on the part of
smuggling actors, the task of discerning the underlying decision-making rationale
remains quite complex in practice. A 1987 analysis even makes the following
observation, less than edifying but all too true, with respect to discernible patterns of
heroin smuggling: “None. Anywhere, anyway, any quantity.”112
However, despite this apparent empirical chaos, the point of departure for this
discussion remains that transnational drug smuggling routes and methods will tend to
follow the path of least resistance toward the most attractive and profitable markets. To
begin with, as drugs are essentially a fungible commodity, for the most part the total
global drug supply alone does not appear to have direct impact either on the availability
of drugs within a given market, or on price as an indirect measure of that availability.
For instance, in spite of major efforts aimed at disrupting supply, heroin prices in the
United States remained relatively unchanged throughout the 1990s.113

111 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, Testimony o f Donnie Marshall, Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency, 3 March
1999, available at http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct990303.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
112 CCC/IAHP, C C C /IA P H Guidelines, 18.
113 As noted in Chepesiuk, 258, in the U.S. heroin was actually cheaper in 1997 than in 1981, when the
Reagan administration launched its “war on drugs.” Furthermore, in the past two decades not only has
heroin use surged, but street supply has doubled as well. Further evidence o f this pricing trend can be seen

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132

Furthermore, by its very nature the pathology of drug abuse and dependency help
to ensure that the overall demand for drugs remains relatively inelastic. This inelasticity
of demand is particularly apparent in comparison to other agricultural commodities,
whose global markets are generally marked by weakness and instability, a fact which
serves to make drug cultivation all the more attractive by comparison.114 As the UNDCP
noted in 1997, “only in the illicit drug industry can seizures of between 10 and 30 percent
of production, the forfeiture of a (small) percentage of financial and other assets and the
loss, through death or imprisonment, of a percentage of operatives, impose merely an
imperceptible or short-term impact on retail price and still allow large net profits at every
stage o f the distribution chain.”115
It should also be noted that, much as other goods increase in price as they move
though the hands o f various middlemen, the bulk of the profit from heroin comes as it
nears its final destination.116 In this particular case, it has been estimated that, altogether,

in the 30% drop in heroin prices in the U.K. between November 1990 and December 2001. See “It’s all in
the price,” The Economist, 8 June 2002, 52-3
114 Williams and Florez, 3. See also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 125. In the corresponding
logistical context, this aspect is referred to as the “distance elasticity o f demand,” or the relative response to
effective demand to changes in transport costs on the part o f the consumer. This dynamic is analyzed
further using the international shipment o f petroleum, another commodity whose demand is relatively
inelastic, in Zenon S. Zannetos, The Theory o f Oil Tankship Charges (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966).
115 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 9-10, 231. Specifically, estimated global interception rates for
heroin in recent years is put at roughly 15 percent. This source also notes that the corresponding rate for
cocaine is approximately 30 percent. See also Graham Farrell, “The Global Rate o f Interception o f Illicit
Opiates and Cocaine, 1980-94,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), which notes the
role that the risk o f interception and other law enforcement measures play in maintaining the prices o f illicit
drugs.
116 However, it should also be noted that the final distribution stage also carries the highest risk as well. In
general, the lucrative profit margins involved have led a number o f TCOs to diversify from their more
traditional core activities into drug transshipment. For instance, “Although they are not narcotics producers
themselves, many organized crime groups - including those from Russia, China, Italy, and Albania - have
cultivated and expanded ties to drug-trafficking organizations to obtain cocaine, heroin, and synthetic drugs
for their own distribution markets and trafficking networks.” U.S Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 6.
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growing, refining and transporting heroin account for only 13% of its retail price.117
Furthermore, in terms of street-level distribution patterns, the illegal drug trade is
“organized like any other importing-wholesaling-retailing business.” At the top level,
those who can handle multiple-kilo lots, those who can handle single kilograms, down
through quarter-kilo, single ounces and, finally, local pushers. The product is generally
adulterated at each level, with a cost to the end user in excess of 300 times the cost of the
original kilo.118
Given the vast complexity of issues and the number of actors involved, the most
straightforward metaphor for the transnational heroin trade is that of a pipeline, traveling
from cultivation and processing through some form of transit to distribution at the final
destination.119 In terms of supply and demand, cultivation regions provide the source of
raw materials, which are, in turn, refined, marketed and then transshipped in response to
international demand. The diagram below offers a generic depiction of such a notional
pipeline, along with the various factors that may serve to diminish the available supply as
it moves to a given market:
117 Falco, 18. To further highlight this disparity, the UNDCP noted in 2000 that, while Afghan farmers
could expect to earn about $14 per pound o f opium, at the consuming end the cost o f a pound o f uncut
heroin in European or North American markets can exceed $40,000. Even keeping in mind the roughly
ten-to-one ratio o f raw opium to heroin, this is an incredibly lucrative profit margin. See Christopher S.
Wren, “U.N. Forsakes Effort to Curb Poppy Growth By Afghans,” New York Times (web edition), 17
September 2000, 2. Offering evidence o f an even higher profit margin, Booth, Opium, 331-2, notes that a
kilogram o f Southeast Asian heroin sells for between $66 and $75, while the same kilogram, obviously
diluted several times over, retails for between $940,000 and $1.4 million.
118 Cressey, 10-1. While the data referenced in this article dates from the late 1960s, there is little reason to
believe that the relative price differentials or other underlying functionalities have changed significantly
since that time. A more recent analysis o f this issue, including an attempt to compensate for the inherent
difficulties in measuring the price o f illicit drugs, can be found in William Rhodes, Raymond Hyatt and
Paul Scheiman, “The Price o f Cocaine, Heroin and Marijuana, 1981-1993,” Journal o f Drug Issues 24, no.
3 (1994), 383-402. However, the focus here is on the street-level prices in the United States, rather than the
differential markup on imports.
119 As a point o f clarification, the distinction made between cultivation o f opium and the actual production
o f heroin is due to varying crop yield factors. UNDCP, “Supply o f and Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances 1996,” UNDCP Technical Series, no. 7 (New York: UNDCP, 1998), available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical series 1998-03-01 l.pdf. accessed 15 July 2004.
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Fig. 9. Heroin global accounting (“cornstalk”) diagram120

As the contraband moves from the source area to its final destination, the
processing steps from raw opium to heroin are implicit, and may theoretically take place
at any point along the route. In general, processing that takes place closer to the source is
considered “upstream,” while cases where these steps occur in closer proximity to the
target market may be considered more “downstream.” Incidentally, a recent trend is for a
higher percentage of heroin processing to take place further upstream than before.

120 This figure is adapted from a diagram developed for cocaine, “Global Accounting Chart,” in U.S. DOJ,
DEA, Semiannual Interagency Assessment o f Cocaine Movement - Seventeenth Edition, Year End Review,
(March 1999). While the document itself is classified, the chart is not. Due to its distinctive outline, it is
know colloquially as the “cornstalk” diagram. In the original conceptualization, this global accounting
applies to the amount o f cocaine that is notionally available strictly for domestic U.S. consumption, rather
than the more generic “destination” used here.
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However, the dilution or “cutting” of pure heroin with various types of adulterating
agents, as mentioned previously, may take place at any time following processing. In
general, this activity becomes more prominent as the product moves toward the streetlevel of distribution and the final end-user.121
The arrows above the transit pipeline illustrate the efforts of the nation-state to
disrupt the supply of heroin available in a given target market via confiscation. Similarly,
the set of arrows on the lower side represent various other types of operational losses that
smugglers might expect to sustain. However, certain factors that effect potential
production a priori, such as crop eradication or drought, are not included in this
schematic, nor are the impact of counter-drug strategies and other variables that serve to
directly reduce demand. Another important dynamic to keep in mind is that, as the
product moves through the supply pipeline, it gains tremendously in value.122
Moreover, the range of physical concealment methods involved is truly
staggering, and as noted previously is limited only by the imaginations of smuggling
actors.

123

•

The lucrative profit margins also account for practices such as body carrying in

its various forms, which including the physical swallowing of drugs as well as contraband

121 For more on this issue, see also Ross Coomber, “The Cutting o f Heroin in the United States in the
\99Qs,” Journal o f Drug Issues 29, no. 1 (1999), 17-36.
122 As an example, Cooper, 50-1, notes that an Afghan farmer can receive as little as $1 for his opium crop
for every $42,000 it will earn on the retail market. However, this is in fact more profit than can be accrued
for nearly any other crops available. This issue w ill be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.

123 Numerous documented methods are discussed in Booth, Opium, 232-8, with a common theme being the
use o f any type o f item that can potentially be hollowed out for the internal concealment o f drugs.
However, among the more bizarre are drugs hidden in the false horns on animals, peanut shells, dead
kittens, live camels’ stomachs, and, during the Vietnam War, inside body bags containing dead U.S.
soldiers. However, the author also notes that, “Most modem heroin transshipment is done by containerized
freight aboard ships, air freight cargo, vehicles, international mail parcels, concealment on commercial
airline flights and light aircraft.”
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secreted in clothes or luggage.124 Such methods are particularly common in heroin
smuggling due to its high price in relation to volume.125
However, despite this profit margin, when compared to multi-ton shipments of
marijuana or cocaine, heroin smuggling that relies on relatively small parcels is
sometimes characterized as “inefficient.” Nonetheless, the expendable nature of a certain
class of courier, known collectively as “mules,” within the wider context of organized
criminal activity appears to more than offset the associated risks in comparison to the
anticipated profits.126
While not addressed directly, the intent of this conceptualization is to ignore
neither the temporal aspects of this phenomenon that evolve over time, nor the interaction
with other black markets as most saliently illustrated by the two-way exchange inherent
to all business transactions. Moreover, though at this level of analysis the issue of heroin
in transit seems distinctly linear, there is a multitude of specific paths by which drugs can
proceed toward their final destination. These may be broken down by the three primary
modes of transportation, namely land, sea and air, or by some combination thereof, as
outlined in the previous chapter.127

124 The ingestion o f contraband is known colloquially as “swallowing,” while methods utilizing the other
end o f the alimentary canal are known as “stuffing.” Moreover, both phenomena are generally covered
under the umbrella term o f “body packing.” The empirical aspects o f this phenomenon are addressed
further in Chapter VII. More generically and in the context o f internal medicine, the risks involved,
detection techniques and treatment should the packages rupture are discussed in L. S. Nelson, “The Clinical
Syndrome o f ‘Body Packing,’” Journal o f Toxicology: Clinical Toxicology 38, no. 5 (March 2000), 175.
125 For instance, with respect to the end market, see “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995,
44, which notes that, “Heroin is more profitable than cocaine: $65,000 - 75,000 a kilo (2.2 pound) in

Miami, against $14,000-18,000 for cocaine.”
126 See Peter Reuter, “The organization and measurement o f the international drug trade,” Conference
Report, Economics o f the Narcotics Industry, sponsored by the Bureau o f Intelligence and Research, U.S.
Department o f State, 21-22 November 1994.
127 In particular, trends such as the containerization o f international cargo have had a major impact on
smuggling patterns, as discussed in the previous chapter. As the volume o f containers has risen, so has the
risk to nation-states, not only with respect to smuggling but to terrorism as well. Paralleling earlier
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Fig. 10. Worldwide heroin seizures by conveyance (1998)128

With respect to this issue, the diagram above delineates the global aggregate of
heroin seizures by mode of conveyance for a single sample year, in this case 1998.
However, a number of caveats should be noted in interpreting this data. To begin with,
given the prominence of intermodal shipping trends in modem logistics, categorizing a
given seizure that has traveled via more than one mode of transit can be problematic.

observations that the same channels that move one commodity can move others, an executive from CSX
Lines, a major shipping company, notes that, “If you can smuggle heroin in containers, you may be able to
smuggle a nuclear bomb.” Quoted in Graham Allison, “Could worse be yet to come?” (Special report fighting terrorism), The Economist (web edition), 3 November 2001. Furthermore, there also exists a
definite relationship between drug smuggling and cargo theft, as both phenomena encompass the same
logistical infrastructure. Speaking in the context o f the U.S., Edward V. Badolato notes that, “The use o f a
drug gang’s organization, contacts, transportation systems and underground marketing systems for illegal
goods provides a ready made entree for drug traffickers to participate in the cargo theft business.” Profits
from cargo theft may then be used to fund other illegal activities or, conversely, the stolen goods may be

used as collateral in drug transactions. Another factor making cargo theft relatively more attractive is the
significantly more lenient punishment vis-a-vis drug offenses. Edward V. Badolato, Chairman, National
Cargo Security Council, “Cargo Security: Avoiding Theft Loss in the New Millennium,” presented at
Supply Chain Solutions ’99, Baltimore, MD, 21 September 1999. See also Julie Salazano and Stephen W.
Hartman, “Cargo Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no.l (Spring 1997), 39-49.
128 This chart comes from U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide,” n.d., available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/di/products/cncweb/home.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
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Furthermore, there is no way of directly measuring how much heroin was successful
shipped to its destination, only how much was not.
As such, it is exceedingly difficult to assess the effectiveness of law enforcement
efforts in this respect, as a high seizure rate may indicate that the relevant mode is either
relatively well regulated or that other modes are not. For instance, the use of mail to ship
drugs may stem from the method either not being statistically significant in terms of
volume or merely seldom detected, and perhaps even both. Similarly, the relatively small
amount of seizures made at laboratories, by definition a mandatory stage of heroin
processing, points more specifically to the ineffective policing or outright corruption
often found upstream, as well as the difficulties in even locating such activity. These
issues, as well as others relating to the difficulties in measuring black market and other
illegal activity, is addressed further in the next chapter.
However, there are certain factors relating to the transnational heroin trade that
can be extrapolated in a more general way. For instance, the volume of seizures from
shipments by land dominates this particular data set. As opium is an agricultural product,
at least the initial portion of any given heroin shipment’s commodity chain must begin
with a land-based component. Much of this can be linked to heavy traffic areas at border
crossings on the part of both vehicles and individuals as discussed previously. With
respect to the latter in particular, the amounts of heroin involved tend to be smaller, as
discussed previously in the context of body carrying.
With respect to maritime drug trafficking, in a historical sense this has been the
dominant mode for the movement of drugs, particularly in terms of volume. This trend
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was even more significant prior to the advent of regular international air travel.129
Moreover, a number of factors serve to facilitate this seaborne trade, with geography at
the top of the list.

For instance, Morrison notes among her primary criteria for

potential drug transit nations whether or not a country has coastal access.

1T1

Furthermore,

seaports can easily be utilized to insert various forms of transiting contraband into the
wider legitimate transportation infrastructure via access to various types of intermodal
connectivity nodes, such as road and rail networks, inland waterway systems and airports.
Finally, the significance of air transportation of heroin is likely to be curtailed for
the foreseeable future, in light of the relatively stricter controls on air transportation since
9/11 and the resultant wider efforts to protect critical logistical nodes and related
infrastructure. However, there is little reason to believe that such activity will wither
away entirely due to enhanced security measures at airports, particularly where airdrops
and other less traditional delivery mechanisms are concerned. As discussed previously,
the use of air modes o f smuggling can vary in terms of being either commercial or
private, with the former primarily involving smaller amounts of contraband secreted in

129 The importance o f this issue at the international level is reflected in the passage o f U.N. Resolution
A .872 (20), “Guideline for the Prevention and Suppression o f the Smuggling o f Drugs, Psychotropic
Substances and Precursor Chemicals on Ships Engaged in International Maritime Traffic,” adopted on 27
November 1997.
130 As Aune, 1-2, notes, “Geography is the main component o f the maritime drug trade: the physical
position or form and accessibility by sea countries or regions influence how and to what degree certain
modes o f transport are used for drug trafficking into or through them.” Transportation by water also easily
lends itself to methods o f multiple routing, by which several ports o f call are made in an effort to disguise

the actual transit o f drugs or other contraband. For instance, “Drug smugglers obfuscate the origins and
destinations o f their shipments by permeating the legitimate flows o f international commerce. By varying
their distribution patterns and using multiple transit points, drug smugglers increase their prospects for
evading contraband enforcement and avoiding priority-country customs inspections.” U.S. DOT,
MARAD, “Emergence o f Vietnam as a Transit Country for Heroin Traffic is Exploiting the Containerized
Export Trade,” Maritime Security Report, no. 2 (April 1996), 12.
131 Morrison, 10-2.
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the luggage or on the person of individual mules, or concealed within the structure of the
plane itself.
In general, the rise of the transnational market for illegal drugs that began in a
rudimentary and localized manner at the turn of the century had become a truly global
phenomenon even by the early 1970’s. Since that turning point, subsequent
developments may largely be characterized as comprising more than anything else a
search for and consolidation of markets. Thus, in addition to the various types of risk
imposed by nation-states, in competing for these markets smuggling actors in turn also
impose additional levels of risk upon one another.
In response to these market imperatives, drug trafficking networks may be seen as
constantly evolving, particularly with respect to their intra- and inter-ethnic transnational
dimensions. As discussed previously, while obviously not a new phenomenon,
ethnically-based organized crime groups are taking on an increasingly transnational
character. In practice, this means that smuggling actors are becoming more mobile,
willing to collaborate when necessary, and conversant with high technology, but also
more prone to violence in order to protect perceived interests.132 Moreover, members of
certain ethnic groups seem particularly suited for a role in the international heroin trade
by virtue of various geographic advantages, such as an established presence in major drug
production areas or in key markets.
Examples of these types of spatial leverage would include a high demographic
concentration in a region where opium both grows well and is difficult to eradicate, a
favorable position either within or in opposition to an appropriately situated central

132 Chepesiuk, 105.
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government, or a traditional involvement in such illicit trading activities.

1 1 'l

Such

networks may also exhibit traditional patterns of both vertical and horizontal integration.
Moreover, heroin trafficking has provided an effective way for a variety of ethnonationalist guerrilla and terrorist groups to obtain funding.134 In general, however, there
is an extremely fine line between groups that seek to justify criminal activity by way of a
political rationalization, and more blatantly profit-seeking TCOs.
At the national level, however, individual nation-states can also be characterized
as either “vulnerable” or “sensitive” to drug transit. Under this conceptualization, the key
relationship is between the country in question and the final transshipment point, as
opposed to that with the source country since the potential for multiple routing variations
become too complex.

1

As Morrison notes, “Any country in the world could become a

drug transit point, even those not on direct routes between producing and consuming
regions. However, this is not to suggest that transshipment routes are chosen randomly.
133 Lamour and Lamberti write that, “It is a noteworthy fact that, generally speaking, the traffickers always
belong to peripheral or closed ethnic groups.” Using observations dating to the mid-1970s and finding the
phenomenon “perfectly explicable” by virtue o f their relative marginalization, the authors continue by
citing the Italian-American, and later Cuban, Puerto Rican and African-American influences in the United
States; Corsicans in France; Sicilians in Italy; Turks in Germany; and the non-resident “overseas” Chinese
throughout Asia. Lamour and Lamberti, 22. For more on Jewish-American drug racketeering through the
1930s, and the subsequent transition to Italian-American organized crime activity, see Block, 40-1, 105-11.
In particular, the author also notes the primary overseas suppliers for these Italian-American groups as
French, Greek, Lebanese and Syrian traders. For more on the trading roles o f transnational “middleman”
minorities, see also Horowitz, 107-24.
134 In the past, links between drug traffickers and armed anti-government groups have been for the most
part localized activities, as in the case o f Sendero Luminoso (SL, or Shining Path) in Peru. However, other
groups with a wider transnational reach that have been linked to drug trafficking include the Liberation
Tigers o f Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Basque Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and the
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey. See Roos, 40; Schmid, 70-2;
and OGD, W orld G eopolitics o f D rugs (2000), 54-5, on the Tigers and 95-7 on ETA. For a wider

analytical overview o f this phenomenon, see also U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, “Narco-Terror: The Worldwide
Connection Between Drugs and Terror,” Testimony o f Randy Beers and Francis X. Taylor, 13 March 2002,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/02031300.htm. accessed 15 July 2004; and Frank
Viviano, “Drug Trade Feeds World’s Rebellions: Profits From Smuggling Keeps Causes Alive,” San
Francisco Chronicle, 18 December 1992, A l.
135 This typology comes from Morrison, 7-14, which in turn builds in part upon Friman, 65-83.
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As opportunists, drug traffickers weigh up the costs and benefits of potential routes in
order to choose those which are most hospitable to drug transit or provide the lowest risk
of detection.”136
Among the factors that Morrison discusses as affecting the establishment of drug
transit nodes is a given country’s strategic position, in particular those relating to physical
geography and encompassing both the range of transportation options available and the
porosity of the relevant borders. Similarly, under the conceptualization outlined above,
involvement in the drug trade can occur either directly via alignment between traffickers
and legitimate governments, or indirectly as the result of a weak central governmental
control or inadequate law enforcement.137
No matter what the mode or method of smuggling, however, transnational
smuggling actors remain very quick to adapt to their changing operational landscape,
particularly in response to risks imposed on their operations by the nation-state. As
ONDCP Director of Strategy James R. McDonough noted in 1998 with respect to entry
into the U.S., “Over the past five years, they [drug traffickers] have reduced their transitzone vulnerabilities by shifting from non-commercial aircraft to maritime methods,
quickly shifting routes in response to effective law enforcement operations.”138 In some
ways this observation restates the generic smuggling model, namely that illicit trade will

136 Morrison, 7-9.
137 Ibid., 2.
138 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee for Coast Guard

and Marine Transportation, Statement by James R. McDonough, Director o f Strategy, Office o f National
Drug Control Strategy, 10 June 1998, 4. In an even more general acknowledgement o f this capability, one
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report notes the following: “A key reason for U.S. countemarcotics
programs’ lack o f success if that international drug-trafficking organizations have become sophisticated,
multibillion-dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control efforts.” U.S. Government
Accounting Office, “Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts,”
GAO/NSAID-97-75 (Washington, DC: GPO, 27 February 1997), 5.
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move toward those routes that serve to maximize access and minimize risk at any given
point in time and space, optimizing connectivity via the path of least resistance.
As discussed in previous chapters, economic incentives have led smugglers to be
nothing if not resourceful. The clearest illustrations of this can be found within the range
of transit zone activities. To return to McDonough, “In contrast to source zone
conditions, traffickers have the initiative in the transit zone and can choose when, where
and how to challenge interdiction forces . . . To date, traffickers have absorbed the transit
zone interdiction as a cost of doing business.”139 The next section offers an overview of
the issue of heroin transshipment by region, with a focus on specific nations that have a
demonstrable involvement with these logistical mechanisms.

Heroin Trafficking: Regional Trends
In geographic terms, an examination of the various regional singularities of the
global heroin trade serves to further illustrate the dynamics that shape the smugglers’
landscape. For instance, as one U.S. government report notes, “each heroin producing
region has separate and distinct distribution methods that are highly dependent on ethnic
groups, transportation nodes, and surrounding transit countries.”140 As noted previously,
by the mid-1970s the market for illegal drugs was well on its way to achieving a
worldwide scope. However, as of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, a number of political
developments had irrevocably altered this landscape.
139 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Statement o f James R.
McDonough (10 June 1998), 4. Though this observation was made in specific reference to the U.S., it
nonetheless holds true with respect to most other major markets and their transit zones. The parameters o f
the U.S. transit zone itself will be discussed at greater length in the context o f Chapter VI.
140 GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia,” GAO/T-NSIAD-96-240,
Statement by Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, to the House o f Representatives, Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security, (Washington, DC: GPO, 23 May 1996), 5.
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Among these, European integration served to facilitate the intra-regional
movement of contraband within the E.U., as well as along its extensive periphery.141 The
break-up of the former Soviet Union led to an expansion of both opium cultivation and
processing in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Moves toward economic liberalization by
China resulted in a greater volume of Golden Triangle production being moved through
Chinese territory.
Similarly, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the dismantling of
its pervasive security apparatus brought a rising prominence to the Southern African
region in the transshipment of heroin.142 Finally, previously marginal players such as
Nigeria and Sri Lanka became increasingly involved in the drug trade across the Indian
and Atlantic basins, while various transnational Asian organized crime groups developed
transpacific routes to the West Coast of North America.
However, as noted above, for the near-term the primary global markets for illicit
drugs are Western Europe and North America, largely by virtue of the wealth of these
regions coupled with persistent demand. Similarly, the Golden Crescent and Golden
Triangle remain the main production areas for opiates at the global level. In terms of
access, much of the European market is reached via the Balkans, Eastern Europe and
North Africa, while heroin destined for North American markets often enters through
established trans-Atlantic, trans-Pacific and Latin American trade corridors.

141 As noted in International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 2, “The well-to-do Western European
population rivals the United States as the most desirable market for drugs, as well as other contraband.”
The growth o f this market has also led to a related expansion o f money laundering activity, as discussed at
length in Ernesto Savona, “European Money Trails,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 4 (Winter
1996), 1-20.
142 See Simon Bayham, “Drugs set to become Africa’s new invaders,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
September 1996, 426-9.
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Both individually and as an aggregate, all of these trends have served to either
modify or reinforce the relevant paths of least resistance. While some of the resultant
routes remain fixtures of the smugglers’ landscape, others appear to have already fallen
by the wayside. Though the case studies focus on specific drug nexus regions, by way of
an overview it is necessary to introduce certain key areas of geographic interest to
transnational smuggling actors. Although the same caveats noted previously with respect
to this type of data still apply, the diagram below serves to illustrate the spatial
distribution of global heroin seizure activity for a single year, once again 1998:

Latin America
United States
10%

Southeast Asia

15%
Europe-Africa

Southwest Asia
18%

Fig. 11. Worldwide heroin seizures by region (1998)143

To begin with, as noted previously Turkey has played a longstanding role as the
major conduit for Golden Crescent heroin moving into European markets and beyond, an
issue that is also addressed in greater length in Chapter V. In terms of domestic
cultivation, all in all the follow-up to the initially U.S.-sponsored eradication effort has

143 This chart comes from U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
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been quite successful as Turkish authorities continue their vigilance with respect to illicit
opium, though processing of licit opiates persist.144 Nonetheless, as with most fungible
globally traded commodities, Turkey’s former market share was quickly taken up by
production from other regions of the world.
However, at this juncture it is worth returning to the case of Turkey with respect
to the specific context of transit. In a confluence of interests, the eradication of the illicit
Turkish opium crop not coincidentally also eliminated a potentially lucrative source of
income for Kurdish guerrilla groups such as the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK, or
Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a major incentive for the Turkish military to support the
policy. According to Turkish police, major heroin processing in the mainly Kurdish
southeast continue to fund the PKK, a major incentive for continued vigilance on their
part.145 As such, trafficking through these areas is often dependent on at least minimal
and tacit arrangements with corrupt officials, the military or non-Kurdish criminal
groups.
As elsewhere, Turkey has also seen a rise in the number of domestic drug users.
Moreover, and somewhat disconcertingly, many Turks seem ambivalent about drug
trafficking. This may be more understandable in light of the inflow of foreign currency
from Europe due to the illegal drug trade estimated at $50 billion annually. Despite
corruption at various levels, there appears little real chance that Turkey will fully

144 In the wake o f the Nixon-era pressures, by most accounts Turkey’s opium eradication efforts were
largely successful. However, for a dissenting view, incidentally used to illustrate the shortcomings o f crop
substitution, see Bruce Bullington, “All About Eve: The Many Faces o f United States Drug Policy,” in
Global Crime Connections: Dynamics and Control, ed. Frank Pearce and Michael Woodiwiss (Toronto:
University o f Toronto Press, 1993), 38.
145 Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall o f the PKK,” ORBIS 45, no. 1 (Winter 2001), 47-63.
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abandon cooperation on counter-drug efforts.146 However, for the foreseeable future the
country remains an important transit route, given both its proximity and access to Europe.
The fact that the U.S. does not consider Turkey to be among the majors speaks volumes
about the priorities and objectivity of the certification process.147
Along with Turkey, Russia constitutes another area of concern, especially with
respect to the access of Russian TCOs to European markets. As Williams noted prior to
9/11, the broad spectrum of criminal activities that transnational Russian mafias engage
in make them a near-perfect case for non-state actors as a security threat.148 With respect
to Russia’s geography, as Nicola J. Lowther notes, “Its 58,000 kilometers long border are
hard to police. Some parts of the border follow no logical lines, nor do they reflect
geographic or ethnic realities. Poor coordination between regional and national police
forces is another major factor. Finally, huge local imbalances of supply and demand
along many of the border offer criminals considerable opportunities for smuggling and
black-marketeering.”149
Furthermore, non-Russian ethnic groups within the former Soviet Union also play
pivotal roles. For instance, while the prominence of Chechens within Russian narcotics

146 See John Doxey, “Losing the battle and the war against drugs,” The Middle East, no. 271 (October
1997), 20-2; and Mark Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime: Where State, Crime and Rebellion Conspire,”
Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 25-41. In the latter case, the author in particular
notes that a key strength o f Turkish organized crime is the considerable protection it enjoys within Turkey,
especially with its vital money-laundering haven in northern Cyprus.
147 Incidentally, this attitude sharply contrasts with a similar understanding o f the parallel challenges facing
Iran, as discussed in the context o f Chapter V. While the tensions between the U.S. and Iran are long
standing and beyond the scope o f this discussion, the latter’s efforts to halt the drug trade on its territory

have been extensively documented. This dichotomy is noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000),
9-10.
148 See Phil Williams, “How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?” Transnational Organized
Crime 2, no. 2/3 (Summer / Autumn 1996), 19-20. In the wake o f 9/11, other groups have obviously also
risen to prominence in this respect.
149 Nicola J. Lowther, “Organized Crime and Extortion in Russia: Implications for Foreign Companies,”
Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 1 (Spring 1997), 27.
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trafficking is well documented, Azeris also play a key, though secondary role, generally
being forced to pay tribute to Chechen organizations.150 To make the situation even more
volatile, the drug trade in the former Soviet Union is also highly intertwined with various
forms of arms smuggling, as is examined more fully in Chapter V.
For its part, India plays an interesting though somewhat ambiguous role in the
global trade in opiates. It is the world’s largest producer of licit opium products, and the
only country that still exports opium gum, valued by pharmaceutical companies for its
high alkaloid content and purity.151 While some diversion to the black market certainly
exists, this is exceedingly difficult to measure. However, despite the persistence of
allegations regarding corruption in this respect, there have been few prosecutions.152
Furthermore, India’s domestic consumption of opiates also appears to be on the rise.153

150 Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia’s New Mafiya (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1995), 193. See also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 39, which discusses the presence o f
Chechen criminal organizations throughout Kazakhstan. Similarly, Booth, Opium, 317, also notes the role
o f Armenians in brokering and transporting from the Golden Crescent through Turkey into Europe. DEA,
NNICC (1998), further highlights the involvement not only o f Chechens, Azeris and Armenians, but also
Georgians.
151 For more on the licit opium trade, see Booth, Opium, 293-5. Other important producers o f licit opiates
include France, Spain and Tasmania, Australia. With respect to the U.S. market for licit opiates, the
prevailing ratio is that India and Turkey together share 80 percent, while the remaining 20 percent is
allocated to new or non-traditional producers. However, globally the Indian and Turkish combined market
share is closer to half. See U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Africa Strategic Unit,
“India Country Brief,” DEA-02022 (Washington, DC: DEA, May 2002), available at
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02022/02022.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
152 See U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia and the Former Soviet
Union,” GAO Briefing Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-148BR (Washington, DC: GPO, 9 May 1997), 1-16. In
particular, concerns over the Indian government’s system o f oversight for opium cultivation licenses is
questioned, with Indian officials holding that very little o f the opium crop is diverted to the black market
despite U.S. estimates as high as 20%. However, this does not appear to be a major concern to U.S.
officials as “most o f the diverted opium is consumed by addicts in India and the surrounding region and
does not constitute a direct threat to the U.S.” On a related topic, this report also notes India’s role as a
major manufacturer, at 40,000 metric tons (MT) annually, o f the acetic anhydride necessary to convert
opium into heroin. Despite Indian chemical control measures, the DEA holds that a “substantial
proportion” o f worldwide supply o f this chemical is diverted from Indian production.
153 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 52, which notes a range o f between 7 and 9 million drug
users in India out o f a population o f nearly a billion.
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Moreover, due to its strategic location between the Golden Triangle and the
Golden Crescent, India often functions as a hub of narcotics trafficking, particularly to
non-U.S. destinations.154 Moreover, the geographic proximity of Sri Lanka to India has
resulted in a fair share of trafficking from the mainland by both sea and air. As the island
nation has no coast guard, and its navy has often been focused on operations against the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), the scope for such activity is quite large.155
Similarly, heroin smuggling activity across the common land borders with both Burma
and Bangladesh has also been prevalent in the past.156
Further east, it is necessary at this point to examine the Golden Triangle in
relatively greater detail, as it will not be addressed as directly as other major heroinproduction regions in the context of the case studies. Southeast Asia’s rise to prominence
with respect to opium cultivation and subsequent trafficking can be traced back at least as
far as the era of European colonialism, with a dramatic impact at the global level being
seen during the Vietnam War.157 However, at present most of the opium later processed
into heroin originates in Burma and, to a much lesser extent, Laos.158

154 As such, U.S.-Indian dialogue on these issues appears to be relatively cordial. See, for instance, U.S.
Department o f State, “U.S.-India joint working group in narcotics,” U.S. Department o f State Dispatch 6,
no. 38 (18 September 1995), 700. Items on the agenda included discussions o f Indian controls over licit
opium supplies, as well as precursor chemicals, o f which the latter is also a major producer. For its part,
India was able to put forth its concerns over the international demand that drives the drug trade.
Furthermore, in the same year Indian drug control officials also met with their counterparts from both
Pakistan and Burma to discuss these issues.
155 U.S. Department o f State, INL, 1NCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia - Sri Lanka.”
156 Though less heroin appears to cross India’s common border with Burma than between the latter and
China, the issue is discussed in Hamish M cDonald, “Hooked on sm uggling,” Far Eastern Econom ic

Review 157, no. 23 (9 June 1994), 34. For more on smuggling across the porous border between India and
Bangladesh, see also Willem Van Schendel, “Easy come, easy go: Smugglers on the Ganges,” Journal o f
Contemporary Asia 23, no. 2 (May 1993), 189-233.
157 See Cooper, 60-7; and Booth, Opium, 255-82.
158 A comprehensive regional overview o f the drug trade in Southeast Asia can be found in OGD, World
Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 56-72. However, for a representative portrait illustrating many o f the regional
dynamics within the Golden Triangle, see Alfred W. McCoy, “Requiem for a Drug Lord: State and
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Commodity in the Career o f Khun Sa,” in Heyman, 129-67. However, while noting that Khun Sa had a
immense impact on both local politics and the global drug trade, McCoy also points out that, “Just as the
state retains the ultimate capacity to crush any outlaw, no matter how powerful, so the global drug traffic is
a vast commodity trade that interpenetrates every aspect o f the modem state, compromising those same
capacities.” McCoy, 156. Furthermore, a discussion o f U.S. regional dmg control efforts focusing on
Burma can be found in U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southeast Asia,” 1-11.
159 Map source: U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
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The map above illustrates some of the more observable spatial manifestations of
this activity. With respect to drug trafficking throughout the region, much of this activity
is facilitated by transnational ethnic ties that often extend far beyond their Southeast
Asian epicenter. As one U.S. government assessment notes that:
Ethnic Chinese and Thai criminal networks in Thailand and Burma play major
roles as brokers, financial backers, and transporters in the Southeast Asian heroin
trade. Operating in major regional commercial centers like Bangkok, Hong Kong,
Singapore and Taiwan and using a wide array of interchangeable front companies
and legitimate businesses. Chinese and Thai criminal networks also arrange
financing and transportation of drugs, routing drugs through many different ports
- largely by commercial shipping - to their final destination.160
In general, the export-based economies of the region, combined with the high volume of
land and maritime trade via containerized shipping, provide ample opportunity and cover
for a wide range of smuggling activity.161
Interestingly, although Thailand has traditionally served as a staging area for
opiate smuggling, the domestic drug of choice as of this writing is methamphetamine.162
Moreover, with the economic opening of Vietnam, that country is also being increasingly
used in the maritime transshipment of heroin.163 Since 1995, however, seizure data
points to a downward trend in the trafficking of opiates through Southeast Asia.164

160 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. III, 24.
161 With respect to maritime modes o f smuggling, see also U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Southeast Asian Heroin
Smuggling Techniques: Containerized Cargo,” Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA-01022 (Washington, DC:
DEA, September 2001), available at http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/01022/. accessed 15 July 2004;
U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Ethnic Chinese Crime Syndicates Prefer Port Cities and Containerized Heroin
Exports,” Maritime Security Report, no. 1 (August 1995), 15-6; and Ko-Lin Chin, “Triad Societies in Hong
Kong,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 47-64.
162 See “A new order: A survey o f Thailand,” The Economist, 2 March 2002, 13. Moreover, there also

appears to be a wider confluence throughout the region between heroin smuggling activity and the
production o f methamphetamines, as noted in Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1.
163 See U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Emergence O f Vietnam As A Transit Country For Heroin Traffic Is
Exploiting the Containerized Export Trade,” Maritime Security Report, no. 2 (April 1996), 11-4. This
source also notes that much o f this activity is still controlled by ethnic Chinese TCOs.
164 For a broad overview o f recent developments throughout the region, see U.S. Department o f State, INL,
INCSR 2001, “Southeast Asia and the Pacific.”
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Specifically, much of this activity appears to have shifted to transit routes through China,
due primarily to the upgrading of the relevant logistical infrastructure, as well as inroads
made by ethnic Chinese TCOs operating along the common border with Burma.165
Consequently, this activity has also led to a tremendous rise in domestic drug use within
China.166
With respect to ethnic Chinese TCOs, the reach of these organizations is both
broad and well documented, not only within China and throughout Southeast Asia, but
also in a number of other countries as well. This phenomenon is especially prevalent
where sizable ethnic Chinese enclaves exist, as these TCOs tend to maintain strong ties
with such expatriate and immigrant communities overseas. Furthermore, their illegal
activities often parallel or even intertwine with other legitimate commercial transactions.
Generally speaking, a distinction can be made between Triad societies,
transnational networks based primarily out of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, and
mainland Chinese groups, often either Fukienese or Cantonese in origin, which are
generally more autonomous. Though membership is relatively closed to outsiders, a
significant feature of ethnic Chinese TCOs is that they tend to have few qualms about

165 Lee, “Drugs in Communist and Former Communist States,” 194-9. The evolution o f these regional
trafficking patterns from the early to mid-1990s can also be found in the following series o f articles: Bertil
Lintner, “Roads from Mandalay: Heroin traffickers exploit new land, sea routes,” Far Eastern Economic
Review 148, no. 26 (28 June 1990), 27; Bertil Lintnter, “Chasing the dragon: Drug traffickers develop new
routes,” Far Eastern Economic Review 155, no. 155 (20 February 1992), 24; and Bertil Lintner, “A piece
o f the action: Burma-China drug trade thrives with official complicity,” Far Eastern Economic Review 157,
no. 51 (22 December 1994), 27. For a more recent assessment, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs
(2000), 60-2 .

166 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 24-7. This
source also notes that, in keeping with some o f the demand trends discussed earlier, “Heroin addiction has
become an enormous problem since China became an increasingly important transshipment route for heroin
produced in Burma. Before 1990, when most o f Southeast Asian heroin transited Thailand, China had few
problems with drug trafficking or addiction. Between 1990 and 1998, however, the number o f registered
drug abusers in China increased by a factor o f 10 from some 70,000 to nearly 700,000, according to official
Chinese statistics; unofficial estimates o f drug addiction in China range from 1 to 12 million.”
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cooperating with other types of criminal organizations in profitable joint ventures. For
example, in the past they have worked closely with both Italian and Dominican groups in
the United States, Canada and Europe.

1f »7

Turning to Africa, it is worth noting that by 1990, one-third of the heroin moving
into Europe was entering through that continent.168 In particular, by virtue of geography,
history and demography, North Africa has always posed a more pressing concern to
European policy makers than to their U.S. counterparts.169 The wider issues driving
African involvement in the transnational drug trade are discussed at greater length in the
context of Chapter VII. Specifically, the focus there is on Nigeria and the rest of West
Africa, though other regions are also examined in this context.
However, in particular the potential of Southern Africa as a drug nexus region,
with South Africa as its center, is relatively high for the near future. With its
sophisticated and relatively unmonitored land, sea and air infrastructure to move illegal
cargo, South Africa at present is primarily a transshipment hub for cocaine, heroin and
Mandrax. The latter compound is a synthetic sedative derived from methaqualone and

167 See also U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 31-3; KoLin Chin, Sheldon Zhang and Robert J. Kelly, “Transnational Chinese Organized Crime Activities: Patterns
and Emerging Trends,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 131-8; and
Willard H. Myers, III, “Orb Weavers - The Global Webs: The Structure and Activities o f Transnational
Ethnic Chinese Criminal Groups,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 1-36. More
generically, the wider commercial aspects o f this phenomenon are analyzed in “Inheriting the bamboo
network,” The Economist, 23 December 1995, 79-80; Sterling Seagrave, Lords o f the Rim: The Invisible
Empire o f the Overseas Chinese (New York: Bantam Press, 1995); and Murray Wiedenbaum and Samuel
Hughes, The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Entrepreneurs Are Creating a New Economic Superpower
in Asia (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1996), which in particular focuses on the prevalence o f this
phenomenon throughout Southeast Asia.

168 Baynham, 426.
169 This differential prioritization may best be seen the case o f Morocco. In 1991, over 27% o f the hashish
seized in Europe was Moroccan in origin. As a result, by 1993, the European Community had agreed to
fund a five-year, $2 billion program to develop infrastructure, irrigation projects and crop substitution in
the northern R if region, the primary cannabis growing area. See “Morocco: fighting the drugs war,” The
Middle East, no. 222 (April 1993), 20. This is precisely the sort o f initiative that the U.S. will need to
support in the future if it expects to receive reciprocal support within this issue area.
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antihisamines, originally developed for veterinary purposes but increasingly popular
regionally as a recreational drug. Southern Africa also appears to have the capacity to
develop into a provider of drug trafficking support services as well, such as money
laundering and chemical processing.

|

nr\

While the parameters of the European market for heroin have been addressed
above, it is worth reiterating a number of key factors that serve to directly facilitate the
smuggling of drugs into the region. These include the E.U.’s single market reforms
permitting the unrestricted movement of goods, services, labor and capital among its
signatory states; a sophisticated logistical infrastructure; the tremendous volume of
people and goods passing across its land borders and through its seaports and airports;
and well-developed trading ties with every other part of the world. Moreover, as
discussed previously, the persistence of certain member nations, such as the Netherlands,
in treating drugs strictly as a health issue rather than a matter of law enforcement
continues to draw criticism from certain quarters.171
With respect to the U.S. market for heroin, by the late 1970’s and extending into
the early 1980’s the Sicilian Mafia had developed a major presence, particularly along the
East Coast.

111

For instance, at one point this group supplied up to 80% of the New York

170 See Robert S. Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” in War and Peace in Southern Africa:
Crime, Drugs, Armies and Trade, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Greg Mills (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institute Press / World Peace Foundation, 1998), 175. For a broader historical view o f the issue, see also
Peter Gastrow, “Organized Crime and the State’s Response in South Africa,” Transnational Organized
Crime A, no. 1 (Spring 1998), 56-80.

171 While this is extensively documented, as an example see “Model makers: A survey o f the Netherlands,”
The Economist, 4 May 2002, 13.
172 See Booth, Opium, 243-50, for more on the rise to prominence o f the Italian Mafia within the U.S.
heroin market. U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 7, also
notes that in the 1960s and 1970s, Italian criminal groups were responsible for as much as 85 percent o f the
U.S. heroin trade. It is also reported that several such groups remain active, particularly those using
connections in Venezuela and Canada.
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market. However, a treaty signed between the United States and Italy in 1982 allowed
for closer police collaboration and the exchange of information, prisoners and witnesses.
As a result of this cooperation, the Mafia’s share of the steadily shrinking American
market is currently under five percent.173
Succinctly summarizing this transition of primacy, Chepesiuk writes, “Before the
mid 1980s, Italian organized crime generally dominated the heroin trade in the United
States and Europe, using the famous French Connection to smuggle large quantities of
heroin from Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle into Europe and the United States.
By 1986, however, Chinese criminals had begun to play a bigger role in heroin
trafficking.”174
Similarly, as noted in a recent U.S. government report, “Fueled by high-purity,
low-cost heroin introduced into the US market by Southeast Asian and Colombian
traffickers, heroin use in the United States increased significantly in the early-to-mid
1990s and has leveled off in recent years. The purity of heroin available in the US is
higher than ever.”175 While the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle remain the
largest suppliers of heroin on a global scale, Colombia and Mexico are the first and
second largest suppliers to the U.S. market, respectively.176 In particular, the role of

173 “A state within the state,” The Economist, 24 April 1997,21. An earlier analysis, predicated upon a
projected growth o f Sicilian involvement with the global heroin trade rather than its observed relative
diminution, can be found in Sterling, Octopus, passim.
174 Chepesiuk, 93. Interestingly, elsewhere the author notes that, “Historically, the Italian American Mafia
never adapted well to the emergence o f the international drug trade.” Making the distinction between the
American branch and its Sicilian counterpart, the author further cites various sources stating the policy o f

the five major New York crime families to eschew any involvement in drug trafficking, even to the point o f
threatening members who choose to become involved with death. Chepesiuk, 117. For more on Chinese
heroin smuggling into the U.S., see also Chin, et al., 130-2.
175 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 5.
176 For a excellent historical overview o f the U.S. domestic market for illegal drugs spanning the past
twenty years, see U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Affica Strategic Unit, “The
Evolution o f the Drug Threat, the 1980’s Through 2002,” Drug Intelligence Brief, DEA-02046
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Colombian organizations in meeting North American demand for drugs is discussed at
length in Chapter VI, as are more specific dimensions of the U.S. market for illicit drugs.
As noted above, many of the aspects addressed in this chapter are examined in the
context of the selected case studies. However, the next chapter focuses more directly on
the supporting methodologies to further conceptualize access, risk and connectivity as
they relate to transnational smuggling, as well as on a number of obstacles inherent to the
study of this topic. With respect to connectivity in particular, the convention of the
smuggling vector, previously mentioned only in passing, is also presented in greater
detail.

(Washington, DC: DEA, June 2002), available at httD://www.usdoi.gov/dea/nubs/intel/02046/02046.html.
accessed 15 July 2004. See also U.S. DOJ, NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2002.
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY: ASSESSING PATHS OF LEAST RESISTANCE

As noted at the outset, due to its complex dynamics transnational smuggling is
precisely the type of phenomenon that lends itself to an interdisciplinary analytical
methodology. In keeping with the domains of smugglers’ decision-making put forth
previously in the generic smuggling model and expanded upon with the functional
schematic of the smugglers’ landscape, this chapter serves to outline the approach to be
employed in the case studies with respect to the generic smuggling model. Furthermore,
it also highlights the various data gaps inherent to the analysis of black markets, as well
as the extant sources of information within this issue area.
However, while this particular study is predicated on geography, it is worth
examining in brief some of the competing models of smuggling, which vary for the most
part in terms of conceptualization depending upon the aspect that is being emphasized.
In general terms, smuggling models fall into two groups, namely those stressing the
security dimension of smuggling and those more concerned with the economic and social
issues that drive black markets. Such divergences are hardly surprising if one accepts
that smuggling itself is, in some respects, a manifestation of the inherent tension between
politics and economics. While this dichotomy is understandable in light of the
complexity involved, and each side certainly has something to add to the understanding
of this multifaceted issue, alone neither approach is wholly satisfactory in terms of
explanatory value.
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On the one hand, security-based models that concentrate on threats to the nation
state tend to minimize such factors as the underlying profit motives of smuggling actors
and the two-way nature of such transactions. As discussed earlier, the threat presented by
smuggling actors to nation-states is often more a byproduct of their activities than a
primary objective, barring an overt political agenda to the contrary. In fact, the responses
of national and international bodies represent a risk that must be either avoided or
mitigated from the smugglers’ perspective, and as such it can be in their interests to
minimize direct threats to the nation-state wherever possible.
As noted in Chapter II, the intellectual dominance of realism within the field of
international security and its reliance on the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis
appears overly limiting in this context, given the transnational dimension of the issues
involved. For instance, the certification process embodied by the INCSR represents an
excellent starting point in terms of data collection. However, one analytical drawback to
such an approach is that, while individual nation-states’ efforts are a necessary condition
to curbing such criminal activity, they are by no means sufficient, as at the transnational
level smuggling actors operate largely outside any single venue.
As such, integrating other types of data from levels of analysis both above and
below the nation-state threshold can facilitate a greater understanding of the functional
aspects of the smuggling phenomenon and even lead to a higher order of threat
assessment. Furthermore, by taking the smuggler’s perspective into account, the
potential for sounder policy analysis also takes shape. That being said, while only
addressing half of the equation, analyses predicated on threat do serve a definite function,
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namely to focus the nation-state’s priorities in order to formulate policy, allocate limited
resources and protect national interests.
However, similar criticisms of models predicated strictly on smuggling as either
an economic or development issue can also be made. In particular, the servicing of
otherwise unmet demand is sometimes presented as a positive force regardless of the
commodity in question, often in comparison to inefficiencies or injustices on the part of
specific nation-states and their policies.1 By contrast, a more holistic view that considers
the motivations of the smuggling actor, and how these motivations interact with the
policies of the nation-state, offers a much wider analytical scope.2
As such, the methodology of this study focuses on the smugglers’ landscape, the
elements of which revolve around the spatial attributes of access, risk and connectivity.
Returning to the generic smuggling model, access and risk are operationalized primarily
at the national level of analysis, most saliently with reference to aspects of physical,
economic, political and human geography. Similarly, connectivity is most meaningfully
addressed at the transnational level of analysis. In particular, this involves the
introduction of the smuggling vector as a convention to more empirically measure paths
of least resistance.
Before moving on to consideration of the smugglers’ landscape proper, the next
section examines the issue of data sources and gaps. Conceptually, the use of a

1 Examples o f an econom ic approach to sm uggling analysis include Yeong-Her Yeh, “On Tariffs and

Smuggling,” International Advances in Economic Research 6, no. 3 (August 2000), 578-80, and Jian-Ye
Wang, “Macroeconomic Policies and Smuggling: An Analysis o f Illegal Oil Trade in Nigeria,” IMF
Working Paper WP/94/115-EA (September 1994). Analyses that stresses the potential benefit or so-called
“welfare effect” o f black market activity include John McLaren, “Black Markets and Optimal Evadable
Taxation,” Economic Journal 108, no. 448 (May 1998), 665-79; and Tullock, 6-14.
2 An excellent example o f such an approach can be found in Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Task Force, Global Organized Crime Project, The Nuclear Black Market (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1996).
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theoretical platform with a relatively open architecture, such as the one already outlined,
serves as far as is feasible to leverage all extant sources of data to the utmost in the
attempt to analyze the decision-making processes of smuggling actors with respect to
route selection. Nonetheless, major obstacles to obtaining data are inherent to the subject
and must be either overcome, circumvented or otherwise mitigated.

Limits o f the Known: Data Sources and Gaps
The geographic analysis of smuggling represents an attempt to sort, in a
meaningful way, the diverse manifestations of a highly complex phenomenon. By its
nature, smuggling activity and, by extension, route selection, is often exceedingly
difficult to observe, let alone assess. The uncertainty surrounding smuggling activity can
be sorted in terms of three basic challenges. The first involves the type and quality of
information available, while the second revolves around the timing of and access to that
information. Finally, there are hurdles relating to the causal interactions that shape
smuggling route selection. These aspects become more apparent as this study unfolds,
and serve to drive the need for an approach that can deal with this uncertainty.
To begin with, incomplete information can almost be regarded as a hallmark of
criminology. Donald Cressey has even likened the study of organized crime to
archaeology, in that both seek “knowledge about inaccessible affairs from consideration
of affairs accessible to study,” using inferential reasoning to draw conclusions “about
both norms and interaction processes.”3 Similarly, in 1999 The Economist noted that,
“By definition the shadow economy cannot be measured precisely; it requires some

3 Cressey, 3-4.
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cunning economic detective work.”4 More recently, Janet MacGaffey and Remy
Bezenguissa-Ganga also discuss the difficulty involved in researching activities outside
the law, particularly with respect to field research.5
As R. Thomas Naylor writes, “Bridging the gap between perception and reality of
the criminal marketplace requires, first and foremost, accurate information. Yet, even for
the legitimate economy, information is getting harder to collect, and official data are
becoming increasingly misleading. These problems are multiplied when economic
activity is clandestine.”6 In the case of smuggling actors, there is, of course, no such
thing as an annual report, despite their many organizational and functional parallels with
MNCs noted previously. On the contrary, in general TCOs actively engage in the
intentional obfuscation of their operational parameters.
As such, there is the overarching question of dissemination of information.
Uncertainty surrounding what is known, when it is known, and by whom is thus of
paramount importance. Ideally, the most accurate picture would emanate from those with
first-hand knowledge of smuggling activity, either directly or via other interaction with
criminal elements. However, the problems, and even dangers, involved with inquiries
along these lines are obvious.
This opacity in turn calls for a more indirect measurement of many of the
constituent elements of smuggling and related activities.7 In the context of drugs, for

4 “Black hole,” The Economist, 28 August 1999, 59

5 MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 25-7. See also Janet L. Jackson, Janet C. M. Herbrink and Robert
W. J. Jansen, “Examining Criminal Organizations: Possible Methodologies,” Transnational Organized
Crime 2, no. 4 (Winter 1996), 83-105.
6 R. Thomas Naylor, “Mafias, Myths and Markets: On the Theory and Practice o f Enterprise Crime,”
Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), 1.
7 As an example, measures used by U.S. Customs to determine their impact on smuggling organizations are
nearly all indirect. These include the number o f arrests, both organizationally and in cooperation with other
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instance, statistics relating to the interception of drugs in transit are a key metric, though
not without drawbacks, as pointed out in the previous chapter.8 The UNDCP has also
noted the divergence between an ideal yet largely unavailable data set of direct indicators
and the use of indirect indicators that, though being the only viable alternative, are much
more subjective.9 While this may seem patently obvious, with respect to drug issues it is
important to note that views of even this heavily scrutinized market are remarkably
divergent and based largely on extrapolation and educated guesswork.10
As discussed in Chapter II, smuggling routes and methods are constantly evolving
in response to changing market conditions and risks imposed by nation-states. Moreover,
factors involved in path dependency, such as known past activities and accumulated
knowledge pertaining to smuggling actors can also be incorporated in their historical
context. The related topic of publicly available versus classified information also comes
to the fore, as the sensitivity surrounding such data collection is obvious. In some cases
data may be available but subject to significant time lags or other restrictions, such as that
from an ongoing legal proceeding. When available, these sources are, for the most part,
of the greatest utility in the tracking of trends.

agencies; the number and amount o f contraband seizures; the number o f convictions; the number o f port
runner incidents; the ratio o f seizures to the number o f cargo examinations; the ratio o f seizures to number
o f passenger examinations; the value o f assets seized from smuggling organizations; the number o f internal
conspiracies disrupted; and the number o f intelligence products generated. U.S. DOT, Customs Service,
U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 19-20.
8 Despite seizure data being one o f the best indicators o f smuggling activity available, its limitations are
evident to anyone who has to work with these numbers on a regular basis. In fact, these statistics have even
been likened to the use o f the “body count” during the Vietnam War, with this particular characterization

coming from a conversation with an analyst from the DEA’s El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), February
2000. This characterization is echoed in UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 24-5, which also urges
caution in the interpretation o f drug seizure data. For more on the underlying methodology o f this subject,
see also Farrell, “The Global Interception Rate o f Illicit Opiates,” 134-49.
9 UNDCP, World Drug Report { 1997), 12-13.
10 Though focused primarily on cocaine, the inherent analytical challenges applicable across a wide
spectrum o f smuggled commodities are admirably set out in Clawson and Lee, 4-10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

163

However, the two most prominent ongoing and publicly available efforts to assess
drug-related activity come from U.S. government agencies and from the various entities
operating under U.N. auspices. A number o f these sources of information have already
been incorporated into the previous chapter, and are further utilized in the context of the
case studies. While each adds to a holistic understanding of the issue, it is important to
understand the potential biases that can skew analysis.
In the case of the U.S. government, while in general an excellent source of
information, its reports are understandably concerned with national interests and thus
may tend to reflect the current relationship between a given country and the United States
during the period in question.11 Similarly, in the case of the United Nations much of the
data is self-reported by participating countries, which may in turn have an interest in
presenting the relevant issues in the most positive light.12
Outside of the aegis of either the U.S. or the U.N., there is also a wide range of
other extant data sources of varying reliability. To begin with, this includes journalistic
accounts, which often prove highly useful as snapshots of smuggling activity.
Furthermore, upon occasion there have also been first-hand accounts either published or
otherwise integrated into research efforts. Such information may come from those who
have been incarcerated or otherwise coerced into providing information by law
enforcement agencies.

11 While this point has been made in the previous chapter, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs
( 2000 ), 8- 10 .

12 The UNDCP gathers much o f its data from member states via its Annual Report Questionnaire, a survey
designed to both provide information on both national drug problems and control efforts. See UNDCP,
World Drug Report (1997), 33, for more on this process.
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Finally, as discussed previously, in many respects the now-defunct OGD served
as a valuable counterbalance to the U.S. and U.N. in assessing drug issues, particularly
with respect to geographic patterns and other spatial manifestations. By the same token,
not all of OGD’s publications were necessarily as comprehensive as either of its main
counterparts, and tended to focus on certain countries while not specifically addressing
the situation in others.

n

While none of these sources should be considered authoritative and thus be used
with impunity, taken together they provide the most complete picture available of the
transnational drug trade. Furthermore, the areas where their data and conclusions are not
in accord may provide important insights into what is not readily discernible. By
extrapolating from the available body of facts, and keeping in mind the various initial
assumptions noted in the introductory chapter, even more gaps may be filled with varying
degrees of confidence. Often this is the best that can be hoped for by way of evidence,
though as an open architecture the smugglers’ landscape should be well poised to
incorporate additional information as it becomes available to further refine the analysis.
As noted in Chapter I, in addition to calling for more sophisticated methodologies
that are not necessarily predicated on a rigid preoccupation with numbers, Williams
observes that an important endeavor of data collection and analysis relating to
transnational organized crime should be anticipating developments and even, potentially,
detecting anomalies in predicted outcomes.14 For instance, with respect to the latter, at

13 By way o f methodology, OGD noted that its final annual report was compiled “based on the
contributions o f some 200 correspondents drawn from the press, scientific and NGO communities o f about
100 countries,” in addition to information shared with other national and international organizations and
research carried out by its staff. OGD, World Politics o f Drugs (2000), 10.
14 Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 82-5.
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some point in time a particular smuggling actor may be observed exercising influence
beyond that which is expected otherwise. While this can be perhaps traced to an
organizational realignment, a strategic partnership or other factors leading to an increased
competitive market advantage, in general such an anomaly may be taken as an indication
that the situation is evolving and thus warrants further scrutiny.
Overall, much of this analysis is qualitatively rather than quantitatively based, in
that the level of fidelity implicit in the latter simply does not exist or is otherwise
inaccessible. As such, it focuses on the smuggling routes themselves and consciously
trade off detail for broader explanatory value, in some ways paralleling attempts to frame
legitimate business activity in ways that are less rigorous but also richer than more formal
approaches. While this is largely necessitated in the smuggling context by the lack of
concrete data, an effort has been made to emphasize those factors that appear to have the
most pronounced impact on transnational patterns of smuggling activity.
If the appropriate data both existed and was available, however, a potentially
fruitful extension of this study would be to attempt the modeling of transnational
smuggling routes via the use of geographic information systems (GIS). In simplest
terms, any data with a spatial dimension can be stored, managed and displayed in a
dynamic interactive setting. The facilitated analysis of spatial relationships is also
represents a key benefit of using a GIS platform.
The utility of GIS across a wide range of applications seems self-evident, as
witnessed by its explosive growth in recent years, particularly in such fields as municipal
planning, environmental analysis and marketing. While GIS certainly encompasses a
technological dimension, an ongoing debate persists among practitioners as to the role
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these systems should play.15 Furthermore, as a vehicle for modeling the real world and
establishing relationships and patterns among spatial variables, GIS at present is limited
by a lack of reliable standardized data sets, particularly at the international level. Though
as of this writing the extant data is for the most part not fine enough to support such
applications at the international or even the national level, there are existing GIS
applications dealing with related issues on a smaller scale.16
As these systems grow from encompassing individual projects to more
comprehensive platforms, their analytical potential will become increasingly apparent.
However, it should be kept in mind that, for much of the world, many of the data gaps
noted above apply beyond the criminal context. Even for statistical information on
legitimate commercial activity, in much of the world such data is underreported,
unreported or intentionally misreported.17

15 Framing the parameters o f this debate, see Dawn J. Wright, Michael F. Goodchild and James D. Proctor,
“GIS: Tool or Science? Demystifying the persistent ambiguity o f GIS as ‘tool’ versus ‘science,’” Annals o f
the Assoc, o f American Geographers 87, no. 2 (June 1997), 346-62, and its response by John Pickles, “Tool
or Science? GIS, technoscience, and the theoretical turn,” Annals o f the Assoc, ofAmerican Geographers
87, no. 2 (June 1997), 363-72.
16 Directly germane to this study are a number o f related applications currently in place that help to clarify
GIS’s potential in this context. In terms o f mapping potential risks, with particular respect to corporate
holdings, GIS applications in the area o f property and casualty insurance constitute one such example. See
Charles C. Ashley, “Putting Risks on the Map,” B est’s Review: Property-Casualty Insurance Edition 98
(January 1998), 84-6. In this context, such a system can map those factors, such as the distance to a toxic
waste site, a seismic fault or a flood plain, which can have an impact on corporate holdings. Such systems
are used to compute the cost o f coverage, validate the underwriting process and coordinate claims.
Furthermore, the issue o f crime mapping is considered significant enough to warrant a targeted research
initiative under the auspices o f the U.S. DOJ, National Institute o f Justice, Crime Mapping Research
Center. See also Keith Harries, Crime Mapping: Principles and Practice, NCJ 178919 (Washington, DC:
National Institute o f Justice, 1999), available at http://www.ncirs.org/html/nii/mapping/index.html.
accessed 15 July 2004. However, at present the thrust o f GIS implementation relating to law enforcement
is toward the local level; an example o f this may be found in Monica Alexander and Wei-Ning Xiang,
“Crime Pattern Analysis Using GIS,” GI S/ LIS (1994), 1-3, which looks at one such system implemented
in Charlotte, North Carolina. The underlying concepts can certainly be expanded to an appropriate degree
o f refinement, as data becomes more widely available, to encompass the national and international levels o f
analysis.
17 Although this observation holds true for any number o f available data sets, see John H. Noer,
Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: National Defense
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Within the field of international relations, the range of potential applications for
GIS seems limited only by the imagination, despite the current lack of applicable data.
However, the aim here is merely to take a single step forward by laying the groundwork
for future work along these lines.18 With respect to smuggling, the various obstacles
pertaining to data availability will persist for the foreseeable future. However, keeping in
mind the question of how to most effectively maximize the extant sources of information,
the next section examines the concepts of access and risk introduced in Chapter I, with
the intent of further conceptualizing the smugglers’ landscape at the national level of
analysis.

Assessing Access and Risk: The National Level o f Analysis
While the generic smuggling model and the constituent decision-making domains
with regard to route selection have already been put forth, in general access and risk may
be thought of as existing in equilibrium, with connectivity both determining and being
determined by their interaction, in a feedback loop of sorts. To begin to assess the
reciprocal dynamics of access and risk, which are incidentally relevant not only at the
national but also the sub-national level of analysis, it is useful to first revisit the
intellectual foundations of the smugglers’ landscape in a more holistic way.

University, 1996), 49, where the author em phasizes this point with respect to Southeast Asia. However, a

similar characterization can be made for the other regions discussed in the context o f the case studies.
18 For instance, one example o f a potentially complementary methodology is the U.S. Customs’ Strategic
Problem Solving (SPS) process, which is used to address persistent law enforcement problems. Since
1996, more than three hundred projects have been initiated using this methodology, including an effort to
reduce heroin smuggling via air passengers at Chicago and West Coast international airports. See William
S. Heffelfinger, “A Snapshot o f Strategic Problem Solving,” U.S. Customs Today 36, no. 5 (Januaiy 2001),
pages not available.
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The concept the smugglers’ landscape has been used to characterize the types of
factors that have a spatially meaningful impact on such actors’ respective operational
environments. As noted at the outset, these environments tend to be not only highly
complex with respect to their causal components, but also quite turbulent in their
interdependencies.19 The resultant analytical template offers the opportunity to rise
above traditional approaches by integrating elements from a wide range of disciplines,
most saliently physical, economic, political and human geography. As such, these
dimensions form the basis of discussion for the analysis of access and risk at the national
level, though other perspectives are integrated as they arise in context.
As discussed previously, access encompasses all the potential efforts that a
smuggling actor can take to maximize operational efficiency in moving contraband
through a logistical network linking points of origin to final destinations, with the
underlying motivation of profit serving as the upper bound on such activity. As noted in
the previous section, the direct observation of smuggling actors as they carry out their
operations can be exceedingly difficult. As such, at the national level of analysis the
parameters of access can be delineated by reference to such factors as the existence and

19 For a theoretical foundation o f this concept outside the specific context o f smuggling, see Paul Krugman,
“Complex Landscapes in Economic Geography,” American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (May 1994), 412-6.
In particular, the author notes the advantages o f interdisciplinary analysis in assessing the dynamic forces
that shape such landscapes. Other precedents for this type o f approach include Noer’s work, as well as
Marc D. Lax, Selected Strategic Minerals: The Impending Crisis (Lanham, MA: University Press o f
America, 1992). Incidentally, a key characteristic o f the latter study is the use o f various strategic minerals
such as chromium, manganese and titanium as benchmark commodities, much as this analysis relies on
heroin. Furthermore, in addition to the physical sources o f these minerals, Lax pays particular attention to
political factors that could potentially lead to scarcity. While the end o f apartheid in South Africa and the
passing o f the Cold War era have largely superseded the more pressing aspects o f the issue, the utility o f
the approach remains sound. For more background on this topic, with an emphasis on southern Africa, see
Michael Shafer, “Mineral Myths,” Foreign Policy 47 (Summer 1982), 154-71; Jock A. Finlayson and
David G. Haglund, “Whatever Happened to the Resource War?” Survival XXIX, no. 5 (September /
October 1987), 403-15; and Koos Van Wyk and M. Anton Von Bulow, “The Debate on South Africa’s
Strategic Minerals Revisited,” Comparative Strategy 1 (1988), 159-82.
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condition of physical infrastructure, the distribution of supply and demand for the given
commodity, existing and projected legitimate flows of commerce, and various aspects of
demography.
By contrast, those factors that serve to impede the efforts of smuggling actors fall
under the heading of risk, defined as the probability that a given smuggling route will
result in a successful transaction, with the implication that there are forces at work that
may either intentionally or unintentionally be working to reduce that probability. As
noted elsewhere, most often risk denotes the effectiveness of the nation-state’s response
to smuggling activity, which tends to be most visible at the national and sub-national
levels where the nation-state is most capable of directly exercising its various forms of
available leverage.
From the smugglers’ perspective, the importance of risk aversion is abundantly
clear. More sophisticated TCOs manage risk by employing a wide range of techniques,
many of which parallel those found in the realm of legitimate commerce. These would
include changing operational methods quickly and often, relying heavily on outsourcing,
insisting that contractors provide collateral, paying contractors in kind rather than in cash,
compartmentalizing operations, reducing the product’s time in transit, and assigning
responsibility for losses.20
However, with respect to the illegal trade in drugs, the lucrative profit margins
involved, the volume of turnover and the size of the market result in correspondingly
higher and discrete levels of risk that may be associated with each transaction. As the
one U.N. report notes, “entry into the industry is not cost-free, and one of the most

20 Zabludoff, 30-1.
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important costs is risk. The illicit drug industry carries a high penalty for inefficient risk
management.”21
In terms of risk assessment, it is useful at this juncture to introduce the topic of
political risk analysis and its underlying methodologies, some of which are analogous to
the approach taken by this study. However, before moving further along there is an
important matter of terminology to be resolved, namely regarding the use of the term
“risk.” Unless otherwise noted, its usage will remain focused on the smuggler’s
perspective as initially introduced. Since the constituent elements of political risk serve
to determine the broader aspects of the playing field upon which both the smuggling actor
and the nation-state must operate, which is to say both the smugglers’ access and risk, the
distinction will be made explicit in the context of the discussion.22
Generally speaking, political risk analysis refers to a structured approach in
predicting how various types of events and policies can affect the business climate for a
given country, particularly with respect to the decision-making of investors or other
commercial entities. In terms of methodology, as David M. Raddock notes:
Many risk analysts state that they prefer a qualitative rather than a quantitative
approach to examining the political risk for foreign businesses in a given country,
and they may go even further and suggest that they have no explicit formula for
the work they perform. Indeed, every country and political culture is unique, and
sometimes these characteristics have a direct bearing on the business
environment. Nevertheless, political risk analysis, as an art or technique, does not
21 UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 129-30.
22 While not meaning to further cloud the issue, risk assessment is also an important component o f the
nation-state’s efforts to thwart sm uggling activity, often used as an extension o f threat assessment. In

simplest terms, while a threat may be though o f as an undesired event or outcome, risk encompasses the
additional dimension o f consequences. Specifically highlighting this as an accepted customs function
internationally, a recent report on best practices among customs services projected that risk assessment as a
skill set will account for 15% o f the total in demand over the next five years. World Customs Organization
(WCO), Survey o f Customs Reform and Modernization Trends and Best Practices (4 October 2000), Chart
10, available at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en/topics issues/customsmodemizationintegritv/surve e.htm.
accessed 15 July 2004.
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preclude an explicit structure. If it is indeed an art, it is not a free-form art.
General descriptions of how to do it and what questions to ask are indeed
possible.23
For the most part, while political risk analyses are used to determine the potential
consequences for legitimate businesses operating within specific countries, most are
generated on the basis of subjective or historical analysis.
By way of metrics, some common components of political risk include economic
expectations versus reality, past economic planning failures, political leadership and party
development, quality of bureaucracy, law-and-order tradition, corruption in government,
involvement of the military or organized religion in politics, ethnic tensions, terrorism,
civil war, and external conflict.24 As such, the determination of levels of political risk
may be considered akin to both an art and a science, with its own intricate methodology
that ranges well beyond the boundaries of this discussion.
As these measures of political risk were originally formulated with respect to
legitimate business operations, their presence or absence and degree of intensity serve to
illustrate the potential impact on that type of economic activity. However, as described
previously, illicit commercial enterprises incur risks that are not always inversely related
to those encountered by their legitimate counterparts. While a subject worthy of more

23 David M. Raddock, Assessing Corporate Political Risk (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986), 4-5.
24 A number o f political risk methodologies are outlined in Llewellyn D. Howell, ed., The Handbook o f
Country and Political Risk Analysis, 2nd ed. (Syracuse, NY: The PRS Group, 1998). These variables are
specifically set forth in the ICRG Risk Rating System, although elements o f the Coplin-O’Leary System
are also incorporated. Moreover, according to ICRG risk components are grouped into three major

categories, political, financial and economic, which are computed separately and used to develop a
composite risk rating. See also Jean-Claude Cosset and Jean Roy, “The Determinants o f Country Risk
Ratings,” Journal o f International Business Studies 22, no. 1 (Spring 1991), 135-43; and Llewellyn D.
Howell and Brad Chaddick, “Models o f political risk for foreign investment and trade: an assessment of
three approaches,” Colombia Journal o f World Business 29, no. 3 (Fall 1994), 70-91. Incidentally, while
the term “country risk” is at times distinguished from political risk, for the purposes o f this discussion the
two may be considered for the most part to be analogous.
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extensive study in its own right, at this juncture it is sufficient to note this distinction with
respect to political risk factors and to highlight the most salient such differences.
For instance, where high levels of public sector corruption exist, smuggling may
thrive while other business activity is stifled. Conversely, factors that negatively affect
the overall level of legitimate trade that in turn serves to camouflage the illicit movement
of goods, such as a major war, can also cause segments of the corresponding black
market to shrink. While a full examination of this complex interaction falls beyond the
bounds of this study, an attempt has been made to discuss such issues in the context of
the case studies.25
Although established political risk methodologies are not directly applicable and
thus are not strictly adhered to in the course of this analysis, a number of the underlying
concepts have been utilized. To begin with, as most available risk ratings and related
data sets are geared toward the national level, thus providing a common denominator and
point of departure among potential units of analysis. However, reference to other levels
of analysis is generated via a range of methodological approaches as seems most
appropriate in context.
For instance, as discussed previously, smuggling actors tend to operate on a
transnational basis, with organizational ties often arising from ethnic or other analogous
affiliations centered on a particular region. However, by virtue of sovereignty, nation
states’ actions tend to be relatively unrestrained below the national threshold. Though
more rigidly circumscribed with respect to the wider international arena, in certain cases
nation-states or supra-national actors are able to impose risk on smuggling actors. As
25 In addition to the various political risk methodologies outlined in Howell, passim, see also Raddock, 738, focusing on linkages among risk factors.
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such, despite a national focus, a full consideration of access and risk must encompass
these levels as well.
As such, each case study begins with a consideration of the national level of
analysis, with particular reference to the impact of physical, economic, political and
human geography on smuggling activity centered on the country in question. This takes
the form of a predominantly qualitative and historical analysis, supported by quantitative
data, supporting maps and other sources of information where applicable and available.
From there, attention extends progressively outward in a series of concentric rings
as the benchmark commodity moves further from its point of origin to its final destination
along the path of least resistance. While access and risk shape the smugglers’ landscape
at the national level at each point along the path of least resistance, the next section
examines how to conceptualize, to the greatest extent possible, the dynamic nature of this
connectivity at the transnational level of analysis.

Characterizing Connectivity: Transnational Smuggling Vectors
In many respects, the smugglers’ landscape and its constituent transactions can be
considered analogous to a vast circuit board across which an energy source supplies the
current. While the smuggling actor parallels the energy source and the components of the
circuit board can be seen as corresponding to the national level of analysis, connectivity
at the transnational level is comparable to the current itself. As initially discussed in
Chapter I, a primary assumption of this study is that smuggling activity tends to follow
the path of least resistance in pursuit of profit. While the previous section centered on the
aspect of resistance and how it is overcome, as determined by the interaction between

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

174

access and risk, connectivity as a decision-making domain revolves around the route
itself and its attractiveness from the smugglers’ perspective.
To develop this concept more fully, this section introduces the convention of the
smuggling vector to illustrate various aspects of connectivity, particular in the context of
trend analysis. By analyzing sets of both observed and expected smuggling vectors,
certain patterns emerge whereby the approach outlined in this study may itself be
assessed in terms of its capacity to identify the divergences between theory and reality.
In turn, these deviations from what may be considered the norm can be used to refine the
model and gain deeper insight into the behavior of smuggling actors as they respond to
changes in their operational landscape.
Given the difficulties inherent in assessing black market activity, and with an
overriding desire to rely on solid empiricism as far as possible, the development of the
smuggling vector concept logically enough builds upon prior related efforts. By way of
precedent, beyond the specific context of smuggling counterfactual approaches to
transportation economics have been employed in the past.26 Similarly, the work of both
the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (ICCSS), focusing
on maritime facilities as nodes for a wide range of criminal activity, and the parallel
initiative undertaken by the state of Florida in a recent security study of its own seaports
have utilized relevant methodologies with respect to threat assessment.27

26 For an application o f this concept in dealing with legitimate trade patterns, see Noer, 95-7.
27 In addition to smuggling, the ICCSS report also addresses terrorism, cargo crime and a wide range o f
other security issues. U.S. ICCSS, Report (Fall 2000), 85-7, 92-6, 106. See also Florida, Executive Office
o f the Governor / Camber Corporation, Florida Seaport Security Assessment Final Report (Tallahassee,
FL: Florida State University, Office o f Special Projects, September 2000), with particular emphasis on the
threat assessment section.
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In simplest terms, each smuggling vector geographically represents a discrete
smuggling transaction. As such, it can be spatially depicted as a single iteration in which
an illicit commodity, of a certain type and volume, moves under the guidance of a
distributor along a specific route from point of origin to final destination. As noted at the
outset of this study, from the smugglers’ perspective a given route’s attractiveness vis-avis alternatives lies in the perception that its use will result in the greatest probability of a
successful transaction.
As such, the notional set of all possible transnational smuggling vectors for a
given commodity in theory contains every route and method by which that type of
contraband can and does move across international borders. Furthermore, in spatial terms
the total flow of an illicit commodity for a particular geographic area can be expressed as
the sum of all smuggling vectors that cross though that area. In the context of this study,
the selection of case studies serves to progressively narrow the set of possible smuggling
vectors from one containing all avenues of approach at the national level of analysis
down to its constituent expected and observed subsets. Specifically, this is done by
tracing such activity outward from the target country through the surrounding region and
beyond.
The commodity, the distributor and the path form the three basic smuggling
vector components. O f these, the commodity has been standardized via the selection of a
benchmark commodity, in this case heroin, to facilitate the analysis. Having set the type
of contraband, however, there are also questions relating to the amount of each shipment
and total volume of trade. Other important considerations are the percentage of the
commodity that is diverted along the way between the contraband source and its final
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destination, where along the route the diversion takes place, and for what reason the
contraband is diverted, as outlined in the cornstalk diagram in the previous chapter.
These issues are addressed in the context of each case study, in as much detail as possible
given the relative paucity of data.
Similarly, the distributor in each case is dealt with in much the same way, by
direct observation when feasible but otherwise by inference. In the broadest sense as
well as in transactional terms, this component relates to the owner or primary controller
of the commodity in question. As discussed previously, as a category these smuggling
actors encompass a wide range of criminal elements spanning from the highly
sophisticated to the relatively limited.
With respect to heroin, given the level of coordination involved and the
prominence of high value shipments of contraband, as noted previously in this
conceptualization the average distributor will most likely be skewed toward the more
organized end of this continuum, primarily TCOs. For instance, the use of such riskavoidance measures as bribery, corruption and intimidation to facilitate smuggling imply
both organized behavior and a relatively higher profile for such activity. However,
lower-level functionaries such as mules should not necessarily be considered as part of
the distributor component, as relatively little decision-making authority resides there.
Often these can be seen in functional terms as mechanisms of transportation or
intermodal transition, and as such more properly falls within the realm of the route
component.
As the focus of study, however, assessment of the path itself receives the most
extensive attention. To begin with, the building blocks of each path are legs and nodes.
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In turn, each path can have multiple legs, with each leg in turn having its own associated
path segment, mode of transportation and handling method. Nodes form the transitions
between each leg, most often where the contraband crosses national borders or otherwise
changes jurisdictions, transport systems or custody. Both legs and nodes also have a
certain set of individuals involved as well, either directly or indirectly, particularly with
respect to the transfer of control and responsibility for the shipment. Paralleling Figure 5
from Chapter II, the diagram below serves to illustrate the basic premise behind the
structure of the path component in general terms:
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Fig. 13. Path components (legs and nodes) of smuggling vectors

To further expand upon the elements that constitute each leg, it is necessary to
define each more concretely. First, the path segment represents the actual geographical
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course the commodity takes along the given leg. Second, the mode of transportation
means the physical means utilized to move the contraband, to include the associated
infrastructure, which in turn is often characterized in terms of a network. Different types
of networks include the aforementioned modes of land, water and air, discussed at length
in Chapter II. Finally, the handling method involves not only the physical receptacle
serving to house the commodity as it moves, but also any personnel involved and the
associated measures taken to conceal or otherwise facilitate its transportation.
By contrast, nodes represent the various types of transitions that may be found
between adjoining legs. Each may be thought of in both a notional and a concrete
geographical sense. In general, these may be broadly categorized as either intramodal,
those that link legs sharing the same mode of transportation, or intermodal, where the
legs change to a new mode. Along the path of a given smuggling vector, nodes can be
found at any number of points. These would include, but not be limited to, where an
international border is crossed, an administrative transition such as where a checkpoint
search or an official inspection takes place, or under other circumstance where the
contraband changes custody or mode of transit.
Very often, nodes are situated at points along the existing physical infrastructure
network. As such, facilities such as seaports and airports may be considered as both the
terrain and as a functional entity in its own right, with cargo, passengers, vessels and
personnel associated with logistical processes constituting the main types of “moving
parts” in any given scenario, generically outlined in Chapter II.28 Moreover, variables

28 At a given facility, there are a number o f security factors that play a role in determining the smugglers’
risk. In terms o f physical security, a fenced perimeter, high mast lighting and the presence o f non-intrusive
inspection technology serve to raise security posture tremendously. Other procedural deterrents include a
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such as topography, intermodal connectivity, public policy and other relevant on-site
economic activities may also play definite roles in determining nodal placement and
characteristics.
Finally, as noted above, each leg and node has its own associated human element.
In most cases, the legs will have some sort of courier exercising authority over the
contraband, usually either a crew member or passenger in the commercial context, or an
analogous arrangement where a private conveyance is involved. The alternative to such a
scenario would be where a totally unwitting courier is utilized. There may also be some
sort of facilitator at each stage as well, such as a corrupt official or a member of an
internal conspiracy that can bring any combination of access, authority and specialized
knowledge to bear. Moreover, the role of the facilitator becomes more crucial in the
nodes than the legs, which generally represent goods in transit. At any node, the courier
may either change or remain constant.
One additional benefit of constructing a smuggling vector in this manner is that it
allows for the examination of the various efforts a nation-state can undertake to deter,
deny, disrupt, delay, detect, or interdict contraband along each leg and at each node,
functionally increase resistance along a given path from the smugglers’ perspective. For
the nation-state, in theory this approach can also provide a systematic framework for
evaluating the consequences of and relative effectiveness among different procedural and
visible law enforcement presence, coordinated interagency security efforts, effective cargo tracking
capabilities and criminal background checks. However, smugglers may circumvent all o f these factors if

operational guidelines are only established in theory but not in practice. In turn, a number o f factors that
facilitate smuggling activity can be found where these deterrents are lacking. These include easy access to
manifest data or related information, ineffective or non-existent physical access controls, a high cargo
volume that overwhelms monitoring capabilities, and extended idle periods for vehicles, vessels and
aircraft. While a number o f transportation industry standards exist, one o f the most comprehensive
available publicly can be found in U.S. DOT, National Science and Technology Council, Office o f Science
and Technology Policy, Intermodal Cargo Transportation.
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physical countermeasures. Furthermore, as an analytical tool in the hands of law
enforcement entities, looking at the issue from the smugglers’ perspective can help to
more astutely assess the ramifications of observed smuggling vectors activity and
anticipate potential smuggling vectors, and then strategize accordingly.
As outlined in the previous section, determining connectivity with respect to a
given country is predicated upon an understanding of specific conditions pertaining to the
national level of analysis. By delineating the relevant sets of smuggling vectors, from the
smugglers’ perspective the paths of least resistance can be rendered with respect to the
relative attractiveness of different routes via a notional cost-benefit analysis. In practice,
this takes the form of trend analysis, comparing the set of potential smuggling vectors
that may exist within a given area with the set that can be observed or is otherwise known
to exist. However, in generating the potential set of smuggling vectors the key lies in
assessing the plausibility of each option in terms of access and risk.
For instance, while the space-based movement of contraband is currently
unavailable to smuggling actors as a mode of transit, this implausibility may be linked
directly to the generic smuggling mode in that the access does not exist under present
conditions and thus the option may not be seen as viable. However, it should be noted
that until recently the use of drug smuggling submarines, as noted in Chapter III, was
hardly considered feasible by most observers until reports to the contrary indicated that
the method was being actively pursued and had in fact neared fruition.
As smuggling vectors dart across the complex landscape of access and risk, there
will only be a relatively small number that are observed, while the remainder can only be
guessed at with varying degrees of accuracy. Some, the most successful from the
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smugglers’ point of view, will not be detected at all. A “typical” smuggling vector thus
constitutes only the nominal point of departure and perhaps the final destination.
However, in truth it must be acknowledged that there is no such thing; each has its own
set of individual characteristics in terms of space, time and method. While all smuggling
vectors are in fact unique, and should be treated as such, the aim of each case study is to
establish commonalities among them, specifically with respect to the benchmark
commodity within the area in question.
It should be kept in mind at all times that in terms of the spatial dynamics
involved, profit serves as the primary motivation within the context of this
conceptualization, as it is a fact that value is a function of both space and time. The
following three case studies, focusing on manifestations of the global heroin trade in
Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria, respectively, serve to illustrate many of the more
prominent aspects of smuggling discussed thus far.
In addition to being one of the two primary sources of opium Afghanistan also
presents a range of features that appear to facilitate smuggling, such as porous borders,
relatively remote terrain, endemic civil war and a high degree of ethnic diversity.
Although many of these characteristics can also be found in Burma, these themes are
much more pronounced in the case of Afghanistan. Furthermore, recent events have led
to an immense transition that is sure to have a most salient impact on the smuggling
landscape throughout the Golden Crescent and beyond.
For its part, Colombia has seen a recent trend toward the growth of domestic
poppy cultivation, largely in an attempt on the part of TCOs at product diversification
vis-a-vis their more longstanding market dominance in cocaine. As noted above, an
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endemic civil war and relatively remote terrain are also extant factors. However, in
contrast to Afghanistan, Colombian drug traffickers exhibit not only a much higher
degree of both horizontal and vertical integration, but also cater primarily to a single
major market, namely North America. As such, the utility of Colombia as a case study
lies not only in the similarities to Afghanistan but also in its differences.
Finally, Nigeria in some respects represents a departure from both of the
aforementioned cases, in that heroin smuggling patterns do not appear to be determined
by geographic location, but almost in spite of it. While not itself an opium producer of
note, Nigeria nonetheless has emerged as a major transshipment hub for heroin.
Moreover, the roles of endemic corruption, immigration and ethno-linguistic ties in
facilitating transnational trafficking activity are also very pronounced in this context. In
particular, the spatial dispersion of Nigerian TCOs, often ranging far beyond Nigeria’s
borders, and the application of strategies that serve to undercut competition, such as the
use of relatively expendable couriers, is also addressed.
In terms of format, each case study begins with an assessment of the smugglers’
landscape at the national level of analysis. In particular, attention is paid to conditions of
terrain, tradition and domestic turmoil, as well as the historic role of the heroin trade and
related criminal activity within the country. This also includes the various modes and
methods by which heroin can theoretically cross the target country’s borders, in an
attempt to measure their relative porosity.
The analysis then moves on to examine the set of observed and potential
smuggling vectors that move through the target country into adjacent regions.
Subsequent linkages to primary markets are also discussed in terms of the integration
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between selected countries and regions into the global heroin trade to form a seamless
whole. At each stage, the roles of access and risk, as well as the resultant connectivity,
form the primary analytical structure in terms of the relevant physical, economic, political
and human geography. A summary assessment of these various factors in the context of
the underlying geographic smuggling framework concludes each case study.
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CHAPTER V
OF TURMOIL AND THE TALIBAN:
AFGHANISTAN AND ITS TRANSNATIONAL HEROIN SMUGGLING VECTORS

This chapter examines the smugglers’ landscape of the Golden Crescent drug
nexus region, centering on Afghanistan, with respect to the geographic analytical
framework introduced at the outset of this study. As the pivotal nation-state in the
regional context of heroin production, Afghanistan’s role is crucial. Along with Burma,
as mentioned previously the country remains one of the two largest world producers of
opium, with that commodity constituting its single largest source of national income. Its
porous and mountainous borders with Iran, Pakistan and Central Asia are particularly
conducive to smuggling, especially on a small-scale basis that is difficult to prevent even
under optimal conditions. Moreover, a paucity of viable economic alternatives, decades
of political unrest, and a tradition of transnational smuggling activity have all served to
bolster this phenomenon.
Moving outward, heroin smuggling activity originating in Afghanistan must then
cross international borders into the surrounding region, particularly Pakistan, Iran and the
former Soviet Central Asian states, before moving onward to their final destinations. The
sets of observed and expected smuggling vectors through these concentric rings of
neighboring countries and those further out, with subsequent linkages to other regions
and markets, are assessed in terms of their relative attractiveness. As noted previously,
the paths of least resistance among available routes are predicated upon their physical,
economic, political and human geographical dimensions, with their relevant spatial
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attributes sorted in terms of access, risk and connectivity from the smugglers’
perspective.

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN
•

....

n is i an

Khprawd;

^K onSuTy

Bagpraim, \w *

|M,-iiA

K ABUL .

Uaiaiabad

*H bcSI

Qhairii

''BhTnddiM

i

,.,r

Cofflrol

Srart

K ftfM sw r

*

P A K I S T A N

1IIIS*
Fig. 14. Afghanistan and the surrounding region1

Heroin in Afghanistan: A Dearth o f Options
Recent events have brought Afghanistan to the forefront of world affairs in the
context of terrorism. However, even before 9/11, within the international system the
country was already of great importance in both symbolic and concrete terms. For

1 Map source: U.S. CIA, CIA W orldFactbook (Washington, DC: CIA, 2002), available at
http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. accessed 15 July 2004.
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instance, under a Huntingtonian conceptualization of clashing civilizations, Afghanistan
lies at the fault line of three civilizations, the Islamic, Russian Orthodox and Chinese, and
near a fourth, the Hindu, making it a natural pivot point for systemic stability or chaos.2
Incidentally, the idea that the country’s position, squarely in the Central or Inner Asian
region, makes it a vital center of strategic gravity for the entire Eurasian landmass is not
new, dating back at least to the writings of Halford J. Mackinder, Nicholas J. Spykman,
and, more recently, Ray S. Cline.3
Following its role as a catalyst in the end of the Cold War, with the rise of the
Taliban government Afghanistan also served for a time as a bell-weather of Islamic
fundamentalism. Furthermore, a number of the same factors that provided a safe haven
for al-Qae’da activity and related phenomena within Afghan borders also served to
facilitate the production of opium and the subsequent smuggling of heroin. While not the
only means of funding available, the enhanced liquidity provided by the drug trade meant
that Islamic fighters could be more autonomous from local society, which in turn helped
pave the way for imported fundamentalist tenets and facilitate the entry of foreign, mostly
Arab, combatants.4
As such, the widening operational scope of non-state actors, often in conjunction
with at least certain elements of national governments, is hardly surprising where the
2 This analytical framework can be found in Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the
Remaking o f World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), passim.
3 Specifically, see Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (London: Constable Publishers,
1942; reprint, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996); Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography o f Peace (New
York, Harcourt Brace, 1944); and Ray S. Cline, W orld P o w er Assessm ent: A Calculus o f Strategic Drift

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1975).
4 See Michael Griffin, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan (London, UK: Pluto
Press, 2001), 131-3, which notes the influx o f volunteers from across the Islamic regions o f the world, and
in particular the impact o f the Saudi contingent, which included Usama bin Laden. See also Ahmed
Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 12840. As will be discussed at greater length below, many o f the governments o f the former Soviet Union
(FSU) are particularly concerned with the spread o f this phenomenon into their territory. For a concise
overview o f this issue, see “The crusade against the Wahhabis,” The Economist, 4 July 1998, 36-7.
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economic rewards are so great and political power is so diffused. As discussed in
Chapter II, the literature on failed states is thus particularly relevant in this context. For
instance, Goodsen calls Afghanistan “the archetype of the failed state and a perfect
example of how non-state actors move into the vacuum created when a state fails.”5
Moreover, the author continues by noting a number of factors extant within
Afghanistan that exemplify this phenomenon, several of which have a definite, if not
explicit, spatial component:
Weak states have distinctive political, social, economic, demographic and even
geographic characteristics. Among these characteristics are limited political
institutionalization and penetration in society, strong ethnic, linguistic, and/or
religious divisions, and slow economic and social development. Some other
characteristics may also be present, such as rapid population growth and/or
resource problems, the interference of neighboring countries and/or big powers,
and even geostrategic location.6
However, to more fully understand the roots of this failure, as well as to establish the
necessary context for later discussion, a brief overview of Afghanistan’s recent history is
in order.
Afghanistan as a modem nation-state dates only back to 1919, when the end of
the Third Afghan War led to a cessation of previous British influence. This prior state of
affairs was in turn part of the wider geopolitical struggle between Czarist Russia and the
British Empire known as the “Great Game” that encompassed much of Central Asia

5 Goodsen, x. As an archetype o f the “weak state syndrome,” themes within the literature on Afghanistan
include its traditionally inefficient and ideologically bankrupt central government unable to adequately
distribute resources, common borders with several regional powers, a history o f superpower involvement
and international manipulation, and the resurgence o f ethnic conflict. For an earlier perspective on this
phenomenon, see also Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War (New York: Darwin Press,
1995). Another very interesting analysis o f non-state actors with a state-like coercive capacity in the
context o f civil war, using Afghanistan’s ethnically-based militias as a case study, can be found in Kristian
Berg Harpviken, “Transcending traditionalism: the emergence o f non-state military formations in
Afghanistan,” Journal o f Peace Research 34, no. 3 (August 1997), 271-88.
6 Goodsen, 11-2. An solid survey o f Afghanistan’s traditional yet enduring geopolitical significance can
also be found in Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid (New Delhi:
HarperCollins India, 1998), 54-69.
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during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.7 Thus, upon independence the reign of
Amanullah Khan from 1919 to 1929 was marked by attempts to modernize the county.
The subsequent reigns of Nadir Shah, from 1929 until his assassination in 1933,
and his son Zahir Shah, culminated in Afghanistan’s first constitution and consultative
assembly. However, a coup staged by Daud Khan, a former prime minister and first
cousin of Zahir Shah, abolished the ruling Durrani dynasty and established the Republic
of Afghanistan in 1973. In turn, Daud was himself overthrown and executed in April
1978 by many of the same Marxist military officers that assisted him in his earlier bid for
power.8
As the Marxists in turn split into factions and internal resistance to their rule
began to mount, the Soviet Union felt the need to come to the aid of its “progressive”
neighbor and thus sent troops into Afghanistan in September 1979. It was the advent of
the Soviet invasion that formed the turning point in recent Afghan affairs by galvanizing
resistance along a wide political and ethnic spectrum.9 A puppet regime was installed,
led initially by Babarak Karmal until he was deposed by the Soviets in favor of the head
of the secret police, Mohammed Najibullah. Though the Soviet withdrawal following a
series of international agreements in April 1988 weakened Najibullah’s position

7 Two excellent overviews o f the region during this period, focusing on the various Great Power
machinations, can be found in Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle fo r Empire in Central Asia
(New York: Kodansha International, 1992); and Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament o f
Shadows: The Great Game and the Race fo r Empire in Central Asia (Washington, DC: Counterpoint,
1999). For a synopsis o f Afghan history up to 1919, see Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A New History
(Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 2001), 1-85; Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Surrey, UK:
Curzon Press, 1995), 20-110; and Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the
Great to the Fall o f the Taliban (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 1-219.
8 For a concise analysis o f this train o f events, see Victor G. Korgun, “The Afghan Revolution: A Failed
Experiment,” in Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, ed. Dale F.
Eichelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 101-13.
9 For an analysis o f the mujahidin opposition in military terms, see Tanner, 243-70.
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considerably, continued material support and the failure of the various mujahidin factions
to unite sustained his government until its final collapse in May 1992.
The ensuing series of coalition governments was marked by ongoing civil war
among the former mujahidin leadership, notably Ahmed Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin
Rabbani representing the Tajiks, Rashid Dostum representing the Uzbeks, Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar and the Hizb-i-Islami party representing the Pashtuns, and the Hizb-i-Wahat
party representing the Hazaras.10 This state of affairs, involving unstable ruling
coalitions and attacks centering on the capital of Kabul by those not in power, lasted until
the rise of the Taliban movement in 1996 with the rise of the Taliban movement.11 While
Afghanistan’s ethnic dynamics with respect to the issue of smuggling is examined at
greater length below
Largely Pashtun in character, the Taliban’s emphasis on piety capitalized on
Afghan war-weariness, which encouraged the movement’s spread, while external and
illicit funding, largely from Pakistan, helped to solidify support which culminated in the
capture o f Kabul in September 1996.12 In response, many Tajik and Uzbek mujahidin

10 The dynamics o f the various mujahidin factions during the struggle against the Soviet occupation are
examined at greater length in Shah M. Tarzi, “Politics o f the Afghan resistance movement: cleavages,
disunity and fragmentation,” Asian Survey 31, no. 6 (June 1991), 479-95. Subsequent internal dissention is
also discussed in Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan’s ethnic conflict,” Survival 40, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 114-26.
11 For more on the genesis and early successes o f the Taliban movement, see Ewans, 179-90; Griffin, 3368; Rashid, Taliban, 17-54; and Tanner, 271-87. In particular, the Taliban’s ability to develop support in
Pashtun-majority areas was crucial. As Rashid notes, “The Taliban had won over the unruly Pashtun south
because the exhausted, war-weary population saw them as saviours and peacemakers, if not as a potential
force to revive Pashtun power which had been humiliated by the Tajiks and Uzbeks. Many surrenders had
been facilitated by pure cash, bribing commanders to switch sides - a tactic that the Taliban were to turn
into a fine art form in later years and which was sustained by the growth o f their income from the drugs
trade, the transport business and external aid from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.” Rashid, Taliban, 35.
12 Goodsen, 109-10. Upon taking Kabul, one o f the first acts o f the Taliban was to forcibly extract
Najibullah from a UN compound, where he had taken sanctuary since the fall o f his government in 1992,
and publicly execute him. Interestingly, one o f his last interviews was remarkably prescient in foretelling
the near future o f his country: “We have a common task - Afghanistan, the USA and the civilized world to launch a joint struggle against fundamentalism. If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will
continue for many years. Afghanistan will turn into a centre o f world smuggling for narcotic drugs.
Afghanistan will be turned into a centre for terrorism.” Quoted in, Griffin, 5.
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factions reconstituted into the opposition Northern Alliance, with Massoud as their most
prominent leader, a state of affairs that lasted up until his assassination heralding the
events of 9/11. As of this writing, the outcome of the resultant U.S.-led regime change in
the county and the subsequent establishment of the provisional government led by Hamid
Karzai, remains to be seen.13
It is difficult to assess the damage done to the Afghan socio-political structure due
to its recent hardships. Decades of continuous warfare led not only to the destruction and
incomplete replacement of prewar elites, but also to an increased role of violence in
society that Goodsen refers to as “Kalashnikovisation.” The underlying statistics starkly
illustrate the level of anarchy involved as the result of decades of endemic conflict.
Nearly 2 million Afghans have been killed, in addition to at least 150,000 Soviet soldiers,
as well as between 600,000 and 2 million wounded. Furthermore, over 6 million
Afghans have been displaced across international borders into both Iran and Pakistan, and
another 2 million internally displaced. In other words, over 50% of the Afghan
population has been killed, wounded or made homeless.14
Sheer human suffering aside, in the context of this discussion the most salient
effect of this extended period of turmoil has been the rise and entrenchment of the
transnational heroin trade. While the attempt here is to sort among the effects of the
relevant physical, economic, political and human geography, it should be kept in mind at
all times that none of these factors exist in a vacuum. Wherever possible these

13 As Magnus and Naby point out, however, the challenge to successive Afghan governments has been to
develop and maintain both internal and external legitimacy. In some respects, these may often be found in
inverse proportion, if at all. Magnus and Naby, 161-71.
14 Goodsen, 5.
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interactions are addressed as they arise, though at times themes may be introduced in one
context only to be developed more fully in another.
However, to set the context of the smugglers’ landscape in Afghanistan, an
understanding of the target commodity’s spatial disposition is in order. While the
cultivation of poppies and the subsequent processing of the raw product into heroin are
not the focus of this study, in the case of Afghanistan it is difficult to separate these
phenomena, and particularly their spatial aspects, from the logistics involved in moving
the product to market.15 As such, these issues must be addressed in order to provide a
background for subsequent analysis, especially with respect to the impact of vastly
expanded opium production over the past three decades.
Writing from the vantage point of the mid-1970s, Lamour and Lamberti note that,
“Afghanistan and northern Pakistan represent a source of opium as yet virtually untapped
by European traffickers whose supplies came from Turkey until poppy cultivation was
banned there in 1972.”16 This productive potential was soon to escalate sharply into a
reality between 1970 and 1982, as Afghan heroin production tripled, from 100 tons to
300 tons.

17

•

•

The catalyst for this massive expansion was the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in 1979, which set the stage for a number of events that accelerated this
trend.

15 It should also be noted that Afghanistan, along with Pakistan, also cultivates appreciable amounts o f
cannabis. As Interpol noted in 1998, while Afghan production is greater than its Pakistani counterpart,
Afghanistan’s lack o f a coastline means that its cannabis “is exported mainly via Pakistan, although some
passes through Iran, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.” This routing is significant due to the parallels with the
opium trade, as will be discussed in the next section. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 2.
16 Lamour and Lamberti, 177.
17 Chepesiuk, 28. Incidentally, the U.S. heroin addict population also rose by 25%, to 450,000 users,
between 1971 and 1982. While it is difficult to actually prove a correlation, the timing o f an explosive rise
in both supply and demand is suggestive nonetheless.
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In response to this final major maneuver of the Cold War, the Carter
administration started shipping arms to the mujahidin resistance, a policy that gained
momentum under the Reagan administration. However, even at the time, some
administration officials expressed a reluctance to support an insurgency in the midst of a
major opium cultivation area, drawing parallels with similar previous involvement in
Vietnam.18 In retrospective support of this view, Alfred W. McCoy notes the evidence
showing Afghan heroin flooding the world market from 1979, much as U.S. support for
Chinese nationalist forces in Southeast Asia helped to bolster the Burmese opium crop
yields from the 1950s.19
However, rather than a direct involvement in the heroin trade by the U.S.
government, a more apt characterization is that there were extensive sins of omission. As
Booth observes, “It has been said that the CIA were not as instrumental or as actively
involved in the Golden Crescent as they had been in the Golden Triangle, but their
intervention certainly encouraged a considerable increase in opium production. Even
when it was known the rebels were dealing in drugs, the CIA would not withdraw support

18 Specifically, David Musto and Joyce Lowinson, members o f President Carter’s White House Strategy
Council on Drug Abuse, wrote an op-ed piece for the New York Times outlining their concerns in this
respect. Cited in Chepesiuk, 64. This trend was accelerated by the Reagan administration, as noted in Bob
Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars o f the CIA, 1981-1987 (New York: Pocket Books, 1987), 357-9, 425.
19 See Alfred W. McCoy, “What War on Drugs? The CIA Connection,” The Progressive (July 1991), 21-6.
Proven instances o f officially sanctioned involvement in the international drug trade under the auspices o f
nation-states are relatively rare. Much more common is either direct but unauthorized involvement, or a
more indirect complicity that serves to enable drug trafficking without first-hand transactional participation.
However, allegations o f the former phenomenon certainly do exist. Examples o f this type o f scholarship,
often with more or less obvious ideological undercurrents, include Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics o f
Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall,
Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies and the CIA in Central America (Berkeley: University o f California Press,
1991). However, with respect to the Cold War era, it would be remiss not to mention the other side’s
policies within this arena. For instance, Jordan traces strategic involvement in the global drug trade on the
part o f the People’s Republic o f China, as well as both the Soviet Union and Cuba, to the understanding
that support for such activity could serve to weaken its enemies from within. In the case o f China, both the
U.S. domestic market and military personnel stationed in the Far East appear to have been targeted,
beginning during the rule o f Mao Tse-tung. Jordan, 62-5. See also Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Red Cocaine:
The Drugging o f America (Atlanta: Clarion House, 1990).
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for fear of jeopardizing their political stand.”

9fl

As in other instances, drugs were

considered the lesser evil as other considerations took precedence. However, in
functional terms it can be scarcely denied that, as Ikramul Haaq notes, “CIA intervention
provided the political protection and logistical linkage that joined Afghanistan’s poppy
fields, through Pakistan’s land mass, to heroin markets in Europe and America.”

91

For the most part, the spatial distribution of opium cultivation in Afghanistan is
centered in the southwest, in Helmand and Kandahar provinces; the east, in Nangahar
province; and the northeast, in certain parts of Badakshan province. However, there has
been a dramatic spread of such production over the last twenty years. By 1999, 104
districts in 18 out of 34 provinces reported significant poppy growing areas, while that
number rose to 123 districts by 2000.22
The reasons for this trend include the virtual destruction of legitimate agricultural
infrastructure such as irrigation networks, roads and factories, and the mining of
cultivable land. As a result, subsistence farmers could neither grow enough food for their
families, nor afford the delays involved in legitimate and relatively higher-retum crops

20 Booth, 289. Jordan, 65-8, also discusses the involvement o f the U.S. government in the drug trade,
specifically relating to Vietnam, Afghanistan and Central America, which he sees as indirect complicity
more than direct culpability.
21 Ikramul Haaq, “The Pak-Afghan drug trade in historical perspective,” Asian Survey 36, no. 10 (October
1996), 946. Like McCoy, the author also notes the parallels between CIA involvement in Southeast Asia,
and the drug trafficking activity that outlasted the relevant covert operations in both instances. Going even
further in an attempt to establish causality, John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and
International Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), 5, notes that, “Never has so much South
Asian marijuana, opium and semi-processed opium products and heroin, reached the drug pushers, the adult
addicts, the children and the general population o f the West, as in the late 1990s. Much o f this was another
direct consequence o f the CIA’s holy war o f 1979-89.”
22 “Afghans lead world in opium growing, UN drug chief reports,” CNN.com, 14 September 2000, 1-3;
Christopher S. Wren, “U.N. Forsakes Effort to Curb Poppy Growth By Afghans,” New York Times (web
edition), 17 September 2000, 2; and Haaq, 951-2. For more on the challenges o f estimating Afghanistan’s
opium production, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 44-5.
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such as fruit.23 The impact of other cultivation trends under the Taliban regime is
discussed at greater length below 24
In its impact, however, this de facto opium monoculture also parallels that of
cotton imposed by the Soviet regime throughout its Central Asian territories. The
difference lies in the fact that in the latter case the system was implemented from above
via a highly centralized decision-making apparatus, while in the former the imperatives
of decentralized anarchy and limited economic alternatives were the primary stimuli.25 In
both cases, however, the effect has been to move farmers away from traditional staple
crops, such as wheat, as well as to stifle the emergence of greater agricultural diversity,
and hence more economic stability. As a result, the dearth of other options leaves large
numbers of Afghan farmers with no other alternative to opium cultivation.26

23 Goodsen, 102. Furthermore, as noted in “The gardens o f Eden,” The Economist, 21 September 2002, 42,
in the 1970s the export o f fruits and nuts provided 40% o f the country’s foreign exchange, while roughly
60% o f the world’s dried fruit came from Afghanistan. However, in addition to war-related damage to
agriculture, the extensive orchards, vineyards and other crops were also severely impaired by the ongoing
drought.
24 However, the scope o f Afghanistan’s drug production near the end o f the Taliban regime is discussed in
U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Africa Strategic Unit, “Afghanistan Country Brief:
Drug Situation Report,” (Washington, DC: DEA, March 2001), available at
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/inteEintel0901 .html. accessed 15 July 2004. See also U.S. ONDCP, “Drug
Policy Perspectives,” 3, which links the cultivation boom dating from 1995 to a strain o f “super-poppy,”
having both a higher potency and a greater rate o f proliferation. Interestingly, this document also estimates
that, while Afghan opium production tripled between 1990 and 1995, from 450 MT to 1,250 MT, it
dropped slightly in 1996 to 1,230 MT. However, there is a notation that their 1996 figure does not
correspond with the UNDCP’s o f 2,300 MT. The stated explanation for this discrepancy is that, unlike the
U.S. government, the UNDCP has been able to conduct actual field survey in recent years. This point
would tend to give the U .N .’s statistics a greater credibility.
25 As such, the impact o f supply and demand on price is readily discernible. For instance, as noted in
“Afghanistan’s poppy politics,” The Econom ist, 18 September 1999, 46, the higher price o f opium in 1998,
$60 a kilo, encouraged Afghan farmers to grow more in 1999, as reflected in a lower price, about $37 a
kilo.
26 For instance, note the following: “Traders offer growers advances to finance inputs, and tide growers
over while the crop is in the ground. They visit households to buy opium. This credit, or advance payment
on future opium production is an integral part o f livelihood strategies in poppy producing areas o f
Afghanistan. The relatively stable value o f opium and its nonperishability mean that it also serves as an
important source o f savings and investment among traders and cultivators.” U.S Department o f State, INL,
INCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia - Afghanistan.”
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Moreover, despite a long history of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, “local
processing of heroin is entirely a post-1980 phenomenon.” Up to that point, the bulk of
this activity had taken place further downstream, primarily across the border in Pakistan.
A number of factors precipitated this development. However, perhaps the most salient
was the Pakistani response to dramatically increased level of domestic drug abuse and
external pressure from organizations such as the UNDCP and the DEA in the early
1990s, which served to push heroin labs back across the border into Afghanistan.27
To support this geographic shift, and as Afghan opium production expanded in
absolute terms, another consequence has been a corresponding rise in local demand for
the necessary precursor chemicals, especially acetic anhydride. For instance, several
seizures of German and Chinese shipments moving through United Arab Emirates have
been made in recent years, while Kazakhstan has become a major source of supply as
well.

Moreover, the large quantities of acetic anhydride destined for Afghanistan seized

in Uzbekistan during 1999 “underscore that the regional drug infrastructure operated in
both directions.”29
As for the smugglers’ landscape itself, predicated upon an examination of its
spatial attributes, this analysis begins with a consideration of physical geography. A
combination of rugged topographical features, high altitudes and harsh climate, along
with a general lack of economic development, has served not only to isolate Afghanistan
internationally, but also to insulate its people from any efforts at centralized

27 Goodsen, 102.
28 Thomas Land, “Middle East drug traffic set to rise,” The Middle East, no. 258 (July-August 1996), 20-2.
29 U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 6.
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government.30 As put forth by Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, the country can be divided
into eight distinctive geographic zones, ranging from mountain to desert to semi-tropical,
further underling not only the diversity of climates but also of the peoples living in these
areas.31
Moreover, among the three primary modes of transportation discussed in Chapter
II, namely those of land, water and air, options for smuggling routes are for the most part
limited to the first. As a landlocked nation, waterborne methods are very limited, except
for a few riverine systems.32 Similarly, air transportation is highly circumscribed by
virtue of the country’s very few venues for civil aviation, though such facilities may
become more common with the ouster of the Taliban regime.
As such, land routes for smuggling heroin out of Afghanistan understandably
predominate. However, there is an important distinction to be made between those landbased modes supported by a physical infrastructure, such as road and rail networks, and

30 See Goodsen, 13; and Haq, 946. Moreover, as Rashid observes, “For few countries in the world is it
more true that geography determines history, politics and the nature o f a people.” Rashid, Taliban, 7.
Magnus and Naby, 1-2, also note the country’s topography has also provided ample opportunities for
individuals and groups to remain isolated for a range o f reasons, such as avoiding religious persecution or
carrying out guerrilla activity.
31 See Magnus and Naby, 5-7. Specifically, these eight zones include the high-altitude Wakhan corridor in
the northeast, extending toward China; the southern mountain valleys o f Badakhshan, Panjshir and
Nuristan; the semitropical lowlands o f Kunar, Logar, Jalalabad and Laghman; the southeastern mountains
o f greater Paktia; the plains and foothills o f the Kandahar region; the central mountains o f Hazarajat; the
northern plains known as Afghan Turkestan; and the western region along the Iranian border, centered on
Herat.
32 For instance, the Amu Darya, forming part o f the Afghan boundary with both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,
is “a sluggish river, more suited to black market smuggling” than other commercial or cross-cultural
activity. As such, it does not constitute a major trade artery linking any primary production centers to
markets. See Griffin, 101. For more on the country’s various lake and river systems, generally utilized
more for irrigation than transportation, see also Magnus and Naby, 2-4, 7-9.
33 Interestingly, several Afghan warlords contesting power with the Taliban began their own airlines in
early 1996. Though quite limited in scope, these were useful in not only bringing in arms, but also in
smuggling out both drugs and gems. However, the obstacles involved included the uncertain state o f both
the planes and the pilots, a lack o f control towers, and bomb-damaged runways. See Ahmed Rashid, “Fear
o f flying,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 July 1996, 86. In particular, Dostum’s Uzbek militia was
able to operate its own “Balkh Airlines” to move smuggled goods from Dubai into northern Afghanistan.
Rashid, Taliban, 57.
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more informal border crossing such as those utilized by the various transnational and
often nomadic groups in Afghanistan. Thus, understandably enough, political control of
various sections of the international border can carry lucrative economic rewards. This
latter set of smuggling vectors is discussed at further length below, under the headings of
both political and human geography.
In general, the overall state of Afghanistan’s physical infrastructure may be
considered as rudimentary at best, even before the recent decades of conflict. The
primary national thoroughfare on the ground is the “Ring Road,” running from Torghundi
in the northwest, south to Herat, southeast to Kandahar and north to Kabul and Mazar-iSharif, before returning to Torghundi. Major spurs extend from the main circle out from
Mazar-i-Sharif north to Termez on the Uzbek border, and from Kabul east to Jalabad,
continuing on to the Pakistani border via the Khyber Pass.
Moreover, few sections of this road are maintained beyond the bare minimum of
upkeep. Highlighting the difficulty of even of intra-national travel, it was only upon
completion of the Salang tunnel in 1964 that overland travel between Kabul and the north
became possible during the winter season. Furthermore, except for a few miles of Sovietbuilt track to move natural gas from the Shibarghan field to the Uzbek border, there are
no extant rail lines in the country.34 Therefore, to effectively move contraband, there is
also a reliance on informal routes, particularly those used by the nomadic groups know
i f

collectively as kuchis.

34 Goodsen, 19-20. For more on the initial development and subsequent decline o f Afghanistan’s road and
rail infrastructure, see also Magnus and Naby, 64-6.
35 Incidentally, the term “kuchi” appears to be a generic term for nomad, rather than a reference to a
member o f any particular ethnic or tribal group. However, in practice its usage can be more specific in its
denotation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198

In terms of access, the physical geography of Afghanistan seems at first glance to
be not particularly conducive to smuggling, or even to efficient legitimate commercial
activity, without a massive investment in upgraded infrastructure. However, the ready
availability of large amounts of a highly lucrative and internationally traded commodity
serves as an important economic incentive to find imaginative ways to maximize access
and mitigate risk, thus optimizing connectivity. The manifestation of this may be found
all along Afghanistan’s porous borders, with countless numbers of illicit transactions
involving various commodities facilitated in large part by the various groups controlling
the adjacent areas.
This may be seen in some ways as overcoming the concept of friction of distance,
whereby factors beyond mere proximity serve to deter trade, as noted previously. In
particular, the application of both political leverage and human networks serve to offset
risk, as discussed at greater length below. However, at an even more basic level, this
trend is even further stimulated by a lack of viable economic alternatives. Furthermore,
many of these patterns are inextricably linked to the country’s political geography,
predicated largely on the decentralization of power to local warlords.
Once again, the Soviet invasion of 1979 serves as a line of departure for
subsequent developments by establishing certain precedents and entrenching other
preexisting features of Afghanistan’s economic geography. To return once more to
Goodsen, “The war so shattered the traditional Afghan economy that an opium-heroin
economic sector based on drug trafficking emerged to replace it.”36 During the protracted
conflict, the two primary funding options available were external and internal, neither of
which was particularly beneficial to Afghan society as a whole.
36 Goodsen, 97.
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To begin with the external, Afghanistan has long been accustomed to a heavy
reliance on outside sources of income, generally distributed with an eye more toward
private gain than social betterment by the relevant political actors at both the national and
local levels. During the era of Soviet control there was a drastically increased
dependency on aid and external loans, often in return for below-market sales of natural
gas to the U.S.S.R. Since the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992, the U.N. and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) provided for most relief and reconstruction
efforts, as both the mujahidin and Taliban factions spent nearly all of their own resources
fighting one another.

T7

The watershed for this trend came with the U.S.-led international response to the
Soviet invasion, namely the provision of weapons and aid to the mujahidin resistance,
countered by the allocation of military assets to the other side from their own sponsors.
Numerous other parties were also involved in this practice of tunneling aid to favored
factions, to greater and lesser degrees, in particular the Pakistanis and the Saudis. For
instance, up to the advent of the Taliban, Hekmatyar was a primary recipient of Pakistani
QO

largesse.

The Hazaras appear to have been supported by both the Iranian and, later, the

37 In addition to freeing up factional resources for continued warfare, this aid had the untended effect o f
further stimulating the cultivation o f opium. “Between 1988 and 1992, over $1 billion had streamed into
Afghanistan, a ‘peace dividend’ that turned aid into an industry on par with heroin and which, in the view
o f some critics, essentially assisted its transformation into the world’s largest opium producer by funding
the repair o f its myriad irrigation systems.” Griffin, 166. Rashid goes even further, noting that the only
effective NGO activity that the Taliban allowed was consciously geared toward benefiting smuggling and
drug trafficking, such as repairing roads, setting up gasoline pumps and inviting foreign businesses to set
up mobile telephone networks. Rashid, Taliban, 213.
38 An insider’s view o f the Pakistani government’s efforts to cope with the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan
can be found in Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics, 1977-1988 (Karachi,
Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1995), 318-28. Later on, while it was in power virtually all o f the
Taliban government’s $10 million annual budget was provided by grants from Pakistan. As a more
generalized effect o f this phenomenon, Goodsen also notes that, “The spillover o f arms from the Soviet and
American pipelines and the profitability o f the opium-heroin industry have promoted the
Kalashnikovization o f society in Afghanistan.” Goodsen, 101-2. See also Griffin, 202-3.
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post-Soviet Russian, governments, most notably during their struggle against the
Taliban.39
As this weapons pipeline gained momentum, Barnett R. Rubin notes, it “provided
ample opportunities for corruption,” including such practices as issuing false receipts,
and then selling the difference for personal profit or funneling it into other
entrepreneurial ventures. Continuing further, he also points out that, “The logistics
system was ideally suited for trade in drugs: it operated under military control and
provided a large network of trucks running loaded to the Afghan border and empty
coming back.”40
Similarly, Ahmed Rashid also notes that the logistics of these operations were
remarkably simple: “The donkey, camel and truck convoys which carried weapons into
Afghanistan were coming back empty. Now they carried raw opium.”41 This trend was
still evident through the Taliban era, where both gray and black market arms transfers to
various combatants in Afghanistan could be observed 42 The arrangements set up under
these auspices paved the way for a discrete set of subsequent smuggling vectors,
particularly with respect to the Pakistani border.43

39 See Ahmed Rashid, “Playing dirty,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 November 1996, 26-8.
40 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation o f Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International
System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 198. See also Goodsen, 102, and Ewans, 163-5.
41 Rashid, Taliban, 121.
42 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 14. The salient
distinction between gray and black market arms transactions is that the former makes use o f legitimate
export procedures, though often using fraudulent licenses to disguise the recipient or the supplier.
43 However, predating even the Soviet invasion, the institutional cornerstone o f illicit trade across the
Afghan-Pakistani border was the Transit Trade Agreement (TTA), initiated in 1965. This govemment-togovemment agreement entitled Afghan merchants and their Pakistani partners to import unlimited amounts
o f duty-free goods through the port o f Karachi, allegedly for domestic Afghan consumption. However, in
practice millions o f dollars’ worth o f goods were almost immediately smuggled back into Pakistan,
particularly after official Afghan oversight mechanisms broke down in 1992. See Griffin, 141-3; and
Rashid, Taliban, 189-92. It should be further noted that fewer goods being smuggled in from Afghanistan
was regarded as one among several factors serving to boost the Pakistani economy in the wake o f the
Taliban’s ouster from power in Afghanistan. See “Bombarded,” The Economist, 17 November 2001,40-1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201

Beyond these external sources of income, the only other feasible option for
participants in the ongoing conflict was to move toward various forms of internal selffunding, all based largely on opportunism. For instance, according to the Swedish
Committee for Afghanistan, the mujahidin resource base could be divided into six
categories. Of these, only two, official and private donations, had an external basis.
Another two were forms of Islamic direct taxes, namely ushr, a tithe on annual
production, and zakat, a 2.5% levy on stocks of wealth, collected with little regard to the
wishes of the local populace, as taxation with representation was an alien concept.
The final two sources of funding demonstrate both directly and indirectly the
challenges to normalizing an economy under conditions of anarchy. These are the
seizure of war booty, and, speaking more directly to the crux of this analysis, indirect
taxes on goods in transit, particularly along major trading routes and on high value
commodities including carpets, lapis lazuli and emeralds, as well as opium.44 With
respect to the latter, as the most lucrative cash crop available its cultivation was also
actively encouraged, as noted above. The importance of these economic dynamics, both
internal and external, is that they took place under the auspices of a wide range of
political factions, with the control of territory becoming not only an end unto itself, but
also the primary vehicle for monetary gain.
Thus, stemming from the convergence of internal and external factors, the
underlying economic geography of Afghanistan has made the various types of black

However, subsequent tensions with India over Kashmir have underscored the many causes for concern
noted in this article.
44 Rubin, Fragmentation, 189-90. The two external sources o f funding discussed by the Swedish
Committee are direct aid from both Western and Arab sources, including that provided through
international relief organizations, and donations from wealthy individuals, especially Saudis.
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market activity, including heroin smuggling, overwhelmingly pernicious.45 Furthermore,
it is the transnational linkages of this activity that serves to make it a tangible concern
both regionally and globally, as under conditions of autarky the situation in Afghanistan
would most likely be of little interest to outsiders except on humanitarian or perhaps
geopolitical grounds. With respect to any given smuggling vector, control of at least a
section of the path is essential to make a profit, with international borders being both the
most logical and the most lucrative pieces of real estate available. This drive to control
territory naturally leads to the topic of political geography.
In some respects, the ensuing regional warlordism in Afghanistan over the past
few decades resembles nothing so much as a medieval political structure with an
admixture of automatic weapons. While it would be all too easy to catalogue the various
factional disputes that have characterized a series of nominal governments, the focus here
is on the continuity of purpose that allowed heroin smuggling to flourish in spite of the
shifting sands upon which various attempts at government were built. With respect to the
smugglers’ landscape, the reciprocal relationship between economic and political
geography lies in the fact that the first encourages those smuggling vectors that maximize
profit, while the second provides the aegis under which such vectors may operate without
impediment.

45 For a more focused analysis o f this linkage see also Barnett R. Rubin, “The political economy o f war and
peace in Afghanistan,” World Development 28, no. 10 (October 2000), 1789-803. Moreover, note the
following passage and the numerous parallels between the Southeast Asian situation, particularly in Burma,
and that in Afghanistan: “Heroin and methamphetamine production in Southeast Asia is dominated by

ethnic drug-trafficking armies operating mostly in Burma’s remote opium producing region. The drug
trafficking armies had begun as insurgent groups and still claim to have an ethnic-based social and political
agenda, but the largest have become primarily engaged in the production and trafficking o f heroin and
methamphetamine and in other illicit and lucrative activities - including gem smuggling and illegal logging
and timber smuggling.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill,
24. As with the average subsistence-level Afghan poppy grower, cultivation o f the crop within the Golden
Triangle, particularly among the various impoverished hill tribes in the region, constitutes a major source o f
income.
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The career of Istamullah Muslim is illustrative of many of these dynamics.
Though initially trained by the Soviets, he had the distinction of being the first Afghan
military officer to be imprisoned by them. His subsequent activity as the leader of the
Achekzai tribe of Pashtuns, traditionally situated between Kandahar and the Pakistani
border, maintained the tradition of smuggling that dated back “since at least the time of
Elphinstone.” Though not singular, his primary motivation in response to a shifting
political climate appears to have been to maintain military control of the key transit
points and roads in his sector that provided a vital link to Pakistan.
As a mujahidin commander, Istamullah conducted military and smuggling
operations in parallel, but fell out with the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI) in 1984 over the issues of both smuggling and his refusal to join any of
the Pakistani-sponsored Islamic parties. As a result, he then defected to join the
Najibullah regime and was made a general, though he later tried unsuccessfully to defect
back to the mujahidin side.
Istamullah’s militia was finally defeated at Spin Boldak following the Soviet
withdrawal, and he died in a Soviet hospital in 1991 from drug and alcohol
complications.46 Though his tactical changes of allegiance may be interpreted as merely
duplicitous, an alternative argument can be made that he was in fact true to his primary
goal of self-aggrandizement, and opted to cooperate with any party that allowed him the
freest hand to pursue that end.
Thus, as the generation o f wealth became increasingly predicated on the control
of territory, an even greater fervor was added to an already keen competition for power.

46 Istamullah’s career is related in Rubin, Fragmentation, 158-9. Incidentally, the Elphinstone reference is
to Mounstuart Elphinstone, who led the first official British mission to Afghanistan in 1809.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

204

This was particularly noticeable during the scramble to fill the vacuum left by the
departure of Soviet troops. However, it would not be at all accurate to say that factional
tendencies in Afghan politics do not predate this period. Geographic position and a long
history of invasions have left a distinct impact on Afghanistan’s politics.
For instance, one emergent theme in Afghan history involves the defense of
territory, in that while Afghans generally do not hesitate to fight amongst themselves,
they quickly unite to face any external enemy.47 Given this tradition, resistance to the
Soviet invasion, as well as to the subsequent Najibullah regime, was perfectly
understandable. What is most salient about the Soviet incursion is how thoroughly most
Afghans became united in their opposition. As such, this series of events delineates a
change in scope rather than one of character. While this pattern seems to have
accelerated over the past several decades, it is too early to tell whether the pendulum
toward centralization will swing back in the post-Taliban era.
As Soviet influence waned, local commanders began to enjoy more autonomy,
with many turning the promotion of opium cultivation as discussed above. Furthermore,
Rubin notes that these warlords were “enabled once again to levy tribute on road
transport - by traders, smugglers and government suppliers alike.” This points to a
degree of local latitude largely uncontestable by either external forces or any central
47 As Tanner notes, “The Soviet invasion achieved that rarity in Afghan history: a unifying sense o f
political purpose that cut across tribal, ethnic, geographic, and economic lines.” Tanner, 243. See also
Magnus and Naby, 50-2. Underling Afghanistan’s long history o f invasions, Goodsen notes the impact o f
individual conquerors such as Darius the Great, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane and Babur.
He also offers the following list o f dynasties and empires that have held all or part o f present-day
Afghanistan: Seleucid, Greco-Bactrian, Indo-Greek, Mauryan, Parthian, Saca, Yueh-Chin, Kushan,
Sassanian, Hepthalite, Hindi-Shahi, early Muslim Arab, Abbasid, Tahirid, Samanid, Saffarid, Ilkhan Turk,
Ghaznavid, Ghorid, Seljuk, Kwarazm Shah, Delhi sultanate, Mongol, Kart, Timurid, Shaybani Uzbek,
Safavid and Mogul. Goodsen, 23-5. Interestingly, neither Russian nor British involvement in Afghan
affairs is mentioned in this otherwise quite exhaustive list. Incidentally, the author also notes elsewhere
that, as a result o f this turbulent history, “one important trait o f the Afghans has been their flexibility in
adapting to new military technology and tactics.” In the context o f this study, this trait helped facilitate the
adoption o f modem weapons, as they became available, by smugglers. Goodsen, 38-9.
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government. In general, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, “and especially helicopters,”
allowed local commanders to once again seize booty and charge tolls at will. Rubin
continues by observing that this was a return to the same type of activity such “as tribal
warlords had done for centuries before the strengthening of the Afghan state in the 1950s,
and as they had started to do again when that state broke down in 1978-9.” 48
During the final days of the Najibullah regime, in the resulting power vacuum
only Hikmatyar and Massoud controlled factions both strong enough and mobile enough
to actively contest power at the national level. In particular, Hikmatyar’s forces were
propped up by both drug money and extensive support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
As Rubin notes, “Hikmatyar was the only leader to exploit opium profits systematically
as a basis for a hierarchically organized party and conventional army.”
Furthermore, anticipating a rapid Soviet withdrawal during the summer of 1988
and a subsequent loss of revenue, Hikmatyar appears to have sent his men out to search
for precious stones and to more actively encourage poppy cultivation. He was later to
become intimately involved in heroin refining, in partnership with Pakistani syndicates,
as opposed to other warlords who were for the most part content to sell raw opium at
bazaars 49

48 Barnett R. Rubin, The Search fo r Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1995), 117, 256. Supporting this observation, Rashid notes the plight o f the trucking
mafia operating between Kandahar and Quetta, Pakistan, subjected to more than 20 separate checkpoints
and accompanying demand for money. As such, the advent o f the Taliban in concentrating these tolls was
considered a welcome development. Rashid, Taliban, 22.
49 Rubin, Fragmentation, 257. Echoing some o f the themes noted above in the context o f economic
geography, the author elsewhere notes the role o f opium in that the “sale o f a cash crop to foreign markets
could substitute for access to external political networks. Thus, the warriors o f the Helmand valley
developed a financial base for despotic warlordism from agricultural exports to developed capitalist
countries.” Ibid., 226. For more on the deterioration o f relations between Massoud and Hikmatyar, see
also Ahmed Rashid, “Warriors o f the north,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 May 1992, 12-3; Griffin,
21-3; and Salamat Ali and Ahmed Rashid, “Separate ways: guerrilla groups seek backing for breakaway
states,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 September 1992, 18-9. The latter article in particular is salient
in that it raises the issue o f the partition o f Afghanistan along ethnic Pashtun, Hazara and Tajik-Uzbek
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However, even Massoud, the mujahidin commander least identified with drug
trafficking during the Soviet occupation, was to be co-opted by circumstances. Once in
Kabul following the fall of the Najibullah regime, he was forced to accede to a tacit
agreement not to interfere with the opium crop in pivotal Pashtun areas along the
Pakistani border. These included Nangahar province, centering on the city of Jalalabad,
and Paktia province, centering on the city of Gardez. Moreover, his primary rival,
Hikmatyar, whose involvement was already well established, unsurprisingly joined him
supporting this concession.50
This leads to the interesting question, to which perhaps there is no real answer, of
whether or not any actor involved in Afghan politics would have been able to totally
eschew a role in opium production. This is not only due to the opportunity costs in the
form of lost revenue, but also to a fear of antagonizing the populaces of poppy growing
areas, not the most politically expedient course of action when vying for national or even
local power.
Furthermore, under such overwhelming systemic constraints, the very concept of
corruption as developed in Chapter II hardly seems to apply. At no time during the postSoviet period has any central government been in charge of the entire national territory of
Afghanistan, though the Taliban came the closest, and thus no concerted effort was ever
made to curb the drug trade. Indeed, there was very little incentive even to make the
attempt, other than to curry external favor.51

lines. This option was seldom discussed in a conflict generally characterized by a winner-take-all attitude
among the contestants and an international reluctance to alter any existing borders.
50 Rubin, Fragmentation, 277. With respect to Gardez, the author notes that poppies were “planted right up
to the roadside in the spring o f 1997,” the first growing season after the Taliban seizure o f Kabul. See also
Ewans, 154-6.
51 As an interesting aside, the Afghan government did ban opium in 1958, but as no penalties were involved
this was routinely ignored. Booth, Opium, 252.
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With the advent of the Taliban and its early successes moving out of Kandahar
and both west into the Helmand valley and northeast into Ghazni, their practice of
denouncing the drug trade and burning poppy fields had the effect of “gaining some
credibility in the eyes of the United States.”

^9

However, as the movement continued its

ascent, the UNDCP appealed to its leaders to outlaw opium production under Islamic
sharia law. The Taliban steadfastly reserved to itself the right to finally arbitrate these
legalities.53 Furthermore, while strongly discouraging the domestic use of drugs, there is
considerable evidence that the export of opiates was actively encouraged.54
In general, external exhortations to control the drug trade served only to highlight
the inability of the international community to enforce its will beyond highly
circumscribed parameters. As Goodsen notes, “Despite early Taliban claims that they
would eradicate opium-heroin production, since early 1994 it has increased in areas they

52 Rubin, The Search fo r Peace, 140. Even earlier, as Griffin notes, “With the capture o f Kandahar in
October 1992, the Taliban took command o f the southern outlet o f a smuggling empire which, since the
withdrawal o f Soviet forces, had expanded deep into Central Asia and beyond, opening a back door into
Pakistan’s heavily-protected market o f 135 million people. In this prototype o f a regional trading bloc . . .
entrepreneurs inside Afghanistan and an 18,000-strong community o f expatriates in the port o f Karachi
played - and continue to play - pivotal roles as middlemen and hauliers.” Griffin, 141. Furthermore, with
the capture o f Helmand in January 1995, the immense poppy fields o f that province also fell under the sway
o f the Taliban as well. During the course o f the operation, smaller drug warlords were encouraged to
switch sides against Ghaffar Akhunzadeh, the largest and potentially most dangerous local rival to the
Taliban, with various promises o f future support and assurances o f a continued flow o f revenue. See
Rashid, Taliban, 33-4.
53 “Drugs and Islamic law,” The Economist, 6 September 1997, 44. In conjunction with this urging on the
part o f the U.N., there were simultaneously stillborn attempts at crop substitution to convince the opium
farmers to grow fruit instead. See also Ewans, 183-5, and Hannah Bloch, “The Taliban Drug Trade,” Time
International, 13 July 1998, 33. O f particular interest, the latter article includes a photo o f the Taliban’s tax
collectors handing out receipts to opium farmers, and border control officials stamping papers to permit the
export o f these narcotics.
54 See, for instance, Ahmed Rashid, “Drug the infidels,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 May 1997, 25-6.
An extensive documentation o f Taliban support for the opium trade can also be found in Rashid, Taliban,
117-27. Concurring with this assessment, Goodsen also notes that, despite lip service to the contrary, the
“unprecedented leap in opium production showed that the Taliban were making no serious inroads in
curbing the narcotics traffic.” Goodsen, 83. Moreover, with respect to the growth o f domestic heroin use in
Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and throughout various Afghan refugee camps, a Taliban court order o f
October 1997 decreed that all addicts should receive treatment. However, in practice the regime most often
incarcerated drug users rather than treating them. U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Southwest
Asia - Afghanistan.”
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control.” Their “half-hearted justifications for continued tolerance of an obviously unIslamic practice” testified to the trade’s strength and influence in high government circles
within both Afghanistan and Pakistan.55 Moreover, despite public condemnation of
narcotics industry, “virtually all of Afghanistan’s opium poppy cultivation and morphine
base and heroin processing laboratories are located in Taliban-controlled territory.”56
By 2000, various pressures on the Taliban government led to a renewed effort to
attain international acceptance. Immediate pressures included renewed Northern Alliance
activity and an ongoing regional drought that led to rising food prices and a subsequent
wave of refugees.

cn

In response, though still openly supporting the Taliban regime,

Pakistan closed its border to refugees in November 2000, citing donor fatigue.
Furthermore, as a result of Usama bin Laden’s continued residence in Afghanistan, new
U.N. sanctions had been applied in the wake of the October 2000 bombing of the USS
Cole in Yemen. Ongoing international criticism of the Taliban’s treatment of women,
part of a wider spectrum of human rights concerns, also contributed to the regime’s
ostracism.

co

55 Goodsen, 102. However, while the heroin tax remained too important to curtail, similar measures to
stem the less lucrative hashish trade were implemented by the Taliban during this period. Further evidence
for tacit support in the face o f rhetorical opposition lies in reports that the Taliban even distributed fertilizer
to opium farmers in an effort to expand their tax base. See U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 3;
and Rashid, Taliban, 124-5.
56 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20.
57 According to the World Food Programme, this drought throughout much o f the southern part o f the
country was the worst in thirty years and persists as o f this writing. Over 3 million people were directly
affected, with a further 8 million threatened less directly. Its projected deleterious impact on the opium
crop may well have precipitated the Taliban’s decision to ban such cultivation for the 2000 planting season.
Moreover, the government is alleged to have told its citizens that the cause o f the drought was “their
impiety and discontent.” See “Drier and more desperate,” The Economist, 12 August 2000, 39; and Griffin,
246-7. Exacerbating the effect o f the drought has been the extensive deforestation o f the country in recent
years. For instance, latest estimates o f Afghanistan’s forest cover are 0.5%, down from 3% in 1980. It is
projected that by 2005 all the natural woods may be gone. “Bare mountains, poor people,” The Economist,
3 November 2001, 24.
58 For more on gender issues in Afghanistan under the Taliban, see Rashid, Taliban, 105-16.
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Reacting to these various pressures, the Taliban announced a ban on opium
cultivation in July 2000, “in an unsuccessful attempt to gain Afghanistan’s seat at the
U.N. and, more generally, international recognition.”59 Although Afghan opium
production for 2000 was considerably lower than that for 1999, much of that drop may be
attributed to the drought.60 However, it will never be known if the profits from taxing
both the production and movement of heroin would have been too lucrative to give up,
even had the political will truly existed, as the Taliban regime would not be in power by
the time of the next harvest.61
Though expressing its disapproval of Afghanistan’s failure to stem its outflow of
heroin, the United States appeared either unable or unwilling to apply appreciable
leverage other than annual decertification, a moot point in concrete terms as unilateral aid
was already suspended on other grounds. Some explanations for this tendency may be a
lesser sense of domestic urgency on the heroin trade vis-a-vis the cocaine trade, and an

59 Goodsen, 84-5.
60 See Christopher S. Wren, “U.N. Forsakes Effort to Curb Poppy Growth By Afghans,” New York Times
(web edition), 17 September 2000, 1-2, which cites U.N. figures. However, according to U.S. Department
o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia - Afghanistan,” between 1999 and 2000 opium cultivation in
Afghanistan actually rose 25 percent despite the drought. Incidentally, a more positive view o f the
Taliban’s opium ban can be found in “Afghanistan’s opium fields,” The Economist 24 February 2001, 43.
Though conceding that the Taliban did manage to enforce their ban for the 2000 harvest, the existence o f
government opium stockpiles was also acknowledged. Furthermore, though never to be tested, the
continuing temptation to revert to large-scale opium cultivation is recognized as well, particularly as prices
for commodities rise in response to relative scarcity. It should also be noted that, compared to most crops
other than wheat, opium poppies require minimal water and, moreover, its harvested resin can be stored for
years before being processed into heroin. For more on traditional irrigation practices, as well as the
challenging the continued use o f these systems, see also Magnus and Naby, 7-9.
61 Though not conclusive, counterfactual evidence does exist that had the Taliban opted to allow a
resumption o f opium cultivation, their strategy in terms o f justification would place the blame squarely on
outsiders. See “Journal Condemns US, Russian Role in World Narcotics Trafficking,” FBIS transcribed
text IAP20010302000022 o f Mustafa Hamid, “The Narcotics Crisis and International Trafficking,” The
Islamic Emirate, 1 December 2000,21-8. In addition to making the case for Afghanistan’s government as
a moral exemplar, the author also notes the roles o f the U.S., in conjunction with its puppets the UN and
“the well-organized Russian Mafia that is run by the decision-making Jews” in exploiting the Afghan
opium farmer. Furthermore, parallels between oil in the Middle East and opium in Afghanistan are made,
whereby a plan is also put forth by which opiates form the cornerstone o f Afghan economic recovery,
expanding even further to service a burgeoning notional pharmaceutical industry within the country.
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unwillingness to further roil turbulent relations with other predominantly Islamic
countries in the region for minimal expected returns. Despite avowed concern for issues
such as drugs, as well as human rights considerations and in particular the treatment of
women, it was the regime’s role in supporting international terrorism that was eventually
to bring the full wrath of the United States’ military down on the Taliban.62
Finally, two features of Afghanistan’s human geography have been crucial in
facilitating a favorable smugglers’ landscape. The first is the ethnic diversity and
stratification of Afghan society, polarized even further by decades of war, as noted
above.63 On this issue, Goodsen notes that among the centrifugal forces in Afghan
society are deep ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, tribal and racial cleavages, all of which “are
reinforced by a spatial pattern of population distribution into different regions of the
country.” Furthermore, “the social system is based on communal loyalties and emphasize
the local over higher-order identity formulations.”64 However, it should be noted that
Islamic identity often takes precedence over even local sentiment, as demonstrated by the
jihad-inspired solidarity fueling the reaction to the Soviet invasion.

62 In early 2000, the ONDCP reported that, “The U.S. has little, if any, leverage with the players involved
in Afghanistan: It has no control over any o f the current Afghan combatants; its sway over Pakistan has
been considerably reduced since Washington terminated all assistance to that country in 1990 as a response
to its nuclear weapons program (i.e. the Pressler Amendment); it cannot pressure Saudi Arabia, which has
its own sources o f money and knows it is central to the U .S’s vital interests in the Gulf; and finally, it has
little or no influence in the regional states opposing the Taliban, namely Iran, Russia, India and the Central
Asian States.” U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 3. The difference in the regional balance o f
power in the period o f less than a year is startling.
63 For an excellent generic analysis denoting the characteristics o f ethnically hierarchical societies, see
Horowitz, 21-36.
64 Goodsen, 12-3. This point is further underlined in Magnus and Naby, 91-4.
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Fig. 15. Ethnolinguistic groups in Afghanistan65

The map above illustrates the spatial distribution of the country’s myriad ethno
linguistic groups. With regard to the general ethnic make-up of Afghanistan, as Rashid
observes, geography plays no small part:
The country is split by a north-south divide along the massive Hindu Kush
m ountain range. Although there w as m uch intermingling of the races in the

twentieth century, a rough division shows that to the south of the Hindu Kush live
the majority of the Pashtuns and some Persian-speaking ethnic groups, to the
north live the Persian and Turkic ethnic groups. The Hindu Kush itself is
populated by the Persian-speaking Hazaras and Tajiks. In the far northeast
65 Map source: University o f Texas at Austin, Maps o f Afghanistan (1997), available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbrOO/video/cbr ctd/cbr ctd 53b.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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comer, the Pamir mountains, which Marco Polo called ‘the roof of the world,’
abut Tajikistan, China and Pakistan. The inaccessibility of the Pamirs means that
there is little communication between the myriad of diverse and exotic ethnic
groups who live in its high, snow-bound valleys.66
The traditional ethnic hierarchy in Afghanistan begins with the Pashtun at the apex. For
example, the former royal family hails from the Muhamadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe,
part of the Durrani confederation of Pashtuns. Along with the Durrani, the primary
contenders for power among the Pashtun have been the Ghilzai, while other important
tribes include the Afridi, Wazir, Mohmand, Mahsud, Jaji, Mangal, Zadran, Kakar,
Khatak, Orakzai and Shinwar.
Historically, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens have comprised the middle layers
of society, with the Hazaras having the “lowest status of any group in Afghanistan.”67
Interestingly enough, the Hazaras are the only major ethnic group whose traditional
territory does not overlap with international borders, and hence appear to have the least
direct involvement in transnational smuggling.68 However, numerically smaller groups
such as the largely nomadic Baluch, with ethnic ties extending into both Iran and
Pakistan, maintain a much higher profile in terms of smuggling.

66 Rashid, Taliban, 7. Moreover, the author also notes the linguistic diversity in Afghanistan that presents a
further hurdle to effective nation-building. “Western Afghanistan was dominated by speakers o f Persian or
Dari as the Afghan Persian dialect is known. Dari was also spoken by the Hazaras in central Afghanistan,
who were converted to Shiism by the Persians, thereby becoming the largest Shia group in an otherwise
Sunni territory. In the west the Tajiks, the repositors o f Persia’s ancient culture also spoke Dari. In
northern Afghanistan the Uzbeks, Turcomans, Kyrgyz and others spoke the Turkic languages o f Central
Asia. And in the south and east the Pashtun tribes spoke their own tongue, Pashto, a mixture o f IndoPersian languages.” Rashid, Taliban, 9-10. In many ways, these observations parallel those regarding
Afghanistan’s eight geographic zones made by Magnus and Naby, 5-7, as discussed above.
67 Rubin, Fragm entation, 28-31. It is important to remember that, as elsewhere, ethnic labels can vary

widely by numerous factors, including language, religion and area o f residence. Other groups within
Afghanistan include the Qizibash, Persian-speaking Shias descended from Turkmen tribes brought in
during the Safavid era for administrative purposes and largely continuing to be members o f the urban elite;
the Nuristanis, relative latecomers to Sunni Islam inhabiting isolated valleys in the northeast; and the Waki
and Kirgiz o f the Wakhan corridor extending eastward toward China. See also Ewans, 7-8; and Magnus
and Naby, 9-17, 81-94.
68 For a more extensive study o f this ethnic group, see Sayed Askar Mousavi, The Hazaras o f Afghanistan:
An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study (Surrey, UK: Curzon Press, 1998).
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With respect to the Pashtun-dominated period of nation-state building dating from
1919 to 1979, Rubin writes, “The structure of the old regime in Afghanistan imposed a
pattern of ethnic stratification on the diverse and fragmented local societies. This
stratification defined the relation of various groups to the state, although local systems of
identity and ethnic relations differed from those defined by the state.”69 However,
underlining the hurdles of centralized rule in such a divided society, Rubin continues by
noting that, “It is misleading to say that the government tried to break large units into
smaller units; among non-tribal peoples it tried to reinforce limited kinship- or residencebased political identities. Such a pattern is typical of a weak state attempting to retain its
power through fragmentation.”70
The second relevant feature of Afghanistan’s human geography is the long
standing tradition, facilitated by transnational ethnic ties, of smuggling that remains both
alive and well in the form of informal border crossings. These same ties have operated
much the same way for centuries, as the region has been a trading hub dating at least back
to the heyday of the Silk Road. Historically, attempts to reign in smuggling have been
fraught with obstacles, as demonstrated by King Amanullah’s 1919 decision that

69 Rubin, The Search fo r Peace, 23. For instance, in its original meaning the terms “Afghan” and
“Pashtun” were considered interchangeable, which by extension implies that although all residents o f the
country are legally citizens, “the term retains its ethnic meaning in popular usage” and resultant
connotations o f exclusion. Further examples o f the historical usage and etymology o f these terms can be
found in Ewans, 3-5. Rashid also offers evidence that the ethnic fragmentation o f Afghan society is
continuing: “Afghans no longer call themselves Afghans, or even Pashtuns or Tajiks, but Kandaharis,
Panjshiris, Heratis, Kabulis or Jowzjanis. Fragmentation is both horizontal and vertical and cuts across
ethnicity to encompass a single valley or town.” Rashid, Taliban, 208. A more optimistic analysis o f
Afghan society can be found in Magnus and Naby, 167-8. In particular, the authors note the potential for a
“multiethnic deterrent,” based not only on internal centrifugal forces but also the large number o f
transnational groups along the country’s borders, to underpin both national and regional stability.
However, given the present polarization such a scenario does not seem likely for the foreseeable future.
70 Rubin, Fragmentation, 25. Echoing similar sentiments, Goodsen notes even more succinctly that, “The
allegiance o f the individual almost never goes beyond the tribal unit.” Goodsen, 14.
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“simplified customs duties and actually tried to collect them, which in turn brought him
into conflict with border tribes who lived by smuggling.”71
Nomadic groups, including elements of the Pashtun, Baluch and Brahui, the latter
living primarily in the southwestern desert region, are able to exploit porous borders and
are thus ideally situated for smuggling activity. Traditionally for some nomads, as Rubin
points out, “smuggling has been a source of more income than agriculture or
pastoralism.” However, their seasonal migration patterns have been disrupted throughout
history by war and other social disruptions.72 In functional terms, these cross-border
human links serve as an integral part of the handling methods for the legs involved in the
relevant smuggling vectors, as discussed in Chapter III. This issue is also addressed
further in the next section.
As noted at the outset of this discussion, the confluence of physical, economic,
political and human geography has had a salient and lasting impact on heroin smuggling
out of Afghanistan. Having broken down these factors, it is beneficial to recombine them
all into a single example that serves to illustrate in detail the many facets of this
phenomenon. In this way, the difficulty of effectively dealing with these endemic and
well-entrenched dynamics all the way from the grass roots to the international level
become readily apparent.
In southern Afghanistan, following the Soviet withdrawal, the local warlord
Mullah Nasim Aksudzada decreed an expansion of opium cultivation within his area of
control, the Helmand Valley region. While a traditional crop in the mountainous north,

71 Rubin, Fragmentation, 55. Incidentally, Amadullah also wanted to build a national railroad, a plan that
has yet to reach fruition, and tried to prevent extortion by border tribes to allow caravans to pass. However,
he did manage to open several new roads and improve existing ones.
72 Ibid., 33.
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he not only encouraged the practice in the south, but also instituted a “salam” system,
under which farmers are paid at the time of sowing at a lower rate than they would
normally receive at the time of harvest. In addition to so exploiting these subsistence
farmers, production quotas were also set. For example, in 1989, 50% of arable land was
earmarked for opium production, with anyone not fulfilling the quota forced to pay the
difference. Both torture and execution were used at times to enforce collection of such
debts.
The opium produced under this system was sent primarily to the Gird-i-Jangal
bazaar, where refinery representatives bargained on behalf of the six main refineries run
by Hekmatyar’s Pakistani-backed Hizb-i-Islami party, in Koh-i-Sultan. Smugglers were
then hired to transport the finished product to Baluchistan via Robat. To facilitate this
cross-border transfer, Nasim even maintained an office in nearby Zahidan, Iran. These
arrangements worked well enough until the summer of 1989, when local commander
Yahya Sayyaf tried to levy taxes on Nasim’s opium passing through his territory. In
response, Nasim conquered Yaha Sayyaf s stronghold.
For its part, the U.S. began to increase its pressure on the Pakistani ISI to cut
Nasim’s funding. However, in the winter of 1989-1990, he showed up at the U.S.
embassy in Islamabad and attempted to broker a deal with Ambassador Robert Oakley
for $2 million in return for halting poppy cultivation within his area of control. While
Nasim expected cash, the agreement actually called for development aid administered
through the U.S. Agency for International Development. Nonetheless, in the spring of
1990 Nasim held up his part of the bargain and proceeded to order a drastic cut in such
activity.
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However, Nasim was assassinated in Peshawar, Pakistan, in late March of that
same year. Not surprisingly, this incident happened to coincide with the start of the
poppy- planting season. The killing was attributed to both rival drug cartels and the
Hizb-i-Islami. In a final irony, the State Department informed Oakley that the deal would
not have been honored anyway, in keeping with a policy of non-negotiation with drug
traffickers. In this power vacuum, Nasim’s brother Ghulam Rasul later took up where his
sibling left off. However, he has stated in interviews that he would be willing to come to
a financial arrangement with the U.S. along similar lines as those pursued earlier.73
In the decade that followed this episode, despite the waxing and waning of
individual fortunes, there was relatively little change, and certainly none for the better.
By early 2001, Afghanistan had already been reduced to a pre-modem level, as given the
collapse of the formal economy “virtually no industry functioned, and the most vibrant
economic activities were the transit trade, opium growing, heroin manufacturing and
smuggling, and other small-scale agriculture.”74 Following the ouster of the Taliban
regime by U.S.-led and indigenous forces in late 2001, the dawn of a new era for
Afghanistan could be hoped for. However, numerous challenges remain in stemming the
outward flow of heroin.
To begin with, the lack of viable economic alternatives persists, often in
combination with continuing warlordism. For instance, Ismail Khan’s control of four
ethnically diverse provinces in western Afghanistan along the border with Iran and
Turkmenistan, centered in Herat and comprising approximately 20% of the national

73 Ibid., 213, 263-4.
74 Goodsen, 96. The author further notes that, as an example, in 1997 Afghanistan’s GDP was $5 billion,
half o f which came from the transit trade with Pakistan, and exports other than narcotics limited to some
timber and gemstones.
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population, forces aid to be funneled under his auspices rather than those of the central
government.75 Even should the Afghan economy begin to recover, the financial
structures simply do not exist to handle much economic development. Paradoxically,
efforts to address these issues may in turn carry their own risks.

7 (s

Moreover, it appears that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan for 2002 have yielded
levels approaching those of the mid-1990s, despite earlier wishful thinking to the
contrary.

77

Earlier in the year, it was reported that, “While American and European

officials have considered measures like paying Afghan opium poppy farmers to plow
under their fields, they have concluded that continuing lawlessness and political
instability will make significant eradication all but impossible.” Rather, a less ambitious
strategy including the targeting of processing facilities and brokers, as well as funding for
anti-smuggling measures in neighboring countries is more likely.
In addition to the inherent difficulty, the primary rationale for avoiding concerted
drug control measures in Afghanistan is that any intense eradication effort could imperil

75 See “Nation Building, Or How to Handle A Warlord’s Wants,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, 28
February 2002, A -l, A-4. The ambiguity surrounding Ismail Khan is highlighted by two profiles from the
same source over the space o f three weeks. In “As good as it gets,” The Economist, 3 November 2001, 24,
Khan is called both “the West’s favorite warlord” and “a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy landscape,”
largely on the strength o f his previous record o f relatively enlightened, though autocratic, rule in the Herat
region. However, as noted in “Sharing power is hard to do,” The Economist, 24 November 2001, 17,
returned to power once again in the wake o f the Taliban collapse, he “still has the air o f a chief, not a
politician.” Furthermore, there is a concrete interest in maintaining control o f this area, as it encompasses
an important cross-border trade conduit with Iran. In fact, when this region was first wrested from Ismail
Khan’s control by the Taliban in September 1995, the big winners appear to have been the various
smuggling and transport mafias that now had better access to Iranian and Central Asian markets. See
Rashid, Taliban, 36-40, which includes a brief outline o f the city’s tumultuous history dating back to the
time o f Genghis Khan and Tamerlane.
76 Note the following: “Civil war in Afghanistan appears to have destroyed most o f the country’s primitive
banking infrastructure . . . If Afghanistan’s financial infrastructure is rebuilt according to Islamic banking
principles, the cash-free nature o f Islamic banking could create additional vulnerabilities to money
laundering.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
77 See “The poppies bloom again,” The Economist, 20 April 2002, 38; and “A bumper crop,” The
Economist, 12 October 2002,42. As discussed at the outset, the latter article quotes one Afghan farmer on
the dearth o f options outside o f opium cultivation: “All our life depends on the income from the poppy, it is
the best cash crop. If there are alternatives we will leave poppy.”
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the stability of the government and thus hamper the ongoing military campaign against
remnants of the Taliban and al-Qa’eda.

78

However, as Hooman Peinani notes, “The

Afghan drug ‘industry’ will continue as long as Afghanistan suffers from two major
deficiencies: the absence of a strong central government, and the lack of a viable
economy capable of generating enough revenue for the government and adequate
•

numbers of well-paid jobs for the people.”

70

With the regime change in Afghanistan, the opportunity to mitigate some of the
domestic factors involved in facilitating the heroin trade also presents itself. However, in
and of itself this is not enough to effectively alter the wider regional smugglers’
landscape. In June 2002, Afghanistan and nine neighboring countries, namely
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, agreed under U.N. auspices to enhanced cooperation in combat the
transnational drug trade.
As the press release accompanying this announcement noted, all of these
countries are not only effected by drug smuggling and related criminal activity, but are
also situated squarely within “the world’s largest opium-, morphine-, heroin- and
cannabis-producing and trafficking region.”80 The next section focuses on the various

78 Tim Golden, “U.S. Braces for Rise in Opium Output,” International H erald Tribune, 2 April 2002, 3.
However, a more optimistic tone was sounded only days later, in Charles J. Hanley, “Afghan Opium Crop
Targeted,” USA Today, 5 April 2002, 4A. This article outlines the Afghan interim government’s promises
to use both the carrot and the stick in eradication efforts, though offering farmers $500 per acre to destroy
their crops seems to hold little appeal when $3,400 is the market value implies a greater potential reliance
on the latter. Interestingly, both articles favorably note the Taliban regim e’s 2000 poppy cultivation ban

without reference to the odds, slim in this author’s opinion, that such a policy would have been adhered to
in practice over any appreciable period o f time. This view is also echoed in OGD, World Geopolitics o f
Drugs (2000), 45-7.
79 Hooman Peimani, “Afghan-Based International Drug-Trafficking: A Continued Threat,” Central Asia /
Caucasus Analyst, Biweekly Briefing (8 May 2002), pages not available.
80 This pledge o f cooperation was formally announced in U.N. Information Service, “Afghanistan,
Neighboring Countries Join Counter-Narcotics Fight,” Press Release UNIS/NAR/753 (14 June 2002),
available at http://www.undcp.org/press release 2002-06-14 3.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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sets of heroin smuggling vectors as they emanate outward from Afghanistan, first
regionally and then further out toward their final destinations.

Turkey

Iran

I NDIA

Fig. 16. Heroin smuggling routes out of Afghanistan81

Smuggling Vectors Out o f Afghanistan: The Crescent and Beyond
Heroin moving across Afghanistan’s borders and into the wider region of the
Golden Crescent can be represented by corresponding smuggling vectors radiating
outward like the spokes of a wheel, in accordance with smugglers’ perceptions of access,
risk and connectivity. It is the transnational complexity of these constantly evolving
iterative patterns that lies at the heart of the demonstrable success of the relevant
smuggling actors.

89

81 Map source: U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
82 As Haaq notes, “The opium and heroin flow from Afghanistan transits Pakistan, India and then Sri Lanka
by overland air routes. Another route transits Pakistan to Hong Kong and Malaysia and then to North
America by ship, while others transit Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon by land and then to Europe by land or sea
through the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal, and on the key markets in Europe and
North America.” See Haaq, 951. Taking an even wider view, Griffin echoes this sentiment by noting,
“The concentricity o f drugs, arms and smuggling rings around a single imploded state created the
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As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the countries immediately adjacent to
Afghanistan tend to be the most affected by this phenomenon, namely Pakistan, Iran and
the Central Asian states. As such, Afghan heroin moving across these borders constitute
the three major sets of threat vectors discussed m this section.

oo

Further out, these

smuggling vectors continue onward, particularly across Turkey, India, Russia and the
Gulf States, before moving on to their final markets.84
However, even beyond the context of smuggling, the historic impact of
Afghanistan’s geostrategic position linking its immediate neighbors cannot be
underestimated. As Magnus and Naby note, “Despite changes in form of government,
ideology, and even the configuration of ethnic groups and international boundaries, this
role of Afghanistan as the vital link and intersection of the Asian landmass gives the land
a significance far beyond its troubled road to political and economic development. In
purely political terms, location puts Afghanistan on par with its neighbors.”85

conditions for the birth o f a unique, post-modern phenomenon: an illegal trading empire that defied
customs, frontiers and laws, connected New York and Dubai with Osaka and the two Koreas but which, to
all intents and purposes, was controlled by scarcely literate warlords living hundreds o f miles from the
nearest bank or fax. Its capital market was the roadside money booth where, amid bundles o f bills from a
coterie o f nations, the only real currency was trust - and the fears o f reprisal, if it were broken.” Griffin,
142.
83 Although Afghanistan does share a common border with China at the eastern end o f the Wakhan
Corridor, given the rugged terrain involved, the lack o f infrastructure and established Chinese access to
Southeast Asian heroin production, this does not appear to be a significant smuggling route. As Magnus
and Naby point out, these mountain passes are snowbound for up to nine months a year, and construction in
this environment is daunting in the extreme. However, it should be noted that the major link between
China and Pakistan, the Karakorum Highway, does in fact lie directly south o f the Wakhan Corridor and
offers a more viable vector through the area. Similarly, international air connections with Afghanistan are
minimal, but if further developed could offer the potential for smuggling vectors to bypass the country’s
immediate neighbors. See Magnus and Naby, 66. However, there is some evidence that Uighur and other
Turkic-speaking ethnic groups in China’s Xinjiang autonomous region have developed heroin smuggling
networks with links to both the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle. OGD, World Geopolitics o f
Drugs (2000), 62-3.
84 At this juncture, however, it is important to note that not all the heroin coming out o f Afghanistan
actually leaves the region. For instance, the ONDCP estimated in 2000 that the region’s growing addict
population at between 3.5 and 5 million. U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 5.
85 Magnus and Naby, 25.
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Though often seen by its neighbors as a danger, in the case of Pakistan and, to a
lesser extent, Iran, it also represents an opportunity. The Economist recently noted, with
respect the post-Taliban era, “As their hosts of Afghan refugees show, Pakistan and Iran
have vastly more to lose from disorder in Afghanistan than do any other outsiders.”

o/

Similarly, the perceived threat to the Central Asian states from the Afghan export of
Islamic fundamentalism has also become an issue, as discussed at greater length below.
However, in economic terms, “No longer merely a buffer state, Afghanistan is
now a crossroads between states that want and need trade, as both Pakistan and Iran
engage in a struggle for access to Central Asia’s mineral wealth and markets.”87 A
particularly salient example of this trend can be found in the efforts of various
governments and multinational corporations to reach an understanding with the Taliban
government by which Afghan territory could be incorporated into competing pipeline
proposals.88 It is thus hardly surprising that Afghanistan’s role linking Pakistan, Iran and
the Central Asian states holds the potential for serving as a conduit for transnational

86 “Now for the equally hard part” The Economist, 17 November 2001,16. Furthermore, there is a definite
linkage between the cross-border refugee situation and a range o f smuggling activity, including the
movement o f heroin, as discussed in Goodsen, 151. Interestingly, an earlier piece in The Economist noted
that, in conjunction with the trafficking o f heroin, smuggling refugees out o f Afghanistan had “long been
the only profitable industry in the country.” “Afghanistan’s opium fiends,” The Economist, 24 February
2001,43. For more on these refugees as they proceed toward other destinations, particularly in Europe, see
also “Not my problem,” The Economist, 8 September 2001, 40-1.
87 Goodsen, 21. Ewans, 36, also links Pakistani support for the Taliban to its efforts to develop road and
rail links to Central Asia in order to better compete with Iran. For more on Pakistani efforts to utilize
Afghan territory to access Central Asian markets, see also Rashid, Taliban, 26-30. In particular, the author
notes the tensions between Pakistani military and intelligence circles, various Afghan factions, and
competing smuggling mafias on both sides o f the border. Even more broadly, Magnus and Naby, 54-5,
note the potential for Afghanistan to once again resume the role o f a regional economic link, functioning to
the advantage o f its inhabitants as in the long-ago heyday o f the “Silk Road.” However, this will not
become a reality until the current political chaos and lack o f economic options can be replaced by a
measure o f stability.
88 The issue o f pipeline politics and their underlying geography, centering on the efforts o f various
governments and multinational corporations, is dealt with extensively in Rashid, Taliban, 143-82.
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crime as well as for economic development, though in recent years the former has been
more common than the latter.
Among these three areas, Pakistan has arguably had the most longstanding and
intimate relationship with Afghanistan, particularly in the context of heroin. However,
before examining the nature of these cross-border ties, an understanding of the history
that has shaped the two countries’ border area is a necessary precursor. Much of this is
can be traced to the colonial influence throughout the region, the calculus of which was in
turn driven by the fears of the British in India of Russian encroachment throughout
Central Asia, the “Great Game” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries noted
previously.
The most salient cartographic legacy of this era can be found in the two countries’
border demarcation. Specifically, the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak, signed in the midst of
the Second British-Afghan War, in turn led to the establishment in 1893 of the Durand
Line as an arbitrary demarcation between Afghanistan and then-British India, now
partitioned into Pakistan and, to the south, India. In effect, this split both Pashtunistan
and Baluchistan, lands traditionally occupied by the Pashtun and Baluch peoples,
respectively, between nominal Afghan and British colonial rule, a border inherited by the
successor governments on both sides that persists up to the present day.89

89 The Durand Line was drawn up by, and duly named for, Sir Mortimer Durand as a “boundary o f mutual
convenience separating Afghanistan from India.” Furthermore, as noted above, “such arbitrary boundaries

over sprawling tribal areas left large portions o f Afghanistan’s leading ethnic groups on the wrong side o f
its borders,” particularly Pashtuns in Pakistan’s northwestern border area, and Baluchs in both Pakistan and
Iran. Haaq, 946. Moreover, as Griffin points out, the breadth and scale o f smuggling activity across this
border is a tribute to Afghan resourcefulness and the strength o f family ties, which had easily outlasted the
creation, a century earlier, o f the Durand Line. Referred to, only half jokingly, as Pashtunistan’s ‘Berlin
Wall,’ it was transformed by Afghan merchants into a vast Panama Canal, allowing commercial passage
between divided hemispheres and the free circulation o f otherwise banned commodities and substances.”
Griffin, 142.
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This division has led directly to decades of tension along the common border, a
trend that accelerated with the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947.
A primary issue of contention centers on which country should legitimately control
traditionally Pashtun tribal areas, Afghanistan or Pakistan, which has become serious
enough at times as to lead to the total breakdown of relations, as between 1961 and
1963.90 More recently, the desire on the part of Pakistani policy-makers to mitigate this
political friction can often be seen in the various forms of leverage exercised via support
for various of the warring Afghan factions, most notably those of Hekmatyar and,
subsequently, the Taliban, as discussed in the previous section.91
On the Pakistani side of the border, the territory in question is the North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP), divided into six tribal agencies, those of Khyber, Mohmand,
Kurram, North and South Waziristan, and Malakand.92 As a 1997 U.S. government
report notes, “The most significant barrier to drug control in Pakistan is that the Pakistani

90 Though data is difficult to obtain, an estimated 15% o f Pakistanis are Pashtun, while, according to U.S.
CIA, CIA World Factbook (2002), 44% o f Afghans are also Pashtun. For more on the background o f this
friction, see Arif, 298-304; and Ewans, 107-9. Furthermore, while residing in Peshawar on the Pakistani
side o f the Khyber Pass during 1986-7, Goodsen notes that the city was, “as it had often been in the past, an
Afghan town.” Goodsen, vii. See also Salamat Ali, “Khyber bypass,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6
June 1999, 44; and Tim Fischer, “Up the Khyber: down with super-terrorism,” Business Asia 9, no. 9
(October 2001), 26. Interestingly, Peshawar has often served as the primary conduit for emeralds
originating from Afghanistan’s Panishir valley, as noted in “In business again,” The Economist, 14
September 1991, 40.
91 Rashid also notes the inherent irony o f the refusal o f the Pakistani-supported Taliban to recognize the
Durand Line or to drop long-standing claims to parts o f Pakistan’s NWFP. This may be attributed in large
measure to the resonance o f “Greater Pashtunistan,” within certain segments o f Afghan society and a theme
o f successive governments for decades. Rashid, Taliban, 187.
92 Interestingly, Haaq notes that during the colonial period the British did not actively encourage opium
cultivation in what is now Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province, unlike elsewhere in India, holding to
the view that such activity could have a destabilizing effect in an already relatively chaotic area. Haaq,
947. See also Cooley, 59-60. Moreover, the case o f Malakand offers a number o f interesting parallels with
neighboring Afghanistan. In addition to its Pashtun ethnic affinity, the local leadership o f Sufi Muhammed
echoes many o f the religious strictures implemented under the Taliban. However, there appears to be little
interest in exporting these tenets. In the context o f this particular discussion, all o f these tribal areas joined
Pakistan at a relatively late date and receiving special tax concessions as a result. Furthermore, their
location adjacent to the border with Afghanistan allows for easy access to smuggling. See “In the shadow
o f the Taliban,” The Economist, 8 September 2001, 68.
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government does not control the Northwest Frontier Province . . . Local tribal groups
were given control when the area was divided upon the British departure from the region,
and the government is reluctant to interfere with their rule and illegal drug processing and
trafficking activities, fearing a civil war.”
As noted in the previous section, the genesis of much of the heroin smuggling
through Pakistan can be found in the arms pipeline arrangements used to supply the antiSoviet resistance, at the time comprised of three discrete three parts, namely the CIA, the
ISI and the various mujahidin factions.94 The control of these routes with respect to a
wide range of goods continues to be an important issue. Evidence of this can be found in
an earlier attempt by the Pakistani ISI to close the main smuggling route between Jalabad
and the Pakistani border, via the Khyber Pass, that aroused a wave of protest from tribes
living along the route. When a settlement was reached in the spring of 1991, tolls were
again to be split between the local tribes and the Afghan mujahidin fronts operating in the
area95 By 1995, this illegal cross-border trade was estimated at $3.5 billion.96

93 U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia,” 13. On the other hand, this
report also notes the pressure put on successive Pakistani government by the U.S. with respect to this issue,
as well as the mixed results. For instance, in an attempt to appear to be making progress, in 1996 an
alleged Pakistani seizure o f 2 tons o f opium was later shown to have been a hoax.
94 During this period most o f the heroin was shipped via cargo container through from Rawalpindi, the
headquarters for the ISI’s Afghan unit, and to a lesser extent from Quetta. Rubin, Fragmentation, 197.
The author also relates that in 1983, the director o f ISI, General Aktar Abdul Rahman, had to remove o f the
entire Quetta operation as a result o f its having been entirely compromised by involvement in bribery,
gunrunning and drug smuggling. The architect o f this illegal activity was Ismatullah Muslim, whose career
was discussed in the previous section, and this setback precipitated his defection to the Najibullah regime.
On the Pakistani side, there was also consequently a reorganization o f its mechanisms to funnel aid only to

recognized and approved mujahidin parties. Rubin, Fragmentation, 158-9, 199. See also Scott and
Marshall, 4-5, which draws parallels between the CIA’s role in the rise o f Afghan heroin with that o f Latin
American cocaine.
95 Rubin, Fragmentation, 262.
96 Ahmed Rashid, “’’Nothing to Declare: The political void in Afghanistan has spawned as vast smuggler’s
market that is crippling Pakistan’s economy and threatens its neighbor’s own economies,” Far Eastern
Economic Review 150, no. 19 (11 May 1995), 58-61. The author also notes that during this period the
Taliban drew most o f its funding from traders grateful for open roads.
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As noted in the previous chapter, Pakistan itself has been a major producer of
opium in the past, with the NWFP at the center of this activity.97 However, in recent
years there has been a significant downward trend, “primarily attributable to a precipitous
decline in Pakistani opium prices, which in turn was due mainly to Afghanistan’s
sustained high levels of production.”98 Moreover, up to mid-1990s, most heroin
processing took place in Pakistani territory adjacent to Afghanistan, though it has since
moved further upstream. A combination of alternative development policies and law
enforcement is generally credited with this diminished output.99
Even as Pakistani production was falling, however, domestic consumption
continued to rise. For instance, in 1992, Pakistan had between 1.1 and 1.2 million addicts
consuming approximately 55 tons of drugs while the country was producing only 18 tons.
The underlying irony in the situation was that, since 97% of the Afghan poppy-growing
land was under Taliban control and taxation, a regime largely supported by Pakistan was
supplying the bulk of its addicts.100 While more recent statistics are difficult to come by,

97 Haaq links the genesis o f Pakistani heroin production to a young official from the Pakistan Council o f
Scientific and Industrial Research who traveled to the tribal areas o f the NWFP to show the local opium
growers how to process their crops into heroin. The tribes were understandably delighted, as this increased
their profit margin by tenfold. Haaq, 954-5.
98 U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 5. This report also notes that its estimates for Pakistan’s 1999
opium production, 75 MT, represent a decline o f over 50% compared to that o f 1995, 155 MT. Moreover,
this is also “the lowest level o f Pakistani opium production since we began crop estimates in 1986.” The
Pakistani government’s ongoing efforts have helped to support this trend, despite resistance in areas where
opium production is deeply entrenched, primarily within the NW FP. See Salamat Ali, “Opiate o f the

frontier: Pakistan’s tribes find it hard to give up the poppy crop,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May
1993, 18.
99 OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 47-9. For instance, in terms o f drug control, Pakistani
officials seized 25,427 tons o f drugs along the tri-border region with Afghanistan and Iran, including
16,320 tons o f hashish, 7,630 tons o f opium and 1,417 tons o f heroin. However, this report also notes the
appearance o f new poppy cultivation zones within the tribal areas o f the NWFP, specifically in Khyber and
both North and South Waziristan.
100 Goodsen, 102. See also Rashid, Taliban, 120, 183-95.
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in 1997 the Pakistani delegate to an Interpol conference reported that Pakistan’s addict
population had risen nearly four-fold to 4.5 million.101
In addition to a thriving domestic demand for drugs, Pakistan also exhibits a
number of social and institutional characteristics favorable to smuggling activity. Like its
neighbor to the north, Pakistan has significant internal ethnic cleavages that range beyond
those discussed above in the context of the NWFP.102 Furthermore, a combination of
poor pay for civil servants and the strong traditional role played by the Pakistani military
in politics has served to provide the political protection that allows smugglers to operate
without fear of arrest.
This quasi-official tolerance of drug trafficking has led in recent years to a boom
in drug use, particularly in urban areas, as well as what has been described as overall
“heroinization” of Pakistani society.

1OT

The impact of this development has in turn

increased the prevalence of drug-based corruption in Pakistani politics, by which the

101 Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 3. Moreover, as noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20, the U.N. has estimated that there are between 3.5 and 5
million local addicts in the major source and transit countries at the crossroads o f the Southwest Asian
heroin trade. While the majority o f these apparently reside in Pakistan, by contrast in 1980 the country
reported virtually no such incidence o f drug abuse.
102 See, for instance, Charles H. Kennedy, “The politics o f ethnicity in Sind,” Asian Survey 31, no. 10
(October 1991), 938-55; and Christopher O. Hurst, “Pakistan’s ethnic divide,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 19, no. 2 (April-June 1996), 179-98.
103 Haaq, 952-4. For a wider analysis o f the issue o f the Pakistani armed forces’ involvement in politics,
see also Hasan-Askari Rizvi, ’’The Military and Politics in Pakistan,” Journal o f Asian and African Studies

26, no. 1-2 (January-April 1991), 27-42, which discusses the challenges faced by Benazir Bhutto following
her 1988 election in the wake o f General Zia al-Haq’s death in office. A more recent and ongoing example
o f this tendency in Pakistani politics can be found in General Pervez Musharraf s assumption o f power and
efforts to maintain his rule. With respect to urban areas, as the DEA noted in 1998 most o f the Pakistani
heroin trade is controlled from the city o f Quetta by a loose consortium o f three families known as the
Quetta Alliance. Although these groups appear to be operationally independent, they often cooperate to
establish facilities, maintain supplies, meet large orders and shield themselves from law enforcement
authorities. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 55.
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laundering of drug profits creates immense political leverage up to the highest levels of
government.

104

While the U.S. has categorized Pakistan as both a major drug producing and
trafficking country, in the past it has often received certification only via strategic waiver.
As discussed in Chapter III, such waivers are granted on the grounds of U.S. national
interest due to issues peripheral to the drug trade and illustrate the relative priorities
among policy-makers. In the case of Pakistan, its growing nuclear capability, highly
unstable economy and, currently, its role in the ongoing war on terror for the time being
all supercede U.S. concerns over drug control. However, military and intelligence links
to Kashmiri insurgents, known to be involved in the illicit movement of arms and other
supplies, can easily be used to facilitate the shipment of other types of contraband as
well.105
In terms of heroin transit, despite the decline in opium production, trafficking
networks involving a significant Pakistani component serve to ensure that the flow of
heroin remains unimpeded not only into the country to meet domestic demand, but also
across its borders and beyond. These networks, spanning the often notional boundary
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are based on long-standing transnational ethnic, tribal

104 An indicator o f how high this corruption reached can be seen in the case o f the 1982 arrest in Oslo,
Norway, o f Hamid Hasnain, vice-president o f the Pakistani government-controlled Habib Bank and Zia’s
personal banker, as related in Haaq, 957. It may be argued that many o f the anti-corruption measures
undertaken by Pakistani Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi helped to undercut his political support and thus
pave the way for Musharaff s seizure o f power. See Salamat Ali, “No drugs, no doubts: tough terms in
store for election candidates,” Far Eastern Econom ic R eview, 9 September 1993, 15.
105 Even before the current upsurge in tensions between Pakistan and India over the issue o f Kashmir,
smuggling through this area was already well established. For instance, in the late 1980s reports o f a major
drug smuggling route through Pakistan’s NWFP into Kashmir through the Karakoram Pass, and then into
China’s Xinjiang Province and Tibet, before moving on into Nepal. Nepalese sources confirmed this route,
noting that the drugs could easily pass across the porous Indian-Nepalese border and on to a seaport for
shipment abroad. See Haaq, 950; and OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 50-2, which also
discussed the activities o f both local networks linked to Indian TCOs, and networks based on foreigners
living in the country.
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and political affiliations that give them the capability to negotiate transactions, assemble
drug shipments and transport these goods to wholesale buyers, frequently in cooperation
with other networks.106 As discussed earlier, many of these links are based on Pashtun or
Baluch ethnic ties.
A sizable number of smuggling vectors thus transit from Afghanistan into
Pakistan using such means. By land, large quantities of opiates and hashish are
transported through this mountainous terrain to the Makran coast or to the port of Karachi
by four-wheel-drive vehicles or pack animals. In particular, camel caravans can avoid
drug enforcement officials, as these animals are capable of traveling over very rugged
terrain. Drugs are also moved through the country by road and rail to seaports concealed
in legitimate shipments.
From the coast, drug shipments are generally either placed on small coastal craft
for delivery to ships at anchor, or fed into the existing commercial infrastructure. In
particular, Karachi is one of the largest and busiest ports in the region, moving high
volumes of both containerized cargo and bulk goods internationally.107 Moreover, some

106 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 22. As Rubin notes,
“After the Soviet withdrawal, as military pressure on the countryside eased, agriculture and trade revived,
much o f this renewed production took the form o f opium growing, heroin refining and smuggling; these
enterprises were organized by combines o f mujahidin parties, Pakistani military officers, and Pakistani drug
syndicates.” Rubin, Fragmentation, 183. Goodsen echoes this observation, writing that, “The collapse o f
Afghanistan’s formal economy has empowered many . . . private actors, especially the drug barons and
smugglers with Pakistani connections, because they provide most o f Afghanistan’s tiny annual GDP.”
Goodsen, 113. The author also provides insight into the state o f the Afghan economy at the time, as
discussed length in the previous section: “The only significant activities in Afghanistan . . . other than
subsistence agriculture, are illegal or quasi-legal, at least outside o f Afghanistan - narcotics manufacturing,
arms trafficking, and smuggling o f duty-free goods.” Goodsen, 96.
107 The availability o f these modes o f transit in the Pakistani context are discussed in U.S. DOJ, DEA,
Intelligence Division, Europe/Asia/Affica Strategic Unit, “Pakistan: Country Brief,” DEA-02012
(Washington, DC: DEA, March 2002), available at http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02012/02012.html.
accessed 15 July 2004. The port o f Karchi is also discussed in U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20. Magnus and Naby, 178, further underline the
importance o f Karachi in this capacity. The Pakistani government has also considered developing an
alternative port at Gwadar in its Baluchistan province, but prospects for Central Asian trade must greatly
expand in order to make such a course o f action economically viable.
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smuggling vectors can be traced out of Afghanistan into Pakistan via the NWFP, and
1 /\Q

which then re-enter Afghanistan via Badakhshan province for transit to Central Asia.
Before turning elsewhere, however, India also offers a potential outlet for heroin
smuggling vectors crossing from Pakistani territory, even beyond the issue of contraband
moving into Kashmir as noted above.109 Indian criminal organizations became involved
in the trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin during the mid-1980s when the Iran-Iraq
War disrupted traditional routes through Pakistan and Iran to Turkey. India’s welldeveloped transportation infrastructure, a long and porous coastline, and lax export
control policies help facilitate not only drug trafficking but also the smuggling of gems
and other contraband. Moreover, its inland container depots, designed to move goods
from the interior to major seaports such as Mumbai (Bombay), Goa, Chennai (Madras)
and Calcutta, all handle a large volume of international trade that can be readily
subverted by TCOs.110
For its part, Iran’s contiguous borders with both Pakistan and Afghanistan have
presented a number of challenges to successive regimes.111 As Haaq notes, “Prior to the
1970s, Afghan opium production was linked to events in Iran, where opium usage . ..
th
became a major problem in the early 20 century.” With an addict population estimated
at over one million by the early 1950s, the Shah’s government banned poppy cultivation
in 1955, and Afghan entrepreneurs moved in to make up the subsequent shortfall.

108 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Southwest Asia - Pakistan,” which also notes many
o f the same routes and methods already mentioned.
109 See U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Pakistan: Country Brief.”
110 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20-2.
111 Moreover, as noted in Magnus and Naby, 31-2, the various dynasties based in Afghanistan and Iran have
also historically shared a number o f cultural affinities even during periods o f strife.
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In 1969, Iran modified its ban to allow limited opium production, and to make
drugs available to government-recognized addicts via a coupon system. In spite of these
policies, Haaq continues by pointing out that, “Afghan traffickers found the movement of
opium into Iran relatively easy and well worth the effort, despite the death penalty if
caught smuggling drugs and the frequent clashes with Iranian law enforcement along the
Afghan-Iran border.”112
Lamour and Lamberti note the common regional drug trafficking pattern as of the
early 1970s, whereby opium was first routed through Kabul, and then on to Iran for either
domestic consumption or transshipment. In the latter case, the smaller Persian Gulf ports
were often utilized, with Dubai specifically noted as a desirable distribution center
primarily due to its contemporary involvement in the black market gold trade with India
and its longstanding reputation for asking few questions with regard to commercial
transactions.

in

The fall of the Shah in 1979 initially eroded law enforcement capabilities,
particularly with respect to deterring domestic opium cultivation. Thus, coincidentally,
as the Iranian market for Afghan opium shrank, the invading Soviet forces also blocked
the traditional smuggling routes into Iran.114 As the Afghan state continued to collapse

112 Haaq, 947-8. Furthermore, as noted in “Go home. Please,” The Economist, 6 April 2002, 41, Iranian
suspicions o f the 2.3 million Afghan refugees in the country are not limited to allegations o f involvement in
drug smuggling, but also encompass prostitution and the more prosaic concern o f stolen jobs. However, as
noted in Cooper, 51, cross-border smuggling has traditionally been controlled by various Baluch tribes with
members residing in both Iran and Afghanistan.

113 Lamour and Lamberti, 185-6. Interestingly, when questioned by the authors as the point where the
opium was processed into heroin, the smuggler providing the information did not appear familiar with
anything but raw opium. Moreover, these trafficking patterns can be very resilient over time, as can be
seen from the following observation from late 2000: “Traffickers use historical routes to move drugs, as
well as other contraband, from Southwest Asia through Iran to Turkey, or to Iranian Persian Gulf coast
seaports and harbors for shipment to the Arabian Peninsula.” U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 20.
114 This confluence o f events is noted in Haaq, 949.
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into civil conflict, an influx of refugees and weapons, as well as drugs, into Iran became a
major cause for concern.115
During the Taliban era, Iran maintained a consulate in Herat despite an absence of
diplomatic relations. However, a turning point of sorts came about in October 1999 when
General Pervez Musharraf ousted the Nawaz Sharif government in Pakistan. Musharraf s
government almost immediately tightened the border controls with Afghanistan in order
to crack down on smuggling, resulting in an immediate rise in Afghan wheat prices and a
devaluation of the value of the Afghan currency, the afghani.
This in turn paved the way for a thaw in relations between Afghanistan and Iran
in late November 1999, resulting in the common border reopening for trade at Islam
Qala, west of Herat.116 As noted in mid-2001, “The advantage for the Taliban is that Iran
is fairly relaxed about its borders with Afghanistan, despite the UN sanctions that have
stopped most of the Afghans’ external trade . . . The advantage for Iran is that it can keep
on good terms with a worrying neighbor.”117
However, with an addict population recently estimated at more than two million
out of a population of approximately 63 million, and a heroin price in early 2001 of $.50
per dose, it is certainly in Iran’s interest to stem the flow of cheap Afghan opiates into its
national territory. Toward this end, Iran has stationed 30,000 troops along its border with
Afghanistan, as well as fortifying lengths of it with trenches, concrete barriers and other
types of fortifications.

115 Rashid, Taliban, 203-6.
116 Gooden, 83.
117 “The odd couple,” The Economist, 26 May 2001,41. This article also notes several incidents marring
these countries’ relations, including a 4 May 2001 explosion in Herat blamed on Iran, that in turn led to an
anti-Iranian riot, and the deaths o f eleven Iranian citizens in 1998 when the Taliban captured the city o f
Mazar-i-Sharif. For more on Iranian efforts to reach a modus vivendi with the Taliban, to include
cooperation with Pakistan on the issue, see also Griffin, 240-2.
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Moreover, although accounting for between 70 and 85 percent of worldwide
seizures of drugs in recent years, Iran also reported having lost nearly 3,000 men in
policing the border, mostly in conflict with armed smuggling gangs.

1| n

From the Islamic

Revolution of 1979 up to 1997, Iran claimed 12,500 law enforcement personnel killed by
drug traffickers.119 However, despite sustained efforts to control the drug trade across its
borders, smuggling vectors utilizing pack animals, private automobiles, buses and
•

commercial vehicles continue to be detected.

17(1

As UNDCP estimated in 1998, three-quarters of the heroin seized in Western
Europe passed through Iran, indicating a sustained and even expanding set of smuggling
« «

•

•

vectors transiting the country under the auspices of various organizations.

191

However,

while crossing Iranian territory, these shipments may either be broken down into smaller
parcels or diverted directly to the domestic market. In addition to the Iranian border with
Afghanistan, much of this contraband comes overland from Pakistan’s Baluchistan
province through to northwestern Iran, which is inhabited by Kurdish groups with

118 See “Drugs and decay,” The Economist, 31 March 2001,42; and “Iranian police seize nearly 2 tons o f
drugs,” CNN.com, 16 September 2001. The latter article in particular gives several details on two specific
seizures. In the first, 1,650 kilos o f unspecified narcotics were taken from smugglers moving their goods
on eleven camels through the desert in Baluchistan province coming from Afghanistan. In the second, 328
kilos o f opium and 26 kilos o f morphine were taken from the back o f a truck in the same area. Rashid,
Taliban, 193, also notes the impact o f petroleum products smuggled from Iran through Afghanistan and on
to Pakistani markets, using the same routes and methods as drugs, though in reverse.
119 This figure was reported by the Iranian delegate at an Interpol conference, as reported in Interpol,
“International Drug Trafficking,” 3. A “wide-ranging operation” undertaken by the Iranian authorities in
Baluchistan, a key conduit for the regional heroin trade, was also mentioned.
120 U.S. DOJ, DEA, N N ICC (1998), 55.
121 “Ally against drugs,” The Economist, 4 July 1998, 41. Similarly, while noting the Iranian government’s
sustained commitment to drug control, particularly with respect to opium poppy eradication efforts, a
recent U.S. assessment continues to say that, “Land routes across Iran constitute the single largest conduit
for Southwest Asian opiates en route to European markets. Entering from Afghanistan and Pakistan into
eastern Iran, heroin, opium, and morphine are smuggled overland, usually to Turkey but also to
Turkmenistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Drugs are also smuggled by sea across the Persian Gulf.” U.S.
Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Iran.” However, as noted in
Chapter III, the U.S does not currently consider Iran a major drug producing or transit nation.
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extensive ties to their Turkish compatriots.

122

Once over the border, any unrefined opium

and morphine is processed in heroin conversion laboratories there.123
Since the U.S. currently maintains no diplomatic relations with Iran, it has
ostensibly been unable to verify claims of eradication and enforcement. However, it is no
secret that harsh punishment is regularly meted out in Iran for drug trafficking offenses,
with thousands having been executed since draconian anti-drug legislation was
introduced in 1988.124 Despite a host of other outstanding areas of friction, counter
narcotic efforts pose an important potential area for common ground in initializing U.S.Iranian diplomatic contacts, should both sides reach that point in the near future.
Furthermore, with the regime change in Afghanistan, Iran must also brace itself for even
more drug trafficking activity across the common border.125
While traditional trafficking routes passing through Pakistan and then overland
through Iran or by sea to heroin refineries and distribution points in Turkey, these routes
“have been used less as traffickers have developed new routes through the FSU [former
Soviet Union] - particularly the Central Asian states. As a result, in now appears that
regional traffickers are trying to reap more profits for themselves and, by bypassing

122 In addition to motorized methods, both horses and mules are used to cross the mountainous 300-mile
border with Turkey. Cooper, 52. Furthermore, as noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001,
“Africa and the Middle East - Iran,” “Shipments o f opiates enter Iran overland from Pakistan and
Afghanistan by camel, donkey or truck caravans, often organized and protected by heavily-armed ethnic
Baluch tribesmen from either side o f the frontier. Once inside Iran, large shipments are either concealed
within ordinary commercial truck cargoes or broken down into smaller sub-shipments. Foreign embassy
observers report that Iranian interdiction efforts have disrupted smuggling convoys sufficiently to force
smugglers to change tactics and emphasize concealment. The use o f human mules reportedly is on the
rise.”
123 U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Pakistan: Country Brief.”
124 “Give the Devil his Due,” Time International, 13 July 1998, 20. While officially decertified for 1998,
Iran was taken o ff the majors list for 1999 in December 1998.
125 See “What the Taliban banned,” The Economist, 16 March 2002, 51, which also notes that during a twoweek period in early 2002, Iran’s security forces seized six tons o f drugs and allegedly killed ninety
smugglers.
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refineries in Turkey, have begun to process more heroin in Afghanistan.”

However,

despite the growth of these alternatives, heroin smuggling from Pakistan and Iran into
Turkey remains very viable as a path of least resistance.
As such, before turning north it is necessary to further trace the smuggling vectors
crossing both Pakistan and Iran, in general moving by land into Turkey, or by sea through
the various ports throughout the Middle East. According to Interpol statistics, during the
late 1990s three quarters of all drug seizures and arrests in Europe involve either Turkish
drug traffickers or narcotics smuggled through Turkey.127 As previously discussed at
length, during the 1970s Turkey was one of the largest producers of opium. However,
generally speaking, Turkish criminal organizations now function primarily as brokers,
who play a “critical role in buying morphine base and heroin from producers in
Southwest Asia and moving the drug to distribution networks in Europe and North
America.” 128
Generally speaking, drugs arrive in Turkey for transshipment to European
markets either across the land border with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and
Syria, or by sea from or via Syria and Lebanon.129 In 1998, the DEA noted three primary

126 U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 5.
127 Cited in U.S. Department o f State, INL, “INL Country Programs - Turkey,” 19 November 1998.
Another indicator o f the volume o f heroin moving through Turkey is the fact that seizures there accounted
for 35% o f the global total in 1997. Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1. More recently, OGD,
World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 15, also noted that, “Turkey has become the main heroin producer for
the European market, importing its raw material (opium and morphine base) from Afghanistan and Iran.”
128 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 21. This source also
links the PKK to the practice o f levying taxes on traffickers moving drugs through Iranian border crossings
and across territory it controls in southeastern Turkey. However, at present, it is unclear whether or to what
extent the leadership o f the PKK is directly involved with these activities.
129 See Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime,” 30-1. The author also notes that routes are both flexible and
under constant review, with back-up routes and expansion into new markets as related goals. Evidence o f
the former can be found in the development o f alternate “Baltic” routes through Russia, while the latter is
demonstrated by the opening o f links to both North and West Africa. For more on drug smuggling through
the Baltic region, see also Christopher Ulrich, “Transnational Organized Crime and Law Enforcement
Cooperation in the Baltic States,” Transnational Organized Crim e3, no.2 (Summer 1997), 79-81.In
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methods of smuggling morphine base into Turkey for processing. These were by sea
from the coasts of Pakistan and Iran into the ports of Istambul, Izmir, Samsun and
Trabzon on merchant shipping; overland by motor vehicle from Baluchistan, Pakistan,
and across northwest Iran into Turkey via vehicles, pack animals or human couriers; and
from Afghanistan through the Central Asian republics, across the Caspian Sea by ferry,
and then through Georgia into Turkey.

1TO

In terms of transit, by virtue of both geography and tradition Turkey remains a
nexus for heroin smuggling as the easternmost linchpin of the “Balkan Route,” despite
competition from developing routes through the former Soviet Union. This long-standing
set of smuggling vectors leading from Turkey into Western Europe have undergone
significant evolution over time in response to both political developments and law
enforcement efforts. For instance, in the 1970s the transport of drugs from Turkey into
Europe began shifting from maritime to overland modes.131
More recently, during the breakup of Yugoslavia, existing smuggling routes
shifted to alternate northern routes through Romania into Hungary, Poland and the former
Czechoslovakia, as well as through Albania, the Caucasus and Russia into Eastern
Europe, with the most favored final destinations being Switzerland and Germany as of

particular, the author notes that, “These shipments make their way to the Baltic States, Kaliningrad or St.
Petersberg via two corridors: through Belarus and Russia, or through the Balkans, Belarus, Poland, and
Ukraine. Drug shipments transit the Baltic States by land, air, sea, and rail.” For a more specific focus on
Lithuania, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs f l 000), 115-8.
130 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 57. This report also notes the role o f ethnic Kurdish elements in
facilitating much o f this activity.
131 Lamour and Lamberti, 25. For more recent drug trafficking trends in Turkey, see also U.S. Department
o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia - Turkey.”
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the mid-1990s.

1 30

However, a 1998 Interpol report concluded that Yugoslavia had

“apparently reopened for drug traffic.”133
As further evidence of the many permutations available to determined smugglers,
it was reported in December 2000 that Bulgaria had become a primary point of entry for
heroin smuggling vectors moving into European markets. This activity was facilitated by
the high volume of trucks crossing from Turkey, up to a thousand per month in the
busiest season, despite the fact that these conveyances are bonded and sealed in
accordance with International Truck Route procedures.134
Turing to the Middle East, in some respects Afghan heroin smuggling vectors
moving through this generally repressive and often tumultuous part of the world represent
merely one type of contraband among many. As The Economist noted in 1998, “The

132 See “The Albanian connection,” The Economist, 29 October 1994; R. E. Kendell, “Drug control:
policies and practices o f the International Criminal Police Organization,” U.N. Bulletin on Narcotics, no. 1001 (1992), 5; and Carter, 141-2. Characteristic o f the E.U. and the concerns o f its particular members,
Germany offers a particularly apt example. A wide range o f drug trafficking organizations currently
operate in Germany, including Chinese, Italian, Russian, Colombian and Japanese groups. However, there
remains a continuing primacy o f the conduit through Turkey and the related issue o f involvement in the
heroin trade by Turkish resident aliens. Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 95, 98-99. Drug trafficking through
Hungary is discussed in Alan Wright, “Organized Crime in Hungary,” Transnational Organized Crime 3,
no. 1 (Spring 1997),72-3. Similarly, for more on drug smuggling via Poland since the political changes o f
1989, see Emil W. Plywaczewski, “Organized Crime in Poland,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 3
(Autumn 1997), 114-6. In particular, the author notes that Colombian, Turkish, Dutch, German and
Scandinavian TCOs are all in contact with local criminal groups. For more on the Czech Republic’s role as
a storage and distribution node for drug trafficking organization, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f
Drugs (2000), 121-4. This report specifically notes that, “Arabs, Nigerians, Asians (especially Vietnamese
and Chinese), Latin Americans (mostly Colombians and Peruvians), Turks, Kurds, and Balkan gangs are all
trafficking drugs in the country, either separately or in joint ventures.”
133 Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 1. This report also notes that in 1997 over 80% o f the heroin
seized in Europe transited the Balkan Route.
134 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 8, which does
not discuss the obvious issue o f apparent loopholes in the applicable international standards. However,
observing the same phenomenon, the increasing suspicion o f Turkish truck drivers throughout the region is
noted in Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime,” 31-2. For another example o f the adaptability o f smuggling
routes through the region, see also “The criminal crucible that is Kosovo,” The Economist, 17 February
2001, 52. Though an estimated four to eight tons o f heroin a month transit the Balkans, much o f this
particular activity currently avoids Kosovo since NATO troops on the ground are on the lookout for illegal
weapons shipments. However, the province has become noted for luring large numbers o f young women
from Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine into sex-slavery with offers o f fictitious jobs in Western
Europe.
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region is a smugglers’ paradise - not just for illicit imports like drugs or illegal
immigrants, but for everyday household goods subject to high tariffs or stifling
regulations.”

IOC

The issue of sanctions against both Iraq and, in the case of the U.S., Iran,

have also provided lucrative incentives for smuggling by land through the Caucasus,
Turkey, Syria and Jordan, and by sea through the Persian Gulf.136 Similarly, with respect
to Egypt, INCSR 2001 notes that, “The transshipment of Southwest Asian heroin is made
easier by Egypt's long uninhabited borders and by the high level of shipping which passes
through the Suez Canal.”137
For a number of reasons, the United Arab Emirates, and Dubai in particular, have
evolved into an important logistical node for Southwest Asian heroin on its way to both
Europe and Africa. To begin with, the U.A.E. was one of only three countries to
officially recognize the Taliban regime, the other two being Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
In recent years it has also emerged as a regional commercial, banking and transportation
hub in its own right.
Specifically, the U.A.E. has an advanced maritime infrastructure including at least
fifteen commercial seaports handling nearly five million cargo containers a year, 2.8

135 See “A goat, a rug, special price?” The Economist, 3 April 1999, 38-9. This article further notes that,
“While “generous subsidies in some countries create irresistible opportunities for arbitrage,” the “biggest
incentive to smuggling comes from the high import duties levied by almost all countries in the region.”
The commodities involved range from cigarettes, alcohol and pornography to goods both more exotic, such
as artifacts and saffron, and more mundane, such as gasoline and bananas. Moreover, such activity has a
longstanding history throughout the region. As noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International
Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 19, “Criminal organizations with international networks centered in
Turkey, Pakistan, India, the United Arab Emirates (UA E), and Cyprus operate within a centuries-old
commercial tradition o f moving contraband merchandise through the South Asia - Middle East - Eastern
Mediterranean region.”
136 For more on the issue o f sanction avoidance, see Appendix A. The specific trend toward an increasing
incidence o f drug smuggling activity through the Persian Gulf is also discussed in “High in the Gulf,” The
Economist, 28 February 1998, 51; and Land, 20-2.
137 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Egypt.” This report also
notes that increased border surveillance and alternate routes through Central Asia appear to have
diminished the incidence o f heroin trafficking through the country.
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million in Dubai alone. Moreover, 70% of these containers are in transit and thus not
generally subject to customs scrutiny. Extensive air connections also exist, with over 60
airlines linking Dubai with more than 150 foreign destinations. In the past, Dubai has
also served to funnel precursor chemicals from various suppliers to destinations in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan.

138

Finally, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, there has been considerable
apprehension that the former Soviet republics of Central Asia would either provide an
alternative to the traditional smuggling route for Afghan opium and heroin to Europe via
Iran and Turkey, or else become major producers themselves.

1 "30

There also exists the

potential for a related dynamic to become manifest, namely the apparent correlation
between volume of drug traffic and subsequent levels of drug abuse most notably
demonstrated in the cases of Pakistan and Burma.140 This set of countries, comprised of
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan actually bordering Afghanistan, with

138 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 22. Griffin, 141, also
notes that, “Dubai is the main entrepot for trans-Afghan smuggling, with 80 companies dedicated to trading
across the Strait o f Hormuz to the Iranian port o f Bandar Abbas. From there, it is just five days’ journey by
road to the Pakistani border, at freight prices one-quarter o f the alternative routes.” For a more recent
characterization o f the country, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the
Middle East,” which notes that, “Although it is not a drug producing country, the UAE is a crossroads for
west-east trade and is proximate to major drug-producing and transit countries, including Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iran and India. It has 700 kilometers o f coastline, is situated in a relatively affluent region, and
has a domestic banking system that only recently (December 2000) adopted formal anti-money laundering
regulations. These factors, combined with the country's laissez-faire attitude toward trade, make it
vulnerable to narcotics trafficking.”
139 As Rashid notes, “Central Asia was the hardest hit by the explosion in Afghan heroin. The Russian
mafia, with ties to Afghanistan established during the Soviet occupation, used their networks to m ove

heroin through Central Asia, Russia, the Baltics and into Europe. Tajikistan and Kygyzstan developed
important opium routes and became significant opiate producers themselves.” Rashid, Taliban, 120.
140 “After the silk came the smack,” The Economist, 28 May 1994, 33. This correlation is echoed by the
GAO, which noted in 1997 that, “Heroin is not used in large quantities by opiate abusers in Russia and the
Central Asian Republics. However, U.S. countemarcotics and government officials in the region believe
that heroin abuser populations are likely to expand and create more demand for illicit drugs in these
countries as opium, heroin, and other illicit drugs become more readily available.” U.S. GAO, “Drug
Control: U.S. Heroin Control Efforts in Southwest Asia,” 8.
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Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan further out, is beset by a host of economic, political and
social challenges endemic among both newly independent and developing nations.141
As discussed in the previous chapter, the FSU has become both a significant
market and a viable transit alternative to the more traditional Balkan Route for Southwest
Asian opium, heroin and hashish smuggling vectors. In addition to advantages imparted
by sheer proximity and lax law enforcement, good east-west rail connections from
Central Asia to Ukraine and western Russia also help explain the flow-through of Afghan
heroin production that has fed the domestic drug market in Russia over the past five
years.142 Furthermore a proposed road linking the Pamir Mountain region of Tajikistan
with the Karakorum Highway, which runs from Kashgar in Chinese province of Xinjiang
south through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, has the potential to
facilitate the movement o f contraband as well as legitimate commercial goods.143
An ONDCP assessment in early 2000 noted that, “Today the easiest exit for
Afghan opium runs due north, through the FSU states of Central Asia. Law enforcement
forces across the FSU republics - particularly in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have faced a rising tide o f Afghan opium and hashish.”144 Generally speaking, the

141 For a concise overview o f these issues, as well as o f the region’s potential, see “The five young
orphans,” The Economist, 25 October 1997,42. For a more holistic analysis o f this region, see also Firuz
Kazemzadeh, “Central Asia’s Foreign Relations: A Historical Survey,” in The Legacy o f History in Russia
and the New States o f Eurasia, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), 195-215; and
Graham Smith, ed., The Nationalities Question if the Post-Soviet States (New York: Longman, 1996).
142 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 12. See also Colin
Barraclough, “Will new railway open door to Central Asia?” Insight on the News 11, no. 49 (25 December
1995), 14-17, which discusses an Iranian plan for a new railway line linking its warm-water port o f Bandar
Abbas on the Persian Gulf all the way to the northern border with Russia and, presumably, Russia’s
extensive rail system.
143 See “A road to riches?” The Economist, 1 August 1998, 36.
144 Among the former Soviet Central Asian states, this report also calls Tajikistan “possibly the most
vulnerable o f them” to narcotics trafficking. However, it is also noted in contrast to the governments o f
both Pakistan and Afghanistan, that Central Asian governments have been aggressive in confronting the
issue, though limited by a lack o f both resources and experience. “All have cooperated closely with the US
agencies in sharing information on international trafficking organizations, and most have made good-faith
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Central Asian countries appear increasingly willing to respond to the call for action,
despite limited resources, in stemming the flow of Afghan heroin through the region. In
particular, the governments of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan have publicly linked
drug trafficking to their respective insurgencies as a source of funding. However, a
recent U.S. government assessment singled out Tajikistan as “the major gateway for
Afghan heroin being smuggled into Russia.”145
A further complication in the region is an ongoing and often active Russian
involvement in the internal affairs of its southern neighbors.146 The most salient such
instance of direct foreign intervention in recent years has been its role in the civil war in
Tajikistan, primarily in the use of Russian troops to patrol the Tajik-Afghan border,
numbering fifteen thousand by 1993. This conflict, revolving around the traditional
enmity among four clans, namely the Khujent, the Kulyab, the Garm and the Pamiris,

efforts to address the legal issues o f the narcotics industry, including money laundering.” U.S. ONDCP,
“Drug Policy Perspectives,” 3-7.
145 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 10-4. This
observation is echoed in Stephen Franklin, “Increased Heroin Smuggling Feared, Tajikistan Dealers Await
Fresh Crops,” Chicago Tribune (we site), 19 October 2001. See also “Inhalable exports,” The Economist,
28 October 2000,38. The latter article also notes, “A vicious cycle o f war, economic collapse, opium
exports and terrorism cannot be addressed by individual governments, say the politicians and experts. They
must work together and outsiders must help too.” For more on the exponentially increasing drug abuse in
both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, see OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 40-3. In particular,
strategies targeting the young, such as free samples, have become more common, while the drug treatment
infrastructure remains very limited.
146 In the context o f security, there appears to be a dichotomy within the more activist aspects o f Russian
foreign policy toward the region. This is between maintaining a veneer o f former imperial influence in
Central Asia, such as demanding a say in commercial arrangements with MNCs, and grappling with the
numerous legitimate threats emanating from the region, such as Islamic fundamentalism in the case o f
Tajikistan. Analysis o f these issues can be found in Rajah Menon, “In the Shadow o f the Bear: Security in
Post-Soviet Central Asia,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), 149-81; and V. I. Slipchenko,
“Russia’s Political and Military Problems in Central Asia,” European Security 6. no. 1 (Spring 1997), 11424. Moreover, in geographic terms, a major issue among these countries is that, in general, they do not
have national borders that correspond to their ethnic ones, but rather borders deemed convenient during the
early days o f the Soviet Union. In this respect, there are many parallels with the post-colonial situation in
sub-Saharan Africa. For more on the region during the Bolshevik era, when Lenin and Stalin established
and solidified most o f these boundaries, see Helene Carrere D ’Encausse, The Great Challenge:
Nationalities and the Bolshevik State, 1917-1930, trans. Nancy Festinger (New York: Holmes and Meier,
1992). In the context o f the fall o f the Soviet Union, this theme is discussed, in far greater detail, in Olivier
Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation o f Nations (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000).
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consisted primarily of a struggle “both for power in the Tajik government and for control
of the smuggling routes used to take opium from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan to
Russia, and from there to Europe.”147 Although by the late 1990s the situation had
largely stabilized, the underlying issues of inter-clan power sharing and the role of
Islamic fundamentalism spreading from Afghanistan remain.

i 4o

In general, Tajikistan has good cross-border roads along the Afghan border,
largely as the result of the country’s use as a staging area during the Soviet involvement
in Afghanistan. During the Tajik civil war, Russian troops stationed there reportedly
accepted bribes to facilitate the movement of Afghan heroin into Central Asia, as well as
being directly involved themselves in drug trafficking. In one salient incident, Tajik
officials seized 109 kilograms of opium from a Russian Border Guards helicopter.149
Furthermore, as Olivier Roy notes, “The Pamiris succeeded in preserving their autonomy
both de jure and de facto in Gormo-Badakshan, having reached a compromise with the
government (actually Russian) frontier guards. Their territory became a prime location
for the transit of drugs coming from Afghanistan to Osh in Kyrgystan.”150
For its part, Uzbekistan also faces a combination of drug trafficking and
insurgency. Specifically, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, operating from guerrilla

147 “The empire strikes back,” The Economist, 7 August 1993, 36. For more background on this conflict,
see also James Sherr, “Escalation o f the Tajikistan Conflict,” Jan e’s Intelligence Review 5, no. 11
(November 1993), 514-6; and Brian Austen, “Tajikistan today,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 19, no. 2
(April-June 1996), 199-212.
148 See Ahmed Rashid, “The Fires o f Faith in Central Asia,” World Policy Journal 18, no. 1 (Spring 2001),
45-56; and “A peace o f sorts,” The Econom ist, 20 September 1997, 46. Underlining the artificiality o f
regional borders, this same article also characterizes Tajikistan, somewhat pithily but no less accurately, as
“a collection o f valleys that was forced into a nation under Stalin.” See also Magnus and Naby, 175-6.
149 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 16. This is by no
means an isolated phenomenon. For instance, the ONDCP notes that standards o f living throughout Central
Asia are so low that “narco-traffickers have been known to bribe impoverished border guards for as little as
a loaf o f bread or $1 USD in cash.” U.S. ONDCP, Drug Policy Perspectives,” 6.
150 See Roy, The New Central Asia, 141. As discussed above, the primary Afghan road north into
Uzbekistan runs through Mazar-i-Sharif.
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bases in Tajikistan, spilling over via the Fergana Valley, which stretches from
Afghanistan into several neighboring Central Asian states, has also been linked to
regional heroin trafficking. The Uzbek government at least partially attributed this
activity to the rebels’ desire “to create havoc to keep the borders open for the heroin
flow.”151
The rebels’ stated goal is an Islamic state in the Fergana Valley, where the
borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan come together, with its primary
strategy being to topple the government of Uzbekistan. According to Kyrgyz
government spokesmen, the rebels are also trying to defend the interests of drug
traffickers in moving opiates through the region and on to Russia and Europe, while the
Uzbek government has labeled the militants as “common criminals.”152
However, according to OGD, it is Turkmenistan that has become the most
prominent Central Asian route for exporting Afghan opiates, as well as for importing
precursor chemicals. In addition to being geographically contiguous, the two countries
also share cross-border Turkmen ethnic ties, solidified during the Soviet era, with links to
Turkmenistan’s security forces. Other factors that have strengthened the country’s role
as a conduit for heroin smuggling vectors include a weakening demand for its natural gas
and cotton, and the fact that its border is much less rigorously patrolled than that with
Iran.153

151 Douglas Franz, “Guerrilla Attacks Raise Worries in Central A sia,” N ew York Times (web edition), 6

September 2000. Approximately a week after this article appeared, the U.S. placed the Islamic Movement
o f Uzbekistan on its list o f foreign terrorist organizations, precluding its citizens from contributing money
or material support to the group, as well as denying visas to or deporting members o f the group. See Judith
Miller, “U.S. Puts Uzbek Group on Its Terror List,” New York Times (web edition), 15 September 2000.
152 See “The militants take aim,” The Economist, 26 August 2000, 32.
153 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 39-40. This report goes on to note, “It is particularly
easy to use the Kushka border post, as enormous quantities o f goods o f diverse origins pass through it on
the way to a wide variety o f destinations. The drugs then go to the Turkmen and Kazakh ports on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243

Finally, ethnic Russian TCOs both supply their domestic markets and facilitate
transnational smuggling vectors throughout the region. These organizations are presently
expanding aggressively into Central Asia and up to the borders of Afghanistan, and are
largely responsible for paving the way for the alternate routes into European markets that
currently compete with those that enter via Iran and Turkey.154 Also of importance is the
opening of extensive former Soviet air, rail and highway networks in facilitating the
movement of contraband throughout the Eurasian landmass.155
Similarly, the Baltic ports and routes through the Ukraine and Eastern Europe are
also important conduits for smuggling vectors with respect not only to drugs, but also to
both black market arms and illegal immigrants into Western Europe. Russian criminal
organizations are also particularly well connected in the Black Sea ports of Odessa and
the Crimea.156 Further afield, even the strategically located naval base at Cam Rahn Bay
in Vietnam, currently leased to Russia, has emerged as a trafficking hub in this context.157
As noted in INCSR 2001, “Dominating all other drug issues in Russia is the
continued dramatic increase in the flow of Afghan heroin into the country across the
southern border.”

158

Taking advantage of this trend, Russian TCOs, especially those

affiliated with the military or particular ethnic groups, are also poised to take up a greater
share of the relevant heroin smuggling vectors. These groups are also establishing and

Caspian Sea. Direct routes connect [the Turkmen capital of] Ashgabat with Tehran, Istambul, Karachi,
Dushanbe, Tashkent and Moscow.”
154 Arkady Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, trans. John and Elizabeth Roberts (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1991), 248. Transit routes from Pakistan and the Middle East through the Caucasus to Eastern Europe have
also become increasingly important. See also “After the silk came the smack,” The Economist, 28 May
1994, 33. Long-standing ties to Afghanistan, especially in the case o f former military officers, are seen as
particularly problematic.
155 Handelman, 197.
156 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 13.
157 J. Michael Waller and Victor J. Yasman, “Russia’s Great Criminal Revolution: The Role o f the Security
Services,” in Ryan and Rush, 195.
158 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia - Russia.”
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maintaining contacts with Latin America cocaine producers and engaging in drug
trafficking from New York to Miami.159
For its part, as noted in The Economist, “The Caucasus is - or should be - a
splendid transit route between east and west, north and south, for goods, money, people
and ideas.”160 In particular, the potential of Armenia in this respect is salient. Because of
its geographical position, the country has the potential to become a significant transit
point for transnational heroin smuggling vectors, though at present it is only a secondary
route due to limited transportation links to neighboring countries. However, an estimated
75 percent o f all opiates in Armenia are being smuggled from Iran. While at present its
borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain closed due to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, when these borders open such activity could increase significantly.161
As discussed previously, a significant portion of heroin smuggling vectors leaving
Afghanistan reach their final destination in European markets, particularly throughout
Western Europe. As such, geography is one of the primary factors in the growth of
organized crime in Eastern and Central Europe, as discussed previously in the context of

159 The geographic extent o f this phenomenon, ranging across much o f Eurasia and beyond, is discussed at
length in Mark Galeotti, “Red Mafias and National Security,” Janes ’ Intelligence Review 5, no. 1 (January
1993), 21-2; “Redfellas,” The Economist, 15 March 1997, 31-2; and Cooley, 171-3.
160 An excellent survey o f the region can be found in “Where worlds collide,” The Economist, 19 August
2000, 17-9. O f particular interest in the context o f smuggling is a table that includes a column assessing
mafia involvement by area, summarized as follows: Abkhazia (unrecognized separatist republic within
Georgia), “Lightly supervised port offers great potential;” Ajaria (autonomous region within Georgia),
“Russian mobsters have been spotted there;” Armenia, “War profiteers, corrupt officials;” Azerbaijan,
“Ruling elite very corrupt;” Georgia, “Rampant cronyism at all levels;” Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijani
enclave), “War profiteers, veterans’ groups;” Nakichevan (Armenian-controlled territory within
Azerbaijan), “Officialdom does conspicuously well;” Pankisi Gorge (Chechen-populated part o f Georgia),
“Don’t ask;” and South Ossetia (separatist region o f Georgia), “Tunnel to Russia offers huge potential.”
161 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia - Armenia.” Moreover,
“The Armenian community abroad provides useful connections to traffic drugs and launder money in the
Middle-East (Lebanon), the Americas (Argentina, United States, Canada) and Russia.” OGD, World
Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 20. This report also notes that Armenia’s huge and largely abandoned Sovietera industrial infrastructure serves as the source for non-ferrous metals and iron that are bartered with Iran
and the Gulf states for heroin and other goods.
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the “Balkan Route.”

1^9

In terms of both transit and distribution, migrant populations in

Western European urban areas have led to the establishment of criminal cells with ties to
Turkey, Iran, North Africa, the Balkans and other regions. For instance, Turkish and
Albanian groups dominate the trafficking of Southwest Asian heroin in many European
Union countries.163
However, a case in point for the evolution of these trends can be found in the
U.K., where 95 percent of the heroin comes from Southwest Asia, chiefly Afghanistan.
With respect to the ethnic and often immigrant-based issue of drug distribution, recently
there has been a rise of Pakistani gang activity in the country rivaling traditional Turkish
dominance of street-level heroin sales, reputedly a $1.5 billion market. Overall, the U.K.
has a much larger and more geographically dispersed Pakistani community in comparison
to its Turkish counterpart. Moreover, facilitated by direct airline connections between
Pakistan and Manchester, Pakistani drug rings have begun using larger numbers of mules
to profit in a strategy of "little-but-often." By contrast, Turkish and affiliated Cypriot
drug traffickers have tended to rely on larger cross-channel shipments by truck.164
While Europe remains the primary market for Golden Crescent heroin, the U.S.
remains an important secondary target for both large organizations and smaller
independent traffickers. As the DEA notes, “The United States was a secondary target

162 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 7.
163 Furthermore, “Although Turkish criminal groups remain the primary source o f supply, ethnic Albanian
crime groups appear to have largely replaced the Turks as the principal distributors o f Southwest Asian
heroin to parts o f Western Europe, according to press reports. They are also challenging Italian criminal
syndicates for control o f other rackets in Western European countries.” U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 3. See also Gus Xhudo, “Men o f Purpose: the Growth o f
Albanian Criminal Activity,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), 1-20; and U.S. DOJ,
DEA, NNICC (1998), 57. While other groups have superseded the traditional dominance o f Italian groups,
who were generally supplied by Turkish traffickers with Southeast Asian heroin, new links with Russian,
Albanian and Asian crime groups appear to be emerging. See Galeotti, “Turkish Organized Crime,” 32-3.
164 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia - United Kingdom.”
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for Southwest Asia’s largest heroin trafficking organizations that generally consider
Europe their primary market. Most of these organizations stored heroin supplies in
secure European locations and only sent shipments to the United States after a buyer had
been identified and partial payment received.” By contrast, groups less well established
in European markets appear to be attracted to the U.S. and have been known to depend
not only on established European routes, but also to develop alternative transshipment
nodes through Africa and Canada.165
The DEA also noted in 1998 that the importation and distribution of Southwest
Asian heroin for the U.S. market is much less centralized than for its Southeast Asian
counterpart, both geographically and with regard to the relevant trafficking groups. In
general, it appears that a relatively limited quantity of Southwest Asian heroin was
available in the U.S., primarily in the Northeast, Midwest and, to a lesser extent, on the
West Coast, where there are relatively larger populations of Southwest Asian origin.
As such, networks based on membership from a number of ethnic groups with
links to the region have been associated with this type of activity, including Afghans,
Pakistanis, Iranians, Turks, Lebanese, Israelis and Greeks. While for the most part
stemming from familial, religious or tribal affiliations, these networks tend to be highly
cohesive, difficult to penetrate and cautious in their dealings with outsiders.166 In some

165 See U.S. DOJ, DEA, “The Availability o f Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States” (Washington,
DC: DEA, May 1996), available at http.//www.fas.org/irp/agency/doi/dea/product/swa heroin.htm.
accessed 15 July 2004. This report also notes that these trafficking and distribution patterns “are generally
more prevalent in cities with large populations from Afghanistan, Greece, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey,
such as Chicago, Detroit, and New York City. For more on trends relating to Afghan heroin within the
U.S. market, see also U.S. DOJ, NDIC, National Drug Threat Assessment 2002; and U.S. DOJ, DEA,
Intelligence Division, Domestic Heroin Unit, “Southwest Asian Heroin - Selected Data,” Drug
Intelligence Brief, DEA-02015 (Washington, DC: DEA, March 2002), available at
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02015/02015.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
166 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), xi, 45-6.
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ways, parallel characteristics can be seen in the structure and activities of West African
TCOs, as discussed in Chapter VII.
By way of a conclusion, having traced the movement of heroin produced in
Afghanistan outward across the borders of immediately adjacent countries and beyond
via widely divergent modes of transportation, it becomes necessary to assess this body of
empirical data in terms of the models, conventions and parameters introduced in previous
chapters. As such, this analysis reviews the most salient elements of the smugglers’
landscape as they apply to Afghanistan, the wider Golden Crescent drug nexus region,
and the many paths out to subsequent final destinations.

Afghan Heroin Smuggling Vectors: An Assessment
To begin with Afghanistan itself, in terms of the political risk factors discussed in
Chapter IV, it would be difficult to imagine a more adverse set of conditions for a
legitimate business to operate. However, the demonstrable success of opium cultivation
and heroin production can largely be seen as the result of the country’s terrain, traditions
and domestic turmoil, aspects of which can be geographically sorted by their physical,
economic, political and human attributes. In turn, these factors serve to set a very
favorable balance of access in comparison to risk, resulting in high degree of connectivity
with adjacent countries with respect to smuggling vectors.
Among the primary types of conveyance discussed in Chapter II, namely land,
water and air modes of transportation, the physical geography and lack of developed
infrastructure found in Afghanistan serve to constrain outbound smuggling vectors, as
well as other types of logistical activity, primarily to the use of land routes. As noted
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above, the country is landlocked, waterways are limited to a few riverine systems, and air
transportation is highly circumscribed by a lack of aviation facilities. However, even
land-based smuggling vectors must overcome the generally poor condition of existing
roads and the absence of railways. Much of this “friction of distance” is overcome by a
combination of profit motivation, political involvement in smuggling at various locations,
and cross-border ethnic ties.
Moving on to the country’s economic geography, the convergence of numerous
internal and external factors in Afghanistan has made various types of black market
activity overwhelmingly pernicious. With respect to the focus of this study, the lack of
viable economic alternatives to and cultural embeddedness of opium cultivation and
heroin processing have led to the country to become one of the largest sources of supply
at the global level, and that commodity constitutes the single largest source of national
income. The spatial distribution of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, centered in the
southwest, the east and the northeast, though extending further over the last two decades,
also tends to allow for relatively easy access to porous border areas.
Similarly, the fragmenting of Afghanistan’s political geography has been
accelerated by decades of occupation, civil war and other forms of endemic unrest, which
have in turn been precipitated by, though certainly predating, the Soviet invasion of the
county in 1979. The lack of a central authority, ensuing regional warlordism and access
to large amounts of weaponry in the country over the past few decades have pushed the
concept of corruption far beyond what is conceivable in most other countries, with
political control of various opium production areas and along pivotal sections of the
border carrying lucrative economic incentives as well. With respect to a given smuggling
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vector, control of at least a section of the path is essential to make a profit, with
international borders being among the more desirable pieces of real estate.
This reciprocal relationship between economics and politics underlines the
cyclical nature of this phenomenon, in that the former provides the motivation in the form
of profits, while the second enables a wide range of criminal activity, including but
certainly not limited to smuggling, to thrive under its aegis while simultaneously reaping
the revenues necessary to maintain the relevant political structures. Rather than dwell on
the specific factional alignments and disputes that have characterized Afghanistan’s
recent history, the key point here is the relative continuity of purpose among diverse
actors that have allowed heroin smuggling to flourish. At this pivotal point in Afghan
history, for the first time in decades there is at least an opportunity to break this cycle.
Finally, two salient features of Afghanistan’s human geography come to the fore
in the context of facilitating a favorable operational environment for heroin smuggling.
The first is the ethnic diversity and stratification of Afghan society, predating yet
polarized by the events of recent decades, as noted above. The second is a long-standing
tradition of smuggling dating back for centuries that has proved quite resistant in the face
of periodic efforts to control the border.
This is particularly true in the case of ethnic groups divided by relatively recent
and often arbitrary international borders. Furthermore, nomadic groups, including but not
limited to elements of the Pashtun, Baluch and Brahui, are able to exploit porous borders
and are thus ideally situated for smuggling activity despite periodic disruption by war and
other events. In functional terms, these informal cross-border human links serve as
integral “legs” for smuggling vectors leaving Afghanistan, as they are much less
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constrained by the lack of a developed transportation infrastructure than more
sophisticated commercial activity.
Thus, in terms of access and risk, although Afghanistan’s physical geography may
seem at first glance to be not particularly conducive to smuggling or other licit forms of
trade, the ready availability of large amounts of a highly lucrative and internationally
traded commodity serves as an important economic incentive to find imaginative ways to
maximize access and mitigate risk, often through political protection and the strength of
ethnic ties. All along the country’s porous borders, countless numbers of illicit
transactions involving various commodities testify to the impact of this favorable
smugglers’ landscape that is not conditional on mere proximity or ease of transit.
The resultant connectivity can be seen in the massive volumes of heroin that
move across Afghanistan’s borders and into the wider region of the Golden Crescent and
beyond. The demonstrable capability of the relevant smuggling actors in this respect can
be linked to constantly shifting and iterative smuggling activity that is both flexible
enough to evolve in new ways when necessary and embedded enough to embrace
historically successful patterns of behavior.
However, even beyond the context of smuggling, the impact of Afghanistan’s
geostrategic influence within the region cannot be underestimated. Though often seen by
its neighbors and much of the rest of the world as a source of instability, drugs, weapons,
and religious fanaticism in the case of Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran, it also
represents an opportunity in terms of access to the current and potential resources of
Central Asia. Thus, although not readily apparent from its recent history, Afghanistan
does in fact hold the potential to act as a conduit for economic development as well.
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To return to the issue in question, the confluence of the physical, economic,
political and human geography within Afghanistan has a salient and lasting impact on
heroin smuggling out of the country. Specifically, as noted above, the three major sets of
smuggling vectors out of the country cross the common and highly porous land borders
with Pakistan to the south, Iran to the west, and the former Soviet states of Central Asia
to the north. The terrain in these areas is generally mountainous or desert, and is
particularly conducive to smuggling, especially on a small-scale basis that is difficult to
prevent even under optimal conditions.
Among these, Pakistan arguably has the most longstanding and intimate
relationship with Afghanistan, particularly in the context of heroin. This interaction can
be best seen against the often-contentious backdrop of competition regarding which
country should legitimately control traditionally Pashtun, and to a lesser extent Baluch,
tribal areas along the common border, though these ethnic ties also serve to facilitate a
wide range of smuggling vectors as well. Moreover, many of the underlying smuggling
mechanisms between the two countries date from the period of the Soviet occupation.
These transnational networks give the relevant smuggling actors the capability to
efficiently negotiate transactions, assemble drug shipments and transport their goods to
wholesale buyers, frequently in cooperation with other networks.
Pakistan’s social and political climate that allows smugglers with the proper
protection to operate with virtual impunity, service the country’s sizable and growing
domestic demand for drugs, and transship a significant amount of heroin onward.
Logistically, the sizable number of smuggling vectors carrying opiates as well as other
forms of contraband thus enter from Afghanistan via both vehicle and pack animal, where
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smugglers can take advantage of a substantially more developed road and rail
infrastructure and access to various forms of waterborne conveyance. Taken together,
this set of conditions enabling access and mitigating risk has resulted in a high degree of
connectivity both in to and out of Pakistan. This connectivity in turn has led smuggling
vectors for Afghan heroin to easily move into India as well, in particular to take
advantage of that country’s relatively more developed infrastructure, access to maritime
modes of transportation, and lax export regulations.
In the case of Iran, its contiguous borders with both Pakistan and Afghanistan
present a high degree of access to inbound heroin smuggling vectors either for
transshipment or to meet domestic demand. Patterns of opium moving first through
Kabul, and then on to Iran, often via Herat, date back at least thirty years, though an
increasing volume of contraband can be seen crossing first from Afghanistan into
Pakistan and then into Iran. Traditionally, from Iran these smuggling vectors then
continued on by land through Turkey and on through the “Balkan Route” into Western
Europe, or by water through various Persian Gulf ports on the way to other,
predominantly European, markets.
However, despite this longstanding set of factors enabling access, in terms of risk
Iran also offers a relatively less favorable operational environment than Pakistan. For
instance, successive regimes have struggled to overcome these access dynamics since the
th

•

early 20 century, with the current leadership demonstrating the willingness as well as
the capability to deal very harshly with traffickers entering its territory. This includes not
only armed interdiction along known smuggling routes, but also the use of the death
penalty for drug trafficking offenses. Nonetheless, despite this level of commitment and
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the resultantly high statistics relating to seizures, it appears that access to Iran as a node
for smuggling vectors is facilitated by its inherent attractiveness regardless of the risks
imposed, with the resultant connectivity being quite evident.
Finally, smuggling vectors through the Central Asian states to the north from
Afghanistan present an increasingly viable alternative to more established routes via
either Pakistan or Iran, particularly since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In addition the
advantages of relatively more effective means of transportation, in particular by land
utilizing the Soviet-built road and rail infrastructure, Afghan heroin smuggling vectors
transiting Central Asia not only have access to the growing regional market for drugs but
also service Russian and European demand.
Furthermore, a number of cross-border, ethnically-based TCOs and other non
state criminal actors, to include various Islamic fundamentalist groups, have also been
involved in the Central Asian drug trade. However, while mitigating against unrestricted
access is the enduring presence of Russian security forces in key states, for the most part
the risk associated with smuggling vectors out of Afghanistan into Central Asia are more
than offset by the access they provide. As a result, the region’s attractiveness is
demonstrated by its connectivity, which in turn becomes empirically evident by an
examination of the relatively high volumes of drugs seized or detected in transit.
In summation, while heroin smuggling vectors leaving Afghanistan vary in terms
of modes and methods, they are constrained by a number of factors and thus can be seen
for the most part as passing though a rather discrete set of conduits. However, it is the
transnational implications of this activity that serve to make it a tangible concern both
regionally and globally, as under conditions of autarky the situation in Afghanistan would
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most likely be of little interest to outsiders except on humanitarian or perhaps geopolitical
grounds.
Further out, however, the situation becomes much more complex, particularly as
the same actors that move heroin out of Afghanistan are seldom the same as those who
provide these illicit drugs to consumers. As such, an increasing number of TCOs, often
ethnically-based, become involved as middlemen and, eventually, distributors within
primary European and North American markets. In keeping with the open architecture of
this analytical framework, the success of these groups hinges upon their ability, at
varying levels of analysis, to effectively create access, mitigate risk and thus enable
connectivity along their respective sections of a given smuggling vector.
This chapter began with a consideration of heroin in Afghanistan and went on to
trace the more prominent sets of smuggling vectors extending outward from that country.
However, despite a commonality in terms of origin, the high degree of fragmentation
both in terms of geography and organization is readily apparent. By contrast, the next
chapter examines Colombia and its smuggling vectors, which tend to be characterized by
TCOs that are much more cohesive and sophisticated in their control of the relevant
logistical channels. Furthermore, though their reach continues to expand, Colombian
TCOs for the most part remain focused on a single major market, namely the United
States.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255

CHAPTER VI
OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS . . . AGAIN:
COLOMBIA AND ITS TRANSNATIONAL HEROIN SMUGGLING VECTORS

In the case of Colombia, the rise in poppy cultivation and subsequent heroin
smuggling is inextricably linked to the more longstanding phenomena of the country’s
cocaine industry. This trend represents a conscious effort on the part of the relevant
TCOs, nothing if not opportunistic, to encourage product diversification in an attempt to
maximize profit margins and expand into new markets.1 In particular, a primary
consideration lies in successfully moving Colombian heroin to the U.S. market, where the
vast majority of production eventually goes. Furthermore, the domestic interactions
between the drug trade, kidnapping and guerrilla activity are also particularly salient.
Paralleling the case of Afghanistan, the themes of corruption, endemic civil unrest and
relatively remote terrain also can be seen as having a distinct and ongoing impact.
The first section will focus on the internal geographic components that drive the
Colombian drug trade, while the second examines the transnational logistics of this
activity. With respect to the latter, in addition to the wider spatial parameters of
legitimate regional trading patterns, the main areas of interest in this context are
Colombia’s external land, sea and air connections. All three major modes of transit have
historically been exploited by TCOs to varying and often cyclical degrees of intensity.
1 While this theme has been discussed in previous chapters, it is particularly salient here. As one ONDCP
report notes, specifically with reference to Colombian TCOs, “International trafficking organizations
operate like multinational corporations, which are profit oriented and risk averse. They seek to develop
new markets, and they are ruthlessly competitive and violent. It is clear that drug traffickers view heroin as
a growth industry.” U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 1.
2 For instance, Europe is fairly well supplied via other sources, as outlined previously. However, there are
indications that Latin American heroin has the potential to expand beyond current North American markets
in the future, as will be discussed below.
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Colombia’s national territory directly borders on that of Ecuador, Peru, Brazil,
Venezuela and Panama. Moreover, the country’s maritime boundaries give it access via
its seaports and along an extensive and porous coastline not only to the greater Caribbean
basin but the Pacific Ocean as well. Finally, both primary and secondary air connections
also serve to facilitate the transnational movement not only of heroin and other types of
contraband, but also of licit goods.
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Drugs and Dirty Wars in Colombia: “Plata o Plomo ”
Although a relatively recent phenomenon in Latin America, the cultivation of
opium poppies on a commercially viable scale and the resultant rise in heroin production
is a natural extension of the country’s previous experience with drug trafficking. As
such, it represents the latest and potentially the most lucrative of a succession of illegal
enterprises on the part of both domestic and transnational criminal organizations based in
Colombia, and an opportunity that such groups are capable of leveraging to a high
degree.4
For instance, after noting that Colombia’s current drug problems lie in the
decision by traffickers thirty years ago to turn the traditional Andean coca crop into a
global business, Rafael Pardo continues by writing, “Two decades later, in much the
same way, they would capitalize on growth in heroin.”5 To fully understand both the
potential and demonstrated impact of Colombian heroin, it is necessary to address the
issue of its antecedents, primarily cocaine.
Furthermore, drug trafficking is inextricably linked with a broad spectrum of
criminal activity and civil unrest that have served to undermine the social fabric of
Colombia. For decades, leaders and average citizens alike were been caught between the
dual coercive leverages o f bribery and violence, colloquially referred to as “plata o
plomo,” silver or lead.6 As a result, endemic and entrenched corruption, driven primarily

4 As evidence o f this pragmatism, Chepesiuk quotes an unnamed U.S. official regarding an additional
reason for this product diversification: “As a stimulant, cocaine will bum out a user in maybe a few months
to a few years, whereas heroin is a depressant and will be used by a junkie over a period o f decades.”
Chepesiuk, 148. Incidentally, a more concrete example o f direct interaction between cocaine and heroin at
the street level is the common practice among addicts o f using heroin to decrease the “crash” following a
cocaine high, known in slang as a “speedball.”
5 Rafael Pardo, “Colombia’s Two-Front War,” Foreign Affairs 79, no.4 (July-August 2000), 64.
6 As Winfred Tate notes, “The power and violence o f the drug industry came to permeate all facets o f
Colombian society, as signified by the saying “plata o plomo,” - silver or lead - meaning “take the bribe or
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by the proceeds of drug trafficking, has spread across nearly all aspects of society.
Moreover, a systemic breakdown of law and order can also been seen, including outright
attacks on the police and judiciary.7
This situation has progressed to the extent that “Colombianization” has become a

byword for similar situations in other countries, much as the term “Balkanization”
denotes a generic socio-political fragmentation along ethnic lines.8 Moreover, as
Francisco Thoumi observes:
The particular structure of Colombian society has been a very strong incentive for
the illegal industry to be positioned there. In many respects Colombia is the most
modem of the Andean countries, a fact that reflects the greater weakness of its
traditional institutions: as modernizing forces overwhelmed these institutions,
they liberated Colombians from many traditional restrictions and produced an
extreme individualistic society. It facilitated the concentration of the illegal
industry in Colombia and also led to a very high level of violence.”9
By contrast, other Latin American countries where crime has been a problem, such as
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, have shown rates of violent death of only 15 and 20
percent of that seen in Colombia. Moreover, in 1998 this statistic was ten times larger
than that of the United States, the most violent developed country.10

take the bullet. Drag lords achieved unprecedented political influence through threats, bribery, and
political contributions.” Winifred Tate, “Colombia’s Role in International Drag Trafficking,” Foreign
Policy in Focus 4, no. 130 (11 November 1999), 1.
7 Incidentally, in the run-up to the most recent election, provincial mayors have been favorite targets.
While numerous sources attest to this phenomenon, recent observations and analyses include Alma
Guillermoprieto, “Colombia: Violence Without End?” New York Review o f Books, 27 April 2000, 38-9; and
Pardo, 64-73. In particular, Pardo notes that despite having “one o f the most sophisticated legal systems in
the hemisphere and every conceivable law in the books,” 70% o f all crimes in Colombia remain unsolved.
See also James L. Zackrison and Eileen Bradley, “Colombian Sovereignty Under Siege,” Strategic Forum,
no. 112 (May 1997), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforam/SFl 12/foruml 12.html. accessed 15
July 2004, which discusses the risks to both the Colombian state and the wider region.
8 In particular, the case o f Colombia graphically illustrates the following synergy: “Three interrelated
phenomena work synergistically to produce the narcostate: organized crime, governmental policy, and
transnational capitalism.” Jordan, 9. However, the author further notes that states transitioning
economically from statism to capitalism, or from authoritarianism to democracy, can be seen as especially
vulnerable, conditions that are less applicable to the Colombian context.
9 Thoumi, 91.
10 Ibid, 83.
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Another key indicator of this chaotic state of domestic affairs in Colombia can be
seen in the endemic incidence of kidnapping. Criminal actors across the ideological
spectrum have engaged in such activity for motives ranging from inciting public outrage
and exerting political leverage to the more straightforward accrual of profit.11 As Alma
Guillermoprieto notes, “Kidnappings are the worst danger for civilians who are travelling
overland.” In addition to roadblocks set out to indiscriminately gather up unwary
travelers, various groups also plan and execute a large number of targeted abductions,
totaling 2,945 such incidents in 1999, and a record 3,707 kidnappings in 2000.12 Aspects
of this phenomenon will be addressed further in their analytical context.13
Following the format laid out in the preceding chapter, this section will examine
the elements of Colombia’s physical, economic, political and human geography that
provide the foundation for the domestic drug trade and its attendant consequences. In

11 This phenomenon has also led to the parallel growth o f another unfortunate practice, that o f “ransom
brokering,” whereby an intermediary arranges for the safe return o f the victim in exchange for a
percentage. In effect, competition for such services serves to raise the market price, and thus the appeal, o f
kidnapping. An additional issue is that o f kidnap insurance and related involvement o f various types o f
security professionals, which can not only further inflate ransoms but also obfuscate the scope o f the
problem. In fact, in 1993 the Colombian government went so far as to enact a controversial law not only
barring private negotiations with kidnappers, but also freezing the assets o f captive’s families and
employers. However, in addition to the numerous methods available to circumvent these strictures, the
Colombian Supreme Court has even gone so far as to rule this law unconstitutional. See Ann Hagedom
Auerbach, Ransom: The Untold Story o f International Kidnapping (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1998),
33,250-1. Throughout this work, the author also offers copious anecdotes involving Colombian
manifestations o f this global phenomenon.
12 See “Miami nice,” The Economist, 5 May 2001,26; and Guillermoprieto, “Colombia: Violence Without
End?” 31. The same author also notes one distinction between such activity as undertaken by the leftist
rebels and the rightist paramilitaries, namely the much slimmer odds o f being returned alive after being
abducted by the latter. Alma Guillermoprieto, “The Children’s War,” New York Review o f Books, 11 May
2000,40. Elsewhere, the author also notes reports o f guerrillas “buying” kidnap victims from ordinary
criminal organizations that do not have suitable types o f safe hiding places, such as locations deep in the
jungle. See Alma Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” New York Review o f Books, 13 April
2000,37.
13 Though discussed at further length below, a harrowing account o f Medellin cartel leader Pablo Escobar’s
kidnapping o f prominent Colombian citizens to use as leverage against the government during the early
1990s can be found in Gabriel Garcia M&rquez, News o f a Kidnapping, trans. Edith Grossman (New York:
Penguin Books, 1996). In a further link between the drug trade and kidnapping, as Guillermoprieto notes,
“Many drug traffickers, for example, got their startup capital through kidnapping and continued to use it as
a source o f income and power.” Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 37.
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particular, the relative underdevelopment o f many rural sections of the country has led to
significant freedom of action for both drug traffickers and insurgents. However, as in the
previous case study, in order to establish the initial framework for the analysis, a brief
overview of Colombia’s history is necessary.
To begin with, there is the dual legacy of both the multifaceted indigenous
cultural heritage and the Spanish colonial experience, the latter most saliently persisting
in the widespread Roman Catholic faith and its predominantly unifying influence.14
With the initial campaigns against Spanish rule in Latin America dating from early in the
nineteenth century, the independence of Gran Colombia was declared in 1821 by Simon
Bolivar, comprising what is now Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama.15

14 The wider issues revolving around the European exploration and subsequent conquest o f the New World
is slightly beyond the purview o f this study. However, an interesting analytical framework regarding the
ways in which disparate cultures have historically interacted in terms o f contacts, collisions and ongoing
coexistence can be found in Bitterli, passim. In particular, see 70-86, where the author discusses the
Spanish experience vis-a-vis indigenous cultures. See also J. H. Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990). For a more recent analysis o f indigenous cultural
identities throughout the region, often juxtaposed with other forms o f nationalism, see Michael Kearney
and Stefano Varese, “Latin America’s Indigenous Peoples: Changing Identities and Forms o f Resistance,”
in Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America, ed. Sandor Halebsky and Richard L. Harris (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1995), 207-31.
15 An excellent and highly readable account o f the campaigns for Latin American independence from Spain
can be found in Robert Harvey, Liberators: Latin Am erica’s Struggle fo r Independence, 1810-1830
(Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000). Incidentally, only two years later, and particularly salient in light
o f later U.S. involvement throughout the region, the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, in essence a
warning to the European powers to eschew future efforts to extend their influence in the Western
hemisphere. From the Latin American point o f view, the inherent irony is self-evident. As early as the
1850s, the adventurism o f Tennessee native William Walker throughout Central America became an
enduring symbol o f Yankee hemispheric ambitions. In this context, an excellent study o f early non
governmental actors operating to various degrees under U.S. sponsorship can also be found in Lester D.
Langley and Thomas Schoonover, The Banana Men: American Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs in Central
America, 1880-1930 (Lexington, KY: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1995). By 1904, an activist
extension o f the Monroe Doctrine had been articulated by Theodore Roosevelt. As a justification for U.S.
involvement throughout Latin America, though in practice limited primarily to the greater Caribbean basin,
the Roosevelt Corollary was hardly popular with regional neighbors. The move away from the Monroe
Doctrine began in the 1930s with an affirmation o f multilateral inter-American treaties, such as the Rio
Pact guaranteeing reciprocal assistance in time o f war, ratified in 1947, and the Charter o f the Organization
o f American States, ratified in 1948. However, though used as a rationale for the overthrow o f the
Guatemalan government in 1954, the Bay o f Pigs invasion o f 1961, and the intervention in the Dominican
Republic in 1965, by the 1980s and 1990s the doctrine had largely outlived its relevance in international
relations.
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However, in 1830 both Venezuela and Ecuador broke away, while with U.S. support
Panama gained its independence in 1903, resulting in Colombia’s present international
borders.
In terms of domestic politics, the dual primacy of the Liberal Party and the
Conservative Party was already established in Colombia by the 1850s and, maintained by
both legal and extra-legal means, continues up to the present day.16 Illustrative of the
periodic shifts in power between the two, the Liberals were dominant from 1863 to 1885,
when the Conservatives came to power and promulgated the 1886 constitution that was in
effect until 1991.
By 1930, a resurgence of Liberal rule was facilitated by the Great Depression,
which lasted until a narrow Conservative presidential victory in 1946 despite continuing
Liberal congressional control. With the assassination of Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer
Gaitan in 1948, the era of oligarchic democracy gave way to the period of undeclared
civil war known as La Violencia, and the genesis of the most prominent guerrilla
movements o f the last four decades.17
This state of affairs led in turn to the military government of General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla from 1953 to 1957. The subsequent return to civilian rule was facilitated by
16 With reference to these two parties, one source notes that, “Their history includes periods o f hegemonic
one-party rule, civil wars, and coalition government. The parties often mobilized armed bands larger than
the national army, indicating the weakness o f the state and the military.” Jonathan Hartlyn, “Colombia,”
The Oxford Companion to Politics o f the World, ed. Joel Krieger (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), 154. Thoumi also notes that, even more perniciously, “Colombia is the only Latin American
country in which the traditional parties and elite neutralized all political reform efforts. There were never
serious land reform programs, and the two political parties retained control and evolved into electoral,
clientelistic machines that co-opted dissidents but prevented social change. The lack o f political space for
both the extreme left and right is at the root o f guerrilla development.” Thoumi, 86.
17 A compelling overview o f both Gaitan’s murder, only two hours before a scheduled meeting with a
young Fidel Castro, as well as the outbreak o f La Violencia, can be found in Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo:
The Hunt fo r the W orld’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 7-11. For a more
comprehensive analysis o f this pivotal era in Colombian history, see also Gonzalo S&nchez and Donny
Meertens, Bandits, Peasants and Politics: The Case o f “La Violencia” in Colombia, trans. Alan Hynds
(Austin: Universty o f Texas Press, 2001), passim.
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an agreement between both parties to form a National Front to share power equally, even
going so far as to agree to alternate control of the presidency from 1958 to 1974. Despite
progress in some areas by the resultant series of coalition governments, in other respects
many of the social problems endemic to Latin America, such as unequal divisions of
wealth and related issues of development and representation, found increasing expression
in guerrilla and other illegal activity.
Following these decades of civil unrest, the current state of affairs in Colombia
can thus be seen in some ways as the logical extension of this legacy, as are the
government’s ongoing attempts to stabilize the situation. Successive administrations
have continued to confront these issues, while at the same time maintaining functional
democratic institutions, with varying degrees of success.18 Since the early 1980s, this
includes the administrations of Conservative Belisario Betancur from 1982 to 1986,
Liberal Virgilio Barco from 1986 to 1990, Cesar Gaviria from 1990 to 1994, Emesto
Samper from 1994 to 1998, Andres Pastrana from 1998 to 2002, and Alvaro Uribe,
elected in 2002.
In many respects, Colombia’s underlying physical geography also contributes to
the country’s present socio-political situation. As The Economist notes:
What makes Colombia so different from its neighbors? A geography that is
difficult even by Latin American standards predisposed the country toward
introversion, regionalism and a weak central state. In southern Colombia, the
Andes break into three chains, splaying out towards Panama, the Caribbean coast
and Venezuela respectively. The highland valleys and tablelands, where most of
the population lives, are separated from each other by the tropical valleys of the

18 For instance, Colombia has been under various forms o f martial law ever since the civil war o f 1948.
Jorge Nef, “Demilitarization and Democratic Transition in Latin America,” in Halebsky and Harris, 85.
More starkly, Bowden notes that, “By the 1960s Colombia had settled into an enforced stasis, with Marxist
guerrillas in the hills and jungles (modem successors to the bandito tradition) and a central government
increasingly dominated by a small group o f rich, elite Bogota families, powerless to effect change and,
anyway, disinclined.” Bowden, 13-4.
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Magdalena and Cauca rivers. The Pacific littoral is clothed in dense rainforest,
much of the Caribbean one backed by swamps or semi-desert. To the south-east
of the Andean chains, almost half of the country is occupied by the tropical
lowlands of the llanos.19
Similarly, though more poetically, Paul Bowden writes, “Colombia is a land that breeds
outlaws. It has always been ungovernable, a nation of wild unsullied beauty, steeped in
mystery. From the white peaks of the three Cordilleras that form its western spine to the
triple-canopy jungle at sea level, it affords many good places to hide.”20
While central governments in Latin America have traditionally been relatively
weak, Thoumi notes the dual roles of both geography and international trade in the
concentrating populations in national capitals. However, in the case of Colombia,
development took the form of a collection of weakly linked regions, as illustrated by the
four major cities, each with over two million residents, and several dozen with more than
a quarter million inhabitants. Moreover, though Bogota is located in the center of the
country, it has never been a primary conduit for any of Colombia’s major exports.21
In addition to fostering political fragmentation, this geography also serves to
impede intrastate economic interdependence due to logistical hurdles. In terms of land
transportation, roads are difficult to traverse due to both terrain and political instability,
though their condition is generally better in the north than in the south or in the east.
Similarly, the country’s railroad network is for the most part antiquated and provides only
limited services between cities.

19 “Drugs, war and democracy: A survey o f Colombia,” The Economist, 21 April 2001, 5.
20 Bowden, 12. Moreover, as observed by Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido, the political violence o f the
1950s diverted government attention from huge sections o f the country that were potentially productive but
largely undeveloped for lack o f roads. As the author notes, ‘Colombia has considerable unexploited rural
wealth but preferred to concentrate finance in the towns. This resulted in vast tracts o f land in the hands o f
criminals.” Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido, The FARC Cartel (Bogota: Ediciones El Faron, 1996), 97-8
21 Thoumi, 84.
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In general, Colombia’s access to water modes of transportation holds much more
commercial potential. The country’s seaboard encompasses both the Caribbean basin and
the Pacific Ocean. In particular, the ports of Buenaventura on the Pacific, and Cartagena
and Barranquilla on the Caribbean are the most active commercial seaports, while
relatively isolated coastal areas along the Gulfs of Uraba and Morrosquillo and the
Guajira Penninsula also offer ample scope for maritime smuggling.22
However, river navigation, particularly of the Magdalena and Atrato basins
running south to north along the western part of the country, the Orinoco basin along the
border with Venezuela, and the Amazon basin in the east, is also important in domestic
terms. Unfortunately, guerrillas and kidnappers often block land access to both seaports
and river landings. This in turn has led to a high dependence on air transport, which as
noted at the outset of this chapter is crucial to linking the nation’s disparate regions.
Furthermore, as in the case of Afghanistan, the physical control of territory is
paramount to the drug trade.

'J'X

In Colombia, the competition for the spatial projection of

power exists largely between the central government and the various non-state actors, of
which guerrilla groups and TCOs are among the most salient. To further complicate the
issue, at various times these non-state actors can be either coexisting or even cooperating
with the central government and in conflict with one another.

22 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 5.
23 Though slightly beyond the purview o f this analysis, issues relating to land ownership and the legitimacy
o f competing claims are key elements o f many endemic Latin American socio-economic problems. An
excellent and wide-ranging discussion on these topics can be found in Roderic Ai Camp, ed., Democracy in
Latin America: Patterns and Cycles, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996). A further parallel
with Afghanistan can be found in the deleterious ecological impact o f the drug trade. For instance, an
estimated 85 percent o f poppy cultivation areas are the result o f deforestation, while highly toxic pesticides
and the chemicals used to process heroin all find their way into the Colombian watershed. See Villamarin
Pulido, 95.
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For instance, with respect to the often-uneasy relationship between rebels and
traffickers throughout the Colombian countryside, Luis Alberto Villamarin Pulido notes,
“The bottom line was the rudimentary but true geopolitical criterion of controlling vast
tracts of land.”24 The specific regions of the country that have traditionally been most
problematic in this respect will be discussed below. However, in general two types of
non-state criminal actors can be seen in Colombia, namely those with economic motives
and those with political motives, though at times the line between the two can become
blurred enough to make them virtually indistinguishable, as will be discussed below.
In the first category, that of economically motivated criminal actors, the most
prominent in Colombia are drug trafficking organizations. However, in the past
Colombian drug cartels have resorted to campaigns of violence against government
institutions and the general public, resulting in the phenomenon of “narcoterrorism,”
most saliently manifest in kidnappings, bombings and assassinations.25 Furthermore,
elements of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups that constitute the second category have
become increasingly involved in various aspects of the drug trade as a source of
funding.26
Taken as an aggregate, drug trafficking shapes the country’s economic geography
to a high degree, and vice-versa.27 However, as Shelley notes, Colombia is in a different

24 Ibid., 11-7. This interaction will be addressed further below, in the context o f the insurgents’
involvement in drug trafficking.
25 While this phenomenon has been discussed in previous chapter, the most prominent example in the
Colombian context can be found in the career o f Pablo Escobar, as will be discussed at greater length
below. However, for a broad description o f Escobar’s terrorist campaign at its height, largely in an attempt
to avoid extradition to the United States between 1989 and 1991, see Bowden, 61-105.
26 Bentham, 11-12, also makes the broader case for the drug trade facilitating regional trends toward
militarization in Latin America.
27 According to Sanchez and Meertens, 195, the comparative advantages that Colombia offers to the drug
trade include “its complex and propitious geography, the quality o f its soil, its strategic location for
international markets, and its accumulated tolerance o f illegal activity.”
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category from either Afghanistan or Burma in that the overall economy is more
diversified, even though drugs have become the largest revenue source.28 Nonetheless,
despite deriving some monetary benefits from the drug trade, Colombia still can be seen
as suffering a net negative economic impact from this phenomenon.
For instance, the influx of dollars into the domestic economy has hurt the
competitive capabilities of traditional industries, promoted speculative investments and
diverted drug money into areas that were suitable for money laundering but not actually
profitable. Moreover, in perpetuating a climate of violence, the drug trade has
discouraged foreign investment, encouraged domestic capital flight, and increased costs
for the commercial sector as a whole by forcing it to invest heavily in security.29
It is worth noting, however, that in a controversial move the government of
Colombia went so far in 1999 as to propose including income earned from the cultivation
of coca, opium poppy and marijuana crops into the calculations of its gross national
product (GNP). This recalculation would serve to significantly increase the country’s
GNP, with projections for trade in illicit drugs ranging between one-quarter and one-third
of the country’s legal exports, roughly $4 billion per year.30
Drug trafficking trends in Colombia over the past two decades can be seen in
terms of a dual evolution. One involves commodities, primarily the shift from cocaine to
a more diversified product line that includes a growing market presence of heroin. The

28 Shelley, “Identifying, Counting and Categorizing,” 6. However, the author also observes that Colombia
TCOs, in contrast to many o f their counterparts, have not expanded their illicit economic activity much
beyond the drug trade and other directly related black markets, such as precursor chemicals and money
laundering.
29 Schmid, 54.
30 Larry Rochter, “Colombia Adjusts Economic Figures to Include Its Drug Crops,” New York Times, 27
June 1999, A-3. See also Claire Poole, “Colombia’s Gross Drug Product,” Latin Trade 7, no. 9 (September
1999), 26, which cites estimates as high as $7 billion per year when the value o f processed heroin and
cocaine are added to the figures.
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other encompasses the changing nature of the organizations in questions, particularly
with respect to the displacement of the Medellin and Cali cartels by a multitude of less
hierarchically structured smuggling actors. Moreover, both the U.S. market for illicit
drugs and the U.S. government’s policy toward the region with respect to this issue area
can be seen as having a discrete impact on, as well as responding to, these developments.
As mentioned at the outset, it is difficult to even approach the issue of heroin in
Colombia before first addressing that of cocaine. Cocaine is a chemical derivative of the
coca leaf harvested from several varieties of the Erthroxylum coca shrub.31 Globally,
coca cultivation centers on Latin America, specifically Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.32 In
contrast to the case of both Peru and Bolivia, it is worth noting that, in Colombia, “the
illegal industry started with the manufacturing and smuggling processes. The agricultural
part of the industry developed as a backward linkage to the manufacturing stage.”33
Incidentally, one trend that predates the issue of either coca or opium in Colombia
is that of cannabis. While Colombia has traditionally been a major foreign source of
marijuana for the U.S. market, most significantly between the late 1970s and early 1980s,
this activity has waned for years despite a limited resurgence in the late 1990s.
Previously concentrated in the Sierra Nevada and Serrania de Perija Mountains o f

northern Colombia, marijuana cultivation has shifted primarily to the north-central and

31 A wide-ranging discussion o f this drug, to include not only its history but also its socio-cultural impact,
can be found in Dominic Streatfeild, Cocaine: An Unauthorized Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
2001). Furthermore, as a stimulant cocaine is technically not a narcotic, the root o f which comes from the
Greek narcos, “to sleep,” despite the continued use o f the misnomer as an umbrella term for all illegal
drugs
32 For a survey o f the drug trade’s manifestations in these three countries, see Thoumi, 67-96; and Clawson
and Lee, passim. See also Bentham, 6-9, which notes the extremely detrimental impact o f coca cultivation
on Latin American ecosystems, which has in some cases been further compounded by various types o f
eradication efforts as will be discussed below.
33 Thoumi, 90. Zabludoff, 21-4, also notes the parallels between large-scale agribusinesses and the
Colombian drug cartels.
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western portions of the country. Furthermore, eradication efforts focusing on coca and
opium poppy growing have allowed marijuana farmers to operate largely unmolested in
these areas.34
In general, Colombian trafficking organizations have tended to dominate both
cocaine refining and transnational modes of distribution throughout the region. As
Guillermoprieto notes:
Colombia, which has a much smaller indigenous population than Bolivia or Peru,
used to cultivate less coca, and for many years it grew what was considered an
inferior product - meaning that the Colombian leaf produced a less potent
alkaloid. But Colombia had a lackadaisical government, uncharted waterways,
and a tradition of smuggling that dated back to colonial days. A small but
flourishing illegal trade in marijuana, emeralds, and pre-Hispanic artifacts had
kept smuggling techniques up to date, and by the early Eighties non-Indian
hustlers . . . had consolidated their hold on the manufacture of cocaine from coca
leaf, and on the export of refined cocaine to the United States.35
During the early boom years, the Colombian cocaine trade was dominated by two main
cartels, respectively centered in the cities of Medellin and Cali.36
Underlining the differences between the two, Bunker and Sullivan put forth as
part of their model of cartel behavior three evolutionary phases, in which the first, the
“Aggressive Competitor,” is represented by the Medellin cartel, and the second, the
“Subtle Co-Opter,” by its Cali counterpart.37 Moreover, despite its common usage in this

34 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 83.
35 Guillermprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 36. Among other things, successful methods o f smuggling
the necessary precursor chemicals necessary to process cocaine, primarily acetone and ether, from the
United States was a key to the early development o f the regional drug trade.
36 Williams and Savona, 18, note that the Colombian cartels were in many ways unique among TCOs in
that they tended to engage almost exclusively in drug trafficking, rather than the wide range o f illegal
activities undertaken by other criminal organizations.
37 Bunker and Sullivan, 59-70. The third and final phase, that o f “Criminal State Successor,” has yet to
truly emerge, though in some ways the first two phases manifest certain transitional aspects.
Characteristics o f TCOs theoretically capable o f successfully challenging nation-states more directly phase
include their involvement in an expanded range o f business sectors and markets, institutionalized global
economic reach, full spectrum technology use and the expanded use o f mercenaries and other specialized
criminal actors. As examples approaching this situation, the authors specifically cite Haiti, parts o f Mexico
and Cuidad de Este, the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.
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context, definitional issues with the term “cartel,” if taken in the traditional sense of a
conspiracy in restraint of trade generally undertaken to divide up the market for a given
commodity, restrict its supply and thus drive up prices. Given the large numbers of
manufacturers and distributors, many of whom are independent agents contracted on a
fee-for-service basis, there is little basis for making the case for any concerted effort to
monopolize the business
That being said, however, in general it is worth noting several features that
characterize most Colombian drug trafficking organizations, the two major cartels as well
as their successors in their various manifestations, and at least partially account for their
sustained prominence. First and foremost, all are innovative organizations with highly
adaptive capabilities.39 For instance, this can be seen in the responses to periods of
declining consumption and prices, as well as to rising seizure rates.
Moreover, there has been a constant attempt to raise profit margins by increasing
production efficiency, such as introducing more efficient harvesting processes, the
recycling of precursor chemicals and vacuum packing. In terms of transit, improved and
diversified smuggling methods are constantly appearing, as will be addressed further in
the next section. Finally, an increased downstream penetration of critical U.S. markets,

38 Naylor, “Mafias, Myths and Markets,” 20-3. The author puts forth one explanation for the persistence o f
this concept, namely that both policy-makers and the general public tend to more readily respond to the
existence o f a single clear-cut adversary rather than a chaotic multitude o f actors.
39 This point is well made in Michael Kenney, “When Criminals Out-Smart the State: Understanding the
Learning Capacity o f Colombian Drug Trafficking Organizations,” Transnational Organized Crime 5, no.
1 (Spring 1999), 97-119. In particular, this article tracks the evolution o f Colombian drug trafficking from
small-time networks largely coordinated by Chilean, Cuban and U.S. TCOs, through the development o f
their own transnational logistical operations, and up their present primacy within the Western Hemisphere.
See also Zabludoff, 23-4, who notes that, “As entrepreneurial groups, the Colombian narcotics
organizations have demonstrated the flexibility needed to maintain their leading market position.”
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primarily by setting up exclusive distribution networks, can also be seen, as well as
extensive market and product diversification.40
The rise in the popularity of cocaine, and the corresponding profits stemming
largely from North American markets, in turn helped create a number of secondary
benefits to Colombia. To return to Guillermoprieto, in cocaine:
Colombia had found what most developing countries lack, a cheap crop that can
produce the levels of employment, return on investment, and national growth that
only industrial goods normally provide. Construction soared, the service sector
exploded, antiquities dealers thrived, airline companies expanded their routes,
artists made more than a decent living and, beginning in 1992, many campesinos
also felt less gnawed by hunger.41
However, while cocaine trafficking indeed brought undreamed-of economic returns to
Colombia, the dark side of the trade also exacted a high social cost, most obviously
manifest in the growing wealth, power and influence of the Colombian drug cartels. As
Nobel laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez points out, “Colombia had not been aware of her
own importance in the international drug trade until the traffickers invaded the country’s
highest echelons through the back door, first with their increasing ability to corrupt and
suborn, and then with their own ambitions.”42
The rise and fall of the Medellin cartel, is exemplified by the meteoric career of
Pablo Escobar and his ultimately futile quest for legitimacy that helped further engulf the

40 Clawson and Lee, 11-2. The authors also note that the rise o f heroin refining and distribution came about
at least partly “in recognition o f the fact that the U.S. cocaine market is approaching its saturation point.”
For its part, UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 260, echoes many o f the factors contributing to
Colombian TCOs competitive advantage in this respect. Among those already discussed are the country’s
physical geography, experience moving contraband and entrepreneurial ethos. Others noted include the
presence o f active guerrilla movements, legal and illegal immigration primarily to the U.S., and a high
degree o f familiarity with black market exchanges and money laundering, all o f which will be addressed
below.
41 Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 36. This observation is echoed by Bowden, who notes
that the drug traffickers “wanted the state to legitimize their enterprise, and given the money they were
willing to spread around. . . some intellectuals saw the cocaine trade as potential economic salvation for
Andean nations, akin to the discovery o f vast oil fields in the Persian Gulf.” Bowden, 31.
42 Marquez, 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271
entire country in a cycle o f violence, is a case in point.43 Much o f this activity centered

upon a campaign of terror consisting of a staggering number of bombings, kidnappings
and assassinations, all designed to exert pressure on the Colombian government to accede
to the demands of Escobar and the rest of the cartel’s leadership. As the human costs
mounted, such atrocities effectively served to undermine any previous romantic images
of drug traffickers as latter-day folk heroes.
Specifically, the domestic backlash against drug trafficking and related activity
can be traced to the murder of crusading justice minister Rodrigo Lara in early 1984,
allegedly by Escobar, which in turn led the Barco administration to cooperate more
closely with the U.S., particularly with respect to extradition. However, it was the
assassination, also attributed to Escobar, of leading presidential candidate Luis Galan in
1989 that led the Colombian government to declare all-out war on the Medellin cartel44
In parallel with these events in Colombia, the notoriety of the drug traffickers also
brought the issue to the attention of the U.S. government. The genesis of the U.S. “war
on drugs” and its primary policy tool, the certification process, has been discussed at
length in Chapter IV. With respect to Latin America, however, U.S. foreign policy has
traditionally focused more on the strategic denial of influence from rivals outside the
hemisphere and maintaining regional political stability than on more entangling issues.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, both the Reagan and first Bush administrations

43 With respect to Medellin, Bowden tellingly notes that even before Escobar’s time, “The region was
famous for contrabandistas, local heads o f organized-crime syndicates, practitioners o f the centuries-old
paisa (street hustler) tradition o f smuggling - originally gold and emeralds, now marijuana, and soon
cocaine.” Bowden, 18. Furthermore, Morrison, 5, correlates the rise in Colombian drug trafficking to the
demise o f the nation’s textile industry, perhaps not coincidentally centered in Medellin. A similar case can
be made for Nigeria with the collapse o f oil prices in the mid-1980s, as will be discussed in the next
chapter.
44 Bowden, 44, 63-4.
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began to focus increasingly in the issue, in particular by putting it into the context of
national security.45
A major turning point in this respect was the November 1989 bombing of an
Avianca Airlines commercial flight in an assassination attempt on the subsequently
successful Colombian presidential candidate, Cesar Gaviria. This act caused 110 deaths,
and included two American citizens among the victims. As a result, the explicit linkage
between drug trafficking and terrorism was made in U.S. foreign policy circles, with the
most prominent impact in the domestic Colombian context being the aforementioned
issue of extradition 46
As early as 1985, in response to the increasing pressure from both the Colombian
and U.S. governments, Escobar began acting through a nominal and largely selfaggrandizing organization called the “Extraditables,” which took the level of violence to
a new level to pressure the Colombian authorities into blocking extradition efforts. In
addition to gaining leverage via intimidation, this move was predicated upon gathering
public support by tapping into the less than tacit insult that extradition represented to
Colombian sovereignty.47

45 For instance, in 1986, Reagan signed a classified National Security Decision Directive that referred to the
flow o f drugs across U.S. borders to be a “national security threat.” Moreover, in 1989 Bush authorized
National Security Directive 18, which called for $250 million to be allocated to intelligence, law
enforcement and military budgets to fight drug trafficking, with an additional $65 million earmarked for
security assistance to Colombia itself. Bowden, 64-5. See also Vincent T. Bugliosi, The Phoenix Solution:
Getting Serious About Winning Am erica’s Drug War (Beverly Hills: Dove Books, 1996), 13-8.
46 Bowden, 80-1, which also notes the resultant increase in U.S. military involvement that also arose from
this event.
47 Ibid., 51-9. The tactics used by Escobar under the auspices o f this group ranged from angry public rants
in the media to kidnapping, assassination and a wide-ranging campaign o f bombing. For an overview o f
the scope o f this domestic unrest and cycle o f violence, see Marquez, 128-30. In addition to assorted car
bombings and even the downing o f passenger planes, four presidential candidates were assassinated before
the 1990 campaign. Moreover, in the first two months o f 1991, there were hundred murders, an average o f
twenty a day, in Medellin. A total o f 457 police were also killed in the first few months o f that year.
Mdrquez, 178. The author further notes that the going rate for the murder o f a police officer was five
million pesos, and 800,000 for each on wounded. Attempts at compromise on the part o f the Colombian
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In particular, extradition was seen by a significant segment of Colombian society
not otherwise in sympathy with the drug traffickers as not only implying that the country
was too weak to administer justice itself, but also that the U.S. somehow saw itself as a
higher moral authority. The initial outcome of this phase was the negotiated
incarceration of Escobar in June 1991, which lasted until his escape in September 1992.
His death at the hands of Colombian police while still at large occurred in December
1993, and for the most part the Medellin cartel was subsequently dismantled.48
By way of an epitaph for Escobar and the cartel he exemplified, Bunker and
Sullivan note that, “In retrospect, the Medellin model can be understood as a new and
very successful, albeit short-lived, form of criminal entity. Its leaders, while tactically
and operationally brilliant, were strategically ignorant. Their attempt at directly taking on
a Westphalian state, politically and militarily, was both organizationally and individually
suicidal.”49
By contrast, the Cali cartel, led by the brothers Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez
Orejuela, maintained a more low-key operational stance as well as purported links with
elements of both the paramilitary organizations and the national security forces,
particularly among the Politia Nacional de Colombia (PNC, or Colombian National
Police). As Williams and Savona note, rather than confronting the government directly
as their counterparts in Medellin had, the Cali cartel adopted a strategy of infiltration.
government seldom went as far as Escobar felt necessary, as in September 1990 when the Decree 2047
under Martial Law was issued. This stated that those who surrendered and confessed to their crimes would
receive the right not to be extradited, while further cooperation with the authorities could have their
sentences reduced by up to half. This was modified by Decree 3030 in December 1990, which provided for
the judicial accumulation o f sentences in that only the longest o f a series would have to be served.
Marquez, 74.
48 The circumstances surrounding these events are discussed at length in Bowden, 119-53,203-49. See
“Colombia contemplates extraditing its dragsters,” The Economist, 31 May 1997, 33, and
“Unextraditable?” The Economist, 20 September 1997, 36-8.
49 Bunker and Sullivan, 62.
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This was predicated upon presenting a front of legitimate commercial activity and co
opting local power structures through patronage.50
Together, and allegedly with the collusion of elements of the U.S. government,
these groups tacitly cooperated to target Escobar’s operations during his brief period at
large between September 1992 and December 1993. This cooperation took the form of a
response in kind to the actions of the Extraditables, utilizing methods that the legitimate
authorities where unable to utilize. A shadowy organization, known as “Los Pepes,”
(Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar, or People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), was pivotal in
undermining the Medellin cartel’s hierarchy from the lowest to the highest levels, and
setting the stage for Escobar’s demise.51
In the wake o f Escobar’s death and the resulting chaos within the Medellin
organization, there were grave concerns that their counterparts in Cali would expand even
further without any major competitors. However, following the election of Ernesto
Samper in 1994, contributions to his campaign by the Cali cartel came to light, leading to
decertification by the United States twice during the mid-1990s.52 The Samper scandal
led to a subsequent crackdown on their operations as well, culminating in the
incarceration of the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in 1994.53 Despite this development,
there is evidence of a continuing though diminished presence of the cartel, and
50 Williams and Savona, 18-9.
51 Bowden, 175-200. Specific reference to the Cali cartel financing Los Pepes can be found in Bowden,
197. See also M&rquez, 231.
52 “Allies or enemies,” The Economist, 22 February 1997, 53; “Policy, which policy?” The Economist, 20
February 1999, 34; and Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 34-9. The potential impact o f
decertification by the U.S. on the Colombian domestic situation is considerable. In fact, by 1999 Colombia
had become the largest recipient o f U.S. foreign aid in the hemisphere and the third largest globally, after
Israel and Egypt. For more details o f these expenditures, see U.S. Department o f State, INL, “INL Country
Programs - Colombia” (Washington, DC: Department o f State, 23 April 1999), available at
http://www.state.gOv/g/inl/rls/fs/12603.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
53 Bowden, 269-72. However, allegations o f close cooperation between the Cali cartel and Marxists
guerrilla groups, including the sharing o f radio frequencies, can be found at least up to 1996, as discussed
in Villamarin Pulido, 11-7.
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allegations that its leaders still maintain control of a considerable share of their former
operations.54
However, the resultant power vacuum did not lead to a decline in Colombian drug
trafficking activity. As Winifred Tate notes, the two major cartels “have since been
replaced by smaller, more vertically integrated trafficking organizations whose nimble,
independent traffickers are more difficult to detect and infiltrate.”55 Echoing this
sentiment, Chepesiuk writes that Colombian TCOs continue “gliding smoothly into new
markets and concentrating on making the drug-trafficking business a truly multinational
enterprise.” Moreover, by combining an established smuggling network with expanding
poppy cultivation and heroin production, “The criminal entrepreneurs, who brilliantly
introduced the business concept of vertical integration into the international traffic in
cocaine, were about to do the same to the heroin trade.”56

54 See, for instance, “The mobsters rub each other out,” The Economist, 28 November 1998, 34-5.
55 Tate, 1.
56 Chepesiuk, 23. For a contrasting view o f Latin American drug trafficking with that found in other
regions, see also U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: U.S. Heroin Program Encounters Many Obstacles in Southeast
Asia,” GAO/NSAID-96-831 (Washington, DC: GPO, March 1996), 1. Specifically, this report notes that,
“Unlike most South American cocaine organizations, heroin trafficking organizations are not vertically
integrated and heroin shipments rarely remain under the control o f a single individual or organizations as
they move from refinery to the streets.”
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The map above illustrates the current spatial distribution of such activity
throughout the country. However, even before the displacement of the two major cartels,
57 Map source: U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, “The Drug Trade in Colombia: A Threat
Assessment,” DEA-02006 (Washington, DC: DEA, March 2002), available at
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/Dubs/inteE020Q6/index.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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product diversification away from a strict dependence on cocaine was already underway.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, with respect to heroin Latin America was considered
more a gateway to the U.S. market than an actual center of production. During this
period, a two-way trade in which Latin American cocaine found its way to European
markets in return for Southwest Asian heroin also emerged.58 According to the former
chief of the PNC, Roso Jose Serrano, the Cali cocaine cartel began to diversify into
opium cultivation during the early 1990s, using consultants from both Afghanistan and
Pakistan.59
As early as 1992, U.S. officials estimated that Colombia was producing as much
as four tons of heroin per year. Despite this relatively limited production, “The
availability of South American heroin, produced almost exclusively in Colombia, has
increased dramatically in the United States since 1993.”60 By 1996, there were an
estimated 2,100 hectares of opium poppies in Colombia, centered on the departments, or
provinces, of Cauca, Huila and Tolima, where the higher elevation and rugged terrain
both provide ideal growing conditions and hamper eradication efforts. However, because
three crops can be harvested per year, actual production figures were placed at 6,600
hectares.61 Furthermore, in 1997 Interpol reported that, “as predicted in 1996,” heroin

58 Lamour and Lamberti, 50-5, 57.
59 Jos6 Roso Serrano, Interview, “America’s New Heroin Epidemics: Along Comes A Horse,” MSNBC,
aired 7 January 2001. Chepesiuk also notes that experienced Golden Triangle heroin “cooks” were lent to
the Colombians for this endeavor as well. The quid pro quo behind the sharing o f such expertise was the
opportunity to observe the Latin American marketing and logistical operations, commonly considered
analogous to the “best practices” found in the legitimate business sectors. Chepesiuk, 23. See also Booth,
Opium, 324-5, for more on the learning curve in the transition from coca to opium cultivation.
60 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 41. This expansion in market share was largely due to a decreasing
availability o f Southeast Asian heroin.
61 Ibid, 48. Furthermore, as noted in Villamarin Pulido, 85, “Poppy production coincides with guerrilla
growth in rural economies, formerly characterized by small stable farmers in the Andean region. The
arrival o f the guerrilla and poppy plantations had been accompanied by a high degree o f violence, continual
agrarian conflicts and the rapid buying and selling o f land.” The author also points out that, as o f 1996,
insurgent activity has been found in 123 o f the 179 municipalities where poppies are grown. Moreover,
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from South America supplied more than just the North American market, with seizures of
shipments originating in the region having been made in Europe.

ft)

The competitive advantage of Latin American heroin is only partially a function
of effective smuggling methods adapted from the transnational movement o f cocaine. As
discussed in Chapter III, by volume heroin offers a considerably higher profit margin
than cocaine.

ft\

Moreover, poppy cultivation is also harder to locate, as the plant is not a

perennial like coca. In fact, according to U.S. officials, it was known that Colombian
drug traffickers were cultivating opium there years before evidence could be found.64
However, it should also be noted that opium cultivation throughout Latin America is
much less culturally embedded that that of coca.
Both purer and cheaper than its chief competitor in the U.S. market, Southeast
Asian heroin, Colombian heroin has been particularly impressive in terms of market
penetration.65 As one DEA report notes with respect to South American heroin, “High
purity was essential to establishing a clientele and maintaining user loyalty in the fiercely
competitive U.S. market. Consequently, Colombia-based traffickers smuggled heroin that
commonly ranged between 80 and 95 percent pure.” Furthermore, at these levels of
purity, it is possible to discard the traditional heroin paraphernalia involving the use of

underling the fact that this is not strictly a rural phenomenon, heroin processing reportedly continued,
“particularly in the urban areas o f many Departments throughout the country.” Interpol, “International
Drug Trafficking,” 1.
62 Ibid., 1.
63 According to Clawson and Lee, 17, while coca yields $4,000 per hectare, a crop o f opium poppies can
earn between $13,000 and $14,000. One reason for this price differential is that many farmers can readily
convert the raw opium to morphine base, which can in turn be used to produce heroin at a 1:1 weight ratio.
64 “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995,44.
65 Chepesiuk, 148. As discussed in the previous chapter, at present the bulk o f Southwest Asian heroin is
destined for European markets.
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the intravenous syringe in favor of either sniffing or smoking. As such, a larger needleaverse segment of the potential market could thus be reached more effectively.66
By early 2000, as the Latin American drug industry continued to diversify, the
cultivation of opium poppies had not only expanded within Colombia, partially in
response to a contraction of this activity in Peru’s mountainous northern region.67
Although as a whole the Andean countries supply less than 10% of the world opium
output, their share is rising and their product, being extra-pure, is especially attractive
even to markets beyond North America.68 As such, an earlier prediction by Flynn does
not seem nearly as far-fetched as it may have a decade ago, namely that, “The
Colombians almost certainly have the means to become the chief world heroin suppliers
of the 21st century.”69
Moreover, as mentioned above, the capabilities of the relevant TCOs also
continued to evolve as their product line expanded.70 For instance, in 1999 The
Economist noted that the times when Colombian drug smuggling “was dominated by the
Medellin and Cali cocaine mobs are long gone. Nowadays, the industry deals in heroin

66 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 42. Moreover, other street level marketing include offering first-time
buyers small quantities on credit, insisting that established cocaine distributors also purchase and sell
heroin, and undercutting competitor’s prices.
67 Decreased Peruvian drug cultivation in recent years is largely due to the chain o f radar sites known as Air
Bridge Denial, preventing small planes from crossing into Colombia and southwestern Brazil. However, as
a result Peruvian traffickers have been actively seeking out alternatives, such a greater use o f sea routes.
OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 10.
68 “A crop that refuses to die,” The Economist (web site), 4 March 2000. Moreover, some observers also
note that Colombian guerrillas have begun poppy cultivation activity across the border in Venezuela and
possible Ecuador. Villamarin Pulido, 6.
9 Flynn, “Worldwide Drugs,” 29. As o f the late 1990s, there were few domestic reports o f heroin use
within Colombia. However, in time Colombian opium poppy cultivation and heroin production has the
potential to stimulate local heroin abuse. UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 263.
0 For example, beyond the purview o f the drug trade, the U.S. Secret Service estimates that roughly a third
o f the counterfeit dollars distributed in the country over the past several years has originated in Colombia,
facilitated by trafficking networks and lax law enforcement. Incidentally, as the global currency o f choice,
American dollars are the most commonly counterfeited in the world. U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 24. See also Fialka, 138.
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as well as cocaine, and has fragmented into hundreds of small, anonymous organizations.
And it is even more productive than ever.”

71

This view was contemporaneously echoed

in an official U.S. assessment, which noted that despite the setbacks suffered by the
cartels, “Colombian traffickers not only continue to meet most of the world’s cocaine
demand, but have become the largest supplier of heroin to the United States.”72
In addition to the characteristics already outlined, the successors to the two major
cartels are increasingly more tactically and technically proficient, both by inclination and
from necessity. They are smaller and more discreet, exhibiting less conspicuous
consumption but more equitable profit sharing, and largely rejecting the extravagant
n 'i

lifestyles and overt violence of their predecessors.

While still endowed with greater

expertise, more capital and better overseas networks than emerging rivals, “This new
generation of Colombian trafficking groups maintains lower profiles, focuses on limited
aspects of the drug trade, and forms more ad hoc alliances that make them more difficult
law enforcement targets.”74 Finally, being much more highly specialized and difficult to
infiltrate, they are also much more elusive.75
In particular, an overarching and well-developed command, control,
communications, computer and intelligence capability, known as C4I in military
parlance, on the part of Colombian TCOs is becoming a prominent hallmark of their
organizational sophistication. For instance, according to the DEA, Colombian drug
71 “Colombia: A new class o f drug trafficker,” The Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
72 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 42.
73 See Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 2; and “Colombia: A new class o f drug trafficker,” The
Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
74 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 42.
75 As The Economist notes, “Today’s traffickers are also much harder to catch. The police reckon they are
mostly aged 25 to 40, have no criminal records and work through legitimate small businesses. Estimates o f
the number o f trafficking organizations range from 80 to 250. Increasingly, they act as coordinators,
contracting out everything from manufacturing to transport to specialist groups.” “Colombia: A new class
o f drug trafficker,” The Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
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wholesaling and money laundering networks are comprised of multiple organizational
cells that maintain meticulous records and use the most advanced commercially available
technology including personal computers, pagers and fax machines.76
Furthermore, many drug trafficking groups have demonstrated an active interest
in acquiring increasingly sophisticated technology, particularly with respect to secure
communications equipment. Additional security measures utilized by trafficking
organizations include the use of a wide array of counter-surveillance techniques, while
disinformation efforts include the witting use of suspected telephones and the staging of
fake drug transactions to thwart law enforcement efforts.77
Moving from the issue of strictly economically-motivated organizations to more
politically-motivated ones, involvement in the drug business as well as with other
criminal activity finances, supplies and gives military strength to non-state actors across
the ideological spectrum. Given the fragmented nature of Colombia’s political
geography, the ability to leverage these resources on an ongoing basis effectively puts
such groups on a near-equal footing with the legitimate central government, barring
external support.
Furthermore, in addition to independently funding their activities, both guerrilla
and paramilitary commanders are able to solidify a local primacy within their areas of
operation by inserting themselves, by force when necessary, into the illegal economy that
is the primary source of income for many rural populations.78 As Thoumi notes:

76 Other illicit communications techniques include the limited-time use o f cloned cellular telephones and
stolen calling cards. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), ix.
77 Even earlier, Escobar was reported to be intensely interested in such technological developments, both as
assets and as threats to his operations. Marquez, 198-9.
78 For instance, within their areas o f operation both the leftist guerrilla and rightist paramilitary forces
“support a widespread illegal economy or illicit activity that is the primary source o f income for the local
population.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 6. Bentham,
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Many coca and poppy growers in Colombia are peasants displaced by political
and criminal violence. They have settled individually difficult-to-access lands
and their lives have been marked by violence. In contrast with Bolivia and Peru,
armed peasants settled in coca and poppy growing areas in Colombia. Illicit crop
regions in Colombia have been very violent and neither state nor civil society
could provide peaceful conflict resolution systems.79
Moreover, even when the local populace would rather not be involved in the drug trade,
economics and the stark realities of power favor few other options.
In some respects, this state of affairs represents an alternate form of plomo o plata
directed primarily toward the non-urban Colombian countryside. At present, on the left
the Marxist-oriented guerrillas of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the smaller Ejercito de
Liberacion Nacional (ELN, or National Liberation Army) continue their brutal struggle
against the central government, a conflict marked by atrocities on both sides.

on

Simultaneously, on the right, bands of paramilitary vigilantes or autodefensas,
mostly organized under the umbrella organization of the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia (AUC, or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), ostensibly wage their own
covert and semi-sanctioned campaign against the guerrillas despite repeated charges of
self-enrichment and human rights violations. A number of these groups have also been

9-10, also notes the lack o f viable economic alternatives for rural populations. A geographical overview o f
the regions o f Colombia most affected by this phenomenon can be found in Villamarin Pulido, 173-8. For
more on the coercion o f rural populations to cultivate illegal drug crops, see also UNDCP, World Drug
Report, 128.
79 Thoumi, 68-9.
80 For more general background on the FARC’s development, see George H. Franco, “Their Darkest Hour:
Colombia’s Government and the Narco-Insurgency,” Parameters XXX (Summer 2000), 83-93;
Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 34-9; and “Colombia’s other gangsters,” The Economist, 25
March 1995,48. In particular, Guillermoprieto’s first-hand account o f meetings with the FARC leadership,
beginning in 1986, offers copious details regarding the personalities o f these individuals. Incidentally, an
interesting internal organizational feature o f the FARC is that an estimated 30% o f its guerrilla troops are
female, while a significant proportion are also minors, both voluntary and coerced. Guillermoprieto, “The
Children’s War,” 37-40.
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linked to elements of the Colombian security forces, particularly with respect to
combating the common adversaries, the leftist guerrilla groups.
At the international level, during the 1980s the popular notion of traffickerguerrilla cooperation held considerable sway within U.S. foreign policy circles, however
questionable some of the assumptions regarding the convergence of interests between the
two types o f groups might have been.81 The notion certainly found receptive audiences
in Washington, still in the grasp of the prevailing East-West conceptualization of the
Cold War, and with Latin American governments that found it expedient to publicly and
politically link its primary enemies.
As with many distortions or oversimplifications, it is the grain of truth involved
that is most problematic. While guerrillas and drug traffickers may not be natural
partners, during the period in question cooperation against various government forces in a
pragmatic and cynically symbiotic manner was a logical response to their mutual threat.82
Rhetoric aside, the complex interaction between these two types of non-state actors is a
phenomenon that defies simplistic monocausal analysis.
The current wave of sustained political instability in Colombia began during the
Gaviria administration in the early 1990s, when economic reforms led to an increased

81 Characteristic o f analyses predicated upon this assumption, albeit in the latter stages o f its intellectual
evolution, is Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andes
States and Panama, Washington Papers No. 137 (New York: Praeger, 1989). By contrast, though writing
at the same time, Renselaer W. Lee III, The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 13, characterizes the overall relationship as more hostile than
cooperative, a stance largely out o f step with the prevailing conventional wisdom but more justified in
hindsight. At the other end o f this spectrum are the views o f Villmarin, whose primary thesis is that the
FARC was involved at all levels o f production and trafficking to the extent that they became “the third and
most dangerous o f the drug cartels in Colombia.” Villamarin Pulido, 17-9.
82 Clawson and Lee, 178-9.
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prosperity that was not distributed evenly.83 This state of affairs was most keenly felt
throughout the more remote regions along the Putamayo and Guaviare river basins in
southern and eastern Colombia, and in the north along both the Panamanian and
Venezuelan borders. Also during this period, however, a new constitution provided for
the reintegration of some leftist insurgent elements into civil society.84
Beginning with the largest of the active guerrilla organizations, the FARC, the
genesis of this movement can be found in the period of La Violertcia lasting from 1948 to
1954. It emerged in 1966 as the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party, one of
a number of groups receiving extensive Cuban backing. As George H. Franco notes:
Rhetorically, the objectives of the FARC have remained largely unchanged
throughout its existence. The group seeks to overthrow the ruling order in
Colombia and to drive out what it perceives to be the imperialist influences of the
United States in Latin America. FARC still publicly clings to its Marxist-Leninist
platform of massive redistribution of land and wealth, state control of natural
resources, and large-scale government spending on social welfare. Additionally,
the group’s predilection for attacking economic targets has placed it squarely at
odds with both domestic and international business interests.
However, ideological trappings aside, the author also points out that the FARC’s success
in recent years “stems from the crafting of a new and largely apolitical motive of selfinterest that has connected with several dissimilar groups.” This partnership of
83 For an enlightening overview o f this period, as well as o f the preceding Barco administration, see Harvey
F. Kline, State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994 (Tuscaloosa: University o f
Alabama Press, 1999).
84 This opportunity was grasped by both M-19 and the Ejercito de Liber acion Popular (ELP, or People’s
Liberation Army), though by neither the FARC nor the ELN. Incidentally, the FARC briefly had its own
political party, the Union Patriotica, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and enjoyed some success in
the mayoral elections o f 1988, though thirteen o f its successful candidates were subsequently assassinated.
By 1992, the legitimate wing o f the FARC was no more. With respect to M-19, Villamarin Pulido, 30-3,
reports that it was the first guerrilla group to enter into a mutually beneficial undertaking with drug
traffickers in October 1981. This interaction appears to have initially arisen as drug traffickers and
guerrillas cooperated to move weapons into Colombia. Moreover, before renouncing violence and joining
the mainstream political process, in November 1995 M-19 commandos took over the Colombian Supreme
Court building in Bogota, an operation that left forty rebels and fifty civilians dead, among the latter eleven
o f twenty-four justices. In addition to crippling the legal system, over six thousand criminal case files were
also destroyed, including those pertaining to Pablo Escobar. It was later alleged that the guerrillas had been
paid approximately a million dollars by Escobar to carry out this raid. Bowden, 53.
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convenience includes migrant and landowning drug cultivators, trafficking organizations,
and, increasingly, disaffected individuals in urban areas.85
Even earlier, the loss of funding from Soviet, Cuban and other Communist
sources has led leftist Colombian insurgent and extremist groups to find alternate sources
of income, primarily through various illegal activities as noted in previous chapters.86
The success of these criminal ventures has in turn led to speculation as to whether or not
these groups are more interested in maintaining the current anarchical status quo and the
associated opportunities for profit than actually seizing power.
In particular, both the FARC and ELN have became deeply involved in both drug
trafficking and kidnapping, as these activities tend to be more lucrative than other
available options such as bank robbery.87 Moreover, the ELN has also developed its own
niche extorting money from oil companies by threatening their infrastructure.88 As
Franco writes, “These economic activities have become so dominant and lucrative that
they are now seen as an end in themselves.”89
With respect to the power vacuum left by the collapse of the major cartels in the
mid-1990s, the various Marxist guerrilla groups moved into the void as protectors of both
85 Franco, 83-4. Noting the same divergence between Marxist theory and profit-seeking practice,
Villamarin Pulido, 144-5, traces the rapid conversion o f the FARC into a major drug trafficking
organization to the August 1990 death o f the organization’s intellectual leader, Jacobo Arenas, and the
subsequent shift in priorities. A skilled though vicious propagandist, Arenas was allegedly opposed to
having the capitalist aspects o f the drug trade taint the movement.
86 This phenomenon is not linked specifically to Colombia, though the country does in fact offer a
singularly salient example. See Michael K. Steinberg, “Generals, Guerrillas, Drugs, and Third World WarMaking,” The Geographical Review 90, no. 2 (April 2000), 260-70.
87 Auerbach, 25. The author also notes the impact o f “double displacement,” with the crackdown on the
drug trade causing layoffs among members o f this criminal class, who then turn their skills and resources to
other illegal activities.
88 For instance, between 1985 and 2000, the ELN bombed Colombia’s main pipeline approximately 700
times, spilling 1.7 million barrels o f oil and causing serious environmental damage. Pardo, 66. See also
“BP at war,” The Economist, 19 July 1997, 32-3.
89 Franco, 84. Going even further, with respect to the Marxist-Leninist dictum that the end justify the
means, Villamarin Pulido, 94, notes that for the FARC in particular, the urge to increase drug profits has
overcome ideology to the extent that the means have become the end.
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poppy and coca growers, in exchange for a 10 percent tax on traffickers operating in their
territory. Furthermore, insurgents have also been known to guard drug-processing labs
for a fee, and even run their own labs and distribution operations in more remote parts of
i

the country.

90

Some analysts estimate that FARC earns nearly half of its total revenues from
taxing the drug trade, with the remainder coming from kidnapping, robbery and other
criminal activity.91 To return once more to Franco, the FARC’s connections with the
largely apolitical drug cultivators and with the often right-wing trafficking organizations
“provided it with the means to contest the state for power. By facilitating an environment
for drug activities, FARC was able to mobilize resources on an unprecedented scale.”
[author’s italics] 92
In addition to the involvement of leftist insurgencies such as the FARC in the
drug trade, right wing paramilitary organizations, or autodefensas, have also been linked
to numerous types of criminal enterprises.93 These groups initially arose in response to
various political and social pressures in Colombia during the past several decades under
the auspices of powerful forces whose interests were being jeopardized. Though not

90 Chepesiuk, 233. See also U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch.
II, 6. As discussed in Villamarin Pulido, 21-6, initially this cooperation was more favorable from the
traffickers’ perspective, as the guerrillas have gained more knowledge o f and contacts within the drug
business their partners have become more expendable. Moreover, a parallel situation can be found across
the border in Peru beginning in the late ‘80s in the activity o f the Maoist-oriented guerrilla organization
Sendero Luminoso (SL or Shining Path). This issue, as well as that o f transnational Colombian
involvement with these groups, is discussed in the following section.
91 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 40.
92 Franco, 86. The author also cites sources within the Colombian National Police that the FARC has
reportedly exchanged drugs directly for both money and weapons from Chechen, Russian, Ukrainian and
Uzbek TCOs, used similar methods to obtain arms from the Middle East and Central America.
93 Ibid., 86. In particular, the author notes those led by the Castaflo and Carranza families as being directly
involved in criminal activity. See also “Drugs, war and democracy: A survey o f Colombia,” The
Economist, 21 April 2001, 3; “Colombia’s drug-bedevilled hopes o f peace,” The Economist, 3 October
1998,39; Tate, 1; and Guillermoprieto, “The Children’s War,” 40. Several members o f the Castaflo family
were also allegedly linked to Los Pepes, as discussed above. Bowden, 197.
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exclusively a rural phenomenon, for the most part their genesis was precipitated by
ongoing leftist guerrilla activity.94
For instance, beginning in the early 1980s, there was the “drastic miscalculation”
on the part of the guerillas to start targeting relatives of drug traffickers for abduction. To
counter this threat, the traffickers created and financed the organization Muerte a los
Seuestadores, or “Death to the Kidnappers,” which began working with the military to
strike back at the guerrillas and anyone suspected of supporting them. This organization
in turn is seen as laying the groundwork for the emergence of the rightist paramilitary
groups. 95
In their present incarnation, led by the AUC, paramilitary organizations appear to
be increasingly involved in drug trafficking. The leader of one major organization has
stated publicly that 70% of his budget came from such sources.96 While the FARC
remains predominant throughout the south and west, in the northwestern part of the
county and in particular along the border region adjoining Panama the autodefensas hold
sway. As The Economist noted in 1998, “The northwest is a traditional hub of the drugs
trade; it contains smaller but important areas of coca cultivation, and its heroin trade is

94 Bowden notes that, for decades, wealthy landowners in the central Magdalena Valley, which the FARC
used as a stronghold, had employed private armies to protect their property and terrorize peasants who
expressed support for the guerrillas. However, by the mid-1980s, the largest landowners in the region were
the leaders o f the Medellin cartel, who had both the resources and the ruthlessness necessary to go after the
rebels with more aggressiveness than the Colombian Army ever had. As such, they both funded and
equipped various paramilitary organizations and facilitated links to the national security forces. Bowden,
33. However, the author also notes that, even as Escobar and his cohorts were assisting the government
against the rebels in that region, elsewhere other members o f the cartel were collaborating to various
degrees with the FARC, ELN and M-19. Bowden, 43
95 The catalyst for this was the 1981 kidnapping o f Martha Nieves Ochoa, sister o f two o f Pablo Escobar’s
closest associates, by the M-19 guerrilla group, as discussed in Villamarin Pulido, 93-4; and Bowden, 33.
Furthermore, Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 37-8, also relates the story o f another
kidnapping by guerrillas in 1981, that o f Fidel Castafto, a minor drug trafficker and the father o f Carlos
Castaflo, currently the prime mover behind the AUC. For more on the revenge kidnapping o f kidnapper’s
relatives, see also Auerbach, 359-62.
96 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 41.
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said to be the lifeblood of the paramilitaries that dominate the region. Most of the
country’s drugs exports, and its arms imports, pass through the area.”97
At times, some observers have claimed to discern a disparity in U.S. policy
toward Colombia in that, despite a public recognition of the extent of the drug trade
throughout the country, much more pressure is exerted on the Colombian central
government to crack down on the FARC-controlled areas. However, former U.S.
Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera stated in January 2000 that, “Everybody in the drug
business - guerrillas, autodefensas, or drug traffickers - will be the focus of these
•

OR

operations.”

In June 2000, an initiative negotiated between the Clinton administration

and that of Andres Pastana appeared set to become the most concrete and ambitious
bilateral effort to date to address this nexus of issues.
Known originally as Plan Colombia, this effort called for $7.5 billion in aid both
to fight the drug trade and support Colombian peace efforts, including $1.3 billion in
military aid. It represented the largest strategic U.S. commitment in Latin America since
its involvement in the Central American insurgencies in the 1980s. A central aim was to
sever the link between drug money and guerrilla activity, in particular by targeting drug
cultivation through the spraying of herbicides, in a sense striking at the lowest level of
drug trade.99 As such, its focus appeared to be on the upstream end of the drug trade,

97 “Colombia’s drug-bedevilled hopes o f peace,” The Economist, 3 October 1998, 39. See also “War
crime,” The Economist, 11 May 2002, 35, which notes the use by both the AUC and the FACR o f the
Atrato River valley as a smuggling corridor to export drugs and import cocaine.
98 Quoted in Guillermoprieto, “Our New War in Colombia,” 39. Beyond the rhetorical, evidence o f the
U.S. commitment to target all extra-legal actors engaged in the drug trade regardless o f ideology can be
seen in the September 2002 indictment o f AUC leader Carlos Canstafio and subsequent request for
extradition. See “Castafio’s gamble,” The Economist, 28 September 2002, 36; and “An olive branch o f
sorts,” The Economist, 7 December 2002, 38.
99 Domestic Colombian perspectives on the genesis o f Plan Colombia are discussed in Guillermoprieto,
“Colombia: Violence Without End?" 31-40. More broadly, the evolution o f this initiative over time can be
seen in the following series o f articles: “Putamayo’s tense wait for the arrival o f Plan Colombia,” The
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rather than the seizure o f drugs in transit as has been the norm for the past several
decades.
One factor complicating the potential impact of Plan Colombia was Pastrana’s
December 1998 decision to give the FARC its own “demilitarized” zone of 16,216 square
miles in south central Colombia as an incentive to negotiate. This was seen by many as
exacerbating the problem by giving the rebels their own base of operation in which to
consolidate and expand their already considerable influence. In addition to providing a
safe haven for guerrilla activity, the drug trade was also able to become both more open
and even further entrenched within this area.100 For a range of reasons, the Pastrana
government “remilitarized” this area in late February 2002.101 However, as of this
writing, its successor, the Uribe administration, though taking a harder line toward the
FARC, is still grappling with the legacy of these previous concessions.
A particularly interesting feature of Plan Colombia is the official U.S. position
that the initiative aims strictly at the drug trade and not wider guerrilla activity, when in

Economist, 19 August 2000, 29-30; “The gringos land in Colombia,” The Economist, 2 September 2000,
32-3; “A hug in the Colombian jungle,” The Economist, 17 February 2001; and “Into battle,” The
Economist, 8 September 2001. Incidentally, this initiative also envisions a forward operating location in
Ecuador, consisting o f radar sites and an air base, as well three other interdiction facilities actually within
Colombia territory. Roos, 43-4.
100 See “Fighting over drugs,” The Economist, 8 July 2000, 34. In some respects, as noted in Franco, 88,
Pastrana’s dealings with the FARC can be seen as an extension o f the preceding administration, Ernesto
Samper’s, policy o f “peace at any cost.” Furthermore, at present it is unlikely that a similar demilitarized
zone o f 1,550 square miles proposed for the ELN will become a reality, as discussed in “Haven sent,” The
Economist, 7 April 2001, 38.
101 The immediate impetus behind the decision was the kidnapping o f senator and dark-horse presidential
candidate Ingrid Betancourt, though the opinions o f both the military and the general public also supported
this move. See “A call to arms,” The Economist, 2 March 2002, 36-7. For more on the context o f this
situation, see also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 142-7.
102 In addition to an avowed ideological stance against the FARC, the guerrilla group not only tried to
assassinate Uribe in April 2002 but was also previously responsible for killing his father in 1983 during a
kidnapping attempt. The progression o f the Uribe administration’s policies against the FARC can be seen
in “State o f commotion,” The Economist, 17 August 2002; “Calling up reinforcements,” The Economist, 21
September 2002, 37; and “More order and less law,” The Economist, 9 November 2002, 37-8. The
FARC’s efforts to recreate their enclave on a larger scale is discussed in “Rebel mini-state,” The
Economist, 15 June 2002, 38.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

290

fact the two are largely intertwined. For instance, with respect to direct military aid to the
Colombian armed forces, the guidelines of using these resources solely to fight drug
trafficking is not reasonable in practice. In fact, concerns over the militarization of this
issue led to Plan Colombia being rechristened as the Andean Regional Initiative, with
money split between law enforcement and development efforts, as well as spread to
•

involve Colombia’s neighbors as well.

1m

«

Furthermore, since 9/11 there have been

various attempts to link such funding to the wider “war on terror.”104
Finally, turning to human geography, a key issue with inherent physical,
economic and political dimensions is the transnational spatial disposition of indigenous
ethnic groups, whose identities are increasingly extending beyond strict national
boundaries. This phenomenon can be found not only in Colombia, but also throughout
Latin America in general. However, in contrast with both Peru and Bolivia, Colombia is
predominantly a mestizo country that has largely assimilated indigenous groups and
institutions.105

103 Though as o f this writing the final budget has not been approved, the revised plan calls for a significant
budget request to cover “not just Colombia, but Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, as a
geographic area.” Moreover, it is balanced so that Colombia does not have the 85 percent funding that it
had under Plan Colombia, but rather a roughly 50/50 split between Colombia and the others. Beers and
Brown, “2000 Narcotics Certification Determinations” (1 March 2001). See also “The struggle to
eliminate a much-loved Andean shrub,” The Economist, 26 May 2001, 35-6. However, to effectively
augment these proposed measures, there also exists a pressing need for trade incentives that will open up
U.S. markets to legal Colombian goods, paralleling those that granted access to Central American products
following the wars in that region during the 1980s. See Pardo, 73.
104 See, for instance, “Staying alive,” The Economist, 25 May 2002, 37. A broad analysis o f this issue since
the events o f 9/11 can also be found in John A. Cope, “Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy,”
Strategic Forum no. 194 (October 2002), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF 194/sfl 94.htm.
accessed 15 July 2004. However, an even earlier indication o f the realization that drug trafficking and
guerrilla activity have become increasingly interconnected is that, prior to 1998, U.S. military aid to
Colombia was listed as “Category 4,” denoting operations not involving hostilities. The 1998 aid package
was the first to be upgraded and put through as “Category 2,” for military operations just short o f war. See
“Policy, which policy?” The Economist, 20 February 1999, 34.
105 See Thoumi, 84. The author also posits that the existence o f significant indigenous communities in Peru
and Bolivia may have encouraged discriminatory and racist attitudes, but also bolstered social controls on
individual behavior. However, “Colombia, on the other hand, is and extreme individualistic society in
which many people simply do not care about the effect o f their actions on anybody else.”
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By their nature, cross-border kinship ties not only serve to facilitate migration, but
potentially a wide range of unofficial transactions as well.106 As Donna Lee Van Cott
notes:
After independence, the new states remained centralized, with the majority of the
government apparatus located in the capital city and some important provincial
commercial centers. By this time, the majority of the indigenous population had
fled or been forced into the more remote areas of the country: the unexplored
jungles, the highest mountain ranges, and along the blurry borders between the
emerging nations. The borderlands were particularly desirable destinations, as
they represented the furthest distance between the centralized power of the state
and thus the weakest zone of power.107
Furthermore, left with few other viable economic options, a high proportion of drug
cultivators are members of indigenous ethnic groups. As such, indigenous peoples in
relatively anarchical areas of Colombia who are forced to coexist in complex and often
uneasy relationships with drug traffickers, guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups
and official security forces in the relatively anarchical parts of the country.108
Finally, there is the more pervasive dilemma of displaced persons throughout the
country, in the context of both internal and external migration. With respect to the

106 As Kearney and Varese observe, “In many Latin American countries indigenous groups span national
borders. This transnational, transborder, transstate character o f Native American ethnic groups is rooted in
colonial territorial partitions and their post colonial confirmation . . . The transnationalism o f numerous
indigenous peoples is also accentuated by their migration across national boundaries.” Kearney and
Varese, 217. See also Donna Lee Van Cott, “Defiant Again: Indigenous Peoples and Latin American
Security,” McNair Paper no. 53, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
(Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996), 1-6.
107 Ibid., 8. In the case o f Colombia, while the majority o f Colombians are o f mixed descent, roughly half a
million indigenous citizens are concentrated in the southwest and the Amazon basin. They comprise
roughly 81 distinct ethnic groups speaking 64 separate languages.
108 Ibid., 13-28. O f particular interest in illustrating these complexities vis-a-vis the central government, the
author notes the following: “While the majority o f guerrilla insurgencies in Latin America are class-based,
nonindigenous movements, there are several instances o f Indian-led guerrilla movements and others where
the leadership and ethnic orientation is murky. The most clear-cut case o f an Indian armed movement is
the Quintin Lame, formed in 1981 by Indians in the Cauca region o f southwestern Colombia to defend
indigenous communities from attacks by guerrillas, drug traffickers, local landowners, and state security
forces . . . While the Colombian government considered the group to be no different than the country’s
other insurgencies, the Quintin Lame was a local self-defense movement with no national political or
military aspirations.” In May 1991, the group put down its weapons and became a legal political
organization.
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former, there has been a longstanding and ongoing demographic shift from rural to urban
areas. At least part of this trend may be attributed to the chaos and lawlessness that is
endemic to much of the Colombian countryside, as discussed throughout this section.
However, in some cases the displacement of people back toward more remote areas in
some cases has partially offset earlier movements to shanty-towns and slums.109
Similarly, with respect to external migration, over the past several years 1.5
million Colombians have been displaced from their country. In 2000, 366,000
Colombians applied for non-immigrant visas to the U.S., more than double the number
for 1997. In recent years, as a national category they are second only to the Chinese in
terms of numbers of political asylum seekers.110 While by no means is more than a small
group directly involved in any kind of illegal enterprises, as discussed in Chapter II, the
mere presence of an extensive expatriate community is pivotal for the expansion of
ethnically-based TCOs.111
As a result of the many economic, political and security-related pressures on the
social fabric of the nation, “Colombia is considered to have one of the largest refugee
problems anywhere outside of Africa.”

11 9

As in the case of Afghanistan, a large and

growing pool of often desperate potential “legs” to facilitate the transnational movement

109 Bentham, 11.
110 Interestingly, the United States announced in 2001 that anyone having ever paid a vacuha, or protection
money to potential kidnappers, would be ineligible for political asylum on the grounds o f supporting a
terrorist organization. “Miami nice,” The Economist, 5 May 2001, 26. This article also notes that Miami
itself, perhaps the most important commercial hub in the greater Caribbean basin, is now home to 130,000
Colombians, demographically the second largest group after Cubans.
111 For more on this phenomenon, see Bovenkerk, 120-1.
112 Franco, 87. See also Thoumi, 86; and Kearney and Varese, 218, which discusses the economic
pressures on rural inhabitants to move to urban areas. It is also noted in “When is a refugee not a refugee?”
The Economist, 3 March 2001, 23-6, that Colombia ranks second only to Sudan in number o f internally
displaced people, with between 2 and 3 million.
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of contraband is an asset that drug trafficking organizations have effectively leveraged
whenever possible.
In general, continuing civil unrest in Colombia compounded by the ongoing
activities of both drug trafficking and guerrilla organizations provides for a highly
favorable smugglers’ landscape in the country for the foreseeable future. However, as
Thoumi notes, “Despite the frightening violent death rates and other social ills that
Colombia has suffered in the past 25 years, it is not wise to look at Colombia as an
aberration. Instead, it should be viewed as a precursor of problems that can arise in any
society that experiences drastic social change.”113
In conjunction with the more established cocaine trade, heroin and its attendant
profits will continue to provide the necessary incentives to keep improving existing
smuggling routes and methods and to move onward toward new business opportunities.
At present, the already immense global reach of Colombian trafficking organizations is
poised to become even longer as these trends accelerate. The next section focuses on
both the transnational activities that this reach entails, with a particular emphasis on the
most pivotal set of heroin smuggling vectors leading to markets in North America.

Smuggling Vectors Out o f Colombia: All Roads North
Paralleling the case of Afghanistan, heroin moving outward across Colombia’s
borders and into the wider hemispheric region can be represented by corresponding
smuggling vectors radiating outward like the spokes of a wheel, in accordance with
smugglers’ perception of access, risk and connectivity. As discussed above, much of this
analysis will by necessity revolve around the parallel issue of the cocaine trade, as in
113 Thoumi, 92.
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many cases trafficking in both types of drugs is inextricably linked if not actually shipped
together. The map below serves to illustrate some of the more salient spatial trends that
have developed over the past several years:

■

Mex i c o

m

*c«a Colombia

Fig. 19. Central and South American heroin flows114

Over the past several decades, Colombian TCOs have dominated the transnational
logistics of the black market for drugs throughout the greater Caribbean basin, especially
with respect to linking South American suppliers to North American and, increasingly,
other markets. However, as discussed in Chapter III, in some respects it is the demand

114 Map source: U.S. CIA, CNC, “Heroin Movement Worldwide.”
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side of this equation that provides much of the impetus to exploit all available roads
north.
The innermost of the concentric rings through which transnational heroin
smuggling vectors originating in Colombia must pass includes Ecuador, Peru, Brazil,
Venezuela and Panama by land, with direct access to the sea available along both the
Caribbean and Pacific coasts. Further out, the isthmus of Panama forms the first step in
along the land bridge that leads through Central America and Mexico to the U.S. border,
while the many islands throughout the Caribbean have also traditionally played an
important role in drug transit. International air connections in some ways leapfrog the
other two modes, and will be addressed primarily in the context of their entry into the
United States. Finally, as all of these vectors close in on their final destination, the last
obstacles remain the border controls of their respective consuming countries.
Despite the lucrative profits involved, smuggling drugs through this region will
always be a complex endeavor involving a limitless number of iterations against as many
obstacles as the U.S. and other governments are able to impose. As Tate points out, in
order to maintain their primacy in this trade, Colombian TCOs “employ new and
constantly changing shipping routes through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean
for moving cocaine and, increasingly, heroin.”115
While these organizations have already established a considerable degree of
access to key production areas and markets, and demonstrated the capability to
compensate for the risks inherent to the practice, in order to maintain this primacy
constant innovation and vigilance are necessary. This is true not only with respect to the
law enforcement efforts of nation-states but also to potential loss of market share to
115 Tate, 1.
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competing groups. However, even as smuggling routes and methods continue to evolve
over time, the corresponding parameters of route selection on the part of Colombian
TCOs remains constrained by geography.
From the U.S. point of view, the transit zone through which such contraband must
travel is defined as “the 2-million square mile area between the U.S. and South American
borders and covers the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, Mexico, and
the Eastern Pacific.”116 Furthermore, within the U.S. strategic conceptualization this area
not only delineates the outer perimeter that is actively guarded by military means, but
also the arena in which the bulk of drug interdiction operations take place.
As discussed more generically in Chapter II, the principal agencies charged with
national border control are customs services. In the United States, the USCS in fact has a
drug control strategy built into its overall Strategic Plan.117 However, in November 1993
a presidential directive called for a gradual shift in the focus of U.S. drug efforts from the
transit zone to source countries further upstream, in theory taking the struggle to the
enemy but in practice leaving vital avenues of approach less protected.
Moreover, other types of missions have also taken precedence in the competition
for limited interdiction resources. An example of this can be found in the early 1990s,
when the U.S. Coast Guard reallocated assets from counter-drug missions in response to
mass exoduses from both Haiti and Cuba, though in 1995 a formal reemphasis on
116 The definition is laid out in detail in U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations on U.S. Interdiction in the
Caribbean,” GAO/T-NSIAD-96-171, Statement by Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, to the House o f
Representatives, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs and Criminal Justice (19 September 1996), 1.
117 For instance, see U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 13-4. As
discussed in Chapter II, in addition to other more massive efforts on the part o f the U.S. such as Plan
Colombia aimed directly at source countries, a number o f Customs programs such as the ACIS also target
drug smuggling via commercial cargo and similar conveyances. Under the auspices o f this particular
program, Colombia is in fact a major focus o f such attention, along with Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela,
Panama, Costa Rica and Mexico.
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interdiction activity was announced.118 As a similar shift in priorities can also be seen in
the wake of 9/11, when border control resources were refocused to address potential
terrorist threats and the possibility of covertly introducing a weapon of mass destruction
into United States territory.119 With land, water and air routes, as well as various
combinations thereof, offering innumerable potential smuggling routes, the challenge
posed by this activity and the potential range of contraband involved is truly daunting.
To begin with Ecuador, there have been many documented instances where that
country has been used as a conduit for Colombia heroin smuggling vectors into the U.S.
One important reason for this is that, in general, less scrutiny is given to travelers and
goods departing from there than from Colombia, thus making it a more desirable transit
country. Ecuador borders Colombia to the north, as well as Peru to the east and south,
and as such offers vast potential access to both poppy and coca cultivation areas.
As evidence of the porosity of the border between Ecuador and Colombia in
particular, kidnappings undertaken primarily by Colombian guerrillas and facilitated by
local bandits have been reported in this region.120 Furthermore, a reverse in the flow of
illicit trade from that in drugs can be found between the Ecuadorian provinces bordering
both Colombia and Peru, namely Esmeraldas and El Carche in the north and Loja and El
Oro in the south, with respect to gasoline and diesel fuel. Although a relatively recent
phenomenon, the quadruple cross-border price differential has been too lucrative for

118 See U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations,” 3; and Bill Stump, “Back to the War on Drugs,” Navy
Times (6 March 1995), 24.
119 Robert Pear and Philip Shenon, “Customs Switches Priority From Drugs to Terrorism,” New York
Times, 10 October 2001, B -l 1.
120 Auerbach, 71-2. However, the author also notes that while tourists have been kidnapped elsewhere in
Ecuador, such occurrences are more often in protest o f alleged ecological damage or government policies
than for profit.
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smugglers to ignore, and has in turn led Ecuador to militarize its gas stations along the
border in April 2000 to prevent the these resources leaving the country.121
With respect to sea modes of smuggling, one U.S. government report notes that,
“Ecuador’s harbors and seaports have become more important as Colombian traffickers
make greater use of eastern Pacific maritime routes.”122 As for air travel, the relative lack
of scrutiny, particularly prior to 9/11, has provided incentives compelling enough that
couriers have traveled overland from Colombian territory to Quito, Ecuador, and then
taken international flights from there. In other cases, couriers have begun in the U.S. and
brought in heroin on the return leg of the trip.

10'!

Finally, the role of Ecuador in

laundering the proceeds of drug smuggling is coming under increasing scrutiny, a
situation facilitated by the absence of controls on the amount of currency that can be
brought either in or out of the county.124
Turning to Peru, there are two important issues that relate directly to this analysis.
The first is the combination of rural insurgency and large-scale production of both coca
and opium poppies, that in many ways parallels the activities of the FARC in Colombia,
as noted in the previous section. The second is the fact that, in terms of transnational
smuggling vectors, Colombian TCOs have managed to maintain control of many of the
upstream aspects of drug production and distribution in Peru. There is evidence,
however, that Peruvian coca and poppy growers are seeking to circumvent the existing
121 Juan Pablo Toro, “Ecuador Militarized Border Service Stations to Control Smuggling,” The Oil Daily
50, no. 80 (26 April 2000), Item 0 211600C.
122 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 41.
123 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 49.
124 “Although Ecuador is not considered an important financial center, it is widely viewed as a significant
laundering center, due largely to its proximity and close economic and social ties to Colombia. There is
limited financial intelligence concerning the source o f illegal proceeds or the magnitude o f the moneylaundering problem in Ecuador. It is believed, however, that money laundering occurs in both the banking
and non-banking sectors, and that the bulk o f the funds laundered stems from Colombian drug sales.” U.S.
Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,” 65-6.
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trafficking links with Colombia by making contact with both Mexican and Russian
organizations.125
Beginning with the domestic insurgency, the relationship between the Sendero
Luminoso (SL, or Shining Path) guerrilla organization and both the drug cultivating
peasantry and various domestic trafficking organizations exhibit many of the same
dynamics found in Colombia.126 SL has had a violent Maoist-oriented strategy dating
from the beginning of its insurgency in Ayacucho department in 1980. As formulated by
its founder, the former academic Abimael Guzman, this type of guerrilla warfare is
predicated upon control of the countryside and support among the peasantry. Eventually
the insurgency grew into a major threat to the central government’s control of large
stretches of territory.
During the mid-1980’s under the administrations of both Fernando Belaunde and
Alan Garcia, the “dirty-war doctrine” held sway, characterized by a willingness on the
part of the police, and later the military, to condone high rates of civilian casualties in an
attempt to crush the insurgency.127 This official onslaught accounts for much of SL’s

125 “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995, 44. The search for alternatives to Colombian
transshipment has also been spurred by the success o f Air Bridge Denial, as noted above.
126 For an excellent overview o f the movement, see Simon Strong, Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in
Peru (New York: Times Books / Random House, 1992), 134. While SL is not the only active insurgency
in Peru, it may be distinguished from the rival Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA, or Tupac
Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in many important ways. The MRTA represents a middle-class and
largely urban-based movement operating primarily in Lima, with both external and internal ties with other
groups. It is generally more interested in staged actions to gain publicity and to obtain funds rather than to
instill fear in the population. Even at its height, the MRTA was considered by SL to be not only the stooge
o f the Peruvian government but actually the greatest potential threat to their movement by siphoning off
resources which SL considered to be within its own purview. While reduced to minimal activities in recent
years, MRTA demonstrated its capability to grab headlines in the 1997 assault on the Japanese embassy in
Lima. However, such actions, despite their spectacular nature, are more indicative o f a fringe group than o f
a well-developed movement with mass support. See Sandra Woy-Hazelton and William Hazleton,
“Shining Path and the Marxist Left,” in The Shining Path o f Peru, 2d. ed., ed. David Scott Palmer (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 235; and Strong, 212-3.
127 In many respects, the U.S. emphasis on countering drugs in Peru was not always in accord with the
Peruvian government’s conceptualizations o f its own internal security priorities. While in Lima’s view
coca was simply a raw material, with the real threat and profit entering the picture further upstream, from
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impetus toward commandeering the coca trade in its quest for survival as a movement.
As a result, much of SL’s strength during its azimuth in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s
can be directly linked to the acquisition of these resources.
By 1987 the group had begun extorting money from drug cultivators and
traffickers via “taxes” levied on coca production and cocaine processing throughout the
Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), the primary coca-producing region in the country. For
their part, SL provided security, albeit in the form of a protection racket writ large, for the
traffickers in return not only for money, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
weapons. However, this complex and coercively asymmetrical relationship meant that
the alliance was difficult for SL to control in times of tactical setbacks.
While the relationship was marked by mutual suspicion, at its height the drug
trade still garnered an estimated $20 to $30 million annually for the organization.128
Such financial self-sufficiency from the proceeds of drug trade in turn mitigated the need
for outside sponsorship or funding, which unlike the FARC was not particularly
forthcoming anyway.

1

In fact, Jose E. Gonzalez goes so far as to argue that there is no

the time SL and the drug traffickers opted to cooperate Peruvian forces were content to attack both. In
some respects this association actually made the internal security situation seem less daunting
intellectually, though still formidable in actuality. However, once these criminal interests diverged, it
became clear that the Peruvian government priority would be to eliminate SL first and then the drug trade.
See Thomas A. Marks, M aoist Insurgency Since Vietnam (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 270.
128 During this period, one estimate puts SL’s portion o f UHV coca profits at 10 percent. Woy-Hazleton
and Hazleton, 232-3. These revenues in turn allowed the organization to pay its insurgents $500 per
month, five times the average Peruvian monthly income. Moreover, charges o f $3,000 to $7,000 per drug
flight leaving the UHV were also collected by SL, either in cash or in kind, as coca paste or base. These
figures taken from captured SL documents, as noted in Clawson and Lee, 179-80. However, conflicting
accounts remain regarding actual control o f the landing strips used for drug flights during this period. For
instance, John Simpson contends that the largest profits went to the Army, not the SL, with the latter as a
convenient scapegoat for both Peruvian and the U.S. governments. John Simpson, In the Forests o f the
Night: Encounters in Peru with Terrorism, Drug-Running and Military Oppression (New York: Random
House, 1993), 132.
129 Since its founding, SL has been almost entirely bereft o f external sponsorship and thus less affected in
terms o f funding by the fall o f communism and the easing o f Cold War tensions than similar groups.
Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, “The Organization o f Shining Path,” in Palmer, 203.
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way to separate the issues of drug trafficking and guerrilla activity in the UHV during
this period.130 However, following Guzman’s capture by Peruvian troops in September
1992 there was a subsequent and logical diminution of guerrilla activity, as well as an
eventual split within the residual leadership.
This crisis on the part of SL in turn led for a time to a loss of influence over the
traffickers as well. While the traffickers were generally forced to pay off the SL when
the latter was relatively well entrenched, they were also in turn just as likely to bribe the
military to fulfil the same roles when the guerrillas weakened. As the trafficker is first
and foremost a businessman, to behave otherwise would make little sense from a purely
commercial point of view. In many respects this is indicative of the simple lack of a
common ideology between guerrilla and trafficker.131 Once SL had managed to rally its
remnants, however, the cooperative pattern emerged again in the face of the mutual
government threat, albeit on a more subdued scale.
As of the mid-1990s, Peru still accounted for roughly two-thirds of world coca
production, though its share has been dropping somewhat due to the increasing Peruvian
army presence in the UHV. However, with respect to heroin, initial attempts by
Colombian traffickers to extend poppy cultivation into Peru began as early as 1992. In
1995, The Economist noted that, “Both local and American officials say it [opium poppy]
130 In addition to providing a source o f income, the relatively isolated UHV also served SL as both a
training ground and logistical base o f operations. Jos6 E. Gonzalez, “Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper
Huallaga Valley,” in Palmer, 138-40.
131 For instance, as Simpson notes, the conspicuous spending typical o f many traffickers is exactly the sort
o f activity that most SL hard-liners would find offensive. Simpson, 131. Despite benefiting from the
proceeds o f the coca trade, SL’s ideological stance should not be construed as supportive o f drug usage
within its own areas. In general, coca and cocaine abuse were both taken as signs o f a politically
degenerate society such as the U.S., and as a means o f further European oppression o f indigenous peoples.
Its propagandists also hold that the U.S. is more interested in controlling the international cocaine trade
than in eliminating it. Strong, 103-5, 107. Moreover, at one point, and understandably enough for a group
consciously advocating the repeal o f the laws o f supply and demand, SL tried to establish an exorbitantly
high floor price for coca leaf production within its sector. This resulted in a glut as the market was
unwilling to bear the additional costs. Clawson and Lee, 180.
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has never been found in Peru in commercial quantities. But drugs policemen and farmers
alike confirm that opium poppies are now being grown along the sierra, notably near
•

Cajamarca.”

1 'J O

,

,

Other plantations have also been found in the northern departments of

Amazonas, Piura and Chiclayo, in the central department of Huanuco, and in the southern
department of Puno, though government pressure on both growers and a resurgent SL
appears to have made much of this activity unfeasible.

133

However, the question of the Peruvian traffickers’ particular vulnerability to both
SL and Colombian influence remains. The answer to this can be found on a number of
levels. To begin with, Peruvian groups tend to be disorganized, especially when
compared to their Colombian counterparts. Nothing analogous to the Medellin or Cali
cartels has ever existed in the domestic Peruvian context to either effectively resist SL or
challenge the central government directly.
Moreover, it is not overstating the case to characterize drug production in Peru as
virtually dependent on the Colombians. In fact, part of SL’s initial platform in dealing
with the traffickers was to present themselves as the only indigenous Peruvian force
capable of defending the drug trade from various types of interference, if only with
respect to its domestic rather than its transnational dimensions. However, while appeals
to both nationalism and greed may have helped to stir animus against the Colombian
TCOs controlling much of this activity, the point remained that their assistance was
invaluable to bringing the product to overseas markets.134

132 “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995,44. As an interesting aside, this article also alludes
to the introduction o f both a fungus engineered to destroy coca plants and a coca-munching caterpillar
allegedly developed in the United States and released on Peruvian territory.
133 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 160-3.
134 Strong, 109. Thoumi, 90, also notes the competitive advantage enjoyed by Colombian trafficking
organizations in being accustomed to using widespread violence as leverage to eliminated the competition
and to intimidate both law enforcement officials and society at large.
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By the late 1990s, out of the twenty-one known drug trafficking organizations
operating in Peru, eleven were Colombian and seven constituted joint ColombianPeruvian ventures, while only three were Peruvian. Furthermore, nearly all Peruviangrown coca is sold unprocessed or only minimally processed, as either coca paste or base,
leaving the more value-added aspects of the trade to take place further upstream along
smuggling vectors predominantly moving under the auspices of Colombian TCOs.
While there has been some effort by Peruvians to increase native control of the
coca trade, Colombians remain the dominant partners. By extension, an ongoing source
of friction has been the corresponding pattern of behavior on the part of the Colombians
vis-a-vis their Peruvian counterparts.135 However, LaMond Tullis does note that the
balance may be tipping in favor of the Peruvians, largely by virtue of an increasing
number of outbound smuggling vectors via Brazil and Ecuador.136
Further inland, Bolivia also has a significant experience in the cultivation of
drugs, forming the third of the major coca-producing countries along with Colombia and
Peru. However, in general Bolivia has not been plagued by large-scale guerrilla
involvement in its drug economy, perhaps due to the strength and legal status of domestic
collective growers’ associations, as well as the high level of cultural embeddednesss of
such activity. The legitimization of the coca-growing peasant’s aspirations at the grass
roots level may at least partially explain the lack of support for either the development of
an indigenous insurgency or of SL influence across the border.137

135 Clawson and Lee, 181. This may account for the inclination on the part o f the Peruvians to take more
active measures and lessen their dependence on the Colombians, most notably by seeking alliances with
mafiosi “from Mexico to Moscow.” See “Downstream drugs,” The Economist, 13 May 1995.
136 LaMond Tullis, Unintended Consequences: Illegal Drugs and Drug Policies in Nine Countries
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995), 70-1.
137 Strong, 224-31. This policy o f tacit tolerance toward coca cultivation within the body politic o f Bolivia
has not always endeared it internationally. For instance, early in 1995, the United States lost patience with
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Moreover, as in Peru, Colombian TCOs have traditionally controlled most of the
upstream transnational smuggling vectors that transport the drugs produced in Bolivia.
As the country is landlocked, this is perhaps more readily understandable than in the case
of Peru.138 However, in addition to riverine connections to Brazil via the Amazon basin,
Bolivia is also linked to via the Paraguay-Parana river system to container terminals with
access to international trucking routes and railways. While drugs have been seized along
both of these waterways, the planned Hidrovia project to further develop the latter and
thus connecting the interior of South America directly to the seaports of Buenos Aires,
Argentina, and Montevideo, Uruguay, may offer a wider scope for future smuggling
vectors transiting these nodes.

1 -IQ

With respect to Brazil, drug smuggling vectors moving to the east out of both
Colombia and Peru by air and via the Amazon River basin has become a major issue.
Raids into Brazilian territory by both Colombian rebels and government troops along the
1,600 kilometer-long common border have also strained relations. Particularly

Bolivia’s failure to meet coca eradication targets. Dependent on American certification and subsequent aid,
Bolivia sent its troops in force to destroy coca crops and signed a new extradition treaty. While the United
States favors alternative development, primarily in the form o f crop substitution, in fact coca is both easier
to grow, more resistant to drought and pests and considerably more profitable than most other available
options. “The charms o f coca,” The Economist, 28 October 1997, 52. See also Simpson, 128-32; and
Cristdbal Kay, “Rural Latin America: Exclusionary and Uneven Agricultural Development,” in Halebsky
and Harris, 37; OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 154-8; and Jordan, 132-7, which specifically
notes the parallels with the case o f Peru.
138 Moreover, as noted in Villamarin Pulido, 83, the increased use o f glyphosate in drug eradication efforts
in both Bolivia and Peru during the mid-1990s helped contribute to greater cultivation o f both poppy and
coca crops within Colombia itself.
139 See U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Cocaine Smuggling From Bolivia,” 4-8. Incidentally, Chilean authorities
have also noted that efforts to facilitate closer logistical integration among Andean countries, such as
giving Bolivia maritime access and setting up inter-ocean trading corridors, may also allow traffickers
greater transshipment opportunities as well. OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs {2000), 163. This report
also notes the use o f Chilean seaports to export drugs, particularly to Europe and often in food shipments,
as these tend to receive less scrutiny than goods coming directly from neighboring drug-producing
countries. Incidentally, with respect to Argentina, U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “South
America - Argentina,” notes that, “Within the last several years, Argentina has become a transit area for
Colombian heroin en route to the U.S. East Coast (primarily New York), although there is no evidence that
the quantities involved significantly affect the U.S.”
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problematic are the areas where the FARC actively operates, such as Vaupes. In 1991,
Brazilian troops crossed into Colombia and shot seven suspected guerrillas in response to
an earlier incursion that killed three soldiers and wounded a dozen more. However, in
the past the Colombian government has felt free to cross the border as well, as when in
1998 it used a Brazilian air base without authorization to attack a nearby FARC guerrilla
stronghold.
By way of response, later that same year the Brazilian government approved a law
allowing the air force to shoot down planes that enter its airspace illegally. Brazil’s
capability to effectively carry out this policy, however, is hampered by a lack of the
means to monitor its own territory. This situation should be remedied by the deployment
of Sivam, a $1.4 billion land- and air-based radar system that is due to come into
operation after 2002.
Moreover, though officially downplayed, apprehensions in Brazil remain that
further Colombian encroachment will occur as Plan Colombia gains momentum. Such a
turn of events may threaten the general aloofness the Brazilian government has shown
toward its neighbor’s internal strife. In mid-2000, Brazil moved 6,000 troops to its
Amazonian border with Colombia in anticipation of an escalation of the Colombian civil
war and a resultant spillover of drug trafficking, refugees and perhaps even actual
hostilities.140
However, there is considerable cause to look to a future expansion of
transnational drug smuggling vectors moving through Brazil. In addition to the various
other regional externalities, largely due to the country’s economic inequalities and related

140 See “Fear o f trouble upstream,” The Economist, 30 September 2000, 38; and “The gringos land in
Colombia,” The Economist, 2 September 2000, 33.
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social pressures the domestic conditions exist for such activity to firmly take root. For
instance, paralleling Pablo Escobar’s calculated largesse with respect to the
disadvantaged of Medellin, various criminal organizations exercise an undue influence
throughout Rio de Janeiro’s poorer neighborhoods in the absence of effective government
programs. 141
In fact, Maria Velez de Berliner and Kristin Lado make a compelling case for
Brazil to eventually equal if not supersede Colombia with respect to drug trafficking. For
instance, the authors note the country’s regional strategic weight in terms of its physical
size, economy and porous borders with major drug-producing areas, and its growing
lawlessness. Moreover, moving the entire spectrum of both production and transit of
drugs into Brazilian territory poses few practical hurdles.
Specifically, Brazil’s access to existing and potential smuggling vectors is readily
apparent from its land borders with ten other Latin American countries, its 7,491
kilometers of coastline encompassing thirty-nine deep-water seaports, and 3,13 usable
airports.142 As Colombian TCOs continue their transnational expansion, it is important to
remember that their Brazilian counterparts need not necessarily be relegated to a
peripheral status indefinitely.
Colombia’s domestic turmoil has led to a number of tensions across the common
border with Venezuela as well, including the flow of refugees and arms as well as drugs.
With either the FARC or ELN acting as the de facto government throughout much of this

141 See Anthony Faiola, “As Brazil fails slum dwellers, gangs win favor,” International H erald Tribune, 23
September 2002,2.
142 With particular resonance in the context o f this study, the authors also assess Brazil’s five distinctive
regions with respect to current or future roles in drug trafficking. In addition to the ethnic make-up and
infrastructure o f each, the Northeast or “Sertao” is noted as having a high potential for the cultivation o f
opium poppies. Maria Velez de Berliner and Kristin Lado, “Brazil: The Emerging Drug Superpower,”
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 239-60.
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region on the Colombian side, it is unsurprising that kidnapping and extortion activities
have also extended into Venezuelan territory. Officials in Venezuela have publicly
expressed concerns that Plan Colombia or its successors may serve to exacerbate all of
these trends.143 A further cause for concern is the so-far limited extension o f opium
poppy cultivation into Venezuelan territory, often facilitated by Colombian guerrillas’
links to local indigenous peoples.144
As one recent U.S. government analysis notes, “Venezuela is a major
transshipment avenue for drug shipments bound for the US and European markets
through the Caribbean.”145 In terms of transit, Venezuela’s mountainous border with
Colombia, as well as numerous seaports with direct access the greater Caribbean basin,

143 See “Blood on the borders,” The Economist, 16 September 2000,43-4. This article also notes the
ideological sympathies that appear to exist between the Chavez government and the FARC.
144 In terms o f facilitating transshipment through these areas, traffickers often supply indigenous groups
with food and alcohol, in return for their expert knowledge o f the area and skills in navigating the Orinoco
River and its tributaries to the coast. In particular, this mostly pertains to the Warao and other Guarjiro
tribes, neglected for years by successive Venezuelan central governments. OGD, World Geopolitics o f
Drugs (2000), 170-1. Similarly, “One small, mountainous area along the northern part o f the border is used
to grow opium poppy but heroin processing is carried out in Colombia and the problem has been limited to
a cultivation area o f under 50 hectares by continued aggressive eradication and expulsion activities by the
Venezuelan military.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCRS 2001, “South America - Venezuela.”
Moreover, the city o f Cucuta on the Colombian side o f the border has been noted as particularly well
situated for smuggling both drugs and arms across the Venezuelan border. This area has recently been the
focus o f considerable guerrilla activity, as discussed in “The fight for the cities,” The Economist, 26
October 2002,37.
145 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 41. For an even
earlier example o f the economic logic o f routing through Venezuela during the heyday o f Pablo Escobar,
see Ken Dermota, “Snow Business: Drugs and the Spirit o f Capitalism,” World Policy Journal 16, no. 4
(Winter 1999), 15. In particular, the author notes one drug smuggler pointing out that the cost o f shipping
drugs through either Caracas or Maracaibo was only a quarter o f utilizing Colombian territory directly.
Jordan, 138, also specifically notes the involvement o f the Sicilian Mafia in Venezuela, represented by the
Cuntrera brothers, in forming a strategic partnership with the Colombian cartels to transport both heroin
and cocaine.
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offers vast potential for northbound smuggling vectors.146 In 1998, it was estimated that
more than 110 tons of Colombian heroin and cocaine passed through Venezuela.147
However, in May 1999, the government of Hugo Chavez announced that U.S. jets
could no longer utilize Venezuelan airspace for counter-drug efforts. This was a
particularly critical decision, as in the same month Howard Air Force Base in Panama
was shut down in compliance with the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty. Furthermore, the
denial of Venezuelan airspace also significantly decreases the effectiveness of new
monitoring sites in the Dutch colonies of Aruba and Curafao, islands fifty miles off the
coast of Venezuela.
Though at the time Venezuelan officials maintained that they were capable of
policing their own borders, the U.S. differed publicly by stating that due to insufficient
monitoring capabilities, in effect an existing drug trafficking corridor via air from
Colombia was now opened even further than before.148 As of this writing, the civil unrest
spurred by popular discontent with the Chavez government tends to puts its capabilities
in this respect further into doubt. An indicator that smuggling vectors moving through
Venezuela were increasing in prominence can be seen in two separate drug seizures of
record volume during August 2000, one for five tons and another for two and a half tons
of cocaine.
Specifically, Venezuelan authorities speculate that these two shipments originated
in Colombia and entered by air into the Orinoco River delta region, where the contraband

146 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 167, which specifically names Maicao, San Cristobal,
Puerto Ayacucho as major drug transit seaports, as well as air facilities at Puerto La Cruz, La Guiara,
Carupano, Cumana and Caracas’ Maiquetia International Airport.
147 Cited in “Drug Czar: Venezuela Opens Window to Drug Runners,” Defense Week 20, no. 35 (7
September 1999), pages not available.
148 Ibid.
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was hidden in the jungle along the northern coast of Venezuela to be picked up later by
sea.149 The alleged drug shipper, a Colombian citizen, was arrested in Venezuela and
extradited to the United States under charges of moving a total of sixty-eight tons of
drugs by sea to both the U.S. and Europe. Subsequently, another forty-three individuals,
including eight Greek shipping operators, were also arrested.
In this instance, the plan appears to have been to use eight to ten cargo ships fitted
with concealed compartments to take on the contraband off the coast of Baranquilla,
Colombia, or Venezuela’s Orinoco River delta, and deliver it via speedboat into Miami,
Amsterdam and other ports. Even further underlining the multinational complexity of
this issue, a total of eleven countries cooperated with this U.S.-led operation, including
Albania, Belgium, Colombia, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Great
Britain, Venezuela and Panama.150
The last of Colombia’s contiguous neighbors, Panama, not only has a history of
involvement with the drug trade but also constitutes the gateway for smuggling vectors
moving by land into the rest of Central America. Its territory also encompasses the
Panama Canal, the most strategic maritime commercial conduit in the hemisphere,
linking the Caribbean and Pacific Oceans and accounting for a very high volume of both
containerized and bulk cargo. This waterway was returned to the government of Panama
in 1999 under the terms of the aforementioned 1977 treaty with the United States.
Furthermore, by virtue of its flag of convenience, the country also accounts for the
second-largest tonnage o f merchant shipping in the world.

149 See “Venezuela has record cocaine bust, newspaper says,” CNN.com, 20 August 2000; and “Venezuelan
forces recover more than 2.5 more tons o f cocaine,” CNN.com, 24 August 2000.
150 “Reputed Cocaine Shipper Appears in Court,” Miami H erald (web site), 28 August 2000.
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While Panama has managed to remain largely neutral in Colombia’s civil war,
both guerrillas and paramilitaries have used Panamanian territory to hide, rest, and
receive supplies. Despite the possibility that an escalation of the conflict could spill over,
for the moment Panama appears to be accruing definite economic benefits from the
situation as wealthy Colombians shift their assets, and sometimes their residences, across
the border.

if I

As discussed previously, this international boundary, 270 kilometers long,

runs along Colombia’s northwestern region, a particularly active corridor for smuggling
activity as noted above.
Moreover, the recent history of Panama, particularly during the regime of Manuel
Noriega, is intimately connected with regional drug trafficking. The culmination of this
activity came to an abrupt end with the 1989 U.S. invasion and Noriega’s subsequent
incarceration.

1

Despite concerted efforts by successive Panamanian governments, the

country’s location, remote coastline, advanced infrastructure encompassing both
extensive maritime and air facilities, an underdeveloped judicial system, and a relatively
sophisticated financial services sector make it vulnerable to a wide range of transnational
crime even beyond the context of smuggling. Furthermore, the country’s heroin seizures
for 2000 were the highest ever recorded.

1 ^3

151 “Nervous in Darien,” The Economist, 7 October 2000,46. Beyond the context o f drugs, the country has
also been used to funnel arms to Colombian insurgents, as discussed in U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Weapons
Smuggled To Colombian Guerrillas in Commercial Containers, Via Panamanian Ports,” Maritime Security
Report, no. 1 (August 1995), 16-7.
152 As early as 1983, while still commander o f the Panamanian army and not yet dictator, Noriega
apparently made an offer to the leaders o f the Medellin cartel to provide a safe haven and protection for
their operations in return for a four million dollar fee. However, even after a down payment o f half that
amount, the Colombian traffickers soon found a less than warm reception, as Noriega seems to have felt
that this would draw even more undue attention from the U.S.
153 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Canada, Mexico and Central America - Panama,”
which also notes that the country’s international banking center, the Colon Free Zone, and its U.S. dollarbased economy are also very attractive to money launderers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

311

When the former U.S. bases in Panama were turned over to Panamanian authority
in 1999, it was hoped that a “multilateral counter-drug center” under civilian control but
with a strong military component could be set up in their place. This was in large part a
move to institutionalize existing counter-drug efforts involving elements of the United
States military and other agencies with the admixture of contingents seconded from other
nations. However, Panamanian critics of any continuing U.S. presence were able to
derail support for such a plan. Furthermore, countries such as Brazil, Argentina and
Chile, whom the United States fully expected to cooperate in such a venture, were
reluctant to expose their militaries to the risk of corruption by using them for counter
drug operations.154
The rest of Central America comprises the land bridge leading first into Mexico,
and then the rest of North America. Specifically, from south to north this includes Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize.155 In terms of
connectivity, the Pan-American Highway constitutes the major conduit for smuggling
vectors travelling north into Mexico and eventually on to the U.S. Furthermore, this
region encompasses maritime access via both the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, as well as
extensive air connections largely catering to tourism.156
Logically enough given its position along the southern border of the United
States, Mexico provides access for a high volume of northbound smuggling vectors with
154 “A canal deal,” The Economist, 29 March 1997, 49-50. For a broader analysis o f this issue, see also
Ricardo Soberdn Garrido, “Crime in Uniform: Corruption and Impunity in Latin America,” TNI/Action
Andina (December 1997), pages not available.
155 Interestingly, western Guatemala was noted in the late 1980s as a significant producing area for opium
poppies. As noted in Booth, Opium, 326, while the U.S. aided Guatemala in 1992 to eradicate poppy
fields, this activity has since shifted to narrow valleys beyond the reach o f crop spraying. Much o f the
country’s drug trade takes place under the auspices o f Mexican TCOs. See also U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC
(1998), 50, which observes that despite sporadic eradication efforts, the lack o f regular aerial
reconnaissance may lead to an increase in poppy cultivation in the remote highlands.
156 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Canada, Mexico and Central America - Guatemala.”
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respect to a wide range o f commodities. Augmenting this propitious physical geography,
increased commercial activity at least partially as a result of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has made smuggling by land a particularly attractive option.
Smuggling actors are assisted in their operations by the sheer number of border crossings
involved, as drugs have been found concealed in cars, trucks and recreational vehicles, as
well as in legitimate tractor-trailer cargo.157
Furthermore, direct access to both the Gulf of Mexico to the east and the Pacific
Ocean to the west allows for a wide range of commercial and tourist-related maritime
activity, along with associated opportunities for smuggling. Drug traffickers have also
exploited extensive air connections between the two countries. Finally, the high volume
of tourists and migrant workers crossing the border on a regular basis constitutes an
opportunity that smugglers have not been remiss in exploiting.
In general, the majority of drug smuggling vectors destined for North American
markets that originate from the south tends to shift cyclically between the southwest land
border with Mexico and the predominantly maritime routes through the greater Caribbean
basin. The resistance along either of these main paths can most often be correlated in
response to the focus of U.S. interdiction efforts at any given point in time. For instance,
in the 1980s Mexican groups played only a very small role in the major Colombiancontrolled smuggling routes into U.S., at that point in time for the most part routed
through the Caribbean.
However, as The Economist noted in 1997, “a fierce American-led crackdown on
Caribbean routes in the mid-1980s led the Colombians to ship ever-increasing loads
157 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 8-9. Between 1992 and 1996, tractor-trailer and rail-car traffic along
the U.S.-Mexican border increased by 50 and 58 percent, respectively. For more on the impact o f NAFTA
on drug smuggling, see also Dermota, 16-29.
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through Mexican smugglers. By the early 1990s, they had grown reliant on them.”158 As
Williams points out, in functional terms Colombian TCOs had inadvertently helped to
create the competition that was to eventually seize a significant portion of their market
share.159
By the late 1990s, the relationship between the two groups had evolved to one of
near-parity, emphasized by the apparent division of labor. As one U.S. government study
notes, “Colombian and Mexican trafficking organizations dominate the drug trade in the
Western Hemisphere. Colombia supplies most of the cocaine and contributes the largest
share of heroin, and Mexico is a major avenue for cocaine trafficking in the United States
as well as a major supplier of heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine.”160

158 “Poison across the Rio Grande,” The Economist, 15 November 1997, 36-8. This article also notes the
rise o f Amado Carrillo Fuentes’s drug trafficking organization based in Ciudad Juarez, which was able to
cut out his Colombian partners by directly linking Andean producers with major North American markets
via a well-developed network o f Mexican immigrants. This state o f affairs lasted until Carrillo’s demise in
July 1997, during plastic surgery and just before a planned shift o f his headquarters to Chile. The resultant
power vacuum was contested by a variety o f successors, notably the infamous Arellano Felix brothers,
Benjamin and Ramon, based in Tijuana. The career o f these siblings was in turn curtailed by the former’s
imprisonment and the latter’s death, as reported in “The end o f the Arellanos,” The Economist, 16 March
2002,43. See also U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 8-9. Peter A. Lupshka, “Transnational NarcoCorruption and Narco Investment: A Focus on Mexico,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 1 (Spring
1995), 96-7, also notes the Cali cartel’s infiltration o f the Mexican Cabinet Office o f Communications and
Transport up to the mid-1990s. In particular, the author notes the use o f commercial airports, business
fronts, trailer trucking firms and railroads. As such, access to the shipping information, official forms and
seals that only this type o f government office can provide is essential to carrying out these sophisticated
smuggling operations.
159 Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 75-6. The author also notes that, in response,
Colombian TCOs returned their focus to routes through Florida and the Caribbean, often using Dominican
groups in place o f their former Mexican partners. As o f this writing, there have been numerous recent
incidences o f Mexicans carrying Colombian heroin at least as far as Mexico. However, it has yet to be
ascertained if this activity is taking place under the auspices o f Colombian or Mexican TCOs. Nonetheless,
this phenomenon is extensively documented in U.S. DOJ, DEA, Intelligence Division, Domestic Heroin
Unit, “Drug Intelligence Trend: Increase in Mexican Couriers Transporting Heroin to Mexico,” DEA02053 (Washington, DC: DEA, December 2002), available at
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/intel/02053/02053.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
160 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 6. Similarly, U.S.
DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 8, notes that in partnership with Colombian organizations, “Mexico-based
trafficking groups have established themselves as transportation specialists for smuggling drugs across the
Southwest Border.”
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With specific respect to heroin, in general Mexican chiva or “black tar” heroin
tends to dominate the U.S. market west of the Mississippi, while purer Colombian heroin
is more common in the eastern half of the country.161 However, despite a level of
cooperation within certain operational parameters as noted above, there is evidence that
both sides actively attempt to expand their operations and respective market shares at the
others’ expense.162
Within the overall context of U.S. drug policy, the prevailing official stance
toward Mexico is particularly salient. Since their country’s initial experiences with
decertification, successive Colombian governments have, perhaps rightly, considered the
process to both arbitrary and high-handed. However, when the arrest of Mexico’s top
anti-drug official in February 1997 brought no reciprocal threat of sanction, Colombia’s
allegations of a double standard gained some credence.163
Further evidence that the Mexican army, traditionally enjoying something of a
reputation for incorruptibility, may have been heavily involved in the drug trade as far
back to the 1980’s has since surfaced as well. While U. S. field agents appear to have
had an idea o f the true situation in Mexico, there was supposition at the time that top

161 This type o f heroin is also sometimes found in a brown powdered form known as “Mexican brown.”
Booth, Opium, 327. Mexican opium poppy cultivation has traditionally centered on the states o f Durango,
Sinaloa and Chihuahua, the latter being directly south o f the border with both Texas and N ew Mexico.
These crops tend to grow in remote areas, with heroin processing carried out in mobile labs that move often
to avoid detection. However, in general, this cultivation entails relatively high overhead in the form o f
costly irrigation techniques, as well as considerable bribes to drug enforcement agents. Cooper, 49.
162 As the DEA noted in 1997, “Heroin traffickers from South America, particularly from Colombia,
solidified their control over East Coast markets, moving into smaller cities, and expanded their efforts to
supply multikilogram quantities beyond the Mississippi.” U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), x, 45. The
same report also notes attempts by Mexican TCOs to enter urban heroin markets in the eastern half o f the
U.S., even going so far as to seek out the expertise o f chemists based in Colombia in order to produce the
higher purity white heroin preferred in that region. See also “Young, white and middle-class,” The
Economist, 6 December 1997,26-7.
163 Dermota, 22-5.
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officials intentionally downplayed the matter in order to ensure the passage of
NAFTA.164
By 1999, the case was again being made in the United States that Mexico should
be decertified for a variety of reasons, though such a decision is extremely unlikely to
take place for political reasons.165 However, the fact remains that by virtue of its
geography Mexican control of its borders will always be of interest to the United
States.166 Moreover, the increasing evidence of drug abuse in Mexico, particularly in the
northern part of the country, may further encourage the Mexican government to more
meaningfully address this nexus of issues more from the standpoint of self-interest than
from external pressure.

1 SI-1

With respect to maritime drug smuggling vectors, the greater Caribbean basin
constitutes the focus of such activity for Colombian TCOs. However, as discussed
previously, smuggling by sea encompasses all kinds of vessels, though for the most part
these can be categorized into either private or commercial, with the latter in turn
delineated into two primary types of activity, namely passenger and cargo. Similarly, the
relevant landside facilities can range from public seaport to private marina to a deserted
stretch of the coast. As mentioned earlier in this study, even the use of submarines to
move drugs has at least been attempted by these smuggling actors.

164 See “Caught red-faced,” The Economist, 22 February 1997,48-53; and “Drug-shocked,” The Economist,
9 August 1997, 27-8.
165 “Uncle Sam’s war on drugs,” The Economist, 20 February 1999, 33-4.
166 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 74-76.
167 OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 137-40.
168 As noted in Chapter II, a partially built submarine, o f a relatively high technological sophistication, was
found in the remote Colombian hinterland, much to the surprise o f police. Bowden, 34, also notes that in
his heyday Escobar built two small remote-controlled submersibles, each capable o f carrying two thousand
kilos o f drugs. These would travel between the northern coast o f Colombia and the waters off Puerto Rico,
where the contraband would then be transferred to speedboats bound for Miami.
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In addition to being bounded by the South, Central and North American
coastlines, the Caribbean itself is dotted with numerous islands, some independent and
others tied by history to other political entities primarily as a legacy of colonialism.169 As
a result, this body of water represents a varied mosaic of territorial and international
waters. Despite an overall willingness to cooperate in the issue of drug transit, however,
the prevailing U.S. view is that, “most Caribbean nations lack resources and law
enforcement capabilities and have some corruption problems that hamper their efforts to
combat drug trafficking.”170
Moving roughly from south to north, the region is comprised of several
archipelagos and may be divided into the Greater and Lesser Antilles. The former
includes Cuba, the island of Hispaniola shared between the Dominican Republic and
Haiti, Jamaica and Puerto Rico. Further to the south and east, the latter is comprised of
the Virgin Islands, Windward Islands, Leeward Islands and the islands immediately to the
north of Venezuela, which include Trinidad and Tobago.
In general, multi-ton shipments of drugs most often move through the Caribbean
via the established maritime transportation infrastructure, primarily through seaports.
Evidence of the viability of smuggling vectors utilizing these modes of transit is abundant
nearer the major drug source areas. Furthermore, projections are that the expanding use
of intermodal transportation throughout Latin America and the Caribbean is “expected to

169 For instance, Martinique, Guadeloupe, the French side o f St. Martin, St. Barthelemy, and French Guiana
are all subject to French law, including international conventions to which France is a party.
170 U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations,” 3. This can be readily seen in the issue o f off-shore banking
and associated money laundering activity, where the temptations o f lucrative profits have led some
Caribbean governments to allow such practices to go virtually unregulated. See “Small states, big money,”
The Economist, 23 September 2000,46. In particular, as noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs
(2000), 22, numerous states in the Caribbean evolved into money laundering hubs via their special
relationships or former colonial ties with richer countries such as the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Spain,
Russia and the U.S.
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increase opportunities for traffickers to use commercial containers for shipping large
quantities” of drugs.

171

Moreover, as many of these islands’ economies are highly

dependent on tourism, the associated cruise line activity and air connections also offer a
wide range of smuggling opportunities.
However, given the fluid nature of smuggling activity, increased security at a
given facility, though desirable in and of itself, can easily lead to a proportional rise in
smuggling vectors through seaports in adjacent areas or alternate ports of entry. Thus, in
practice the modified path of least resistance would thus most likely lead to greater usage
of less protected access routes such as smaller private marinas or even more remote
landing areas.172 Closer to coastal areas, smuggling activity may often take place on
weekends to blend in with recreational craft, or at night to off-load contraband along
remote areas of the coastline, or from larger “mother ships” to smaller “go-fast” boats.173
As of this writing, highlighting the cyclical nature of many smuggling routes,
instances of seaborne smuggling vectors through the Caribbean basin to the United States
have become more prevalent once again. In addition to the urge toward innovation
necessitated by the imperative of maintaining competitive advantage, this resurgence is

171 U.S. ONDCP, “ 1998 Annual Assessment o f Cocaine Movement,” 1. The report continues by noting,
“The large quantities o f drugs seized in two recent container seizures in Cartagena indicate that traffickers
have considerable confidence in this mode o f transportation.” Echoing this trend with respect to the Pacific
Ocean, according to the DEA, “South American traffickers used commercial maritime cargo as their
primary means to transship multiton loads to the U.S. West Coast.” U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 9.
See also “Trouble in paradise,” The Economist, 23 November 2002, 36, which quotes a U.N. estimate that
the Caribbean regional drug trade nets $3.3 billion annually.
172 The DEA, while asserting that, “commercial maritime vessels posed a significant smuggling threat,”
further notes that, during the relevant period o f analysis, seaborne smuggling operations consisted primarily
o f go-fast boats. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 4-5. For a more thorough breakdown o f these issues, see
Aune, 4.
173 Ibid., 7-8.
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largely a response to tighter cross-border controls, as well as higher bribes, along the
U.S.- Mexican border.174
Realizing the limitations imposed by small populations and limited monetary
resources among the Caribbean nations, the U.S. in general has tried wherever possible to
sign bilateral agreements allowing its personnel to conduct operations in the territorial
waters and airspace of the relevant nations. Thus, by the late 1990s the U. S. government
had begun pressuring countries adjoining the region to sign “ship-rider” agreements
allowing U. S. patrols to pursue suspected drug dealers into some twenty-five different
territorial waters within the region.

17^

With respect to specific territories, beginning in the south Trinidad and Tobago
have evolved as a drug transit hub due to their geographic position opposite the Orinoco
River delta of eastern Venezuela. Leveraging support from various sectors of the islands’
multiethnic societies, made up in turn of Afro-Caribbean, Indian, Lebanese, Chinese and
Latin American communities, often facilitates this activity.

in

c

Further east, seven

Caribbean countries, namely Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St.
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines form the eastern edge of
the Caribbean transit zone for drugs.177 In terms of seizures, Jamaica has also emerged as
one of the most active parts of the entire Caribbean basin in terms of drug trafficking.178

174 For instance, as reported in mid-2000, “Once again, as it was a decade ago, the Caribbean has become a
favored route o f Colombian drug traffickers to get their product to the United States and Europe.” “A tidal
wave o f drugs,” The Economist, 24 June 2000,42. This article also notes the various nations in the region
that have become hubs for drug transit, including Haiti, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Suriname.
175 “Uncle Sam wags its finger,” The Economist, 4 January 1997,44-5. For a broader overview o f maritime
drug control, see also Fuss, passim.
176 OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 170-1. With respect to the Gulf o f Paria between these
islands and the mainland, this report also notes that, “Since the colonial era, this stretch o f water has been
the scene o f intensive smuggling: whiskey, weapons, rare animals and so on.”
177 With respect to this archipelago, U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “ The Caribbean Eastern Caribbean,” notes that “Colombian drug traffickers and various organized crime groups have

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

319

The island of Hispaniola, comprised of both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, is
exceedingly well positioned to serve as a transit point for smuggling vectors moving
through the Caribbean to the United States. In particular, Haiti’s favorable geography for
smuggling, including the territorial extensions of the country’s northern and southern
peninsulas, which create five separate coastal segments stretching nearly 1,800
kilometers. The country’s fourteen seaports are dispersed all along this coastline.
Furthermore, the Dominican border area, 338 kilometers in length, is mostly
mountainous, sparsely populated and serviced by few roads with little law enforcement
presence.

17 0

However, even with its other advantages for smugglers, without the endemic

corruption that plagues the country it would not play such a pivotal role.180
For its part, at the other end of the island the Dominican Republic has also
emerged as a significant hub for drug trafficking, particularly with respect to the U.S.
According to INCSR 2001, both intelligence and seizures throughout the region indicate

infiltrated many o f the eastern Caribbean nations, establishing their own infrastructure and contracting the
services o f local criminal organizations. To move the drugs within the region, many traffickers use a barter
system, paying for services with drugs and/or weapons to limit costs and to increase demand and markets in
the region.” As these are all small nations in terms o f both population and territory, such activity is
understandably very destabilizing.
178 Incidentally, the USCS reported in 2000 that Jamaica is the embarkation point o f the largest number o f
passengers arrested with drugs at U.S. airports. U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “The
Caribbean - Jamaica.” The same report notes that data for the first half o f 2000 indicate that the amount o f
cocaine transiting Jamaica quadrupled compared to the same period in 1999, making it the leading drug
transshipment point in the Caribbean by volume.
179 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 43. For more on the
role o f Haiti in the transshipment o f drugs and other contraband via maritime methods, both directly and
after crossing the common land boundary with the Dominican Republic, see U.S. DOT, MARAD,
“Maritime Smuggling o f Drugs and Contraband Goods Adversely Impacting Legitimate Commerce and
Development,” Maritime Security Report (April 1997), 1-10.
180 For recent trends on drugs transiting both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, see OGD, World
Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 173-7. Interestingly, even criminals are not immune from Haiti’s present
sociopolitical chaos. For instance, see also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “The Caribbean Haiti,” which notes that the major impediments to the country’s further expansion as a hub for the drug
trade “may be the difficulties traffickers experienced in moving drugs through Haiti because o f poor
infrastructure or the seizure o f drugs by rival traffickers or other criminals.” As mentioned in Chapter III,
in 2001 Haiti was not certified by the U.S. for its lackluster cooperation on drug issues but rather by the
granting o f a national interest waiver.
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that Colombian, Dominican and Puerto Rican TCOs have made the country a major
command and control center. However, many major drug shipments coordinated from
the Dominican Republic do not actually transit the country. In general, Colombian
suppliers begin the logistical process, while Dominican networks are more directly linked
to primarily East Coast markets.181
Only ninety miles from Key West, Florida, Cuba’s unique geography presents an
inviting environment to both seaborne and airborne smuggling vectors. The island
stretches over 600 nautical miles from east to west, with over 3,500 nautical miles of
coastline and more than 4,00Q islets and cays. In particular, its location in the northern
Caribbean provides direct and indirect paths for drug smugglers attempting to reach the
United States. Nonetheless, despite a relative lack of authoritative information, at present
the country is not considered a major conduit for drugs into the United States.182 As
such, the case of Cuba has traditionally been troublesome in the context of regional U.S.
drug policy, and would most likely be so even in the absence of the state of enmity
between the two countries.
In addition to the prevailing hostility toward the communist regime of Fidel
Castro, in the past various sectors of the public and of the U.S. government have publicly
accused the Cuban government of direct involvement in drug trafficking. In 1989, in
what may well have been an instance of killing two birds with one stone, Castro had two
top military officers executed for alleged drug trafficking, including General Amaldo
Ochoa, who had with immense popularity among the armed forces and as such was a
potential rival. Despite broad cooperation with European countries on this issue, the U.S.

181 Ibid., “The Caribbean - Dominican Republic.”
182 Ibid., “The Caribbean - Cuba.”
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and Cuba currently work together only on a very limited case-by-case basis.183 However,
in what may be cause for guarded optimism, recently there has been more de facto
cooperation, particularly between the respective coast guards.184
Even closer, the Bahamas offers easy access to the U.S. mainland along Florida’s
eastern coast, particularly by virtue of its tourism and freight-forwarding links. However,
there has been a shift of drug smuggling away from the Bahamas due to a perception of
greater risk to drug traffickers due to U.S. interdiction efforts there. Much of this activity
has moved to Puerto Rico, which in addition to its propitious geography, as a U.S.
protectorate the island has numerous official and unofficial ties to major East Coast
markets.185
For its part, Puerto Rico is centrally located astride the three main sets of
Caribbean smuggling vectors to the continental U.S., namely those coming directly from
South America, those transiting the island of Hispanola through both Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, and those moving through the Antilles archipelago. While
Colombian traffickers remain the driving force in moving both heroin and cocaine
throughout the Caribbean, Dominican groups dominate the transit trade through Puerto
Rico by capitalizing on their ties to these groups.186
Finally, both private and commercial air links throughout the region have
constituted smuggling routes from south to north. In the early days of the cocaine trade,
183 See “The disputatious diplomacy o f drags,” The Economist, 11 September 1999, 37.
184 Carol Rosenberg, “Hidden outpost in Keys scores series o f wins against drag traffic,” Miami H erald
(web site), 3 August 2000.
185 As noted in U.S. GAO, “Drag Control: Observations,” 2, “Puerto Rico has become a major entry point
for cocaine moving through the Eastern Caribbean into the United States.” See also U.S. DOJ, DEA,
NNICC (1998), 43, which notes the links to East Coast cities with large Puerto Rican populations, such as
New York and Orlando, Florida.
186 U.S Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 43. Moreover,
Dominican criminal organizations also play a significant role in the retail-level distribution o f heroin in the
northeastern United States. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 42.
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this activity utilized primarily small private planes landing in various and generally
remote staging areas. However, when moving directly to the U.S., recent heroin
smuggling is most likely undertaken either by commercial passengers carrying small
quantities, or via shipments hidden inside air cargo. Though variations understandably
exist, this activity tends to take place on direct flights from South America to major East
Coast destinations such as Miami or New York.187
As evidence o f smuggling routes constantly shifting toward the path of least
resistance, in 1997 a number of Central American couriers were arrested carrying drugs
through Texas airports in an attempt to avoid increased airport security on the East
Coast.188 While the U.S. General Accounting Office noted that same year that,
“Caribbean traffickers have shifted their operations from primarily air-related activities to
maritime activities,” given the cyclical and opportunistic nature of smuggling route
selection successful patterns inevitable resurface.189 In a more recent case, ten
Colombian nationals were arrested in Cali for concealing more than half a ton of heroin,
as well as some cocaine, on commercial airliners bound for Miami.190

188 Ibid, 41. Though data is not yet available as o f this writing, as noted previously the dramatic increase in
airport security across the U.S. in the wake o f 9/11 can only have increased the hurdles for smugglers
attempting to use these modes o f entry for contraband.
189 U.S. GAO, “Drug Control: Observations,” 1-2. In particular, the use o f both commercial and
noncommercial maritime vessels became more prevalent during this period, including the documented use
o f fishing boats, containerized cargo ships, and private motor and sailboats in this capacity. See also U.S.
DOT, MARAD, “Increased Drug Smuggling Via Lesser Antilles Threatens Growing Maritime Container
Trade,” Maritime Security Report (January 1997), 1-6.
190 See Jared Kotler, “Colombians smuggled heroin,” Detroit News (web site), 26 August 1999. An airline
maintenance company, Aercol, servicing American Airlines jets in Cali, employed those involved. These
mechanics hid the contraband in the tail sections, behind pilot’s seats, and in false compartments, to be
extracted in Miami by associates. As with a wide range o f other smuggling activities, this operation was
explicitly predicated on access to nominally secure areas as well as expert knowledge o f various types o f
flight operations. An earlier investigation in mid-1997, also involving American Airlines, resulted in the
arrest o f 6 employees for allegedly facilitating the transport o f up to 22 lbs. o f heroin and 1,100 lbs. o f
cocaine on planes leaving Bogota bound for Miami. An interesting facet o f this smuggling operation was
allowing the plane to make one domestic flight to ensure less scrutiny before unloading the contraband,
indicating a high degree o f familiarity with security and other procedures. Richard Willing, “Airline Drug
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In terms of distribution patterns within the U.S., as noted above Colombian heroin
tends to dominate most East Coast markets. However, this in itself is only a relatively
recent phenomenon. For instance, according to the DEA’s Domestic Monitoring
Program (DMP), which chemically tests and tracks the purity levels, place of origin and
retail price o f heroin across the country, nearly 85% of heroin samples taken in 1997 in
the eastern half of the United States were of South American origin.
By contrast, in 1991 Southeast Asian heroin accounted for more than two-thirds
of the samples, indicating a major shift over a relatively short period of time. One
explanation for these statistics may be the high degree of reliance on internal and external
body carriers. Though such methods can be characterized as relatively unsophisticated
and may account for the high number o f Colombian heroin seizures, they are nonetheless
demonstrably effective.191
However, it is important to note that, in addition to providing the primary market
and thus much of the demand that helps drive the hemispheric drug trade, the U.S. also
facilitates such illicit commerce in more indirect ways. For instance, the United States
itself is a major provider of precursor chemicals for Latin America drug processing,
primarily due to the relatively shorter distances involved in transporting these oftenunstable compounds, as well as being a more reliable supplier than many alternative
sources.

1Q9

An even more important enabling factor for the continuation of the regional

Smugglers Getting Ever more Sophisticated,” USA Today, 1 August 1997,4A. See also “Colombia: A new
class o f trafficker,” The Economist (web site), 11 September 1999.
191 Similarly, data from the DEA’s separate Heroin Signature Program also supports these conclusions,
noting that their findings for 1997 were that South America was supplying 75% o f U.S. heroin market. See
U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 39-41, and, for more on domestic U.S. cocaine distribution trends, which
tend to parallel those o f heroin, 11-2.
192 Furthermore, “foreign drug-trafficking groups typically import chemicals into neighboring countries in
an attempt to disguise their purpose and destination, before diverting and smuggling the chemicals to their
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drug trading cycle can be found in the methods by which Colombian TCOs are able to
repatriate the illegal proceeds of their enterprises earned in the U.S.
The black-market peso exchange is one of the main money laundering
mechanisms that has been used by Colombian drug traffickers, in which dollardenominated profits are sold at a discount to brokers, who then credit the seller an
equivalent sum in pesos through a Colombian bank. The dollars are then sold to
Colombian businesses at an exchange rate exceeding that of the official rate, and used to
finance the purchase and export of goods from the United States. This system effectively
circumvents both Colombian and U.S. currency reporting requirements.193
Yet another method allegedly used by Colombian TCOs and both their Mexican
and Dominican counterparts involves the use of international money remitters to launder
their profits. These businesses arrange payments via the electronic transfer of funds to
selected recipients in return for a commission, usually up to 10 percent of the principal.194
As the regulations governing such transactions have been tightened further since 9/11, it
would be unsurprising if the risks, and subsequently the commissions, were to rise as
well. However, in the interim, U.S. law enforcement authorities are able to utilize
Geographical Targeting Orders (GTOs) against money remitters suspected of money
laundering, which provides for a sixty-day window in which stricter reporting and record-

drug-producing laboratories.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment,
Ch. Ill, 50.
193 Ibid., Ch. II, 31. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, as much as $5 billion in drug trafficking
proceeds may be laundered annually using this method. Further details o f this mechanism can be found in
U.S. Department o f State, INL, INSCR 2001, “Money Laundering.”
194 Presently in the U.S., money remitters are now required to register with the government and to report
both suspicious activity and any transactions exceeding $100,000. U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 31.
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keeping requirements can be imposed on specific service providers in a given
geographical area.195
Similarly, in the context of the physical transfer of currency, many of the
smuggling techniques described above once more come to the fore, albeit in reverse.
According to the DEA, money launderers have begun to rely increasingly on bulk
shipments of cash in commercial export shipments, largely as a result of the successful
targeting of illicit wire transfers.196 Often such transfers of U.S. currency to Colombia
utilize commercial maritime freight mechanisms as discussed in Chapter II.197 Moreover,
because of the Colombian government’s tariff on dollar deposits, these funds are often
converted into third-country currencies, such as the Venezuelan bolivar or the Ecuadorian
sucre, and then smuggled into the country.198
Finally, as an additional example of the physical transfer of negotiable assets,
goods purchased with the proceeds of criminal activity can also be used to circumvent
money laundering strictures. For instance, according to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
195 For instance, in mid-1996 a GTO was issued in the New York metropolitan area cut the targeted money
remitters’ volume o f trade with Colombia by 30%, with several halting all such transactions and others
going out o f business completely. See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,”
12-3.
196 U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on National Security,
Statement by James Milford, Acting Deputy Administrator, DEA, before the Subcommittee on National
Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, 17 July 1997,available at
http://www.usdoi.gov/dea/pubs/cnsxtest/ct970717.htm. accessed 15 July 2004. A similar view is also noted
in U.S. DOT, National Science and Technology Council, Office o f Science and Technology Policy,
lntermodal Cargo Transportation, 14-5.
197 In general, smuggling currency out o f the U.S. in maritime exports is considered relatively easy given
the high volume o f containerized trade, and the fact that USCS resources devoted to inspecting cargo
containers are primarily focused on inbound shipping. For a thorough overview o f this issue with respect
to Colombia, see U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Currency Smuggling from U.S. Facilitated by Front Companies
Exporting Containerized Maritime Freight,” Maritime Security Report (January 1996), 3-6. Incidentally,
once repatriated the physical storage this currency can also become an issue, as in cases where drug
traffickers reportedly must dig up bundles o f plastic-wrapped currency buried in the Colombian jungle.
The money is then dried with battery-powered hair dryers so that it does not disintegrate from the humidity,
and then reburied until such time as it can be safely introduced back into the banking system. Recounted in
Bentham, 145.
198 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 104-5. Relatives o f traffickers have also been known to have
incredible streaks o f good fortune, “winning” millions o f dollars in pesos from various lotteries.
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Tobacco and Firearms, “Colombian drug traffickers often use illicit drug proceeds to
purchase cigarettes that they smuggle into Colombia for black-market sales, avoiding
high tariffs and taxes on legal tobacco imports.”199 Similarly, movable assets, such as
luxury boats, have been purchased in France, sailed back to South America and sold, thus
legitimizing the drug profits with sales receipts.200
As a prominent gateway from the greater Caribbean basin into the rest of the
contiguous United States, the state of Florida offers an interesting example in several
respects. For instance, in terms of physical geography, its relative proximity to primary
source and transit countries, as well as approximately 1,350 miles of largely unprotected
continental coastline and additional access by sea via the Florida Keys archipelago, make
the state very attractive to drug traffickers.
Given the relatively free movement of goods once they enter the United States, a
well-developed transportation infrastructure, including numerous deep-water seaports,
international airports, interstate highways and rail lines linking it to the national
transportation network, all serve to enhance Florida’s appeal in this respect. Moreover, a
diverse ethnic population, heavily influenced by immigration from Latin America, also
serves to facilitate a wide range of both formal and informal transnational transactions.
Ironically, many of the same factors that initially drew organized criminal
elements to Florida also serve to bolster the state’s competitive advantage in legitimate
international trade. Between 1990 and 1998, this trade increased by 126%, from $30.6
billion to $69.3 billion. Economic activity at Florida’s seaports accounted for $44.8

199 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 17.
200 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 108.
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billion, or 65%, of that amount.

It is not too much to say that Florida by itself exerts a

powerful international influence throughout the Caribbean basin and Latin America,
culturally as well as economically.
Throughout the state, the Colombian cartels remain the most prominent criminal
element. However, theses groups have been working to expand their associations with
Florida- and Caribbean-based Dominican, Haitian, Puerto Rican and Cuban traffickers.
Among these groups, South Florida in particular remains an international command and
control center for drug trafficking as well as money laundering. This part of the state has
also been identified as having the second largest concentration of Russian and Eurasian
immigrants in the U.S., after the greater New York metropolitan area, and logically
enough, related ethnically-based organized crime activity. As the trend toward
cooperation among criminal groups of differing ethnicities increases, the fluidity o f these
partnerships becomes more apparent as well.
These factors notwithstanding, by the early 1990’s, much of the illegal drug
traffic entering the United States had shifted further west, focusing on the extensive and
porous land border with Mexico, as discussed above. The subsequent diversion of
federal resources to the southwestern border of the United States, as well as concurrent
hurricane-related infrastructure damage in Central America, led to higher transit costs
passed on by Mexican smugglers to Colombian producers. This, in turn, helped

201 Florida Seaport Transportation and Economic Development Council, F lorida’s Seaports: Dynamic
Facilitators o f Commercial and Economic Development (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Ports Council, 2000), iii,
xi.
202 The DEA notes the use o f Mexican and Caribbean-based trafficking organizations as surrogates o f the
Colombian cartels, while Colombian alliances with Dominican and Puerto Rican groups dominated U.S.
heroin distribution along the eastern seaboard. U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), ix-x.
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facilitate the resurgence of traditional routes through the Caribbean into Florida by the
late 1990s by making them both less risky and more economically feasible.203
At the state level, the best estimate as of early 2000 for the amount of heroin
coming into Florida was between one and three MT annually.204 Colombian heroin is
considered a major problem in Orlando and a growing one in Miami, due to many of the
factors discussed above such as market penetration and higher purity levels.205 In
recognition of South Florida’s perennial attraction for drug trafficking activity, the South
Florida High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) was one of the original areas so
designated in 1990 by the U.S. federal government. Largely in response to a rise in
heroin fatalities in Orlando, a Central Florida HIDTA was also set up in 1998.206
Moreover, the ONDCP also notes the emerging role of Jacksonville in the northern part
of the state as a major transportation hub for large quantities of drugs smuggled into the
southeastern region of the country.207

203 In particular, trends include both an increase in both airdrops and drops to ‘go-fast’ boats from ‘mother
ships,’ and greater integration among Caribbean distributing organizations. Florida Department o f Law
Enforcement (FDLE), The State o f Drugs in Florida (Tallahassee, FL: FDLE, n.d.), “Smuggling and
Trafficking Trends,” available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/osi/crimebriefs/drugassessment/drugs.html.
accessed 15 July 2004. These conclusions are supported by other contemporary assessments, as noted in
U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 3-4, 9. In particular, according to the nationwide Federal Drug Seizure
System, between 1996 and 1997, maritime drug seizures increased most dramatically as a proportion o f
total seizures, with the Caribbean and South Atlantic regions ranked the highest. These same figures also
attest to a correspondingly sharp decline in seizures along the southwestern border with Mexico. See also
U.S. DOJ, NDIC, “Florida Drug Threat Assessment - Heroin” (Johnstown, PA: NDIC, July 2003),
available at http://www.usdoi.gOv/ndic/pubs5/5169/heroin.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
204 This figure comes from a consensus among participants o f the state-sponsored Florida Drug Supply
Estimating Conference, St. Augustine, Florida, 22-23 February 2000. A similar range for cocaine o f
between 150 and 200 MT was also agreed upon.
205 Florida, FDLE, The State o f Drugs in Florida 1998, Orlando and Miami regional assessments.
206 In general, the HIDTA designation allows for federal funding o f programs within the area in question
and the establishment o f interagency working groups focusing on various geographic and issue areas. See
U.S. ONDCP, “Miami HIDTA - FY 2000 Fact Sheet” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, 2000); and U.S.
ONDCP, “Central Florida HIDTA - FY 2000 Fact Sheet” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, 2000).
207 U.S. ONDCP, Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, “City o f Jacksonville, Florida: Profile o f Drug
Indicators,” (Washington, DC: ONDCP, August 1999), 4.
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Finally the growing penetration of Colombian TCOs into Canadian, European,
Asian and African markets is a trend that appears to be accelerating.208 With respect to
Europe, for instance, throughout the mid-to-late 1980s, direct cocaine shipments reached
the continent primarily through Spain and, to a lesser extent, through Italy, facilitated by
links with the Sicilian Mafia.209 As a U.S. government analysis notes, “Cultural and
linguistic ties between the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America are exploited by South
American drug traffickers who stimulate the demand for cocaine in Western Europe’s
more profitable market.” In addition to entry points along the extensive and rocky
Spanish coastline, lax border control at the Netherlands’ deep-water ports in Amsterdam
and Rotterdam also constitute a major gateway for Latin American drugs entering
Western Europe 210
Further east, before Colombia began to cultivate its own opium on a
commercially viable scale, there were numerous indications that both the Medellin and
Cali cartels made contact with their Sicilian and Russian counterparts to exchange

208 For more on Colombian TCO activity in Canada, see Canada, “Documentation: Criminal Intelligence
Service Canada, 1996 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” Transnational Organized Crime 2,
no. 4 (Winter 1996), 145-7. See also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 177-8. While noting the
primacy o f Asian networks in importing heroin, and partnership between Colombian and Canadian criminal
organizations, this report also discusses several indications that Colombian and Asian TCOs are beginning
to work together in the eastern half o f the county as well. For instance, in late 1997 a Vietnamese male
bound for Montreal was arrested at the Baranquilla airport with a significant amount o f heroin in his
luggage. Moreover, drug trafficking routes into the U.S. market via Canada are also increasingly common,
for a number o f reasons. For instance, see U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Canada, Mexico
and Central America - Canada,” which notes, “International drug traffickers attempt to route drug
shipments, primarily heroin, cocaine and MDMA (ecstasy), through Canada to the U.S. to take advantage
o f the long and open Canada-U.S. border, the massive flow o f legitimate containerized commerce, and the
lower criminal penalties compared with the U.S.”
209 See Friman, NarcoDiplomacy, 105; and Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 75.
210 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 3. OGD, World
Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 12, 89-94, also notes that in the 1980s many Colombian TCOs relocated some
command and control functions to the Galician region o f Spain in response to various pressure, but have
since grown strong enough to function largely without the assistance o f their Spanish partners.
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cocaine for heroin.211 However, as Clawson and Lee point out, drug-for-drug exchanges
of this type seem likely to diminish over time 212 Italian organized crime groups also
provide money laundering services for Colombian drug traffickers, among others 213
With respect to other regions of the world, though Japanese yakuza groups
acquire most of their heroin and methamphetamines from Chinese criminal organizations
based primarily in Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are reports of links with South
American traffickers as w ell214 Finally, as will be seen in the following chapter,
Nigerian TCOs continue to expand their global roles as drug trafficking intermediaries
for Colombian groups as well as a wide range of other criminal organizations.

Colombian Heroin Smuggling Vectors: An Assessment
In order to assess smuggling vectors out of Colombia in terms of access, risk and
connectivity, it is first necessary to revisit the various factors relating to terrain, tradition
and domestic turmoil that facilitate these vectors at their points of origination. As noted
at the outset of this chapter, the country displays a very high level of political risk in

211 For instance, in June 1995,480 pounds o f Colombian cocaine were seized in Gdansk, Poland, while a
few days later the first sizable shipment o f crack cocaine into Eastern Europe was disrupted a few
kilometers away in Gdynia. See “Cali comes to Gdansk,” The Economist, 10 June 1995, 50. Even earlier,
in February 1993, nearly a ton o f cocaine was seized in St. Petersburg. Since it would take years for the
relatively small Russian cocaine market to absorb such a quantity, it was presumed that the final destination
would be the wider European markets. For more on Colombian TCOs market penetration into Eastern
Europe, see also Pablo Galarza, “Cocaine Czechs In,” Forbes 149, no. 11 (25 May 1992), 18; and OGD,
World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 123-4. In particular, the latter notes the activities o f both Colombian
and Nigerian TCOs in the Czech Republic.
212 The authors note two reasons for this projection, namely the growth o f Colombia’s domestic heroin
industry and the gradual withdrawal o f the Sicilian criminal organizations that have cooperated in the past
with Colombian drug traffickers. Clawson and Lee, 77-8. For an earlier view o f this phenomenon, see also
Sterling, Octopus, 311-2.
213 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 6.
214 Ibid, Ch. Ill, 34. Though Japanese TCOs have not been addressed directly at length in the course o f this
study, Booth notes that, “ Although it is known that the Yakuza bankroll bulk shipments o f drugs to
Western markets, the extent o f their involvement in present day international drug trafficking is hard to
assess. They are virtually impenetrable and, given their organizational skills and financial prowess, not to
say the cover Japanese world trade can afford them, almost impossible to combat.” Booth, Opium, 310.
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terms of the methodologies discussed in Chapter IV, and in many ways parallels the case
of Afghanistan in its relatively remote terrain, endemic civil unrest and high levels of
corruption, all of which can be seen as having a distinct and ongoing impact. In addition
to the ramifications of the thriving trade in illicit drugs, the average Colombian must also
deal with kidnapping and extortion attempts, periodic bombings in urban areas, ongoing
depredations by various armed factions in rural areas, and other forms of entrenched
systemic violence.
With respect to heroin, it is important to note that opium cultivation is a relatively
recent phenomenon in Latin America and thus not nearly as embedded as coca
production, though in many ways it can be seen its natural extension. As such, it is the
latest and potentially the most lucrative of a succession of organized illegal enterprises
undertaken by both domestic and transnational Colombian criminal groups. Over the
past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in this activity, as these organizations
continue to diversify their markets, leverage their competitive advantage by way of
effective smuggling routes and methods developed to transport cocaine, and realize
greater profit margins by offering higher purity levels than their competitors, particularly
in key North American markets.
As discussed previously, the various geographic factors that serve to shape the
smugglers’ landscape at the national level can be sorted in terms of their physical,
economic, political and human dimensions. To begin with physical geography,
Colombia’s terrain is difficult even by Latin American standards, and has historically led
to a high degree o f regional isolation and subsequent autonomy. Transportation by land
is limited by absent or underdeveloped roads and rail lines, water navigation is for the
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most part constrained by the availability of navigable rivers, and there is a significant
dependence on domestic air travel.
Thus, within the country, both access and risk are impeded, though the high profit
potential of the drug trade allows it to flourish nonetheless. However in terms of
connectivity, Colombia’s porous land borders with its neighbors, ocean access to both the
Pacific and the Caribbean, and international air linkages allow a wide range of smuggling
vectors to pass through. For the most part, while certainly limited by physical geography
there is still a demonstrably wide range of options available to the relevant TCOs.
With respect to Colombia’s economic geography, the dual impact of a weak
central government and relative regional isolation have led to low economic
interdependence between different parts of the country, as well as a multiple
concentrations of populations rather than within the capital itself, in contrast to other
nations in the region. Furthermore, though near the geographic center of the country,
Bogota itself has never been a major economic center in relation to the major exports.
This centrifugal tendency has been further compounded by an overall lack o f economic
development in rural areas, which has in turn led large numbers of peasants to become
involved either voluntarily or involuntarily in drug cultivation and processing.
While more economically diversified than a number of other major drug
producing countries, the influx of drug proceeds into Colombia have had a net negative
impact nonetheless. The detrimental effects on the economy include hurting the
competitiveness of traditional industries, promoting speculative investments, and
diverting funding away from legitimate investments and into money laundering channels.
Furthermore, these conditions help to perpetuate a climate of violence that has in turn
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encouraged capital flight and discouraged legitimate foreign investment. However, the
massive profits created by the drug trade have also served to dislocate Colombia’s
economic geography to the degree that access has become deeply entrenched and risk is
largely mitigated by either bribery or coercion.
In addition to a history of ineffective central government and its ramifications,
Colombia’s political geography is also predicated upon the enduring primacy of elite
rule, to include the maintenance of power by recourse to extra-legal means when
necessary. By extension, a range of non-state actors with both political and economic
motives have arisen to contest power in various parts of the country, with their activities
often romanticized by various sectors of the population.
In the context of the drug trade, as in Afghanistan the physical control of territory
is paramount to ensuring access, mitigating risk, and accruing the resultant profits, which
has led drug traffickers to cooperate with or compete against leftist insurgencies,
paramilitary militias, or even elements of the government itself at any given point in time
and space. In particular, leverage over rural populations can be seen as crucial to
ensuring that drug production proceeds unhindered. With respect to politically-motivated
non-state actors, ideological trappings became largely secondary to the imperatives of
accruing profits as external state sponsorship waned at the end of the Cold War, not only
from the drug trade itself but also from various other illegal activities.
While in the recent past the Medellin and Cali cartels rose and fell in their
attempts to challenge the nation-state, by respectively direct and indirect means, their
successors have tended to be smaller, nimbler, and more diverse in terms of both
structure and commodities offered. However, Colombian TCOs have generally shared a
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number of other attributes that have made them extremely effective, such as their
openness to innovation, opportunism and extensive transnational presence.
This very success, however, has in turn led the U.S. government to regard drug
trafficking as perhaps the major threat within the hemisphere. Despite the vast number of
assets have been dedicated to eradicating the drug trade in Colombia, the results have
been decidedly mixed, as the empirical evidence suggests that overall connectivity has
not been appreciably impaired. In addition to programs targeting drug production and
processing upstream, U.S. vigilance with respect to the transit zone is a hallmark of these
efforts. While at times other priorities have taken precedence, the linkage of this issue
area to that o f terrorism in the wake of 9/11 should have the effect of further solidifying
this stance.
Finally, there are two primary features of Colombia’s human geography that have
an impact on the illicit drug trade, namely the presence of cross-border indigenous ethnic
groups and trends relating to the movement of populations both domestically and
internationally. With respect to the first, although the country’s indigenous ethnic groups
have been largely assimilated, their spatial distribution and sense of identity is
increasingly transnational, which in turn not only facilitates migration but also other
forms of unofficial economic activity. It should also be noted that a high proportion of
rural drug cultivators are members of these groups.
Similarly, the overall number of displaced persons within Colombia shifting back
and forth between rural and urban areas is significant, as the country has one of the
highest refugee populations outside of Africa. Externally, large and growing expatriate
communities have served to extend the potential reach of Colombian TCOs, particularly
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in the U.S. As noted previously, however, this is not to insinuate that members of these
ethnic groups are either more or less likely to be involved in illegal activity than other
individuals, but rather that their mere presence can serve to facilitate access and mitigate
risk with respect to the relevant smuggling vectors.
Thus, as in Afghanistan, a combination of physical, economic, political and
human geographic factors have come together to create a firmly entrenched drug
production and processing nexus in Colombia. However, unlike the case of Afghanistan,
drug smuggling vectors moving outward from Colombia are largely controlled to some
degree by Colombian TCOs. Over the past several decades, these groups have dominated
the hemispheric trade in illicit drugs, especially with respect to the linkages between
South American supply and predominantly North American demand.
As discussed in Chapter III, in some respects the demand side of this equation
frames the geographic parameters for much of this activity as these smuggling vectors
move generally northward. Colombian TCOs have been demonstrably success in
adapting to changes in the smugglers’ landscape by maintaining a considerable degree of
access to key production areas and markets, and managing their risks by either mitigating
them or shifting to less risky venues. However, the transnational logistics linking these
products to primary markets, particularly those in North America are crucial as well.
The relevant sets of smuggling vectors exiting Colombia can be broken down into
those proceeding respectively by land, by water and by air. By land, Colombia’s borders
are contiguous with those of Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama. By water,
the country’s maritime access via both seaports and an extensive coastline allow for
transit through both the greater Caribbean basin but the Pacific Ocean as well. By air,
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both primary and secondary air connections also serve to facilitate a wide range of
smuggling activity. Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that the transnational
movement of heroin is often inextricably linked to, and in some cases actually
coexistence with, that of cocaine.
Beginning with smuggling vectors exiting Colombia by land, there are numerous
documented instances of drug smuggling vectors exiting the country via Ecuador. In
terms of access, in addition to types of terrain similar to those found in Colombia,
evidence o f Ecuador’s porous borders can be found in the spread of certain aspects of the
drug trade, kidnapping and other forms of illicit cross-border activity between the two
countries. In addition to proximity to both Colombian and Peruvian drug producing
areas, access to the country’s Pacific seaports and banking structure have allowed
Colombian TCOs more options for smuggling as well as money laundering. Conversely,
risk for these organizations is minimized by avoidance of some of the scrutiny that
travelers and goods departing Colombia must endure.
In the case of Peru, there are a number of parallels with Colombia with respect to
large-scale drug production and rural insurgency. However, the waning influence of the
primary insurgent group in recent years has led to more operational scope for Colombian
traffickers. While at the domestic level the interaction between these two types of non
state actors is similar to that found in Colombia, the transnational impact of these
activities is for the most part managed under the auspices of Colombian TCOs. The
regional preponderance of Colombian TCOs in both Peru and Bolivia can be seen in the
demonstrable ability o f these organizations to gain access to upstream operations at a
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minimum of risk, in turn allowing them to in turn leverage these countries’ potential for
connectivity as well.
With respect to Brazil, the attractiveness of smuggling vectors out of Colombia
moving eastward into the Amazon Basin and beyond hinges more on the issue of risk
than of access. Incursions across the border by both Colombian non-state actors and
government forces have been met with force as well as diplomatic protests. Furthermore,
Colombian TCOs are not nearly as dominant in Brazil as elsewhere in the region, with
some analysts seeing a greater Brazilian presence in the hemispheric drug trade in the
near future. As such, Colombian TCOs must contend not only with risks imposed by
government forces from both countries, but by competing criminal organizations as well.
As in Brazil, the spillover of not only drug-related activity but also the flow of
both arms and refugees into Venezuela has become a significant issue. The failure of the
current Venezuelan leadership to control this phenomenon has given Colombian
insurgent groups in particular considerable sway within the border region. A
combination of lax law enforcement and civil unrest have both enabled access and
mitigated risks to Colombian TCOs and allowed them to take advantage of the country’s
considerable connectivity as a result.
As the last of Colombia’s contiguous neighbors, Panama is also the gateway by
land to the rest of Central America and Mexico, with its control of the Panama Canal
further multiplying available smuggling vector options. The country’s history of
involvement in the hemispheric drug trade and the use of routes from northwestern
Colombia into southern Panama to move illicit drugs also illustrate the reach of
Colombian TCOs in particular. These organizations have been able to gain access to
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Panama’s transportation infrastructure and financial system, while the relocation o f U.S.
military assets and the relative inefficiency of Panamanian law enforcement and legal
apparatus serves to keep risks to a minimum as smuggling vectors continue north by land.
The land border between Mexico and the United States is often the last barrier for
many of the smuggling vectors originating in Colombia and traveling either by land or by
water. In addition to very favorable access stemming for the most part from its physical
proximity to major markets, the sheer volume of goods and people moving both legally
and illegally serves to minimize risk. Moreover, such factors as the ratification of
NAFTA, high levels of public corruption, and various types of strategic partnership
between Mexican and Colombian TCOs further mitigate these risks. Generally speaking,
a cyclical pattern of drug smuggling activity emerges, with activity shifting between the
Mexican land border and maritime approaches via the greater Caribbean basin, often in
response to U.S. law enforcement efforts.
Returning to Colombia proper, smuggling vectors by water can exit the country
across either the eastern Pacific or the Caribbean. In general, routes utilizing the Pacific
can return to land at any point along the western seaboard of Central or North America
where risks can be minimized most effectively. Potentially offering more options in
terms of access by virtue of its many islands and archipelagoes, and consequently more
complexity, smuggling vectors crossing the Caribbean tend to be dominated by
Colombian TCOs or their surrogates. However, the risks involved in transiting the region
by water are highly dependent on the U.S. interdiction posture at any given point in time,
and different islands or sets of islands offering optimal connectivity as a result.
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Finally, with respect to air modes of transportation, both private and commercial
aviation serve to facilitate a wide range of drug-related activity within Colombia.
Outbound smuggling vectors from Colombia utilizing international commercial air links
tend to involve either relatively small quantities carried by passengers or in luggage, or
larger amounts in air cargo in cases where access can be controlled. While private air
transit offers greater latitude, it is still constrained by geography as well as subject to
monitoring by law enforcement entities. Smuggling vectors moving through airports also
face tremendously increased scrutiny since 9/11, and thus much greater risk.
In the past, issues revolving around cocaine trafficking held primacy in U.S.
policy-making, while Europe and other regions of the world have traditionally been more
concerned with the transnational heroin trade. Though an increasing share of the world’s
opium supply is now produced in Latin America, by contrast coca is rarely produced
outside the region. Moreover, the blurring of formerly distinct lines between different
black markets continues apace. As such, the radical alteration of familiar patterns will
most likely become increasingly common as the global economic and political climate
changes.
Colombian TCOs are in many respects uniquely suited to take advantage of this
evolution, and are continuing to expand their influence well beyond the hemisphere.
These groups exhibit not only a highly sophisticated capability to manage extensive
transnational supply chains, but also to prosper in the relatively difficult operational
environment posed by the U.S. This is true not only with respect to drug smuggling
vectors, as seen in the case of Florida, but also to money laundering as well.
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Given this combination of experience and adherence to “best practices” within the
field of smuggling, in the future the roads north may not be the only ones eventually
dominated by Colombian TCOs. However, while these organizations have a
demonstrable influence over the relevant logistical channels linking both their domestic
drug production and that of much of the adjacent region to the major hemispheric markets
in North America, in geographical terms their expansion to date has not been nearly as
great beyond its core areas of hemispheric operation.
By contrast, Nigerian TCOs can be seen as taking this business model a step
further by dispensing with the need to actually maintain control of drug cultivation areas
and focus on connecting areas of supply and demand at a global level. However, before
moving on to that issue, the next chapter examines the various extant conditions within
Nigeria that have both facilitated the growth of such entities and continue to provide them
with a safe haven.
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CHAPTER VII
ENABLING THE ENTERPRISE:
NIGERIA AND ITS TRANSNATIONAL HEROIN SMUGGLING VECTORS

The final case study in this analysis is that of Nigeria. While not itself a major
producer of opiates, the country has emerged as a major trafficking hub for heroin almost
in spite of its physical geography. The primary function of Nigerian TCOs in this context
is particularly important, as they provide the “legs’ for a high volume of transnational
heroin smuggling activity. This chapter represents a bit of a departure in terms of format
compared to the previous two case studies, in which the relevant set of smuggling vectors
reflect heroin solely in transit without the previously associated aspects of production.
As such, the first section deals with the domestic situation in Nigeria that enables
widespread criminal enterprises, of which smuggling forms only a portion, to flourish.
As such, endemic corruption, the legacy of colonial borders, the impact of oil’s
dominance on the national economy, and the role of ethno-linguistic social ties and
tensions are all germane to this discussion. Even in cases where this activity does not
actually occur on Nigerian territory, the favorable smugglers’ landscape of the country
provides an important enabling factor.
While the role of Nigeria proper as a base of operations is critical, in terms of
transnational access, risk and connectivity an analysis of Nigerian TCOs demonstrates
how discrete regional smuggling actors can interact with wider global black markets to
form a seamless logistical continuum. The second section addresses the scope and
activities of these organizations directly, with a focus on their expansion in recent years.
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In particular, the demonstrable adaptability of these groups, particularly with respect to
routes and methods, has been a major contributing factor to their continuing expansion.
The Nigerian government’s attempts to address the problem are also addressed, as is the
spatial distribution of Nigerian and other West African expatriate communities. Finally,
an assessment is made of the relevant smuggling vectors in terms of models, conventions
and parameters used throughout this study.
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Fig. 20. Nigeria and surrounding region1

1 Map source: U.S. CIA, CIA WorldFactbook (2002).
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Crime and Corruption in Nigeria: On Fertile Ground
While perhaps neither better nor worse in terms of crime and corruption than
many other places in sub-Saharan Africa, what does stand out in the case o f Nigeria are
the scale and the scope o f these activities. A multi-ethnic federation of 36 states, plus the
federal capital territory of Abuja, the country encompasses more than 250 distinct ethnolinguistic groups. Furthermore, its demographic weight of 120 million represents
approximately 20% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa.
Adding to existing internal and regional tensions, Nigeria’s large and ethnically
diverse populace has long been entangled in an extremely intense competition for access
to state resources, primarily the massive nationalized petroleum revenues, via a highly
developed spoils system. As Jeffrey Herbst notes, “Nigeria’s problems stem from a
peculiarly corrupt political economy combined with an unfortunately generous oil
9
reserve.” Even more succinctly, The Economist observes that, “To understand Nigerian
•

•

•

politics, you have to go back to one event: the discovery of oil.”3
However, in some respects the root cause of Nigeria’s ills is even more
fundamental. As starkly put by Chinua Achebe, “The trouble with Nigeria is simply and
squarely a failure of leadership . . . The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability
of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example that are the
hallmarks of true leadership.”4 The ramifications of this sustained failure of leadership

2 Jeffrey Herbst, “Is Nigeria a Viable State?” The Washington Quarterly 19, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 156. The
author also notes “the pernicious political dynamic in which control o f the state became critical in order to
regulate the flow o f patronage.”
3 “Let down again: A survey o f Nigeria,” The Economist, 21August 1993, 4.
4 Chinua Achebe, The Trouble with Nigeria (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing, 1985), 3.
Putting the issue even more squarely within the context o f this analysis, U.S. Department o f State, INL,
INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Nigeria,” notes that “the narcotics and crime problems in
Nigeria are deeply rooted in Nigeria's present governmental system, and in Nigerian society. It will require
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across the course of decades will become self-evident as this analysis progresses.
Beyond the national context, this state of affairs is particularly relevant in that the
combination of Nigeria’s instability and strategic weight has the potential to further
disrupt an already-fragile West African region, if not the entire continent.
As such, Nigeria offers extensive and fertile ground for a wide range of illegal
activity, particularly for those with the proper political connections. The country itself
has been described by one unnamed U.S. expert as a “massive criminal enterprise,”
largely due to its role as a major transit point for heroin from Asia and other drugs en
route to Europe and the United States.5 As noted in 1995, “Nigeria’s farmers have not
gotten around to growing coca or poppies. But its entrepreneurs recognize a commercial
opportunity when they see one, and there is no business as profitable as selling other
people’s drugs. Though far from the narcotic-growing zones of Latin America and Asia,
Nigeria has become a big distribution hub.”6
Since that time these trends have all accelerated. However, from an even wider
perspective, one recent estimate characterizes nearly 80% of Nigeria’s GDP as coming
from the “shadow economy.”7 As such, in addition to drug trafficking, a host of related

courageous political will for any Nigerian government to confront these difficult issues and bring about
meaningful change.”
5 Quoted in Dan Connell and Frank Smyth, “Africa’s New Bloc,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (March-April
1998), 88.
6 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist (web edition), 26 August 1995. This article also notes the
increasing use o f drugs in the country, particularly among young urban males.
7 The supporting data is from a study by Friedrich Schneider o f Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria,
as cited in “Black hole,” The Economist, 28 August 1999, 59. This is the highest percentage among those
countries listed, and as such serves as a key indicator o f the level o f corruption endemic to Nigeria.
Incidentally, the term “shadow economy,” or the gap between the reported and actual GDP, is meant to
cover not only overtly illegal economic activity but also unrecorded legal income. It is further noted that in
emerging economies, “the shadow economy is driven not so much by the incentive to avoid taxes, which
tend to be lower than in rich countries, as by a desire to evade the law.” For a more focused analysis o f this
issue in the African context, see also Stephen Ellis and Janet MacGaffey, “Research on sub-Saharan
Africa’s unrecorded international trade: some methodological and conceptual problems,” African Studies
Review 39, no. 2 (September 1996), 19-42. A contrasting point o f view is that black markets in Africa

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

345

and subsidiary phenomena necessarily contribute to this state of affairs. For instance, the
west coast of Africa, off Nigeria and Senegal, is one of the two most piracy-prone areas
o

of the continent. However, another more invasive and far-reaching phenomena is the
prominence of Nigerian groups in certain types of financial fraud.
In particular, the solicitation of bogus advance fees from both individuals and
businesses, in return for promised later windfalls, has proved quite lucrative. This class
of criminal activity is know as “419” fraud, named for the relevant statute of the Nigerian
penal code. Often, the perpetrators pose as officials representing the Nigerian
government, banking establishment or national oil company. Furthermore, such groups
also “capitalize on their ability to produce fraudulent identities and to suborn key
employees of banks and companies in order to steal customer credit card data.”9

represent a dynamic force allowing the poorest elements o f society to survive in the face o f failing
institutions and official corruption. An example o f this perspective can be found in Tom Nevin, “The black
market: alive and kicking in Africa,” African Business, no. 299 (February 1998), 8-11.
8 See U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 16; and “Those in
peril on the sea,” The Economist, 9 August 1997, 40. The other main piracy area in Africa lies off
Somalia’s east coast. While other regions, particularly Southeast Asia, have experienced more incidents in
recent years, in Nigerian waters such activity is often coupled with the taking o f hostages. Moreover, in
general, African piracy tends to be characterized by a higher degree o f violence than that found elsewhere.
Lawrence J. Kahn, “Piracy: A Problem for the 21st Century,” presented at annual meeting o f the National
Cargo Security Council, New Orleans, Louisiana, 5 June 2000.
9 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. II, 25-6. See also
“Nigerian Fraud Syndicate Exposed,” African News Service, 25 August 1999, 100823u6870, which notes
the solicitation by mail o f British businesses to pay money up front in order to expedite the laundering o f
money for a percentage o f the principal. Inevitably the participants see neither their investment again, nor
the promised profit. Incidentally, in early 2002 the author was approached twice via e-mail by parties
purporting to represent the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) within the first two months
o f setting up a consulting practice. These messages illustrate a relatively obvious example o f attempted
advance fee fraud, which aims to entice victims into providing up-front funding for “necessary” expenses
such as bribes, taxes and legal fees, in return for lucrative windfall profits. For a thorough overview o f this
phenomenon, see also U.S. Congress, House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime: Testimony
Provided by U.S. Officials before the Subcommittee on Africa o f the House International Relations
Committee,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 91-101. For more recent
permutations o f this phenomenon, see also “Scam o f scams,” The Economist, 24 August 2002, 56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

346

Generically speaking, significant ambiguity surrounds Africa’s overall economic
performance, a situation underlined by the difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics.10
However, by international and even regional standards, Nigeria represents a particularly
salient example of economic mismanagement and corruption. For instance, in his study
of Nigerian business activity, Tom Forrest acknowledges that, “problems of measurement
exist because of the porous nature of the Nigerian economy. Unofficial flows of goods,
services, currency and labour across international boundaries in West Africa are
important and may alter orders of magnitude.”11
The issue of corruption was initially discussed in Chapter II, and is pivotal to
understanding much of the economic and political activity that occurs across the
continent. However, it would be unfair to even broach this topic, endemic throughout
sub-Saharan Africa as well as many other part of the world, without initial reference to
the enabling factors, predominantly multinational corporations willing to pay the
necessary bribes in order to do business.12
As the Speaker of the South African Parliament, Dr. Frene Giniwalla, observed at
a European Business Ethics Conference in Frankfurt that the dictionary definition of
corruption makes no distinction between the receiver and the payer of a bribe.
Furthermore, the following point was also emphasized as well: “The truth is that
international corruption is often tacitly supported and actively encouraged by Western

10 These issues are highlighted in Richard Grant and John Agnew, “Representing Africa: the geography o f
Africa in world trade, 1960-1992,” The Annals o f the Association ofAmerican Geographers 86, no. 4
(December 1996), 729-94.
11 Tom Forrest, The Advance o f African Capital: The Growth o f Nigerian Private Enterprise
(Charlottesville, VA: University Press o f Virginia, 1994), 10-1. Moreover, despite a relatively optimistic
assessment o f the nation’s economic activity and progress, the author does acknowledge that some o f his
accounts are “overly sanitized” with respect to both political corruption and drug trafficking.
12 For more on this issue as it relates to the African context, see Anver Versi, “On corruption and
corrupters,” African Business, no. 215 (November 1996), 7.
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countries. While most countries have laws against domestic corruption, only one - the
USA - has made it illegal to bribe foreign officials. Many countries consider bribes to be
legitimate business expenses that are deductible for tax purposes.”13
As an analytical point of departure with respect to corruption in Nigeria, however,
it is worth returning to Paulo Mauro’s outline of the relevant casual factors involved in
public sector corruption, all of which are quite evident throughout the Nigerian body
politic. In particular, the relevant factors include various forms of government
regulation, such as trade restrictions, subsidies and price controls, multiple exchange rates
and low civil service wages. Furthermore, the author also notes the impact of natural
resource endowments, predominantly oil in this case, and sociological factors, in
particular strong kinship ties and subsequent ethnic factionalization as will be discussed
below.14
According to the international organization Transparency International, Nigeria
remained at the bottom of its annual Corruption Perception Index for 2000. However,
while acknowledging efforts by the current government to stem systemic corruption, this
report also noted that such entrenched attitudes take a long time to modify.15 Thus,

13 Quoted in Ibid., 7-8.
14 Mauro, 4-5. Further putting these issues into context, see also Charap and Harm, 14-9. While critical o f
the more apologetic literature with respect to this subject, the authors note that definitions o f corruption
generally come from modem societies that take political legitimacy for granted and liberally use the term to
characterize other societies with a wholly different set o f structures and objectives.
15 See Barbara Crossette, “List Shows Corruption is Lingering,” New York Times (web edition), 16
September 2000. The annual Corruption Perception Index is based on surveys o f risk analysts and
representatives from international economic organizations. For the report itself, as well as more
information on the underlying methodology, see Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index
Report 2000, available at http://www.transnarencv.org/cpi/2000/cpi2000.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
Interestingly, this is the first time that data has covered a three-year period, 1998-2000, rather than just a
single year, which may serve to make the effects o f Nigeria’s current anticorruption drive take longer to
register. However, a relatively unprecedented step in the right direction took place in August 2000 with the
impeachment o f Chuba Okadigbo, the president o f the Nigerian senate and thus the third highest official in
the country, in relation to irregularities in the awarding o f contracts. See “Nigerian senate president
impeached after corruption inquiry,” CNN.com, 9 August 2000.
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understandably enough, when the roots of corruption run this deep there are no easy
solutions.
For instance, James T. Gire makes an excellent case that Nigeria’s poor record of
punishing corruption, particularly among the prevailing oligarchy, has led to other people
emulating these corrupt activities to the point that the phenomenon has become pervasive
at all levels of society.16 The tangible impact of this demonstration effect is that as law
and order are undermined and the judicial system is blatantly skewed in favor of the rich,
powerful and connected, the faith of ordinary Nigerians in their governing institutions
becomes still further eroded.
Similarly, and with broader application throughout sub-Saharan Africa, George B.
Ayittey develops the concept of the “vampire state” to delineate the detrimental effect of
corruption on countries with weak democratic institutions. As such, Nigeria presents a
prime example of a predatory oligarchy benefiting from providing less public order and
avoiding good governance as defined in Chapter II, thus expanding the opportunities for
corruption.17
Understanding this wider pattern of systemic crime and corruption, as well as its
evolution, is a necessary precursor to the analysis of Nigeria’s role in the transnational
smuggling of heroin. In keeping with the structure used in previous chapters, this section
addresses the key elements of Nigeria’s physical, economic, political and human
geography that have led to the country’s rise to prominence within the realm of
16 James T. Gire, “A Psychological Analysis o f Corruption in Nigeria,” Journal o f Sustainable
Development 1, no.2 (Summer 1999), 1-11. See also George B. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1992), 249-53.
17 This characterization is developed at length in George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos (New York: St.
Martin’s Griffin, 1999), 149-84. See also Douglas Marcouiller and Leslie Young, “The black hole o f
graft: the predatory state and the informal economy,” American Economic Review 85, no. 3 (June 1995),
630-46; and William Renko, “Clandestine Economies, Violence and States in Africa,” Journal o f
International Affair 53, no. 2 (Spring 2000), 433-60.
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transnational criminal activity. As with other aspects of this analysis, the divisions
between these spatial variables are not clear-cut, and interactions among them will be
discussed in context.
However, as in the previous case studies, to put these issues in perspective a brief
overview of the Nigerian historical experience serves as the initial framework for this
discussion. In particular, European colonialism set the stage for many of Nigeria’s
subsequent ills, most specifically with respect to international borders and endemic ethnic
tensions. Moreover, many of these same unfortunate legacies can be seen across much of
the rest of the continent.18 As this era began to unfold, an important component
underpinning stability of the international system based on a balance of power was the
capacity of Europe to expand its political, economic and military control of nonEuropean territories.19
The watershed of this activity was exemplified by the “Scramble for Africa,” the
upsurge of European imperialism lasting from the 1870s to the 1890s that formalized the
political partition of the continent. Incidentally, the imperatives to maintain the overall
18 With respect to pre-colonial West Africa, most relations among political entities appear to have been
predicated upon asymmetries o f power and the extraction o f various forms o f tribute. For an overview o f
these issues, see Robert S. Smith, Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa, 2nd ed. (Madison:
University o f Wisconsin Press, 1989). See also E. A. Boateng, A Political Geography o f Africa (London,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 105-11, which notes the prior to the arrival o f the Europeans,
trade had flowed primarily via routes across the Sahara. However, as commercial activity utilizing the
West African seaboard expanded, a steady movement o f people from the interior to coastal areas began,
along with a series o f powerful new kingdoms springing up. Though these were generally short-lived and
small in area, they mainly conformed to current linguistic and tribal groupings.
19 There can be little doubt that Europe’s relative technical capabilities largely enabled these efforts.
Robert L. O’Connell makes the case that, like the first period o f European imperial expansion following the
introduction o f firearms, “the second climactic period o f Western imperialism fell neatly in sync with the
multifarious improvements in arms which took place during the latter half o f the nineteenth century.” He
further characterizes the partition o f Africa as taking place with “almost ridiculous ease.” Small groups o f
Europeans armed with machine guns, “the perfect labour-saving device,” time and again proved perfectly
capable o f slaughtering vast numbers o f African warriors. Robert L. O’Connell, O f Arms and Men (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 231. See also Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools o f Empire: Technology
and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
However, with respect to both West and Central Africa in particular, the European penetration o f the
interior also had to wait until suitable anti-malarial drugs had been developed.
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European balance of power during this period led to a convergence of Great Power
interests in this issue area, with relevance not only to the status of colonial territories but
also to wider issues involving the existing international system.20
However, neither imperial ambition nor technological prowess alone fully
explains European motivations. One major drawback of a metrocentric analytical
approach to this phenomenon is that it gives too much credit to central governments’
capabilities and intentions in the planning and execution of colonial endeavors. As the
Scramble gained a momentum of its own, the relevant national actors were often
compelled by circumstances beyond their immediate control, often predicated on the
maneuvers of non-state actors such as missionary groups or private commercial ventures.
As such, rather than well-constructed strategies, either geopolitical or economic,
the resultant pressures led to a mixed legacy as European colonial powers annexed large
territories and developed spheres of influence, with varying degrees of administrative
oversight, as the relatively short-term perceived interests of the time dictated.21 Evidence
of these decisions, some apparently arbitrary even when being made, can be seen today
all across the map of Africa.

20 With particular reference to the European partition o f Africa, as informal arrangements became
increasingly less viable and the competition for influence and territory escalated, it became necessary to
construct a framework for addressing these potentially volatile issues. The Berlin Conference o f 1884-85
was in many respects an attempt to establish an international security regime to regulate this competition.
As such, it aptly fits Robert Jervis’ definition o f a security regime as “those principles, rules and norms that
permit nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.” Robert Jervis,
“Security Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983), 173. See also Mark B. Slater, Barbarians and Civilization in International Relations (London: Pluto
Press, 2002), 37-9.
21 These included moves by other powers, initiatives by traders and administrators in existing colonies,
public opinion, low perceived risk in comparison to returns, and the very situation the Berlin Conference
was called upon to address, the breakdown o f existing informal arrangements. David Kaiser, Politics and
War: European Conflictfrom Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 283. For
more background, see also Michael Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); and
Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble fo r Africa: The White M an’s Conquest o f the Dark Continent from 1876
to 1912 (New York: Random House, 1991).
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As part of the British colonial empire, Nigeria was initially governed as three
separate regions, namely the north, east and west, each with its own capital and
administration. With respect to these three regions, they also roughly coincided with the
three dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Ibo or Igbo in the south,
and the Yoruba in the west. While the impact of Nigeria’s multiethnic dynamics is
discussed in context below, the following map illustrates the underlying demographic
distribution in spatial terms:
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Fig. 21. Nigerian ethnic groups22

In particular, indirect rule along the lines of the sub-continental Indian colonial
model was common in the north. However, the decision of Frederick Lugard, the first
governor-general of Nigeria, to administratively integrate the culturally disparate
22 Map source: University o f Iowa, “Art and Life in Africa - Nigeria Information,” available at
http://www.uiowa.edu/~africart/toc/countries/Nigeria.html. accessed 15 July 2004.
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northern and southern portions of the territory in 1914 was to prove pivotal to the
country’s future.

Furthermore, during this period, the British administration appears to

have been content to overlook local corruption as long as Africans did not challenge their
supremacy at the national level, an ominous precedent for the nation’s future.24
Following the Second World War, a broad wave of decolonization began to
sweep across the globe, with Nigeria achieving self-rule and statehood in I960.25 The
country’s initial attempt at democracy came under Nnamdi Azikiwe, from 1960 to 1966.
Following a series of four military rulers, notably Yakubu Gowon from 1966 to 1975,
and Olusegun Obasanjo from 1976 to 1979, there was a second attempt at democracy
under Shehu Shagari from 1979 to 1983.26
From 1984 to 1993, the country once again experienced military rule under
Muhammadu Buhari for the first two years and Ibrahim Babangida for the remainder.
After a brief interim of civilian rule under Ernest Shonekan in 1993, there came the
military dictatorship of Sani Abacha that lasted until his sudden death in 1998.27

23 See Eghosa E. Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1998), 1-12.
24 See Robert L. Tignor, “Political corruption in Nigeria before independence,” Journal o f Modern African
Studies 31, no. 2 (June 1993), 175-202. The author also notes that British officials used the corruption
issue in an attempt to delay the implementation o f Nigerian self-rule. Underlining the link between the
colonial legacy and ongoing issues o f corruption, Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 25, further notes that, “The
elite in Nigeria is factionalized mainly along ethnic, regional, religious and institutional lines, being the
product o f the uneven development and rivalry which British colonial administration fostered among the
different segments.”
25 For a broad ranging analysis o f decolonization in West Africa, see Rudolf Von Albertini,
Decolonization: The Administration and Future o f the Colonies, 1919-1960 (New York: Holmes & Meier,
1982), 124-41.
26 The two other military rulers during this period, Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi during 1966, and Murtala
Muhammed from 1975 to 1976, were assassinated in office. For more on patterns o f military involvement
in Nigerian politics, see also Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 54-6.
27 See “Nigeria’s unexpected chance,” The Economist, 13 June 1998,43. It was widely expected that Chief
Mashood Abiola, who was widely considered as duly elected when Abacha seized power and thus was
subsequently imprisoned, would take over as head o f state. However, a month later Abiola was dead as
well, due to an apparent heart attack while still in custody. See “Abiola’s dangerous death,” The
Economist, 11 July 1998,47. An excellent time line o f the various Nigerian regimes since independence
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Following a caretaker military government under Abdulsalami Abubakar, Obasanjo
returned as an elected head of state in early 1999, a position he still retains as of this
writing.
At the time of independence, Nigeria’s new leaders rejected the former British
system of a three-region parliament in favor of an American-style federal presidential
•

•

system, in many ways an extension of Lugard’s policies of centralization.

98

Though

originally the federation centered on the three dominant ethnic groups, as noted above,
this later expanded to four states in 1963, to twelve and then nineteen in 1976, to thirty in
1991, and finally to thirty-six in 1996.
However, a key flaw in this national conceptualization from the outset was that
nearly all allocation of revenues ran outward from center. As such, with respect to the
prevailing group identities, smaller tribes with no states under their collective control
often had no real voice in national or even local affairs. Moreover, further compounding
this situation at all levels, from collective to individual, is the ongoing issue of
legitimacy.
The example of the British during the colonial period, though not the worst by
relative standards, was still highly exploitative, and this unfortunate legacy can still be

up to this point can be found in “Nigeria’s long road back to democracy,” The Economist, 12 December
1998,45.
28 See “Let down again,” The Economist, 5. See also E. Ike Udogu, “The allurement o f ethnonationalism in
Nigerian politics: the contemporary debate,” Journal o f Asian and African Studies 29, no. 3-4 (JulyOctober 1994), 164-7, in which the author notes that the debate on the potential balkanization o f Nigeria
into geo-ethnic entities is not new, and in fact can be traced back to the colonial period. Specifically
germane to this issue, the author includes a 1947 quote by Chief Obafemi Awolowo: “Nigeria is not a
nation. It is merely a geographic expression. There are not ‘Nigerians’ in the same way there are
‘English,’ ‘Welsh,” or ‘French.’ The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those
who live within the boundaries o f Nigeria from those who do not.”
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seen repeating itself in the policies of successive governments.29 Even from the outset, as
The Economist notes, “When Britain . . . left Nigeria, it handed authority over not to
traditional rulers, who were viewed as having some legitimacy, but to doctors, lawyers
and the horde o f literate hustlers who did well in the British bureaucracy and the British
army and now make up Nigeria’s ruling class.” 30
While the blame for the initial failure of these leaders to connect with ordinary
citizens must be shared between both the outgoing British and incoming Nigerian
administrations, the onus must rest upon the latter and their successors for subsequent
shortcomings.31 As long as these pernicious systemic issues persist, the resultant friction
between the rule of law and that of expediency will continue to plague the country. For
instance, it is interesting to note the distinction between the various transitions to civilian
rule, and that to democracy.
Highlighting this aspect of Nigerian politics, Amadu Sesay and Abiodum Alao
point out that, “Democratization implies popular participation, free choice, popular will,
etc., and it can only take place in an atmosphere devoid of military pressure. But the
handing over of power to civilians by the military rarely takes into cognizance these

29 Even when compared to the rest o f Africa, as Beoteng notes, “Unlike the rest o f the continent, especially
East, South and North Africa, where the climactic and other physical conditions made a permanent white
settlement possible, West Africa never experienced permanent settlement by Europeans, and trade and
other forms o f economic exploitation remained the primary object o f European colonization efforts within
the region.” Boateng, 102.
30 “The roots o f violence,” The Economist, 15 September 2001, 42. As evidence o f the ordinary Nigerian
citizen’s attitude toward those in power, Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, 35, notes that, “Most Nigerians collapsed
into hysterical laughter when they heard their late head o f state, General Sani Abacha, had launched a ‘war
on corruption,’” as much o f the looting o f state assets was carried out by his own inner circle.
31 Taking a somewhat more charitable view, Herbst argues that the leadership in Nigeria is not significantly
worse than elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. However, he does continue by noting that, “Nigeria stands
out as a country whose national design has resulted in a political economy that may prevent it from moving
forward irrespective o f who is in charge and that will, seemingly inevitably, spiral downward.” Herbst,
154.
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elements of democracy. Thus, many transitions end up as ‘stop gaps.”’32 As such, much
of Nigeria’s political experience since independence can be seen as a near-perpetual
transition to democratic rule, an end that appears no closer to fruition now than upon the
eve of self-rule. Moreover, given the continuity of corruption and incentives to
clientelism throughout the country’s history, democratization alone does not necessarily
constitute the antidote to Nigeria’s many ills.33
Within its current boundaries, Nigeria encompasses 923,768 square kilometers of
territory, with an estimated 4,049 kilometers of shared land borders with Benin, Niger,
Chad and Cameroon, and a nautical coastline of 1,600 kilometers. A further 9,000
kilometers of navigable inland waterways, primarily along the Niger and Benue Rivers,
link the hinterland with the seacoast. The seacoast itself is comprised of a thick belt of
mangrove swamp stretching from the border with Benin to the west and with Cameroon
to the east, offering many opportunities for illegal smuggling activity.34 In addition to
this maritime access via its five major seaports, international airport facilities such as that
32 Amadu Sesay and Abiodum Alao, “Democracy and Security in Africa: The Changing Nature o f a
Linkage,” in Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspectives on Security, ed. Adebayo Oyebade and
Abiodun Alao (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1998), 53. See also Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, 241-3.
33 As Herbst notes, this became particularly apparent during Nigeria’s second attempt at democracy under
Shehu Shagari, from 1979 to 1983, “After the fact investigations by subsequent military governments
discovered levels o f corruption . . . that astonished many even in a country long familiar with statesponsored theft.” Herbst, 174. The following passage illustrates the disgraceful benchmark this
administration set: “With a great potential for a viable economy and a sound industrial base, Nigeria, soon
after independence, launched itself on the path o f economic mismanagement and large scale corruption.
The Second Republic especially epitomized the height to which corruption could climb in an African
country. In 1979, when the military left the political stage, Nigeria’s external reserve was $5.1 billion. The
country, in addition, earned some $51.6 billion from petroleum and non-oil exports between 1979 and
1983. But by the time the civilian administration was terminated in December 1983, the country was
indebted externally and internally to the tune o f $26 billion. This meant that in four years, the government
o f the Second Republic had access to over $82 billion our o f which $17 billion could not be accounted for.”
Victor Oguejiofor Okafor and Sheriffdeen Telia, “Economic Development and the Prospect for Economic
Security in Africa,” in Oyebade and Alao, 21. However, a differing point o f view is offered by Gire, 5,
who notes that, “ft is common knowledge today that the best time to embezzle money in Nigeria is during a
military regime because the military is never probed.”
34 These physical parameters and their impact are set out in U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime
Prevention (ODCCP), “Nigeria Country Profile - Political and Economic Situation,” (New York: ODCCP,
22 June 2002), 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

356

in Lagos provide moderately good commercial links between Nigeria and the rest of the
world.
However, in the context of physical geography, the single most important factor
contributing to Nigeria’s present situation is the existence of massive petroleum reserves
within its territory, primarily centering in the Niger River delta region. Oil exploration
within the county began in 1937 as a joint venture between Shell Oil and British
i f

Petroleum, with the first positive indications of extensive reserves being found in 1956.
Unfortunately, Nigeria’s overall experience with oil wealth and its subsidiary effects can
be characterized as highly detrimental, and lends credence to the argument that an
abundance of natural resources may not always be considered a blessing.36
Rather than being used for productive purposes, in effect Nigerian oil revenues
both overshadow and taint much of the country’s economic, political and human
landscape. Dating from the early 1970s, a sharp rise in Nigeria’s revenues from
petroleum due to a combination of increases in production and higher prices worldwide
also made political power more valuable, especially after the oil sector was nationalized
in 1979.37 As a result, the already heated competition among the various ethnic groups
for control of the state and its attendant political processes can be seen as becoming all
the more pronounced.
35 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Questfo r Oil, Money and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1991), 527.
36 For a more generic discussion o f the seemingly paradoxical role that natural resources can have in
impoverishing countries, see also “Ungenerous endowments,” The Economist, 23 December 1995, 87-89.
In particular, it is noted that, compared to human and capital resources, “The value o f natural resources is,
indeed, clear - provided that other things are equal. The trouble is that other things are never equal.” An
overview o f African oil production can be found in Jonathan Bearman, “Oil: The barrel runneth over,”
African Business, no. 211 (June 1996), 8-11. For further examples o f how oil dislocates other economies in
West Africa, specifically Sao Tom6, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, see also “What oil can do to tiny
states,” The Economist, 25 January 2003, 47.
37 As noted on Yergin, 696, the Nigerian government nationalized British Petroleum’s extensive holdings in
response to allegations o f the company’s indirect sales o f oil to the apartheid government o f South Africa.
These assets were subsequently auctioned off on the open market at even higher prices.
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In strictly economic terms, Nigeria’s potential petroleum wealth is vast. At
present it is the fourth largest producer among the members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the fifth largest exporter of oil to the United
States. In total, the country has estimated proven oil reserves of 22.5 billion barrels, with
net oil exports for 2001 of 1.9 million barrels per day earning $19.5 billion.38 In
particular, Nigeria’s status as a major supplier of oil to the United States gives it at least
some insulation from international pressure, the ramifications of which are discussed in
the next section.
In practice, however, the predominance of oil has served to stifle the growth of
other sectors o f the economy. As noted by The Economist in 1999, “Oil, or rather the
misuse of oil money, has been the downfall of Nigeria.” With the rising price of oil,
there was a scramble from all quarters of the national polity to get a share of the windfall
profits, while the local currency, the naira, appreciated to such an extent that it all but
destroyed traditional agricultural exports such as cocoa, cotton and groundnuts.39 For
instance, between 1983 and 1993, petroleum as a share of exports rose from 96% to 98%,
while by comparison manufacturing as a portion of GDP remained at only 8.6%.40
Moreover, access to these petroleum reserves gives the Nigerian leadership a
cushion for corruption, as it is not directly linked to the country’s actual economic
performance. The immense temptation to pilfer the public coffers is particularly
insidious in that not only do such assets constitute unearned income, but their mere
38 These figures are cited in “Vital Statistics: Oil and Energy in Nigeria,” Drillbits and Tailings 7, no. 6 (31
July 2002), available at http://www.moles.Org/ProiectUnderground/drillbits/7 06/vs.html. accessed 15 July
2004.
39 See “Can Obasanjo save Nigeria?” The Economist, 6 March 1999,44-6, and “Boiling oil,” The
Economist, 14 April 2001, 44.
40 These statistics are cited in “Let down again,” The Economist, 7. Furthermore, Forrest observes that
indigenous capabilities were undermined as immense oil profits “encouraged easy access to a flood o f
imported technology that was extremely wasteful and disruptive o f local learning processes.” Forrest, 236.
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existence also serves to raise expectations among ordinary Nigerians. The unfortunate
reality of the situation is that, on average, Nigerians are poorer now than they were before
oil was discovered.41 Further collateral effects of this economic dislocation include weak
or non-existent contract law, poorly regulated financial systems and the rampant bribery
of officials.42
While oil is the most tangible of Nigeria’s resources, its human capital in the form
of cheap, plentiful labor should not be overlooked. However, the lack of economic
development beyond the petroleum sector translates directly into insufficient domestic
employment opportunities. As a result, a large number of bright, articulate, welleducated Nigerians are encouraged to emigrate and, in some cases, turn to criminal
activity with a high degree of success.43 Moreover, in response to criticism over low

41 During the first 14 years o f its oil boom, 1973 to 1987, per capita income in Nigeria fell 22%.
Furthermore, during the “oil boomlet” o f 1990-1 caused by the Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait, the World Bank
estimated a windfall o f $14 billion, or a 49% increase, all but disappeared by 1992. Finally, between the
period from 1980 to 1993, Nigeria is the only developing country in the world with a population over 100
million to have a negative per capita growth rate. Statistics cited in Herbst, 159-62. In 1983, however,
market pressure from a price cut in North Sea oil, which competes directly with Nigerian oil in terms o f
quality, served to undercut NNPC profits. However, the collapse o f the country’s oil boom in mid-1980s
can largely be explained by the unreported and illicit pumping o f oil, with the complicity o f government
ministers and employees o f the NNPC. Ironically, one destination for this oil was South Africa, at the time
under a range o f international sanctions. To further complicate matters, the standard practice o f paying for
oil upon delivery rather than at the time o f loading rather than unloading lent itself to various forms o f
fraud, such as advance fees and selling the same, often non-existent, oil to multiple customers. See R. T.
Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers: On Economic Warfare, Embargo Busting and State-Sponsored Crime
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999), 141-2; and Yergin, 720. For more on the ramifications o f this
type o f activity, see also U.S. DOT, MARAD, “Maritime Fraud Pounds Nigerian Insurers,” Maritime
Security Report, no. 1 (August 1995), 19-20. In particular, this report notes that maritime fraud costs the
Nigerian insurance industry an estimated $50 million per year.
42 As The Economist notes, “Ultimately, it is political as well as economic failings which have handicapped
Africa’s efforts to reform. Governments fear the protests which reform tends to provoke; and the
paraphernalia o f state control - rationing goods, issuing licenses, staffing state enterprises - tends to suit
governments that want friends and fellow tribesmen in the right places.” “A flicker o f light,” The
Economist, 5 March 1994,24. Cited as an example o f these institution shortcomings, in 1992
approximately $3 billion, or 10% o f annual GDP, disappeared out o f Nigerian public accounts, with half
that amount vanishing in the first half o f 1995.
43 Williams and Savona, 19. This point is also well made in “Let down again,” The Economist, 6-7, 9. The
following from a recent U.S. government assessment also echoes this observation. Though written with
specific regard to Southeast Asia, parallels with West Africa also exist: “Unskilled young males in or from
these regions —especially those who have migrated to urban areas where they have few job prospects - are
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rates of economic growth throughout Africa, The Economist also notes that,
“Entrepreneurs across the continent disprove the insulting proposition that Africans do
not respond to profit motive in the same way as anyone else.”44 This dynamism will
become even more readily apparent in the next section.
At times, Nigeria’s economic policies have further compounded the existing
inefficiencies associated with primary dependence on a single commodity. For instance,
in 1994 the World Bank incongruously listed Nigeria as one of only six sub-Saharan
African countries with sound macroeconomic structures, including improved industrial
output, exports, savings rates and per capita income. However, in January of the same
year Abacha’s military government did away with these reforms, fixing an official
exchange rate twice that of the free-market rate, and ordering interest rates down to
negative real levels.45 As many of the hurdles to legitimate commerce are political, it is
no coincidence that much of this entrepreneurial spirit is forced to find expression within
illegal activity.
Though generally optimistic otherwise with respect to the country’s overall
business climate, Forrest does note that, “Nigeria is a high-risk environment emanating
from economic instability, political uncertainty and from inconsistent and unpredictable

a prime source o f recruits by drug trafficking and other criminal organizations.” U.S. Interagency Working
Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 25. More broadly speaking, as noted in Boateng,
129, internal economic disparities have led to the movement o f labor from the relatively less developed
interior to the coastal regions.
44 “A flicker o f light,” The Economist, 22.
45 Ibid., 21-4. Similarly, and unsurprisingly, the series o f corruption investigations that began as the
Abacha regime replaced that o f Babangida achieved little in practice. For more on the initial hopes
surrounding this effort, see Ocheroeme Nnanna, “Corruption unlimited,” African Business 23, no. 195
(January 1995), 23-4.
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changes in government policies.”46 Moreover, neither periodic international pressure nor
the country’s involvement in such supra-national organizations such as the regional
economic bloc, the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS), have
provided incentives significant enough to effect real change.47
However, as mentioned at the outset of this analysis the ongoing crisis of
leadership presents an even more fundamental dilemma, despite the possibility that the
actual personalities involved may be less important than the underlying structural
deficiencies. As Nigerian Nobel Prize recipient Wole Soyinka notes, “To obtain a basic
understanding of today’s reality of Nigerian politics, one had better learn about and come
to grasp with the phenomenon of the spoils of power.”48 Since the government
administers most of the assets of the country, notably oil revenue as discussed above, the
control of political authority is the most prominent means to wealth, as well as an end
unto itself.
In conjunction with the widespread use of official office to siphon public assets,
known in local slang as “chopping,” corruption in Nigeria generally takes the form of a
spoils system based on either kinship affiliation or some other functional basis for
clientelism. The immensity of the country’s oil wealth in many ways serves to insulate
Nigeria’s leadership from any sense that a day of reckoning may someday come since,
46 Forrest, 234. While the author is writing primarily with respect to the underlying causes o f capital flight,
or the reluctance o f Nigerians to invest in their own country, the same dynamics also serve to deter external
investment.
47 At present, this is only one among a dozen competing and overlapping economic blocs on the continent.
See “Affabet soup,” The Economist, 10 February 2001, 77. Incidentally, Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, 17, also
notes allegations o f looting by members o f the Nigerian contingent o f the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG) resident in Liberia during the early 1990s. Ironically, this effort itself was linked to
wider Nigerian notions o f its own “manifest destiny’” in terms o f leadership within sub-Saharan Africa.
See Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 29-30; and Tunmi Olonisakin, “Arresting the Tide o f Mercenaries:
Prospects for Regional Control,” in Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, ed. Abdel-Fatau Musah
and J. ‘Kayode Fayemi (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 248.50.
48 Wole Soyinka, The Open Sore o f a Continent: A Personal Narrative o f the Nigerian Crisis (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 62.
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despite the apparent perceptions to the contrary, these resources are in fact finite. As
such, a looming impasse lies in the country’s sheer demographic size and constantly
expanding number of factional relationships, which in turn must be cemented by
increasingly greater amounts of money, eventually more than can be even theoretically
made available.49
In this respect, both political and human geography can be seen as intertwined to
an exceedingly high degree. This is particularly true in assessing the political dimensions
of ethnicity and the ethnic dimensions of politics. Given the prevailing zero-sum view of
domestic Nigerian politics, the result is that ethnic groups with numerically superiority or
some other socio-economic advantage are able to marginalize minority ethnic groups.
Thus, though the latter have a distinct interest in good governance in order to protect their
collective interests, in practice this seldom amounts to more than mere wishful thinking.50
As successful politicians reward their ethnic constituencies and seek to deny
resources to other groups, systemic instability is both reinforced and institutionalized.51
Furthermore, in this context, ethnic competition is not just about political power, but

49 Herbst, 157-8.
50 This ethnic marginalization can be readily seen against the detrimental human impact o f the Nigerian oil
industry. Groups such as the Ogoni and the Ijaw living in the swampy coastal oil-producing areas have
received relatively little benefit from the wealth pumped literally out from under them. In turn, this has led
to attacks on oil installations, damage to pipelines and the kidnapping o f oil workers by local militants. For
their part, multinational oil companies operating in the country have resisted any suggestion that any party
besides the Nigerian central government, via the national oil company, holds title to these assets. However,
the primary offshore operator, Royal Dutch / Shell, has recently begun to unilaterally allocate funding to
development projects in the region. A more extensive analysis o f this issue, focusing on the eastern portion
o f Nigeria from 1990 to 1993, see Eghosa E. Osaghae, “The Ogoni uprising: oil politics, minority agitation
and the future o f the Nigerian state,” African Affairs 94, no. 376 (July 1995), 325-44. For more on two
separate episodes in which theft from damaged pipelines has led to explosions and considerable loss o f life,
see also “A catastrophe bound to happen,” The Economist, 24 October 1998, 44, and “The high price o f
Nigeria’s oil,” The Economist, 15 July 2000, 46.
51 As a result, “Whereas this instrumentality and strategy in politics is not peculiarly or uniquely Nigerian,
the very form which it takes is often blatant and impedes Nigeria’s quest for political atomism.” Udogu,
166-7.
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extends into many other spheres of the country’s public and private sectors.52
Unfortunately, in both the African context and beyond, Nigeria is by no means alone in
these respects.
As E. Ike Udogu notes, “In sum, conflict is a significant dimension of ethnicity,
and this is where ideology becomes problematic in endeavors toward the successful
governance of most African polities.”

Many of these dynamics can be seen throughout

the continent. In particular, the legacy and the burden of Africa’s often-arbitrary colonial
boundaries, rarely coinciding with pre-existing ethnic ones, provide an inherent stimulus
toward ethnic competition.54 Despite these endemic animosities, however, there remain a
number of vested interests involved in maintenance of these political boundaries.55

52 For instance, ethnic tensions also play out within the country’s military, traditionally the de facto if not
the actual power brokers within the country. For a more comprehensive analysis incorporating the
Nigerian experience with this phenomenon, see Pradeep P. Barua, “Ethnic conflict in the military o f
developing nations: a comparative analysis o f India and Nigeria,” Armed Forces and Society 19, no. 1 (Fall
1992), 123-37. There have also been numerous instances when the military has been used to settle ethnic
scores, as in the communal violence between the Tiv and the Jukun, in which the forces sent to keep the
peace ended up killing a reported 136 Tiv civilians. See “Military terror tactics,” The Economist, 3
November 2001, 54. Moreover, an ethnic quota system also dominates access to higher education, as
discussed in “No easy answers,” The Economist, 10 September 1994, 47-8; and Herbst, 154.
53 Udogu, 162. Moreover, writing in 1998, Abiodun Alao and Funmi Olonisakin, “Post Cold War Africa:
Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict and Security,” in Oyebade and Alao, 136, note that, “Nigeria seems to be one of
the countries where ethnic differences is most likely to be the dominant issue till the end o f the this century
and well into the next.” Supporting this conjecture, an overview o f several recent instances o f communal
violence in Nigeria can be found in “Reaching for your machete,” The Economist, 31 July 1999, 36. For a
broader analysis o f this phenomenon, see also Eghosa E. Osaghae, “Managing multiple minority problems
in a divided society: the Nigerian experience,” Journal o f Modern African Studies 36, no. 1 (March 1998),
1-24. A more focused case study o f the traditional conflict between the Tivs and the Jukuns in the central
Nigerian state o f Benue can be found in Karl Maier, “Eternal enmities,” Africa Report 37, no. 3 (May-June
1992), 17-8.
54 For instance, noted in Beoteng, 109, “The partition o f West Africa into distinct territorial units ruled by
different colonial powers had the effect o f bringing several different tribal groups together for the first time
under a single external political authority. But since the new political boundaries had been drown without
any serious reference to the wishes or interests o f the local populations the resulting political units turned
out to be no more than mere geographic expressions totally unrelated to the ethnic and socio-economic
realities o f the region. A similar characterization o f political boundaries can be made for much o f the rest
o f the continent as well.
55 Foremost among these parties has been the Organization o f African Unity (OAU), which has upheld the
inviolability o f colonial borders since its inception in May 1963, as well as sitting heads o f state in the
region and the various international bodies dedicated to economic aid and development. The first, and to
date only, precedent for changing colonial boundaries in Africa is the independence o f Eritrea from
Ethiopia in 1993. The organization, rendered largely irrelevant by its failure to condemn even the most
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In many respects, the legacy of attempted secession of the Biafra region
highlights these ongoing ethnic cleavages within the country, particularly between north
and south, which shape the country’s human geography. This unsuccessful endeavor,
centering on the southern and eastern Ibo-majority areas, lasted from May 1967 to
January 1970 and launched the country into a major civil war. It was considerably
prolonged by external support for the secession, though the lasting effects are reflected
primarily in the context of domestic inter-ethnic relations.56 Its underlying dynamics can
be seen as a struggle on the part of the Ibo to free themselves from Hausa-Fulani Muslim
domination from the north.
However, in their failure the Ibo also felt immensely betrayed by the lack of
support by the Yoruba, the third major demographic group in the country, expected to
lend their demographic weight in light of perceived common interests.57 This in turn lent
yet another dimension to the existing tripartite tensions among the majority groups.58
Pondering the Biafran secession attempt and subsequent civil war, Nigerian intellectuals
egregious behavior on the part o f its members, has recently been superceded by the African Union, which
has yet to be tested in this respect. See “New Name, Similar Struggles For Group o f African Nations,”
New York Times, 5 February 2003, A8. With specific reference to Nigeria’s borders, see Herbst, 151-72.
In particular, the author contends that the underlying optimism that any given country can develop
economically within its existing boundaries is irrational, as demonstrated by the burgeoning number o f
failed and failing states. In light o f the issues discussed in previous chapters, his assertion that, while
economics and particularly the flow o f capital has evolved dramatically in recent years, “The ultimate
framework for business - the nation-state - has, however, almost everywhere remained unchanged.”
However, Herbst does make a distinction between his views and those put forth in Kaplan, “The Coming
Anarchy,” passim, in that it is necessary to assess developing countries on a case-by-case basis, rather than
simply make generalizations.
56 For more on the various forms o f external support received by Biafra, as well as the shady activities o f
the middlemen involved in circumventing the subsequent U.N. embargo on arms to the secessionists, see
Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers, 153-6.
57 The underlying rationale for the Ibos’ expectation o f Yoruba support rests primarily on fears o f northern
Hausa-Fulani dominance and the need to balance this situation. While the salience o f religious differences
will be addressed at greater length blow, more generically there are longstanding dichotomies that exist
throughout West Africa between inhabitants o f the coastal areas and those o f the interior. On the one hand,
the former tend to be more politically sophisticated and economically developed, while those o f the interior
are for the most part more conservative and often suspicious o f their counterparts. Boateng, 118-9, 122-5.
58 See Alao and Olonisakin, 136-7. For more details o f the genesis, evolution and outcome o f this conflict,
see also Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 63-9.
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such as Soyinka were able to ask the pointed question as to whether or not mere
geographic integrity, rather than the nation itself, had been saved.59
The lingering effects of these divisions is that successive governments have had to
engage in a balancing act in order to maintain even a modicum of nationwide authority.
As Herbst notes:
Governments have always had to mollify fears in southern Nigeria of the Hausa /
Fulani political domination while at the same time attempting to win the
confidence of the peoples of the relatively more underdeveloped North through
the deliberate allocation of industry, infrastructure, and commercial assets.
Indeed, the peoples of the South, especially in the oil-producing areas, openly
protest the “enrichment” of the North via the state at the expense of the South and
demand, in turn, to be compensated.60
However, further exacerbating the cleavages among the Hausa-Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba,
there is also the issue of religion.
Broadly speaking, moving from north to south, the far north can be described as
overwhelmingly Muslim, the central band running from east to west as mainly Muslim,
and the far south as mainly Christian. Tensions among these groups is most concretely
manifest in the periodic attempts to apply Islamic sharia law within those states
controlled by Muslim majorities. Moreover, episodic communal violence with religious
overtones can also be observed on a semi-recurrent basis.61
Putting all of these issues into proper perspective vis-a-vis the focus of this study,
the transnational smuggling of oil is particularly germane in that it illustrates aspects of

59 This question is pondered at length in Soyinka, 28-30. In particular, the author notes the lack o f debate
on the subject o f Nigeria’s territorial integrity, attributing support for the status quo more to the interests o f
those in power than to a genuine feeling o f cohesiveness on the part o f the nation’s citizenry.
60 Herbst, 157-8. See also “Let down again,” The Economist, 5, 10-2, which further emphasizes the role o f
strong kinship ties in facilitating this phenomenon.
61 In 1966, the massacre o f thousands o f Ibo Christians in the city o f Kano was a precipitating factor in the
Biaffan secession attempt. See Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 130-3; “Islamist push,” The Economist, 6
November 1999, 48-9; and “When the law becomes a sword,” The Economist, 8 July 2000, 47. See also
“Let down again,” The Economist, 12-3.
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all the aforementioned dimensions of geography. To begin with, in terms of the
necessary profit motive, there is a direct link between this activity and national monetary,
exchange rate, and oil pricing policies, in that the resultant cross-border price differentials
make it an extremely attractive and lucrative proposition given adequate political
connections.62
In practice, the common border with Benin offers a case in point. Specifically,
the use of “secret” trails to avoid customs checks, various cross-border canals and other
water routes, and illicit markets and warehouses all support this activity, with officials on
both sides paid to turn a blind eye. As OGD noted in 2000, “Within this context it is
almost impossible to distinguish between the ‘illegal’ smuggling of legal goods and the
illegal trafficking of illegal goods, such as narcotics and possibly arms.”63
As such, it is hardly surprising that there exists a chronic domestic shortage of
gasoline, despite a national refining capacity able to meet domestic demand twice over,
though this has been allowed to languish. To make up the shortfall, fuel is often imported
at emergency prices, an activity that nets millions for those with the proper official
protection from arrest and prosecution.64 However, despite its economic and social costs,

62 An excellent analysis o f this phenomenon can be found in Wang, passim. Moreover, in the early 1980s
under the Buhari regime, the offences o f the smuggling and illegal stockpiling o f oil were made capital
crimes. Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 172. Presumably, this only applied to the lower echelon o f those
involved in this activity and unlucky enough to be apprehended.
63 OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 213. Incidentally, this distinction also underlines the typology
o f smuggled goods put forth in Appendix A.
64 See “Abacha’s wobbly throne,” the Economist, 30 May 1998, 45-6. In particular, daylong lines at gas
stations have served to inflame public emotions at the grass-roots level. This problem persists into the
current Obasanjo administration, which claimed to have spent over $1 billion to import fuel in 2000.
However, “much o f this was promptly smuggled abroad, to Benin, Niger or Cameroon,” or sold inside
Nigeria on the domestic black market. See also “Fuelling trouble,” The Economist, 24 March 2001, 56.
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efforts to rescind the existing gasoline subsidy have generally met with strikes and other
forms of public protest.65
In summary, the following passage succinctly underlines many of the issues noted
throughout this section: “In view of the prevalent political and socio-economic situation,
a burgeoning unemployed, underemployed and youthful population, the relatively porous
borders and corruption of the security network, the country is ripe and burdened with
drug abuse, drug trafficking and related crimes.”66 By way of transition, the growth of
domestic Nigerian drug use, shifting the country from a straightforward trafficking role to
one that includes significant consumption, does not auger well for the nation’s future.67
Furthermore, as a fitting segue into the next section, in the context of
transnational refugees Nigeria’s capacity to generate massive outward population flows is
generally ignored in the literature, despite its extremely high potential. In particular, such
movement is generally linked to civil conflict, high levels of economic mismanagement,
unfulfilled expectations, endemic underemployment and ongoing ethnic and religious
disputes.

The resultant augmentation of the already considerable West African diaspora

in turn offers expanded opportunities for Nigerian TCOs to increase their global reach.
Having outlined the parameters that enable criminal activity and corruption to
flourish in Nigeria, the next section moves on to wider issues of heroin smuggling on the
part of Nigeria TCOs at the transnational level of analysis. In particular, this involves a
focus on drugs in transit from source to destination in an area of operations encompassing
65 As o f 1994, this had happened twice at the national level. “A flicker o f light,” The Economist, 22.
66 U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile - Political and Economic Situation,” 4.
67 Explanations for this include a push by traffickers to develop the local market, and the growth o f the
practice o f paying couriers in drugs. See Sam Kiley, “Booming trade in cut-price drugs adds to Nigeria's
woes,” Times (UK), 29 June 1998; and Hugh Dellios, “Once Just a Supplier, Nigeria Develops Heroin
Woes,” Chicago Tribune, 29 July 1998, A l, 4.
68 See Toyin Falola, “Nigeria in the global context o f refugees,” Journal o f Asian and African Studies 32,
no. 1-2 (June 1997), 6-7.
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arguably the largest geographic area among all extant criminal organizations. By
managing a substantial portion of the “legs” for an extensive set of smuggling vectors
linking major production regions to key markets, these organizations are pivotal to
enabling the global drug trafficking enterprise.
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Fig. 22. Eastern hemisphere drug and arms trafficking routes69

Smuggling Vectors and Nigerian TCOs: O ff the Beaten Path?
Having addressed the range of features that make Nigeria itself an attractive
sphere of operations for illicit enterprises, it is worth reiterating from the outset that,
strictly in terms of geography, Nigerian involvement in drug trafficking is in some ways

69 Map source: Heritage Foundation, Issues ’98: The Candidate’s Briefing Book (Washington, DC:
Heritage Foundation, 1997), “Chapter 19, Terrorism and Crime: Containing the Threat,” Map 19.1,
available at http://heritage.org/research/features/ISSUES/98. accessed 15 July 2004.
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an anomaly. Nonetheless, it does exist, as the map above illustrates.

70

For instance,

outlining the scope of these activities, one U.S. government report noted in 1999 that:
Nigeria remains the hub of African narcotics trafficking. Nigerian poly-crime
organizations operate extensive global trafficking networks, control the subSaharan drug markets, and account for a large part of the heroin imported into the
U.S. They also transport South American cocaine to Europe, Asia and Africa,
especially South Africa, and export marijuana, the only narcotic grown in Nigeria,
to Europe and West Africa.71
However, outside of cannabis, the country is neither a major producer of drugs nor even
of precursor chemicals, and Nigerian TCOs have risen to prominence almost solely as a
distribution center for the output of faraway regions, primarily both Asian heroin and
Latin American cocaine.72
By the late 1990s, between forty and sixty percent of the world’s heroin were
thought to transit the country itself, though Nigerian TCOs appear to have shifted to the

70 For a theoretical discussion the role o f geography in determining competitive advantage, see Steven E.
Crane and Patrick J. Welch, “The problem o f geographic market definition: geographic proximity vs.
economic significance,” Atlantic Economic Journal 19, no. 2 (June 1991), 12-20. In particular, the authors
develop the ways in which a hypothetical geographic market can be made up o f a combination o f non
contiguous areas.
71 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 1. For a somewhat dissenting view o f the scope
o f Nigerian drug smuggling, which puts this activity at a level below that o f their Asian or Latin American
counterparts, see OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 209-10. However, this report does note the
country’s international stigmatization as a drug trafficking center due to the protection o f this trade by
successive military regimes and its citizen’s involvement in small-scale smuggling. Moreover, the use of
non-Nigerian couriers is also mentioned as well, though “all told, 1998 and 1999 have not witnessed a
significant reduction o f drug-related activity by nationals o f the Giant o f Africa.”
72 With respect to marijuana production, U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 89, notes that, “Substantial
quantities o f low-potency cannabis are cultivated in Nigeria by subsistence farmers in several areas, with
the greatest concentration in the central and northern parts o f the country, as well as in the Niger River
delta in the southeast. In general, these crops are used as a source o f barter or as currency in illicit crossborder transactions for food or consumer products. For the most part, eradication efforts on the part o f the
Nigerian government have focused on the destruction o f individual marijuana fields and discussions o f crop
substitution programs.” Cultivated in all 36 o f its states, Nigerian marijuana and its derivative resins are
primarily consumed domestically, with the excess exported to neighboring West African nations and
Europe. U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 3. See also Milan Vesely, “Africa Highway to Drugs Hell?” African Business, April 2000, 11, which cites Morocco, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal
and the Ivory Coast as major African producers o f cannabis. In all o f these cases, including Nigeria, “vast
tracts o f forest concealing plantations o f marijuana” make eradication efforts especially problematic.
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use of alternate routes in recent years.73 With Nigeria acting as a safe haven of sorts, as
well as a center for criminal support services such as money laundering, such criminal
organizations have thus been able to expand their reach globally.74 While the success of
these groups is inarguable, on the surface a certain spatial illogic remains that must be
examined further.
Peter Reuter echoes this sentiment, even as he highlights the demonstrable
transnational reach of these organizations:
Nigeria is a nation that seems to have little potential role in the international drug
trade. It is isolated from any of the principal producer or consumer countries and
lacks a significant base of traditional domestic production or consumption.
Nonetheless, Nigerian traffickers have come to play a significant role in the
shipping of heroin between Southwest Asia and the US; recently these traffickers
have even entered the cocaine business, which is still more remote from their
home country.75
After thus acknowledging that Nigeria is in many respects off the beaten path of the
global drug trade, however, the author continues by cataloguing the complex of factors
that have stimulated this trend. Some, such as longstanding official corruption and
moderately good commercial links to the rest of the world, have been addressed above.
73 These figures were cited in 1998 by both Sam Kiley, “Booming trade in cut-price drugs adds to Nigeria's
woes,” Times (London), 29 June 1998; and Hugh Dellios, “Once Just a Supplier, Nigeria Develops Heroin
Woes,” Chicago Tribune, 29 July 1998, A l, 4.
74 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,” 96-7. See also Booth, Opium, 232-3;
and U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 36, which notes,
“Nigerian criminal syndicates centered in Lagos, many o f which have global networks, operate with virtual
impunity in an environment o f pervasive corruption.” With a wider perspective on this issue, Williams and
Savona, 10-2, discuss the concept o f “national sanctuaries,” countries where TCOs can operate largely
unhindered and with a high degree o f latitude, if not outright official involvement, which would apply in
this instance. Furthermore, parallels with countries that sponsor or harbor terrorism, such as the Taliban
regime’s support for al-Qa’eda when in power in Afghanistan, are obvious.
75 Reuter, 3. However, for a slightly dissenting point o f view which appears to put the geographic spread o f
Nigerian TCOs into a more historical context, note the following: “Powerful and sophisticated criminal
syndicates based in Nigeria have extensive networks that reach into Western Hemisphere, Europe, Russia
and the NIS [newly independent states], Southeast and Southwest, Australia, and Africa. With Nigeria an
historical trading crossroads both in Africa and along maritime routes between East and West, the
international criminal operations o f Nigerian syndicates are the legacy o f a history o f moving capital and
commodities on a global scale.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment,
Ch. Ill, 36. For more on the historical context o f West Africa as a transnational trading hub, see also
Beoteng, 105-7.
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Others, such as a large overseas population and the highly entrepreneurial Nigerian ethos
are discussed below.
In this case, economic linkages, rather than geographic proximity, also help to
explain access dynamics with respect to smuggling vectors. For instance, as Friman
notes, “the Nigerian ties to drug source countries in Southeast Asia appears to have been
facilitated by patterns of licit trade. Specifically, Nigeria’s imports of and buying
missions for rice and textiles from Thailand have provided a broader stream of economic
transactions linking the two countries and have created opportunities for establishing and
masking illicit trafficking.”76
More generally, Morrison points out that, “As global infrastructure and
transportation systems improve, the need for drug transit points to be located on a direct
route between drug producing and consuming countries is no longer compelling, as the
rise of Nigeria as a key transshipment point has shown.”77 With terms of transshipment
and specifically in reference to Nigeria’s role in the global heroin trade, Friman also
observes the declining importance of geographic distance as a result of technological
advances in transportation and communication.78
Taken together, these conditions certainly help to account for the fact that
Nigerian TCOs have managed to exert a distinct presence across a far-flung geographical
area. However, this in turn begs the question of whether or not, in an increasingly
interdependent world economy, the issue of physical location is still paramount. The
contention of this analysis is that, by virtue of its methods and the spatial distribution of

76 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 71.
77 Morrison, 2.
78 Friman, “Just Passing Through,” 69.
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its operatives, these organizations TCOs have been able in many ways to both adapt to
and, in some cases, reroute global heroin trafficking patterns.
In the previous case studies, both of which happened to center on drug cultivation
areas, the relevant smuggling vectors were characterized as spokes on wheel radiating
outward. In this case, the key to the success of Nigerian TCOs in transnational heroin
transit has been the ability of these groups to maintain control of the links between the
primary producing regions on the one hand, and the major consuming markets on the
other. As the U.S. Department of State noted in early 2000, “Neither growers nor streetlevel retailers, the African criminal groups are the middlemen of the drug trade.”

70

Therefore, having begun the chapter with a consideration of Nigeria proper, this
section examines various aspects of Nigerian TCOs’ role in facilitating the logistical
process underlying the global trade in terms of access, risk and connectivity. Thus, the
discussion encompasses the set of transnational smuggling vectors that move under the
auspices of these groups, regardless of their starting point or final destination. However,
before addressing the issue of routes, a discussion of the evolution of these groups and
their practices is in order.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Nigerian involvement in drug trafficking was on a
relatively low scale, and focused primarily on cannabis and its derivatives.80 The
contention has even been made that “organized crime in Nigeria and other African
countries was unheard o f until the early 1970s.” This is based on the view that the
introduction of a monetary economy, chronic political instability, rapid urbanization,
79 U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” Fiscal Year 2001 International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington, DC: Department
o f State, April 2000), 1.
80 See U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile - Illicit Drug Trafficking,” (New York: ODCCP, 22 June
2002 ), 1.
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widespread poverty and underdevelopment, and the growth of international trade led
directly to the organization of criminal activity on the continent.81 However, this tends to
overlook the well-developed underlying social networks that are the necessary
precondition for such an evolution.
The expansion of Nigerian TCOs into the global heroin trade has been traced to
the early 1980’s, when a clique of Nigerian naval officers undergoing training in India
decided to begin smuggling Southwest Asian heroin to Europe and, eventually, the
United States.82 Other analysts have been less specific, tracing the genesis of West
African participation in the transnational heroin trade to Nigerians studying and working
•

*

abroad during the 1970s.

O '!

The common denominator among these accounts is the early

and concerted involvement of the elite levels of Nigerian society in fostering this
phenomenon.
Throughout the 1980s, Nigerian TCOs continued to expand their roles, primarily
by establishing links with Southeast Asian opium producers and transporting Golden
Triangle heroin to both the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, the collapse of Nigeria’s oil
boom in the mid-1980s in the face of competitive market pressures, economic
mismanagement and the illegal siphoning off of petroleum, as discussed above, was also
pivotal in solidifying the gains of its indigenous trafficking organizations.84

81 For instance, see Chepesiuk, 169.
82 See Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 172. More generally, the emergence o f the Indian
sub-continent as a major source o f heroin has also been correlated to the integration o f Nigeria into
transnational drug smuggling networks. U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile - Illicit Drug
Trafficking,” 1. See also Rob Marsh, With Criminal Intent: The Changing Face o f Crime in South Africa
(Johannesburg, South Africa: Ampersand Press, 1999), 106-7.
83 U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile - Illicit Drug Trafficking,” 2.
84 Shelley, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 473.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

373

This steadily growing involvement finally began to come to light primarily via a
number of mass media reports dating from the early 1990s.85 However, in the mid1990s, it was still noted that, “the Nigerians are not in the same league as the Colombian,
Lebanese or Thai gangs that ship drugs wholesale in containers and specialist aircraft and
are rarely caught. Nigerian smugglers deal in smaller quantities and are much more
vulnerable.”86 As will be discussed below, this latter observation should not necessarily
be construed as a weakness.
As the decade progressed, Nigerian criminal groups involved in the trafficking of
both heroin and cocaine continued to evolve. They adopted more complicated and
complex methods of operation than ever before, including more direct access to
production sources in Asia and expanding activities in South America. Perhaps most
importantly, Nigeria’s provision of drug couriers has become an integral link in the
worldwide distribution of narcotics.

an

In terms of composition, there is a distinct need within the literature to move
beyond blanket assertions that Nigerians are heavily involved in the global drug trade.
While this in fact appears to be a truism, Nigeria is an astonishingly diverse country in
terms of ethnicity, language and religion, as outlined throughout the previous section.
Thus, there is a distinct need for more research to be done regarding both the membership
and network affiliations of these organizations.

85 See, for instance, Danielle Pletka, “Heroin Inc.: the Nigerian connection,” Insight on the News 7, no. 39
(September 1991), 22-4; and Joshua Hammer, “The Nigerian connection,” Newsweek, 7 October 1991,43.
86 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1.
87 As an example, note the following: “As recently as 1985, African criminal organizations were
inconsequential in the international drug trade. Now they are major players, moving a substantial amount
o f the world’s heroin and cocaine.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,”

1.
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As discussed in Chapter II, TCOs are most often delineated using national
umbrella labels such as “Italian,” “Colombian” or “Russian,” even though other regional,
ethnic or linguistic organizational dynamics are generally also present. However,
highlighting the uncertainty surrounding this issue with respect to West African TCOs,
Lupshka noted in 1996 that, “It is likely that other groups, like Nigerians, are also bonded
by tribal, regional, religious, or family-clan ties, although this has not yet been developed
in any research about them.”88
Nonetheless, there are some general observations that can be made regarding the
structure of Nigerian and other West African criminal organizations. To begin with, as
noted in The Economist, “Despite the dangers, there is no lack of recruits, particularly
from the traditional coastal trading communities. Family- or village-based gangs are
impenetrable to outsiders, speaking dialects that defy interrogators and phone-taps. Their
loyalty to each other is absolute.”

OQ

However, as these groups continue to evolve, they no

longer necessarily limit themselves strictly by ethnic affiliation.90
Moreover, while many Nigerian criminal groups operating overseas appear to be
both small and autonomous, many others belong to larger criminal syndicates based in
Nigeria. This diversity can be at least partially explained by the enormous profit
potential of drug smuggling, which on the one hand creates an intensely competitive
environment, but at the same time allows nearly every group involved to accrue lucrative
gams. 91

88 Lupshka, “Transnational Organized Crime,” 22. As o f this writing, this observation still appears to hold
true.
89 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1-2.
90 U.S. Congress, House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime,” 103. According to this source,
these organizations have come to recognize that international law enforcement targets Nigerian nationals,
and adjusted accordingly as discussed below.
91 Gastrow, 75.
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Out of necessity, the smaller groups frequently pool resources and tap into highly
fluid networks in countries around the world to facilitate their criminal operations.
However, the larger Lagos-based organizations are able to maintain compartmentalized
cells of operatives wherever they are needed.

As one U.S. analysis notes, “Worldwide,

there are hundreds of Nigerian criminal cells located primarily in major metropolitan
centers in North America, Europe, and Asia. Recent estimates suggest that more than
500 Nigerian crime cells are operating in at least 80 countries.”93
This geographic spread of Nigerian TCOs has been facilitated to a high degree by
immigration from Nigeria, as well as the greater West African region.94 In general, most
criminal networks face significant hurdles expanding beyond their national and
ethnonational borders. However, Nigerian TCOs represent an excellent example of the
following: “For many organized criminal groups, their international activities were more
regional than global. For those with a more worldwide presence, their operations were
mostly confined to countries with a large ethnic expatriate population.”95 In particular,
drugs shipped by Nigerians may be retailed by the same ubiquitous West African trading
networks that peddle handicrafts and jewelry on street comers in major cities all over the
world.96

92 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 38.
93 Ibid, Ch. I, 3. This report also observes that Nigerian criminal groups “have long had members or cells in
foreign countries and international connections to obtain, distribute or market contraband.”
94 For instance, see Cooper, 58.
95 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 3. Elsewhere, the same
report also notes that, “Nigerian criminals take advantage o f large West African ethnic communities in
these cities to establish the infrastructure needed to support a wide range o f criminal activity.” Ibid, Ch. Ill,
38.
96 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1. Though allegedly more involved with unlicensed
peddling and sales o f counterfeit goods than drug trafficking, the transnational Mouride street-trading
network represents an interesting parallel with some Nigerian TCO activity, particularly with respect to
common West African origins and uneasy relationships vis-a-vis law enforcement authorities. This Islamic
group, founded in Senegal at the turn o f the last century, not only extends from New York to Paris and
Tokyo, but also continues to grow via conversion. Furthermore, it has been estimated that approximately
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Vis-a-vis the competition, Nigerian TCOs exhibit a markedly greater willingness
to take higher risks in return for a lower marginal profit, using various practices that serve
to undercut the competition. Traditionally, these groups have specialized in using
numerous and relatively expendable mules to smuggle in small qualities. This practice
simultaneously makes their operations both safer at the strategic level and riskier at the
tactical level, since at least a certain proportion is bound to get through customs despite
the loss of a certain percentage.
In terms of smuggling vectors, the use of more complex itineraries, multiple
couriers and fraudulent travel documents are also become increasingly sophisticated and
serve to conceal any direct link with the source country. In this context, the use of more
than one passport by individual mules has also been noted. For instance, in travelling to
and from Asian or Latin American source countries via West Africa, the courier may start
with one passport as far as Abidan or Lagos in Nigeria, Brazzaville in the Congo, Lome
in Togo, or Cotonou in Benin, and then proceed on with a second passport. On the return
journey, the first passport is used upon reentry into the region.

07

Moreover, in planning their operations, these organizations make a careful study
of customs and security procedures at relevant border control checkpoints, and adapt to
law enforcement measures against them.98 For instance, according to the USCS there are
a number of signs that an international traveler may be a drug courier. These include
routing irregularities, suspicious amounts of luggage in relation to purported duration of
stay and short stops in known transit countries. From the smugglers’ perspective, the
$100 million is transferred from New York to Senegal every three months by way o f affiliated informal
banking arrangements. See “On the streets o f New York,” The Economist, 19 June 1999,27. See also
MacGafihey and Bazenguissa, 15-6; and OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 20-1.
97 See U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile - Illicit Drug Trafficking,” 1.
98 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 39.
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methods of diverting risk to counter various types of security screening procedures
includes the use of decoys to distract customs agents while the real mules move safely
through the checkpoint, as well as multiple couriers on a single conveyance."
With respect to the latter, one such technique is known as “shotgunning,” or
arranging for numerous couriers travel on the same flight in an attempt to overwhelm
customs officials. Its use virtually guarantees that at least some of the shipment will get
through in the confusion at a busy border entry.100 Utilizing these types of methods tends
to increase the amount of contraband that is confiscated at the checkpoint, and each
customs administration along the route in question could potentially account for an
impressive number and volume of seizures. On the other hand, the actual losses to the
trafficker in both heroin and mules is a small price to pay in comparison to the huge
profits generated, and are generally written off as merely the costs of doing business.101
The ONDCP refers to the physical transport of heroin by individual couriers using
international conveyances as the “favorite method of Nigerian traffickers.”102 As
discussed in Chapter III, this phenomenon is generically known as body carrying. This
may involve drugs secreted in either luggage or actually on the person of the mule, who
may wear a corset or some other type of specialized garment in which the contraband can
be concealed.
"Chepesiuk, 171-2.
100 Specifically, this method has been identified with the “Vice Lords,” a U.S.-based Nigerian cartel, and its
use has been documented at Britain’s Heathrow Airport. Vesely, 9.
101 This observation is made by Lane, 70-1, with reference to heroin originating in Southeast Asia and
carried via Africa to Europe, with eventual transshipment to the U.S. The author also notes the essential
irony that both customs officials and heroin traffickers were both quite pleased with this outcome. See also
“Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1. Moreover, with respect to this activity, “Most sources
agree that only a fraction o f the couriers are actually detected and apprehended. When they are arrested,
the bearers usually choose not to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement. Instead, they plead guilty, serve
their time, and are subsequently deported to Nigeria. This lack o f cooperation makes it difficult for U.S.
law enforcement to identify and pursue the head o f the drug trafficking operations, who remain safely in
Nigeria.” U.S. Congress, House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime,” 96.
102 See U.S. ONDCP, “Drug Policy Perspectives,” 1.
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However, such concealment methods also include heroin carried internally within
the body cavity, colloquially known as body packing via either swallowing or stuffing, as
noted previously. Some swallowers may ingest up to 150 egg-sized condoms filled with
heroin, though one kilogram tends to be a much more reasonable average. Moreover, this
practice is can be extremely dangerous to the health of the courier, and numerous deaths
have been attributed to defective condoms bursting within the stomachs of these
carriers.103
In addition to an acceptance of higher calculated risks, another essential
characteristic of Nigerian TCOs is their adaptability. As fast as law enforcement
procedures are set up to stop illicit shipments, new channels are opened up. For instance,
as one U.S. government assessment notes, “Recently, Nigerian traffickers have relied less
on individual concealment methods and more on increasingly sophisticated concealment
methods and difficult to detect air, sea and land bulk shipments and express mail
services.”104 Moreover, these groups also exhibit a willingness to cooperate, negotiate,
form alliances and make numerous types of business arrangements with a wide range of
other criminal organizations, further helping to explain their success.105
As noted at the opening of this section, the links that Nigerian TCOs have been
able to establish over the years with respect to the major heroin producing areas of the
world are pivot to explaining their sustained and growing presence. For instance, one
U.S. government assessment observes that:

103 Vesely, 8. See also Marsh, 109-10. For more on the observable physical characteristics o f body
packers, see also Chepesiuk, 170-1.
104 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 2.
105 See Raymond E. Kendall, “Responding to Transnational Crime,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no.
3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 272.
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Producing no heroin of their own, Nigerian traffickers have well-established
networks in Southeast and Southwest Asian countries to acquire the drug. The
steady and virtually uninterrupted flow of Nigerian-controlled heroin from these
source regions is facilitated by criminal cells in transit countries along the way .
.. They tend to avoid sending drug couriers on direct flights from drug-producing
and key transit countries to market countries, relying instead on a widely diverse
number of routes transiting airports through Asia, Africa, and Latin America.106
Specifically, these groups buy heroin wholesale throughout both the Golden Crescent and
the Golden Triangle, where there are significant Nigerian and West African populations
to facilitate such transactions.
With respect to the Golden Crescent, Nigerian couriers have a longstanding
operational presence in Pakistan, while there is also an evolving relationship between
West African TCOs and Afghan trafficking groups based in New Delhi.107 Paralleling
this situation in terms of access to the Golden Triangle, such networks have been detected
in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, generally using international airports as
transit hubs for drug couriers or relying on various types of postal services to ship their
product.108 Published intelligence resources have also indicated that Nigerian and West
African heroin traffickers travel from their bases of operation in Bangkok to Pakistan in
order to acquire heroin for $2,000 to $4,000 per kilogram, far below the $10,000 to
$12,000 per kilogram price in Thailand for product of comparable purity.109
As such, from the point of purchase onward, these groups are able to control
nearly all aspects of the relevant transnational smuggling vectors for their heroin, in some
cases all the way up to street-level distribution.110 The typical movement of heroin from
Asian source countries thus occurs in stages. For instance, one courier may pick up a
106 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 39.
107 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 55.
108 Ibid., 52-3, 59.
109 See U.S. DOJ, DEA, “Drug Intelligence Brief: Southwest Asian Heroin - Selected Data.”
110 Chepesiuk, 170.
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shipment in Bangkok, Thailand, and fly it to a transit county such as India, Indonesia or
Egypt. From there, it is handed over to a second courier, who brings it into another
transit country, where it may then be parceled out and brought into the United States by
family members visiting relatives or returning college students.111
Paralleling their involvement with the global heroin trade, links to the cocaine
producing area of Latin America have also been actively developed by Nigerian TCOs.
As early as 1995, these groups had reportedly reached deep into the Brazilian interior,
near the border with Bolivia, allowing for access to the world’s major coca cultivating
region as discussed in the previous chapter.112 Nigerian criminal organizations have also
been able to draw on contacts with Brazil’s African community and, by extension, the
common Portuguese language and heritage with Lusaphone Africa, to bring cocaine into
South Africa via both Angola and Mozambique.113 In particular, Angolan and
Mozambican expatriates resident in Brazil are crucial to facilitate such shipments.114
Drug smuggling vectors moving from disparate source regions into sub-Saharan
Africa encounter a combination of porous international borders, corruptible police and
security forces, and numerous established smuggling routes moving not only drugs but
also weapons and other types of contraband. Taken together, these factors make the

111 Vesely, 9.
112 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1.
113 Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 176-7; and, more recently, U.S. Department o f State,
INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Angola,” which notes specifically that, “Nigerian
traffickers control the smuggling o f cocaine from Brazil through Angola to South Africa.” Nigerian TCOs
are also prominent in shipping cocaine from Argentina to South Africa as well, often via either Angola or
Namibia. As noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill,
39, “Using techniques and concealment methods similar to those used smuggle heroin from Asia, Nigerian
criminal syndicates dominate transatlantic cocaine shipments between Brazil and Africa, from where the
drug is transshipped to markets in South Africa and Europe.”
114 For more on the exploitation o f ethnic ties between Brazil and Africa in this manner, see also Velez de
Berliner and Lado, 253-4. In particular, the authors note the estimated 11% o f the country’s populations
that is o f African descent, and who maintain contacts across the Atlantic via both family and trade
connections.
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continent an inviting operational environment for transnational criminals, drug
traffickers, and terrorists.
Moreover, numerous African cities with extensive commercial and financial ties,
as well as maritime and air transportation links, to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are
increasingly becoming hubs for a wide range of illegal activity. This connectivity is
being particularly exploited by Nigerian TCOs.115 Overall, as Simon Bayham observes,
Africa is and will remain for the foreseeable future “the weakest link in the international
war against narcotics operations.”116
However, in terms of U.S. foreign aid to help address these issues, most of the
limited funds earmarked for Africa have focused on Nigeria and South Africa, despite a
realization of the fact that countries “as disparate as Malawi, Ethiopia and the Ivory Coast
have become transit routes.”117 There has even been speculation that a regional drug
triangle linking West Africa, centered on Nigeria, to both East Africa, primarily Kenya
and the Sudan, and South Africa itself.118 While the connectivity among these three areas
may be more or less speculative at this point, the potential for this type of interregional
smuggling interaction certainly exists.
To begin with East Africa, given its maritime access to the Indian Ocean, both
Golden Triangle and Golden Crescent opium production can easily reach that side of the
115 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 35. This view is also
echoed in U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 1, which notes that,
“Major African cities are increasingly the destination for drug shipments as well as being transshipment
hubs.”
116 Bayham, 429. More recently, as noted in OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 187, with respect to
the drug trade, “Africa is confirming its role as a production area, a transit territory and a consumer
market.”
117 U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 1. It should be noted that, as of
this writing, South Africa is not considered as a major drug trafficking country under the U.S. certification
framework.
118 C. J. D. Venter, “Drug Abuse and Drug Smuggling in South Africa,” in Rotberg and Mills, 185. See
also Bayham, 426. O f interest by being often omitted in such analyses, Central Africa is also not immune
to this type o f activity, as noted in MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga, 77-8.
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continent by sea. Significant amounts of heroin have also been smuggled through various
coastal towns in the region from India.119 Major East African cities, such as Nairobi,
Mombassa and Addis Ababa, are becoming significant transit points for heroin heading
for the U.S. from Asia, in particular utilizing commercial air connections.120 In recent
years, Uganda has also arrested a number of Nigerians and its own citizens on charges of
drug trafficking, to the extent that the two countries signed a bilateral agreement to
cooperate on this issue in December 1998.

i -yi

Similarly, as noted in INCSR 2001, “Kenya's sea and air transportation
infrastructure, and the network of commercial and family ties that link some Kenyans to
Southwest Asia, make Kenya an important transit country for Southwest Asian
heroin.”122 In particular, the country’s Lamu archipelago along the northern coastline
bordering Somalia contains thousands of small islands and estuaries provide countless

119 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 218-20, also notes the favorable geographic position o f
Mauritius in this respect, situated in the southern Indian Ocean between East Africa, the Indian
subcontinent and Southeast Asia. During the 1980s, it became a hub linking in particular Nairobi, Bombay
and Bangkok by virtue o f its dense network o f air routes, sophisticated telecommunications infrastructure
and popularity as a tourist destination, in addition to its status as an off-shore banking center and free port.
However, a significant rise in heroin use has also accompanied this involvement in the drug trade.
120 Much o f this activity appears to originate in or at least transit the Indian subcontinent. For instance,
“Nigerian traffickers are present in India, particularly in Delhi. In some instances, Nigerian-controlled
couriers transit through India en route to international destinations. This is apparently an effort to avoid law
enforcement authorities at the destination airport, as passengers arriving from major drug-producing or
transit countries are subject to greater scrutiny. Pakistani officials continue to arrest couriers, who are
ticketed to India, at airports in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad. In other cases, West African traffickers
reside in India and primarily sell heroin and hashish in-country to other Africans and Indians.” U.S. DOJ,
DEA, “India Country Brief.”
121 OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 211. During the signing ceremony, and apparently in an
effort to downplay the issue, Maman Daura, Nigeria’s high commissioner in Uganda, saw fit to point out
that not all those arrested with a Nigerian passport are necessarily Nigerian citizens. However, as discussed
above, given the suspicions fairly or unfairly attached to that nationality such false documentation would
hardly be the best choice for anyone wishing to maintain a low profile.
122 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Kenya.” This source also
notes that, “Heroin normally transits Kenya by air, carried by individual couriers. These couriers were once
primarily West Africans. More recently, however, couriers are more commonly South Asian (Indian,
Pakistani) or East African (Tanzanian, Ugandan). Once in Kenya, heroin is typically delivered to agents o f
West African crime syndicates, mainly Nigerian.”
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smuggling opportunities. A standard practice is to drop the contraband offshore, where
fishermen retrieve it on the incoming tides.
Furthermore, Somali warlords report that the routing of heroin through their
territory has become their major source of income.123 The situation in Tanzania also
parallels that in neighboring Kenya in many ways. Moreover, primarily due to its
favorable location, porous borders and numerous road, rail, sea and air points of entry,
Afghan heroin entering Tanzania from Pakistan is being smuggled to the U.S. by
Nigerian traffickers.124
With respect to West Africa, and as discussed in the previous section, Nigeria
serves as a center of gravity for a wide range of criminal activity as well as a natural hub
for the command and control of drug trafficking operations. While the country itself no
longer appears to have the same volume of drug smuggling vectors moving directly
through its territory, Nigerian TCOs have both expanded their operations further into
other nations and contracted out certain other functions. However, as one regional
assessment notes, “Nigeria is the key to crime control efforts in West Africa.”125
Overall, the response of the Nigerian government to the drug-related activities of
these TCOs has been decidedly mixed, in keeping with the domestic trends addressed in
the previous section.126 According to Isidore S. Obot, a persistent feature of Nigerian

123 Vesely, 8-9. Further south, a similar situation appears to be emerging in Mozambique, as noted in
“Booming, if a little dirty,” The Economist, 5 October 2002,43; and, more extensively, Antonio Paulo
Namburete, “Organized crime in Mozambique and its impact on the regional and international context,”
Institute fo r Strategic Studies, May 1999, 26-36.
124 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Tanzania.” This report also
notes that, “There are also strong indications o f a drugs-arms connection in Tanzania linked with the arms
demand in the Great Lakes Region (Democratic Republic o f the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, etc.).”
125 U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 2.
126 For instance, note the following: “Past Nigerian regimes have typically tried to cast the drug trafficking
and financial frauds committed by Nigerian criminal syndicates as victimless crimes that are driven by
demand in Western countries . . . Nevertheless, some Nigerian elites, including in the military, have come
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drug control mechanisms has been the emphasis on the reduction of supply, with the
imposition of harsh though inconsistent punishment. Consequently, initiatives aimed at
demand reduction have generally been neglected. Furthermore, these statutes were most
often formulated under military regimes with an overriding concern for law and order.
One reason for this is that, to a great extent, these efforts have been largely in response to
international pressure.127
For instance, beginning in the early 1980s the Buhari regime inaugurated a
nominal crackdown on drug trafficking. This area of criminal activity was one of several
designated as capital offences in 1984. To further illustrate its dedication to the effort,
the Nigerian government executed three young men in Lagos in April 1984, while several
more were consigned to death row when the decree was overturned soon afterward.

I

Significantly, few high-level or politically connected criminal figures were ever arrested
during this period.
However, the most salient development within this issue area came in 1989, when
the Nigerian Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) was set up. Established using
the U.S. DEA as a model, the NDLEA soon became a byword for corruption.129 For

to recognize that pervasive crime and corruption in Nigeria have crippled the economy, contributed to
social and political tensions, and undermined relations with major historical trading partners, including the
United States and Western European countries.” U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime
Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 36.
127 Isidore S. Obot, “Ethical and legal issues in the control o f drug abuse and drug trafficking: the Nigerian
case,” Social Science & Medicine 35, no. 3-4 (August 1992), 481-93.
128 Specifically, drug offences were addressed under Special Tribunal Decree, no. 20. The other capital
crimes so designated included tampering with oil pipelines, electrical or telephone lines, and the
unauthorized import or export o f oil or mineral ores, reflect the priorities o f the regime. Osaghae, Crippled
Giant, 179.
129 According to OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 212, NDLEA officers are paid approximately
$30 per month, lower than any other government workers in Nigeria. Moreover, to avoid corruption, these
officers are ordered to relocate to different cities four times a year, but are not reimbursed for moving
expenses. Finally, given the proportion o f alleged drug offenders released by the courts and the supply o f
cheap assassins, the issue o f revenge killings is also prevalent. As a result, “many drug officers are
completely discouraged and have started extorting money at roadblocks and airports.”
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instance, suspects “escaped” from NDLEA custody on a regular basis, while much of the
drug tonnage the agency seized found its way back into the black market. Furthermore,
rumors persisted that its leading officials were taking a percentage of the profits.
In response to U.S. pressure, the agency was put under the leadership of MajorGeneral Musa Bamaiyi in May 1994, who promptly fired 350 employees. Furthermore,
at the time he privately admitted that much of the agency was “irredeemable.”130 Among
a host of other shortcomings during this period, Nigeria also failed to fund its own
narcotics control strategy in 1995.131 By 1998, more than a thousand NDLEA staff had
been fired, including fifty-five that were reportedly awaiting prosecution.132 Bamaiyi
was replaced in turn by Ogbona Onovo in December 1998.
In terms of Nigeria’s overall relationship with the United States, the strategic and
economic importance of the country must be constantly weighed against it overall laxity
in efforts to control the transnational drug trade. In general, as The Economist notes,
“Nigeria’s oil wealth makes its rulers invulnerable to almost any sanctions except an oil
embargo.”133 As discussed previously, the country’s leadership seems content not only to

130 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 2. Furthermore, within the issue area o f money
laundering, though the agency has been given extensive powers to examine bank accounts, Nigerian bank
records are not computerized. Therefore, looking for patterns indicating illicit activity is exceedingly
difficult, and further complicated by banking regulations that tend to obscure the sources o f deposits. See
also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 1, which in addition to underling the above
observations, further notes the failure o f the Nigerian government to extradite 24 outstanding suspects to
the U.S., despite a reaffirmation o f the bilateral basis for such action.
131 See U.S. House, “Nigerian Organizations and White Collar Crime,” 104.
132 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 2. See also Chepesiuk, 174; and OGD, World
Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 210-11. The latter does note that, despite a reputation for incorruptibility, all
o f the agency’s equipment was procured by a single supplier, an Ibo businessman, with Bamaiyi receiving
10 percent o f the contracts signed by him. Despite this, several Western governments asked that he be kept
in office, apparently since this activity was not drug-related.
133 “Abacha’s wobbly throne,” The Economist, 45-6.
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ignore international criticism but also to tolerate extremely high levels of corruption,
often as its beneficiaries.134
U.S. law enforcement authorities point out that, with profit margins running into
the many thousands of percent, corruption among foreign officials is the single biggest
problem in addressing drug smuggling through Africa. This issue is particularly crucial
as it relates to Nigerian government officials, as when members of the military and police
have allowed smugglers to gain access to A-2 visas, conferring diplomatic immunity as
they move through customs.135 Moreover, it is also exceedingly difficult to plan joint
counter-measures without having them compromised by the involvement of high-level
functionaries as necessitated by protocol.136
Beginning in 1993, Nigeria held the dubious distinction of being the only
strategically significant country annually decertified by the United States solely on the
grounds of its involvement with drug trafficking rather than production. Specifically,
direct participation in the drug trade by members of Abacha’s cabinet as both smugglers
and consumers helped lead to this decision.137 This action on the part of the Clinton
administration was made despite intense lobbying from major U.S. firms.
In particular, oil companies with interests in Nigeria argued that commercial
interests should take precedence over the drug issue, or at a minimum that cooperation in
counter-narcotics efforts not be considered the overriding criterion. The fears were that
134 “International trade,” The Economist, 26 August 1995, 36.
135 Chepesiuk, 174. The author also notes the lax Nigerian banking regulations allow for the easy recycling
o f illicit profits.
136 Vesely, 10. Moreover, Booth, Opium, 323, also quotes an unnamed U.S. congressman as saying that,
“We gave some sniffer dogs the Nigerian customs, but it’s a poisoned chalice. Dogs cannot be corrupted.
They are a permanent danger for any customs authority any time a minister’s wife walks near them.”
137 In one instance, Abacha’s head o f security, Major Hamza Al-Mustapha, and his wife allegedly
coordinated a Persian Gulf network and used diplomatic pouches to smuggle drugs. At the same time,
competitors were also subject to arrest and imprisonment. OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 210,
citing as its source o f information an unnamed U.S. Embassy employee.
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the drag trafficking label would undermine investor confidence in legitimate business
ventures in the country.138 As discussed in Chapter III, Nigeria received full certification
for 2000, more in response to professed good faith on the part of the Obasanjo regime
than any real progress in this issue area.

1

In general, the Nigerian government’s efforts at drag enforcement with respect to
border control have been decidedly mixed as well. One method used by the authorities
was to reduce drag trafficking activity through their airports was to stop direct flights
between Nigeria and known source countries.140 The NDLEA has also had some success
in airports by targeting individual courier activity, albeit through sometimes heavyhanded techniques.141 However, it has also been contended that the exit visa system
instituted by the Abacha regime, ostensibly to control the drag trade, was chiefly a tool to
more effectively monitor domestic opposition.142

138 Falco, 18-9. For example o f such lobbying within the oil industry, see Kimberly Music, “Panel backs
ending drug report cards for foreign countries,” The Oil Daily 89, no. 47 (9 May 1997), 4. Moreover,
according to OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 212, while the United States is though to have solid
information on numerous high-level Nigerian officials, the preference is to use this information behind the
scenes in order to pressure the government into adopting policies favorable to U.S. interests.
139 Chepesiuk, 174. Justification for this decision can be found in U.S. Department o f State, “2000
Narcotics Certification Determinations.” Furthermore, U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001,
“Africa and the Middle East - Nigeria,” also observes that the Obasanjo government has achieved mixed
results as its apparent good intention face an uphill battle o f ingrained attitudes and established interests.
As evidence o f this, the report points out that the current administration also supports the controversial
1990 NDLEA Act Number 33. This statute says that Nigerians convicted o f drug offenses abroad will be
arrested upon their deportation back to Nigeria, and, if convicted, be liable for a minimum o f 5 years
additional imprisonment for “harming the reputation o f Nigeria.” However, the most salient instance o f
Nigerian cooperation within this issue area, from the U.S. standpoint, was its agreement to transfer custody
o f four fugitives to the U.S for trial on a range o f drug-related charges in November 2000.
140 Interpol, “International Drug Trafficking,” 4.
141 U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Nigeria,” 2. In one particular case during 1998, the
NDLEA broke up a smuggling ring that had been concealing heroin in the wheelchairs o f the Nigerian
Special Olympics participants as they transited Lagos airport. However, as noted in U.S. Department o f
State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Nigeria,” in response to better security in Nigerian
airports, “Smugglers have been forced to change tactics and ship contraband via Nigeria's five major
seaports or across its porous land borders.”
142 See Falola, 20-1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

388

Throughout the rest of West Africa, the impact of Nigerian criminal activity has
also been substantial, spilling over across international borders into neighboring
countries. As E. A. Beoteng notes, the region is the most highly segmented in Africa, the
direct result of the direct competition for trade and territorial control that took place
among the European colonial powers between the fifteenth and twentieth centuries.143
Moreover, the successful example of Nigerian TCOs has also tended to encourage
imitation throughout West Africa, notably in Ghana, Benin and Sierra Leone.144
Similarly, in the maritime context, bulk shipments of heroin hidden in cargo containers
transit through Lagos, and then re-exported via any of the numerous available seaports of
neighboring West African countries.145
With specific reference to these neighbors, in addition to being an alternate transit
hub for Nigerian TCOs, Ghana serves as an important source of mules, particularly since
Nigerian citizens have become internationally stigmatized as being involved in the drug
trade as noted above.146 Similarly, in Senegal, Nigerians have been characterized as “the
biggest factor” in the country’s drug trade, though some Senegalese and Gambians are
also involved.

i

An

143 Beoteng, 105.
144 Williams and Savona, 21. Nigerian traffickers’ use o f Ghana, Benin and Senegal as transit points is also
noted in “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1. For more on Sierra Leone’s porous border
with Liberia, allowing a considerable amount o f both arms and gem smuggling in addition to a two-way
flow o f refugees, see “The forgotten conflict,” The Economist, 9 November 2002, 50.
145 Chepesiuk, 170.
146 Booth, Opium, 323. Moreover, as noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the
Middle East - Ghana,” “Ghana is a transit point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin being smuggled
to Europe and the U.S., and South American cocaine being smuggled to Europe. Increasing amounts o f
heroin are destined for the U.S. Some o f the cocaine might also be smuggled to South Africa. Trafficking
occurs at Accra's Kotoka International Airport as well as at the ports o f Tema and Sekondi. Overland
trafficking occurs at the land borders with Togo (Aflao) and Cote d'Ivoire (Elubo). As Nigeria improves its
interdiction efforts, Nigerian traffickers are strengthening their presence in Ghana.”
147 See U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - Senegal.” This report
also notes that, “Professional drug networks, many o f which are operated by foreigners (e.g., Nigerians),
are well established in the marijuana trade.”
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As discussed in the previous section with respect to oil smuggling, Benin’s
proximity to Nigeria and its relatively open economy inevitably also make it attractive to
those wishing to dispose of ill-gotten gains from narcotics trafficking.148 Moreover, the
country has been characterized as both a “corridor country” and a “warehouse-state,” due
to its role linking Nigerian to Togo, another known smuggling hub, and an economy
based almost entirely on re-exports, a specialization tailor-made for illegal trade.149
Finally, “Nigerian nationals, residing in Cameroon, traffic heroin to Europe and to some
extent also to the United States.”150
However, it is Southern Africa that perhaps offers the most potential for Nigerian
TCOs to expand their activities, and to date these groups have made every effort to
aggressively exploit the rich trafficking opportunities of the region. Adding to the
already inherent complexity of this activity are the interrelated logistics for a number of
black market goods. As C. J. D. Venter writes, “Because of well-established smuggling
networks in the southern African region, the same routes are often used for such drugs as
Mandrax, cannabis, heroin and LSD as for weapons, cars, rhino horn, ivory and gems.”151

148 In particular, “Benin is neither a major financial center nor a major money laundering country, but
Beninese authorities believe that their country is being used by traffickers to launder drug profits. The
primary methods for laundering appear to be purchasing lawful assets such as real estate or vehicles, or by
using legal businesses as front operations.” U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money
Laundering,” 49.
149 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 212-4. As elsewhere, corruption among high-level
government officials in Benin significantly helps to enable this activity. Furthermore, “A desire to draw
the maximum amount o f profit from Nigeria’s oil, Niger’s uranium, and Togo’s phosphates has for the past
two decades led the authorities to allow ‘the development o f transit and re-export activities within a
framework o f smuggling.’” With respect to Togo, as noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001,
“Africa and the Middle East - Togo,” Togo's relatively porous borders permit traffickers, mostly African
and including many Nigerian nationals, relatively free access to the country. This ease o f access has made
Togo a transshipment point in the regional and sub-regional trade in narcotics, especially for heroin coming
from Southeast and Southwest Asia, destined for Nigeria, and from there to Europe and the U.S.”
150 Ibid., “Africa and the Middle East - Cameroon.”
151Venter, 185. Bayham, 427, also makes a similar point with a specific reference to Nigerian access to
cocaine. Incidentally, Mandrax is a tranquilizer manufactured in India that has developed a significant user
base in the region, as noted briefly in Chapter III.
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At the supra-national level, the Southern African Development Community
(SADC), consisting of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, has attempted to
formulate its own regional strategy to stem the flow of illicit drugs through the region.
Due to the unavailability of reliable statistics, however, it is difficult to accurately assess
the problem, though trends over the past several years indicate an alarming growth in
both trafficking and consumption. Moreover, concerns related to expanding drug use in
correlation with the spread of the HIV virus throughout the region also give impetus to
these efforts.152
However, paralleling Nigeria’s role in West Africa, South Africa is the pivotal
country in the context of smuggling in Southern Africa. This is largely a function of its
economic weight within region, its role as a maritime transit point from Indian to Atlantic
Oceans, its good flight connections to Europe and America and its relatively
sophisticated banking network.

Furthermore, in general the feeling among smugglers

152 “SADC plans to launch anti-drug strategy early ‘98,” AIDS Weekly Plus, 22 September 1997, 16. As o f
this writing, this initiative does not appear to have made any significant progress.
153 “Drug skirmishes,” The Economist, 16 July 1994, 38. This article also notes that, in the 1980s Zambia
became enmeshed in the drug trade, particularly in terms o f its access not only to the South African market
but also its borders adjoining seven other countries. Furthermore, direct flights from the capital, Lusaka, to
both Europe and India provide extra-regional connectivity. See also Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in
Southern Africa,” 176-7; Booth, Opium, 323-4; and U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa
and the Middle East - South Africa,” which also notes the considerable advantages that South Africa’s
infrastructure offers to smugglers. Even prior to these more recent developments, however, apartheid-era
South Africa’s ability to exert considerable economic leverage against intransigence on part o f its
neighbors was facilitated by an odd quirk o f geography. A number o f its adversaries were both landlocked
and dependent on the export o f raw materials, especially minerals, to keep their economies going. Thus,
the use o f both the South African military and various proxy forces to interdict alternate transport routes to
seaports was pivotal. The figures for the transport sector are the most startling, as witnessed by Lesotho
and Botswana’s 100%, Zimbabwe’s 80% and Zambia and Malawi’s 40% dependence on wholly South
African-controlled transport routes and facilities. These figures come from Patrick O ’Meara, “South
Africa’s Regional Goals,” in Apartheid Unravels, ed. R. Hunt Davis, Jr. (Gainesville, FL: University o f
Florida Press, 1991), 223-4.
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appears to be that goods originating in South Africa receive relatively less scrutiny than
those coming from Nigerian or other West African ports.
Since the end of apartheid rule, major cutbacks in military spending have led to
considerably more porous borders, demonstrated by the fact that, as of 2000, only four
out of 350 registered airports reported any form of police presence. However, another
cause commonly cited in the growth criminal activity in South African is the rapid
increase in numbers of illegal immigrants, “especially Nigerians,” many on the pretext of
securing refugee status.154 According to South Africa's Institute for Security Studies, of
some 100,000 estimated Nigerian residents of South Africa, only 700 are legally
permitted residents.155
Moreover, drug use is on the rise throughout Southern Africa, and in particular
there is a thriving market for both cocaine and heroin among rich, white South Africans,
as well as a growing preference for Mandrax from India. In fact, South Africa has
become the largest consumer of heroin on the African continent, as well as the leading
market for hallucinogenic drugs.156 There has also been a significant increase in the
number of Southern Africans arrested for involvement in the drug trade outside the
region. While not yet considered by the U.S. as a major drug trafficking nation, these
trends indicate an increasing involvement with this issue on a number of levels.

154 While exact figures do not appear to be readily available, the number o f Nigerians seeking refugee status
is estimated to run into the thousands. Furthermore, under South African law each applicant is entitled to a
formal adjudication, and in the interim given full rights to work and study in the country. However, until
the middle o f 1999 fewer than 10 Nigerians had been found to be genuine political refugees. “SA is ‘top
drug smuggling base’,” African News Service, 21 February 2000, 1008049u7130. See also Mark Shaw,
“State Responses to Organized Crime in South Africa,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 1 (Summer
1997), 1-19. In addition the presence Nigerian TCOs, the author also notes the impact o f both Russian and
Chinese criminal organizations operating in South Africa.
155 These figures are cited in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East South Africa.”
156 Vesely, 9-10. This trend is also discussed in OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 204-5, which
notes in particular the rise o f heroin use in the Johannesberg area and in Cape Town.
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In terms of transit, Nigerian TCOs were the first organized criminals to exploit
South Africa’s diplomatic normalization following the institution of majority rule in
1994.

1cn

By 1995, it was estimated that there were 136 drug networks were operating in
1co

the country.

In 1999, the British intelligence service, MI5, singled out South Africa as

the most important conduit for South American cocaine into Western Europe. Since
then, transshipment cells have continued to develop in South Africa to facilitate
movement of both heroin and cocaine to other parts of the world, and most likely to
distribute drugs domestically as well.159 All in all, “Nigerian and South African criminal
organizations have matured and become transnational concerns that exploit whatever
weakness they find or, with their growing sums of money, create.” 160
With respect to smuggling vectors entering Europe under the guidance of
Nigerian TCOs, the DEA noted in 1998 that, “Nigeria-based trafficking organizations
were responsible for a growing amount of heroin smuggled into Europe using
157 See Gastrow, 61-2, which notes that even as early as the mid-1980s, South African law enforcement
officials saw Nigerian criminals as the first foreign criminals to become active in the country on a
noticeable scale, though during the apartheid era other internal and external security issues obviously took
precedence. Largely confined to the greater Johannesburg metropolitan area, these groups relied heavily on
transnational networks and took great pains to avoid the sorts o f petty crime that would bring them undue
attention. These activities formed a solid basis for future expansion as political conditions evolved. See
also OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 200-1.
158 Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 176-7. While many were Nigerian, some were Indian
groups specializing in heroin and Mandrax and drawing on the sizable and well-established Indian
expatriate community. See also Marsh, 104.
159 Gelbard, “Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa,” 174. With respect to cocaine, an emerging trafficking
route appears to link both Nigeria and South Africa with Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Traffickers reportedly
travel to Harare, Zimbabwe, via either Ghana or Swaziland, obtain a visa for South Africa, and proceed by
land to South Africa and then on to Latin America. U.N. ODCCP, “Nigeria Country Profile - Illicit Drug
Trafficking,” 2. See also U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East Swaziland,” which also notes the expansion o f Nigerian TCOs into Swaziland as a conduit for smuggling
cocaine into South Africa.
160 U.S. Department o f State, INL, “Africa Regional Anticrime Program,” 1. This view is echoed in U.S.
Intergency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 52, which observes that,
“Nigerian traffickers are finding South African air and seaports to be attractive gateways for transshipping
both cocaine and heroin into the Western European market. South Africa’s growing role in the
international drug trade has increased its domestic addiction problem, especially for cocaine, which
Nigerian traffickers have made widely available at low prices.” Furthermore, beyond the context o f drug
issues, Nigerians in South Africa have also been discovered engaging in types o f “419” fraud, as discussed
previously. U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Africa and the Middle East - South Africa.”
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commercial air connections.”161 More specifically, within the wider European law
enforcement community both the United Kingdom and Italy have officially expressed
concerned about Nigerian criminal groups.162
Within the latter country, Nigerian TCOs have been known to cooperate with the
Naples-based Camorra in both drug trafficking and prostitution, and are well concealed
among the country’s 15,000 Nigerian immigrants.163 Couriers under the control of West
African criminal groups have also been detected transiting the Athens international
airport carrying both heroin and cocaine, as well as through the Aegean islands from
Turkey.164 Similar activity has been documented in Russia as well, particularly with
regard to exploiting international air links with the rest of Europe.165
Finally, in the past there has been a tendency on the part of U.S. law enforcement
officials to underestimate Nigerian drug trafficking activity, despite estimates that as
much as 50% of the heroin that enters the country is smuggled under their auspices.166
However, even as early as August 1993, the United States suspended direct commercial
flights to and from Nigeria, largely in respond to the volume of couriers coming in to

161 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC, (1998), 57. This report also notes that in the past Nigerians have occasionally
been involved in trading heroin for cocaine.
162 U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. Ill, 4.
163 See OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000), 88. A significant volume o f cocaine smuggling into Italy
via commercial air channels is also carried out by Nigerian couriers, primarily members o f the Ibo ethnic
group, both in luggage and on or within their bodies. Ibid, 82.
164 This is noted in U.S. Department o f State, INL, INCSR 2001, “Europe and Central Asia - Greece.”
165 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 59.
166 Chepesiuk, 167-9. However, the author also quotes an unnamed DEA agent as saying, “When you talk
to law enforcement people and you mention Nigerians, that’s almost synonymous with heroin. Nigerians
have developed a worldwide reputation.” This sentiment is echoed in “Can Obasanjo save Nigeria?” The
Economist, 45, where is it noted that, “Drug smuggling, money laundering and all sorts o f frauds have
made Nigeria synonymous with international crime. American drug officials speak almost in awe o f the
inventiveness and audacity o f Nigerian crime syndicates.” See also Mark Jones, “Nigerian crime networks
in the United States,” International Journal o f Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 37, no. 1
(Spring 1993), 59-73.
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New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport. Consequently, traffickers adapted by utilizing
routes through neighboring West African countries.167
By 1995, it was reported that Nigerians were transporting roughly 40% of the
heroin seized in the United States.168 With respect to the methods discussed above, many
of these can be seen in practice as drugs enter the country under the auspices of Nigerian
TCOs, such as the use of immigrants, both legal and illegal, as expendable couriers.169
This phenomenon is spurred on by the illusion prevalent in Nigerian society that migrants
to the West in general, and the United States in particular, that success and fast money are
easily obtained there.

1 70

As of late 1996, Nigerian traffickers had begun using the company Express Mail
Services to import drugs into the United States. During 1997, at least ten separate such
consignments of Southeast Asian heroin were seized, many of which had been routed
through Germany and concealed both inside a wide range of seemingly innocuous items
and within the packaging itself. In general, vis-a-vis the use of couriers, the advantages
of these methods include relative anonymity, predictable dates of delivery, and a decrease
of costs and risks.171 The DEA also noted in 1998 that during the previous year most
multi-gram and multi-kilogram seizures of Southeast Asian heroin in the U.S. were of
drugs controlled by Nigerian-based traffickers using primarily couriers and commercial
delivery services.172

167 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 46.
168 “Nigerian trade, internal trade,” The Economist, 1.
169 For instance, it is noted in U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment,
Ch. II, 7, that, “Ethnically-based Nigerian criminal organizations “’’employ illegal aliens smuggled into the
country [U.S.] to undertake higher-risk criminal activities.” As noted previously, other prominent trends
include the use o f various forms o f body carrying and travel on international airlines.
170 Falola, 15-6.
171 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 47.
172 Ibid., 45.
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The following case helps to illustrate the geographic scope of a single Nigerian
drug trafficking network. In October 1996, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force operation code-named “Global Sea,” a U.S. initiative supported by officials in
Thailand, France and Great Britain, arrested members of a Nigerian heroin smuggling
and distribution network in Chicago, Boston, New York, Detroit, Thailand and Pakistan.
Previously, a number of other individuals allegedly affiliated with this group had been
arrested in Texas, New Mexico, Thailand, Switzerland, Mexico and the Netherlands.
Incidentally, the leadership of this group was made up predominantly of Nigerian
women. 173
However, in addition to smuggling drugs into the United States, Nigerian groups
are also increasingly involved with distribution. In particular, heroin is often sold on
street comers in suburbs containing large concentrations of West Africans, with roughly
90% of the supply being of Southeast Asian origin.174 As Toyin Falola notes, “Nigerians
in the United States, whether successful or not, experience complications with their hosts,
in part because of aggressive survival strategies that may involve criminality.”175

173 See U.S DOJ, “U.S. Law Enforcement Dismantles International Heroin Smuggling Ring Run
Predominantly By Women,” Press Release # 503 (Washington, DC: Department o f Justice, 11 October
1996), available at http://www.usdoi.gov/opa/pr/1996/Oct96/503crm.htm. accessed 15 July 2004; and
“Nigerian heroin-smuggling ring is broken up,” New York Times, 12 October 1996, 8-9. This particular
operation originated with a case in Chicago in August 1995, and as o f the date o f this press release had
seized approximately 55.5 kilograms o f heroin, with an estimated wholesale value o f between $150,000
and $200,000 and a retail value o f more than $26 million. In keeping with the types o f trafficking behavior
noted above, couriers allegedly flew to Thailand to pick up the heroin, where controllers met them to
ensure they reached their destination. Generally proceeding by air to Europe and then Guatemala, before
moving on through Mexico and across the U.S. border. The main conduit within U.S. territory stretched
from Texas to Chicago, where the heroin was parceled out into 100-gram quantities. The cash receipts
were then tunneled back to Southeast Asia to begin the cycle once again. See also Vesely, 11. For more
on the interaction between drug and gender issues, see also UNDCP, World Drug Report (1997), 79-83.
174 Vesely, 9. Furthermore, the author also notes that, in order to cope with the astronomical mark-ups and
insatiable demand, as discussed above some traffickers resort to the use o f express mail delivery just to
keep up with business.
175 Falola, 15-6. Moreover, as Thomas Kneir notes, Nigerian criminal organizations are “seldom, if ever,
engaged in drug trafficking to the exclusion o f other crime.” This would include a wide range o f financial
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In addition to their links to both Southeast and Southwest Asia, the distribution
networks operated by Nigerian criminal organizations also tend to be much more loosely
organized, and thus much more difficult to penetrate despite being still very sophisticated
and adaptable. These groups have also established links with inner-city gangs and both
Chinese and Jamaican criminal organizations with respect to distributing Southeast and
Southwest Asian heroin. In addition to these heroin-related activities, Nigerian TCOs
have reportedly been expanding their Latin American cocaine pipeline to service markets
that the Colombians are not fully exploiting.176
As of 1997, Nigerian and affiliated West African crime organizations had
reportedly taken over 70% of the Chicago heroin market.177 In 1998, the DEA noted that
Chicago was the only major U.S. city where Southeast Asian heroin predominated,
reflecting the strong Nigerian presence within this market.178 Furthermore, these groups
were well enough established by 2000 that a U.S.-based, ethnic Nigerian gang called the
Blackstone Rangers reportedly set up its own training school in Chicago to teach couriers
of all nationalities to avoid detection by customs and border officials.179 Similar groups
have also been operating as distributors throughout New York, Baltimore, Washington,
D.C., Atlanta, Dallas, Houston and Milwaukee.180

crimes including fraud, money laundering, and document alteration and counterfeiting, as well as
smuggling o f both illegal immigrant and other types o f contraband. U.S. Congress, House Committee on
International Relations, “Combating International African Crime,” Statement by Thomas J. Kneir, Deputy
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau o f Investigation, 15 July 1998,
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa50884.000/hfa5Q884 O.HTM. accessed 15
July 2 0 0 4 .
176 Chepesiuk, 168.
177 “Streamlined for success,” The Economist, 11 October 1997, 29.
178 U.S. DOJ, DEA, NNICC (1998), 47.
179 Vesely, 9.
180 “Nigerian drugs, internal trade,” The Economist, 1; and U.S. Federal Bureau o f Investigation, Organized
Crime Section, Asian/African Criminal Enterprise Unit, “African Criminal Enterprises” (Washington, DC:
FBI, n.d.), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/aace/afficancrim.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
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The demonstrable ability of Nigerian and other West African TCOs to operate
within the constraints of the U.S. market, which despite its relatively high degree of
access also involves a proportionate level of inherent risk. Keeping in mind that the
value of a drug tends to rise as it approaches its final points of sale, the impact of massive
profit margins result in a balance between access and risk whereby the latter is largely
mitigated. As such, these manifestations are entirely in accord with observable operating
patterns found along any number of Nigerian-controlled smuggling vectors.

Nigerian Heroin Smuggling Vectors: An Assessment
As noted at the outset, without being a major drug-producing nation itself, Nigeria
has emerged not only as an important heroin trafficking hub but also as a support center
and safe haven with respect to a wide range of illegal activity. This evolution has taken
place almost in spite of rather than because of the country’s physical location. With
respect to access and risk, the former being so high while the latter is so low has made
Nigeria attractive enough in both relative and absolute terms that most hurdles to
connectivity have been overcome in cases where Nigeria itself is a node on a given
smuggling vector. Even in cases where Nigerian territory is not actually utilized,
however, the country’s combination of high access and low risk also serves to facilitate
various other essential TCO functions, primarily relating to command and control.
In parallel, the external capabilities of Nigerian TCOs have expanded beyond
Nigeria to the extent that they now provide the “legs’ for a significant volume of
observable transnational heroin smuggling vectors. As noted previously, in contrast to
the previous cases focusing on Afghanistan and Colombia, the issue of drug production is
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largely moot, and the focus will remain on issues relating to transit. However, setting the
stage for such an analysis, the nexus of domestic factors within Nigeria that allow
widespread criminal enterprises to operate with minimal risk has been discussed, though
aspects must be reiterated.
To begin with, in addition to drug smuggling, Nigerian involvement in various
related phenomena including but not limited to financial fraud, piracy, and both public
and private sector corruption on a massive scale has become demonstrably apparent and
increasingly pronounced in recent decades. Moreover, even when these activities do not
actually occur within Nigerian territory, access to the favorable operating environment
provided by the country is an important enabling element in the transnational context.
Furthermore, though a number of these facilitating factors predate or are related to
Nigeria’s period of colonial rule as part of the British Empire, others largely stem from or
have been exacerbated by economic mismanagement or abuses of political power since
the country’s independence. In several instances, the legacies of the former have been
used as the excuse for the latter. Regardless of the assignment of blame, however, the
fact remains that Nigeria’s problems, combined with its regional strategic and
demographic weight within both West Africa and with respect to the entire continent,
makes the nation’s endemic failure to effectively meet these challenges a matter of global
interest.
The question is thus whether the conditions found in Nigeria can be considered as
causal to, a derivative of, or emerging concurrent with the crime and corruption that is
empirically evident within the country. To answer this, a brief review of the more salient
aspects of Nigeria’s physical, economic, political and human geography is in order. This

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

399

include, but are not limited to, the impact of oil profits, the issue of corruption, the British
colonial legacy and the various ethnic tensions within the country, all of which are
interrelated to varying degrees. At this juncture, it is also worth noting that there are
generally three relevant dimensions to each of these factors, namely its intrinsic impact,
its spillover effect into other issue areas, and the ways in which this cumulative impact is
managed.
For instance, in this analysis the discovery of oil was introduced initially in the
context of physical geography. However, the impact of this event and the resultant
profits has served to dislocate the Nigerian economic, political and social structure in
fundamentally predictable yet still tragic ways. Specifically, the dominance of the
petroleum sector has led to a stifling nearly all other aspects of the country’s economic
development, and in turn given political elites and their predominantly ethnically-based
constituencies a significant goal for their more acquisitive inclinations.
Economically, in conjunction with the oflten-detrimental effects of oil revenues
and high degree of illicit trading activity, public sector corruption also crosses a number
of issue areas, most fundamentally with respect to the high levels of these patterns of
behavior found throughout Nigeria in both relative and absolute terms. While both those
offering and accepting bribes should certainly be held accountable, corruption is a
longstanding national tradition that was largely overlooked under British colonial rule
and has continued to flourish since independence. Nearly all of the generic conditions
that tend to facilitate corruption can be found in Nigeria, including but not limited to
restrictions on or obstacles to legitimate economic activity, the presence of significant
natural resource endowments, and strong kinship ties linked to ethnic factionalization.
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Similarly, the political impact of the British colonial legacy also continues to
resonate across Nigeria, both as a focus of rhetorical ire and as an excuse for the overall
absence of good governance since independence. With respect to the latter, in
conjunction with the inheritance of inadequate governing mechanisms from the colonial
administration, a sustained failure of leadership across the course over many decades is
abundantly clear. For instance, the aforementioned issue of corruption set against the
backdrop of oligarchic rule has led Nigeria to become one of the foremost examples of
the predatory “vampire” state that has become all too common across the continent. The
country’s near-perpetual transition to democracy, punctuated by periods of military rule,
has only exacerbated these tendencies and their underlying rationalizations.
Linked even more directly to the legacy of British colonial rule are the parameters
of Nigeria’s human geography. Leaving aside for the moment the wider issue of artificial
borders, the country was initially governed as three separate regions roughly correlated to
the three dominant ethnic groups. However, it was later ruled under a more centralized
federal framework, and it was this system that was adopted upon Nigeria’s independence.
Since that time, ethnic identities and tensions have become inextricably connected to an
intense competition for access to national assets, and oil wealth in particular, by way of a
highly developed system of political patronage. These dynamics, including the
marginalization of smaller tribal groups, continue to provide an inherent level of
instability.
To return to the issue of why crime and corruption are able to flourish in Nigeria,
at the apex of the hierarchy of challenges facing the country is, most simply put, a failure
of leadership. As such, it is not necessarily oil wealth per se is not the problem, but
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rather the ongoing inability to manage these assets to the benefit of the citizenry and
avoid the temptations of personal gain. Similarly, while there are no easy solutions
where corruption has taken root, the country’s poor record of punishing high-level
corruption has had a significant demonstration effect across the body politic. With
respect to the institutional inheritance from the British colonial administration and the
issue of zero-sum ethnic competition, as Nigeria approaches a half-century of
independence the plausibility of generic excuses wears thinner and thinner.
While this failure of leadership cannot be properly considered as a causal factor, it
is perhaps the single most important enabling element that has allowed other and often
preexisting conditions to evolve into a highly favorable operational environment for
smugglers as well as other types of criminal actors. In terms of access, risk and
connectivity, the global success of Nigerian TCOs demonstrates how this type of
smugglers’ landscape at the national level effectively mitigates risk to such a low level
that access becomes less difficult to maintain, especially for those with the proper
political leverage. In conjunction with the country’s porous borders and entrepreneurial
traditions, the resultant connectivity has in turn enabled these discrete regional smuggling
actors to have a seemingly disproportionate impact on wider global black markets.
In this context, the demonstrable and expanding capability of Nigerian TCOs to
control drug supply chains from production area to point of sale lies not only in their
ability to solidify this national base of support for their command and control functions,
but also to extend their reach to form a seamless transnational logistical continuum. As
such, with respect to transit this assessment represents a departure from the previous case
studies in that since it is not a major drug producer, consideration of Nigeria proper

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

402

figures into only one discrete set of smuggling vectors in which Nigerian TCOs are
involved.
In turn, the effectiveness of smuggling activity conducted under the auspices of
Nigerian TCOs is predicated upon ongoing access to relevant source areas, transit
countries, and major markets, facilitated in large measure by the spatial distribution of
various Nigerian and West African expatriate networks. While most ethnically-based
TCOs experience significant obstacles in expanding beyond their national or regional
borders, in general Nigerian TCOs appear to have experienced relatively fewer such
constraints in developing a worldwide presence.
In doing so, these groups have been able to take advantage of a number of
developments associated with globalization. This includes, but is not limited to, the
growing ease of transportation, more efficient methods of international shipping, better
technology and communications, and the fact that transshipment countries no longer need
to be along a straight line between supply and demand. As such, in this instance
economic linkages serve to trump mere geographical proximity.
Moreover, in order to maintain this type of access, a number of structural and
behavioral attributes exhibited by Nigerian TCOs in their management of risk can also be
directly linked to their competitive advantages and subsequent successes, as noted
previously. For the most part, these characteristics relate primarily to the adaptability of
such networks, particularly with respect to both routes and methods. In the context of the
latter, the use of expendable couriers dealing with smaller quantities has been a hallmark,
but this is changing as Nigerian TCOs become increasingly sophisticated. In conjunction
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with a greater relative willingness to accept higher risks in return for a lower marginal
profit, this flexibility has been essential to their evolutionary processes.
As such, over the past several decades Nigerian TCOs have been able to extend
their reach into a number of primary source regions and countries. In particular, the
genesis of their connectivity with both the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent
heroin production areas dates back decades, and in many cases can be traced back to the
expansion of commercial or official ties into the transshipment of illicit commodities.
Thus, longstanding links to local organizations have facilitated the purchase of heroin at
wholesale prices, which Nigerian TCOs can in turn accrue their own profits by
controlling nearly all subsequent aspects of the logistical process. Incidentally, a parallel
situation can also be found in Latin America with respect to cocaine.
In terms of transit, although not the only salient region in this context sub-Saharan
Africa can be seen as having a relatively high degree of connectivity for a number of
reasons. Objectively, a combination of porous international borders, corruptible police
and security forces, and established smuggling routes with respect to a wide range of
contraband can be found throughout the region. In the more specific context of heroin,
the continent is relatively accessible from both the Golden Triangle and the Golden
Crescent, particularly by water and by air. Finally, and more subjectively, the significant
presence of Nigerian TCOs in nearly every African country makes smuggling vectors
across this region highly attractive from the perspective of command and control.
Exhibiting these attributes to an even higher degree than the rest of the continent,
Nigeria itself as well as the rest of West Africa serve logically enough as a natural center
of gravity for Nigerian TCOs. Not only is access maximized and risk minimized, but
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moderately good commercial maritime and aviation links to major markets create
additional incentives as well. Moreover, the sporadic attempts on the part of the Nigerian
government to address this problem, generally in response to various forms of external
leverage, for the most part have resulted in such activity merely shifting across regional
borders to the territory of Nigeria’s neighbors. Similarly, South Africa’s logistical and
financial infrastructure also makes it a very attractive alternative, as does the growing
domestic market for drugs.
In addition to servicing a significant portion of the demand for drugs in the
relevant transit countries, Nigerian TCOs also maintain an active operational stance in
most major markets as well, in particular with respect to Europe and North America.
While an increasingly diverse range of couriers aboard international aircraft carrying
relatively small amounts of drugs is still the norm, larger shipments using maritime forms
of conveyance are becoming increasingly common.
Cooperation with more longstanding and often ethnically-based criminal
organizations can also be seen, though Nigerian and West African distribution networks
are certainly not unknown. In general, however, having achieved access to these
markets, the relatively higher risk found in operating within these environments have not
deterred Nigerian TCOs, but rather encouraged them to exhibit the same types of
adaptive behavior that made them successful in the first place.
As this chapter has demonstrated, the global reach of Nigerian TCOs is truly
impressive, particularly given the operational reliance on relatively low-tech yet
nonetheless effective smuggling techniques. Moreover, in spatial terms the existence of
extensive expatriate communities through which influence can be extended into
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numerous other countries, as well as access to a safe haven in the form of Nigeria itself,
have served to facilitate the growth of these smuggling actors. In an attempt to bring this
study full-circle, the final chapter not only draws conclusions by way of comparisons and
contrasts among the case studies examined herein, but also to point the way toward future
applications of the underlying geographical methodology.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

406

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

Throughout the course of this study, an effort has been made to meaningfully
engage a subject with an admittedly high degree of complexity, namely transnational
smuggling route selection. By way of conclusion, a review of this analysis must
encompass a number of interrelated topics, beginning with an appreciation of this pivotal
issue as having a longstanding, ongoing and growing relevance. This is not only true
with respect to smuggling in its own right, but also in terms of both supporting, and in
return being supported by, a wide range of related criminal activity, with terrorism being
the most salient within the context of the prevailing international security paradigm.
As such, given the impact of black market activity as a component of the global
economy, a fuller understanding of the transnational dynamics that enable the underlying
illicit cross-border logistical processes is increasingly crucial. With respect to the
literature within the field of international security, this issue can be firmly established
with respect to the interlocking contexts of the “end of the nation-state” debate, the
friction between various types of transnational networks and geographically
circumscribed nation-states, and the impact of globalization and its related
manifestations.
To model the decision-making parameters that drive transnational smuggling
route selection, the relevant operational landscape was conceptualized as a function of
geography, particularly with respect to the impact of various economic, political, and
human factors, from the smugglers’ perspective. Underpinning this approach at a holistic
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level, a number of initial assumptions were made that serve to more meaningfully
circumscribe the research question.
Specifically, this included positing the existence of a fundamental link between
geography and both licit and illicit economic activity, as well as certain shared dynamics
that transcend any specific type of smuggled good and thus allow for a delineation of
common and contrasting features of both expected and observed logistical patterns
among diverse illicit commodities. To further qualify this analysis, there was an overt
focus on rational actors dealing in tangible commodities, though neither condition may
necessarily apply in the real world. Finally, ceteris paribus, smuggling activity has been
characterized in spatial terms as following the path of least resistance, largely as a result
of various spatial factors that serve to “push” or “pull” such activity by making it more or
less attractive within or across a given area.
To more concretely assess this phenomenon, analysis was predicated on a basic
model involving three interconnected decision-making domains of access, risk and
connectivity. More specifically, access denotes the ability to control a smuggled <
commodity throughout the logistical process, while risk stands for the set of factors that
serve to impede access, most often imposed upon smuggling actors by nation-states.
From the smugglers’ perspective, within the limitations of their respective capabilities
such actors use these criteria to seek the most attractive routes for a given commodity,
namely those that maximize access, minimize risk, and optimize connectivity.
In terms of methodology, the inherent difficulties involved in the study of black
markets were addressed at length in Chapter IV, with a particular emphasis on data gaps
relating to the unknown and the inaccessible. As such, the intent behind a geographic

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

408

approach to the issue of transnational smuggling was driven in large measure by the need
to develop an approach that could most effectively leverage extant sources of
information. The resultant basic model can be seen as a template for mapping out the
more discrete spatial manifestations of this phenomenon.
As this template was consciously designed to be an open-ended architecture, its
most compelling feature is its extensibility, specifically in terms of space, time and
commodity. By being scalable to the relevant level of geographic analysis, flexible
enough to encompass a diverse and often opaque set of data in the form of data points,
observations, trends and events as they become available over time, and capable of
meaningfully addressing nearly all identifiable types of illicit commodities and their
related issue areas as outlined in Appendix A, this basic model can be seen as both usable
and reusable to a high degree.
As such, the various aspects of and interactions among the decision-making
domains of access, risk and connectivity was developed first in its generic form without
reference to a specific commodity, and then applied to the global trade in heroin, which
served as a benchmark commodity to illustrate the utility of this approach. Moreover,
while realizing that smuggling actors can be depicted along a spectrum of organizational
sophistication, with respect to this phenomenon the focus of this study was on TCOs,
which not only represent of the upper end of this spectrum, but also are particularly
noteworthy both within this issue area and for the complexity of their interaction with
nation-states.
In terms of the relevant geographic levels of analysis in analyzing transnational
smuggling activity, access and risk were conceptualized as operating reciprocally at the
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national level, with both in turn shaping and being shaped by connectivity at the
transnational level. It should be noted, however, that the nature of the research question
itself served to set these spatial delineations, and in theory the model could just as easily
address the movement of illicit drugs up and down the eastern seaboard of the United
States.
However, having set these specific geographic parameters, it became necessary to
consider the respective national and transnational factors under which smuggling is most
effectively able to flourish, given the underlying imperatives of supply and demand. For
instance, at the national level, the impact of terrain that impedes the imposition of central
government or law enforcement, traditions that foster smuggling activity, and various
types of ongoing domestic turmoil can be most readily seen in balancing access and risk,
with more favorable smugglers’ landscapes exhibiting higher levels of access and lower
levels of risk, and consequently higher levels of connectivity.
As the very concept of connectivity is illustrative of the actual modes of
conveyance and methods of concealment used to physically move illicit commodities
across borders, at the transnational level of analysis issues relating to globalization,
porous border control and the lack of effective cooperation between nation-states become
relatively more important. At this juncture, the analytical convention of the smuggling
vector was introduced as well to assist in assessing this activity.
However, to begin by revisiting the relevance of heroin as a suitable benchmark
commodity, among the attributes that make it well suited to this role are that it is globally
traded, of high value by weight, has a ubiquitous market presence worldwide but
relatively discrete and moderately circumscribed primary source areas, functions beyond
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its own supply and demand parameters as collateral in numerous types of other illicit
transactions, and is subject to a longstanding and well-developed prohibition regime
based on a broad international consensus.
Following an overview of opium and its derivatives, the evolution of international
drug control and the related black markets for precursor chemicals and money
laundering, the parameters of global heroin supply and demand that shape the spatial
dimensions of the trade were discussed. In particular, the major opium cultivation areas
of Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia and Latin America, as well as the key markets of
Western Europe and North America were addressed in the context of the transnational
movement of heroin, as are a number of other regional drug trafficking trends. The
various approaches to the issue taken by specific national actors in terms of strategies
designed to target either supply or demand were also outlined, as was the primacy of U.S.
leadership within this issue area.
Generally speaking, recent decades have seen the evolution of increasingly
diversified smuggling patterns with respect to illicit drugs, as well as a broadening of this
phenomenon’s impact. More specifically, the lines between producer and consumer
nations, as well as among supply- and demand- reduction strategies, continue to blur for
both heroin and cocaine, though the latter does tend to be more highly circumscribed in
terms of production within the Western hemisphere. While this analysis for the most part
has been explicitly predicated upon supply-side considerations, to include the issue of
transshipment, this phenomenon could not exist in the absence of the underlying demand
for these substances, and as such a more holistic understanding of the issue must temper
criticism, however warranted, of countries associated with illicit drug supply.
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The selection of Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria as case studies served to
further illustrate specific aspects of the global heroin trade and to represent its more
diverse regional manifestations. Using the basic model as a point of departure, an
assessment of the relevant empirical data combining the conventions and parameters
developed to address this issue was then conducted with respect to the transnational
manifestations of this phenomenon. Similarly, other related methodological techniques
were also discussed, specifically with respect to modified applications of geographic
information systems and political risk analysis.
Each case study began by framing the national-level context of smuggling, and
examined the physical, economic, political and human geographic factors that shape
heroin smuggling within the country in question by focusing on the themes of terrain,
tradition and domestic turmoil in their historical perspective. From there, the various sets
of smuggling vectors proceeding outward from or across the focal nation-state via various
modes of conveyance through intermediate transit nodes to their respective final
destinations were considered. Finally, an assessment of this activity by applying the
three interrelated decision-making domains, augmented by various other models, metrics
and conventions, was conducted.
As the pivotal country within the Golden Crescent region with respect to this
issue area, Afghanistan was in many ways a natural selection for such an analytical focus.
Along with Burma, it is one of the two largest opium cultivators worldwide, while by
virtue of its recent history the country has also become associated with both Islamic
fundamentalism and terrorism. With respect to the entrenchment of the drug trade, in
particular a state of protracted civil conflict dating from the Soviet invasion of 1979, as
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well as enduring warlordism and ethnic tensions, have significantly heightened both
opium production and trafficking emanating outward from the country into the wider
region.
Lacking maritime access and significant airport facilities, the primacy of land
routes out of Afghanistan through Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian states is both
logical and readily observable, as are various sets of smuggling vectors continuing
outward, especially via Turkey, Eastern Europe and Africa. However, although Western
Europe constitutes the major end-user market for Afghan heroin, growing demand in
other regions can also be seen. Overall, the relevant transnational trading activity is
characterized as a high degree of complexity in terms of intermediary relationships with
respect to goods in transit.
For its part, in addition to successfully adapting established cocaine smuggling
routes and methods to the movement of heroin, Colombia has also become a primary
source country with respect to the U.S. market. Domestically, the nation’s ongoing civil
strife, and in particular pressure on the central government from both guerrilla
movements and drug trafficking activity, has become salient enough to make
“Colombianization” a byword for parallel situations in other countries.
Overall, Colombian TCOs exhibit a high degree of control within the region with
respect to illicit drug supply chains originating in Latin American, most saliently by
exerting considerable leverage over their various partners. By focusing on North
America as the major market, these organizations have been able to maintain primacy
across land routes directly through Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil and Central America, and
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often from there into Mexico, maritime access to both the Caribbean basin and the Pacific
Ocean, and control various air routes via both commercial and private conveyances.
Finally, over time Nigeria has evolved into a known heroin transit hub without
being a center of production, demonstrating that factors other than mere proximity can be
decisive. This development has been significantly facilitated by the fertile ground
provided by the country’s demonstrable corruption and ineffective political institutions,
with in turn can largely be traced to an influx of massive oil wealth, the legacy of colonial
rule, and a spoils system that exploits the endemic ethno-religious tensions throughout
the nation.
Moreover, not only does Nigeria proper serve as both a safe haven and a
command center for transnational criminal activity, by linking major drug supply and
demand regions Nigerian TCOs can be seen as providing a significant portion of the
“legs” for the global heroin trade. As such, Nigeria and the wider West African region
cannot be considered as being off the beaten path of the worldwide and increasingly
borderless drug trade. Their capabilities in this respect can for the most part be attributed
to their strategic and spatial competitive advantages, with the later largely stemming from
the widespread West African diaspora and resultant presence within the relevant markets.
Despite a number of regional variations, certain distinct commonalities emerge
from a comparison of these three cases. Specifically, the impact of terrain has had a
distinct impact on observable sets of smuggling vectors as they cross international
borders and continue on toward their final destinations. Similarities among the various
groups involved in transnational smuggling are also readily apparent, many of which can
in many instances be traced back historically to longstanding traditions of smuggling.
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Finally, perhaps the most salient parallels between Afghanistan, Colombia and Nigeria
can be seen in their legacies of domestic political, economic and social turmoil, which in
turn have allowed for various types of criminal activity to become entrenched.
In absence of Cold War as a global security paradigm, the rising profile of
transnational security issues, to include not only organized crime but also terrorism and
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, seems well positioned to fill this vacuum.
However, for the foreseeable future there will be no viable contenders to the primacy of
the nation-state on the international stage. That being said, nation-states still need to
come to terms with threats that transcend their borders, with a particular onus on those
countries where such threats either originate or are otherwise allowed to flourish.
As such, in the future other national actors within the international system may be
compelled to intervene either unilaterally or multilaterally, despite the constraints
imposed by accepted concepts of sovereignty. Thus, in the future nation-states that are
chronically and demonstrably unable or unwilling to effectively manage their borders
may increasingly find their sovereignty compromised by unilateral or multilateral
external action. For instance, beyond the specific issue area of the illicit drug trade, the
potential transnational spread of weapons of mass destruction was one of the primary
justifications for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003.
Moreover, of the three cases examined in this study, the U.S.-led invasion of
Afghanistan and the subsequent ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001 constitute
another of the more extreme examples of this trend. In Colombia, the issue of the
extradition of drug smugglers to the U.S. remains contentious, though arguably this
leverage was decisive in propping up the central government during its internal struggle
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with the Medellin cartel. Finally, in the recent past Nigeria has had the dubious
distinction of being the only non-drug producing nation to be decertified by the U.S. due
to its ongoing failure to meaningfully address its role in the global transit of narcotics.
As noted previously, Afghanistan and Colombia have also had experience with
decertification by various U.S. administrations.
However, while the United States remains the indispensable superpower, no
single nation is capable of meaningfully countering either the global drug trade or the
wider range of pressing transnational security issues alone. To begin to meet the
challenges posed by this type of threat, nation-states must first recognize the complex
interaction between smuggling actors and nation-states at the systemic level, particularly
in the context of public sector corruption, good governance, border control, failed and
failing states, “interspaces” within the international system, and the evolving role of
customs entities worldwide, and then concentrate on transnational criminal networks
rather than being narrowly focused on arresting and prosecuting individuals.
The demonstrable scope of transnational security issues should theoretically
provide the grounds for a deepening for international cooperation by rational national
actors based on concrete mutual interests. However, the key to this type of substantive
interaction of course lies in the willingness of decision-makers to both meaningfully
engage and devote resources to the problem. As an obvious prerequisite for effective
action, before the relative projected feasibility of any specific measure can be discussed,
a deeper appreciation of the spatial manifestations of the smugglers’ landscape is in
order.
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Being successful in this endeavor in turn means that nation-states must develop
more flexible and robust legal and investigative expertise and assets, and with respect to
profit-motivated non-state actors in particular to even more fundamentally “recognize
that organized crime is a business, and business and enterprise models are a useful way to
conceptualize it.”181 With respect to access, while elements of the nexus of identifiable
enabling factors have been allowed to take root to varying degrees in nation-states all
over the world, and as such the issue in turn needs to be engaged meaningfully at both the
local and the international level.
Given the conceptualization of risk from the perspective of the smuggling actor,
in terms of vulnerability versus likelihood, or susceptibility to losses versus the
consequences of those losses, certain measures can be taken to raise the deterrence
threshold within a specific geographic area beyond what is considered economically
feasible by the relevant smuggling actors. Toward that end, there are several broad
conclusions that can be made regarding the parameters for optimizing success within this
issue area, many rather simple in theory yet complicated in practice. As the USCS noted
in 1997, “The combination of technology, changes in detection methods, and
international and domestic cooperation holds the greatest potential for improvements in
the disruption of smuggling organizations.”182
Finally, in terms of connectivity, the potential and actual modes of transnational
smuggling by land, water and air must also be taken into account, as must be the roles of
other non-state actors such as multinational corporations. Efforts to impede criminal
connectivity include, but are not limited to, effective international and interagency

181 Lupska, 38.
182 U.S. DOT, Customs Service, U.S. Customs Service Strategic Plan (1997), 16.
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communication and coordination; timely and actionable intelligence sharing covering
both the broad picture and local threat assessments, especially those driven by human
intelligence; and the implementation of industry “best practices” at all transportation
facilities by offering the private sector incentives if necessary.
This last issue should also encompass the deployment of innovative as well as
proven countermeasures, particularly those relating to new and emerging technologies,
but must be tempered by an awareness of the unintended consequences of robust
interdiction and inspection efforts. This includes, but is not limited to, the economic
impact stemming from intrusive inspection regimes and the migration of the flow of
contraband to alternative modes of transit in search of relatively more attractive paths of
least resistance.
In order to come full circle and return to the primary goal of this study, the
attempt to first formulate and then validate an approach that can effectively frame the
varied manifestations of smuggling in geographic terms lies as the crux of this study. As
noted above, the open-ended architecture of the basic model is highly extensible in terms
of space, time and commodity. Thus, in framing an agenda for future research, there are
several distinct areas to which this generic template can be applied and extended.
Spatially, the level of analysis can be adjusted in accordance to the parameters
necessitated by the focus of interest, be it local, regional, national or international.
Furthermore, as only three case studies were presented for a single commodity, there is
ample scope for further work to be done even within the parameters put forth in the
course of this study, since every nation-state can be seen to a greater or lesser degree as
challenged by transnational smuggling. Temporally, as more compete information
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becomes available the decision-making domains of access, risk and connectivity can be
updated accordingly.
Given greater granularity in terms of such data, the whole structure of basic model
could be extended considerably. Furthermore, any discernible gaps between expected
and observed sets of smuggling vectors for a given commodity in the context of a given
space and time could point the way to further modifications and perhaps a subsequent
transition to more predictive modes of analysis. The methodologies discussed in Chapter
IV, particularly relating to political risk analysis and geographic information systems,
may also be further exploited. With respect to the latter, it is hoped that more emphasis
will be placed on the collection of geospatially-correlated data pertaining to the relevant
issue areas, and that such data will be both openly accessible and leveraged to its fullest.
Finally, in addition to expansion in terms of space, time and data, there are
countless applications of this approach that can be made in the arguably even more
straightforward extension necessary to encompass other types of illicit commodities. In
fact, the observable range of smuggled commodities delineated at greater length in
Appendix A offers a serviceable point of departure for framing such a research agenda.
Overall, this analytical framework has been presented to illustrate the geographic
dynamics of an extremely pressing global challenge, in conjunction with the associated
models, conventions and case studies. With the aggregation of these constituent
elements, it is hoped that the utility, flexibility and robustness of geographic analysis has
been demonstrated with respect to the relevant issue areas.
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APPENDIX A
TYPOLOGY OF SMUGGLED GOODS

Contraband Tvoe

Examples

Prohibited
(de facto illegal)

Illicit Drugs (1)
Nuclear Materials (2)
Endangered Animals and Animal Parts (3)
Trademark Infringement and Counterfeit Goods (4)

Restricted
(de jure illegal)

Embargoed Goods (5)
Sensitive and Strategic Items (6)
Weapons and Military Equipment (7)
Illegal Immigration (8)
Art, Antiquities and Cultural Artifacts (9)

Duty-Avoidance,
Diversion & Differential
Pricing

Cigarettes and Alcohol (10)
Gasoline and Other Fuels (11)
Gemstones (12)
Gold and Other Metals (13)
Miscellaneous Commodities (14)

The table above represents an attempt to sort the various types of contraband
smuggled internationally for profit. In the first category are those commodities that by
their nature are either prohibited under international agreement or otherwise highly
controlled. In the second, goods that are not necessarily illegal by their nature, but rather
become contraband by virtue of where they originate from, are destined for, or who
controls their movement. Finally, items in the last category may not be illegal at all, but
may be commonly smuggled primarily to circumvent import and export controls and thus
maximize profits. However, as these categories are not mutually exclusive, some overlap
can be found among them, as will be discussed below.
Furthermore, this typology is limited to tangible commodities. While falling
beyond the bounds of this study, however, the illegal international movement of non
tangible assets remains an important issue. In particular, this would include such
categories as classified information, trade secrets, password and other coding
information, proprietary encryption algorithms, wire transfers of laundered money, and
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child pornography in digital formats. However, despite this distinction, the basic
smuggling model of access, risk and connectivity can, at least in theory, be adapted to
meet these analytical challenges as well.

(1)

As discussed in Chapter IV, the two primary categories of illicit drugs are the
natural and the synthetic. Among the former, there are three types that are
cultivated on a large scale for profit. These are the opiates, from which such
compounds as morphine and heroin are derived; the cannaboids, such as
marijuana and hashish; and the coca derivatives. Other types of natural drugs
include hallucinogens such as the fungal-based lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD),
the psilocybin mushroom, the bufotenine found in secretions from the cane toad,
and peyote buttons, found among the roots of the namesake cacti. The latter
figures prominently in certain Native American religious practices, as discussed
in “A field full of buttons,” The Economist, 3 April 1999, 27.
Furthermore, more regionally based drugs also have a moderately circumscribed
popularity, such as mambog and kratom in Southeast Asia, the latter derived from
the Mitragyna speciosa shrub, and the qat, or khat, leaf containing the stimulant
cathinone and traditionally chewed by Muslims throughout East Africa. An
excellent account of both the economic and social aspects of the qat trade can be
found in Kevin Rushby, Eating the Flowers o f Paradise: A Journey through the
Drug Fields o f Ethiopia and Yemen (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). See
also Jonathan Stevens, “Krazy Khat,” Somalia’s Deadly Drug War,” New
Republic, 23 November 1992, 17-8; OGD, World Geopolitics o f Drugs (2000),
189-92 focusing on Kenya; and “Qat Trade in Africa,” Case 427, Trade
Environment Database (TED), American University, available at
http://www.american.edu/proiects/mandala/TED/qat.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
By contrast, synthetic drugs such as amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), various
barbiturates and “club drugs” such as Ecstasy, as well as a wide range of
prescription medicines, form the other major class of controlled substances.
Incidentally, the UNDCP’s taxonomy lists prescription drug used illicitly as a
separate category. For more on the abuse of prescription drugs in the U.S., see
“Give them their pills, the fuddled masses,” The Economist, 23-4.
Finally, it should be noted that in several Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia
and Sudan, alcoholic beverages are also illegal. Moreover, historically a number
of commodities now not considered as drugs per se have in the past fallen under
this heading. For instance, see Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World
That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to Present
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 77-108; in addition to opium and coca,
coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco and sugar are discussed from this perspective.

(2)

An insightful analysis of this phenomenon can be found in Center for Strategic
and International Studies, The Nuclear Black Market (Washington, DC: CSIS
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Task Force Report, Global Organized Crime Project, 1996), particularly 9-18.
However, actually tracking the illicit movement of fissile materials is
understandably problematic. A chronology of recent detected international
nuclear smuggling events involving nuclear materials (1993-6) is available as an
appendix to U.S. Senate Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, Testimony of
John Deutch, CIA Director, 20 March 1996, available at
http://www.fas.Org/irp/congress/l996 hr/s960320c.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
For more on this crucial issue, which has developed a significantly higher profile
since 9/11, see also “The plutonium racket,” The Economist, 20 August 1994, 3940; U.S. Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment,
Ch. 1 ,13; and, for a European perspective on this issue, Frank Gregory,
“Transnational Crime Law Enforcement Cooperation: Problems and Processes
Between East and West in Europe,” Transnational Organized Crime 1, no.4
(Winter 1995), 126-8.
(3)

Within this issue area, the leading international regime is the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), originally established in
1973. However, as with most international agreements there are broadly
divergent views regarding fairness of application. A good example of the failure
of national governments to reach true consensus is the anti-whaling issue area,
with perennial objections voiced by both Norway and Japan. In each of these
cases, national sovereignty and cultural, in this case dietary, traditions most often
form the basis of opposition. See Calvin Sims, “Japan, Feasting on Whale, Sniffs
at ‘Culinary Imperialism’ of U.S.” New York Times (web edition), 10 August
2000 .
A related area of disagreement arises between balancing protection of resources
with sustainable development. An example of this is found in efforts to liquidate
existing elephant ivory stockpiles, which is often categorically opposed even
when the proceeds are earmarked to fund conservation efforts. See “Sustainable
arguments,” The Economist (web edition), 21 June 1997, and “Excitement at
CITES,” The Economist (web edition), 15 April 2000.
Furthermore, certain types of animal parts in particular, such as rhino horn, tiger
bone and grizzly bear gall bladder, are highly prized as ingredients in traditional
Chinese herbal medicines and remain an important stimulant of demand. See
“Why rhinos recommend Viagra,” The Economist, 30 May 1998, 76; and Marsh,
133-5.
Other product derived from endangered species may be used in the production of
consumer items, especially in the fashion industry. Finally, there is the collateral
trade in the smuggling of exotic live animals, most often for eventual use as pets.
The increasing profitability of servicing the pent-up demand for such goods is
apparent from the level of overall poaching activity, as well as a growing interest
in this area on the part of more organized criminal groups.
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For more on this issue, see Michael D. Lemonick, “Animal Genocide, Mob
Style,” Time, 14 November 1994, 77-8; “Kill the butterfly,” The Economist, 8
April 1995, 28-9; Williams, “Networks, Markets and Hierarchies,” 78-9; and,
more recently, “Pet owners hear the call of the wild,” International Herald
Tribune, 14 February 2002, 8; and “Out of the blue,” The Economist, 2 November
2002, 77-8. Shaw, 6-7, also notes the involvement of apartheid-era South African
military intelligence networks in this trade as a means of both gathering
information and raising money for additional projects.
(4)

This category covers a wide range of intellectual property violations across a wide
range of commodities, include such items as fake Gucci bags or Rolex watches, as
well as pirated copies of movies and music. While diligence with respect to
enforcement varies from country to county, in theory these goods are de facto
contraband at the global level. In theory, this area is governed under international
copyright law.
For more on the scope of this issue, see U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 20-2; and “Imitating property is
theft,” The Economist, 17 May 2003, 52-4. A more recent association between
this type of activity and terrorist financing can be found in David Johnston,
“Terrorist groups dealing in counterfeit goods, Interpol head says,” International
Herald Tribune, 17 July 2003, 4. For more on efforts to control such activity, see
Jeffrey Sparshott, “Faking out the fakers,” Washington Times, 23 June 2003, C l7,
20; and with specific reference to this phenomena’s manifestations in Vietnam,
“Faking it,” The Economist, 15 February 2003, 40.

(5)

This category refers primarily to official sanctions imposed at either the national
or international level. As such, there may exist a degree of overlap with other
types of prohibited goods. An excellent overview of sanctions and their
circumvention can be found in Naylor, Patriots and Profiteers. Moreover, one of
the most salient historical examples can be found in the case of apartheid-era
South Africa, while the situation in Iraq, ongoing as of this writing, offers yet
another.
To make this issue even more complicated, smuggling actors generally do their
utmost to disguise the point of origin for their goods that have a legitimate
alternate source. As such, enforcement is particularly difficult in the case of
fungible commodities. For instance, overlapping with (11) below is Iraqi or, in
the case of the United States, Libyan and Iranian oil. For a snapshot of the
shortcomings of the sanctions regime in Iraq, see Vivienne Walt, “Iraqis making
the most of porous sanctions,” USA Today, 1 November 2002, 15-6A; and with
respect to Iran, “ 18 U.S. businesses searched as part of inquiry into arms sales to
Iran,” International Herald Tribune, 11 July 2003, 5.
Another example is so-called “conflict” diamonds, which as of this writing is the
subject of various international efforts aimed at curbing this source of funding for
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guerrilla movements, particularly focusing on sub-Saharan Africa. Interestingly
enough, there is a parallel with the more long-standing issue of illicit diamond
buying (IDB), which the DeBeers cartel has been trying to curtail for the greater
part of a century. For a historical view of this long-standing phenomenon, see
Stefan Kanfer, The Last Empire: DeBeers, Diamonds and the World (New York:
Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1993). More recent permutations of this issue are
discussed in Matthew Hart, Diamond: The History o f a Cold-Blooded Love Affair
(New York: Plume Books, 2001), 191-3.
Within the mining industry, more recent international and regional efforts have
been focused on seemingly intractable internal conflict in Sierra Leone, Angola
and the Congo, with various plans revolving around the development of an
international-recognized process to certify a given gemstone’s point of origin.
See Blaine Hardin, “The West Hopes to Curtail Diamond Trading, but Without
the Money and Troops.” New York Times (web edition), 2 August
2000;“Diamond king,” The Economist (web edition), 29 January 00; and
“Diamond leaders in pact to ban ‘conflict gems’ funding African wars,”
CNN.com, 18 July 2000; and “A crook’s best friend,” The Economist, 4 January
2003, 50.
(6)

For an overview of this phenomenon, see R. T. Naylor, “The Rise of the Modem
Arms Black Market and the Fall of Supply-side Control,” Transnational
Organized Crime 4, no. 3 / 4 (Autumn / Winter 1998), 209-36. However, this
category shades into the one immediately following, in addition to an obvious
overlap with (2) above, but the intent here is to differentiate between high-end,
sophisticated weaponry and more common types of arms. For instance, in
addition to the control of arms and other weapons-related transactions, the export
of some types of dual-use civilian-military items may also fall under this heading.
Moreover, a similar case can be made for the various technologies deemed of
strategic importance, such as supercomputer, missile and satellite systems.
An example of an item that could easily be placed under either heading is the
U.S.-produced ground-to-air, shoulder-fired Stinger missile, lavishly distributed
throughout Pakistan for use in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. These
have become common throughout the region ever since, to the extent that the CIA
unsuccessfully tried to initiate a buy-back program in the early 1990s. By 1995,
the estimated $65 million spent had served primarily to drive up the price tag for
these units.
For more on this issue, see Natalie J. Goldring, “Links between domestic laws and
international light weapons control,” presented at Project on Light Weapons Controlling the Global Trade in Light Weapons, Washington, DC, 11-12
December 1997; and, William D. Hartung, “Reports - Weapons at War,” World
Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center, May 1995, available at
http ://www. worldpolicv. org/proiects/arms/reports/wawrep.html. accessed 15 July
2004, with a particular emphasis on Section II.
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(7)

Among all categories of smuggled weapons and military equipment, small arms
are logically enough the most ubiquitous. The extent of this trade is detailed in
“Hey, anybody want a gun?” The Economist, 16 May 1998, 47-8. In particular,
this article makes note of the various versions of the Kalashinkov rifle, both longlasting and easy to reproduce (with a total of only 16 working parts), but puts
forth the interesting suggestion that it “may be more realistic to restrict the
ammunition that is so cheap it is unattractive to smugglers.”
See also Phil Williams, “Drugs and guns,” Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists 55,
no. 1 (January 1999), in which the author also makes the salient point that “for
organized crime, armaments are both commodities and tools of the trade.” This
view is also echoed in R. T. Naylor, “Loose cannons: Covert commerce and
underground finance in the modem arms black market,” Crime, Law and Social
Change, 22 (1995), 1-57. Unofficial ties between the military-industrial complex
and organized criminal elements in Russia have been well documented, with
weapons comprising a key commodity for transfer. See Handelman, 207-14; and
Graham H. Turbeville, Jr., “Organized Crime and the Russian Armed Forces,”
Transnational Organized Crime 1, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 64-73.
For a holistic overview of the issue of weapons moving through the international
system, to include developments since the end of the Cold War, as well as the
roles of air and sea routes, see also U.S. Interagency Working Group,
International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 13-5; and Bryan Wood and Johan
Peleman, “The Arms Fixers: Controlling the Brokers and Shipping Agents,”
NISATResearch Report 99.3 (November 1999), available at
http://www.nisat.org/publications/armsfixers/default.htm. accessed 15 July 2004,
with an emphasis on Ch. 1, 5-7.

(8)

Though illegal immigration is subject to a wide range of motivating factors, most
of these may be categorized as either economic or political. Furthermore,
international criminal groups appear to be increasingly engaged in this trade, with
an emphasis on ensuring migrants pay for the service. As noted in U.S.
Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 8,
“Besides being a profitable criminal business, smuggling illegal immigrants is
less risky than trafficking in other illicit contraband, such as drugs.” For a
excellent overview of this issue with respect to illegal economic migrants from
Mexico crossing into the U.S. circa the mid-1980s, see Conover, passim.
However, a number of trends can be seen developing, including the growth of the
dangerous practice of sm uggling human beings in containerized cargo, an
increase in the systematic use of false documents and the overall surge in volume
of activity. At least part of this increase has been attributed, either directly or
indirectly, to a shift on the part of smuggling actors away from drugs, seen as
carrying higher risks with similar profits. While press coverage of the numerous
recent cases abounds, overviews of this issue area can be found in Kerry, 133-49;
and “World faces deluge of human trafficking,” CNN.com, 31 August 2000. For
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more recent discussions of this phenomenon, see also “Desperate cargo,” The
Economist, 2 March 2002, 44; and “A cargo of exploitable souls,” The Economist,
1 June 2002, 30-1.
Furthermore, this activity is also highly correlated with efforts to ensure sufficient
“workers,” often coerced, to support various venues associated with the sex trade.
For an overview o f the latter issue, see Amy O’Neill Richard, “International
Trafficking in Women to the United States: A Contemporary Manifestation of
Slavery and Organized Crime,” DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Program
monograph, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, November 1999, available
at http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/women/trafficking.pdf. accessed 15 July
2004; Sarah Shannon, “Prostitution and the Mafia: The Involvement of Organized
Crime in the Global Sex Trade,” Transnational Organized Crime 3, no. 4 (Winter
1997), 119-43; and “In the Shadows,” The Economist (web edition), 26 August
2000 .
Finally, a related issue involves the illegal trade in human organs. For a
comprehensive international overview, see Nancy Scheper-Hughes, “ The Global
Traffic in Human Organs,” Current Anthropology 4, no. 2 (April 2000), 191-251.
An analysis of a single case study, which also serves to highlight differences in
national legal approaches to the issue, can be found in “India Kidney Trade,”
Case 240, Trade Environment Database (TED), American University, available at
http://www.american.edu/TED/kidnev.htm. accessed 15 July 2004.
(9)

This area o f smuggling is intimately involved not only with stolen goods but also,
increasingly, the legal status of such items in terms of provenance and residual
ownership. Even objects acquired in good faith have been the focus of
repossession efforts on the grounds that they are national treasures or illegally
obtained at an earlier period, depending on interpretations of often-conflicting
national laws, See “Caveat emptor,” The Economist (web edition), 18 September
1999; and “Unplundering art,” The Economist, 20 December 1997, 126-8.
An important aspect of this black market is the blurring of lines between legality
and illegality in terms of both commodity and actors. See Lauren L. Bemick,
“Art and Antiquities Theft,” Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. 2 (Summer
1998), 91-116, which also includes discussion of the use of these items as both
collateral for drug transactions and to launder money. For instance, a growing
exporter of smuggled art in recent years has been Russia, with trafficking in stolen
religious artwork being especially prominent, as noted in Handelman, 182-9.
However, a number of other countries with rich archeological heritages have also
been subject to this phenomenon. One recent example has been the wholesale
looting of museums in Iraq in the wake of the U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein
and the resultant power vacuum and breakdown of law and order. See “Heavy
history, light fingers,” The Economist (3 May 2003), 79; and “The Disappearing
Treasure of Iraq,” Washington Post (23 April 2003), C l, C8-9.
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(10)

Both of these commodities are among the more commonly smuggled goods, by
virtue of relatively high import duties and stable demand. Exploitation of crossborder prices may be found in many parts of the world; recently, Britain in
particular has been an attractive target. See “The Belgium job,” The Economist, 8
May 1999, 58-9, which focuses on both alcohol and tobacco bootlegging; and
“Smuggling - tobacco galore,” The Economist (web edition), 18 March 2000,
which notes that, “Tobacco smuggling is the Britain’s fastest growing category of
crime,” due primarily to low risks and high profits.
For another recent example, further underlining the linkage between criminal
activity and terrorism, a Charlotte, North Carolina-base cigarette smuggling ring
was recently broken. This group was allegedly raising money for the Islamic
guerrilla group Hezbollah by exploiting interstate tax differences between North
Carolina and Michigan, rather than operating internationally. “U.S. authorities
bust cigarette-smuggling ring linked to Hezbollah,” CNN.com, 21 July 2000.

(11)

For instance, Handelman, 243-4, discusses the use of Baltic routes by Russian oil
and petroleum shippers seeking to avoid export duties. An extensive case study
of this phenomenon in the 1980s can also be found in Block, 307-39. According
to the author, those involved included “traditional organized criminals from the
New York metropolitan region, organized criminals newly migrated to the U.S.
particularly from Eastern Europe, criminal entrepreneurs from the Benelux
nations, various energy-industry executives in the U.S. and Europe and
institutions and individuals involved in quite massive money-laundering
operations.”
Finally, two further examples of this phenomenon have been previously discussed
in the context of this study. Specifically, both the case studies focusing on
Colombia and Nigeria address this issue in terms of its relevance to a more
holistic view of regional smuggling. As such, the exploitation of cross-border
pricing differentials with respect to fuel between Colombia and Ecuador is noted
in Chapter VI, while a similar situation Nigeria and its West African neighbors, is
examined in the first section of Chapter VII.

(12)

Gemstones, both cut and uncut, comprise a particularly lucrative and highly
fungible form of highly portable wealth, and are often used as collateral in a wide
range of illegal transactions. Preferences appear to vary according to local market
conditions and availability. As discussed in (5) above, diamonds are a commonly
smuggled commodity whose trade is often strictly regulated without generally
falling into a restricted category.
For a regional analysis of the situation in Africa prior to the drive for international
sanctions on “conflict diamonds,” see Francois Misser, “Smuggler’s rout,”
African Business, no. 200 (June 1995), 27-8; and “Dirty dealings,” African
Business, no. 211 (June 1996), 16-9. The latter article in particular notes the
disparity between statistics reported to the Diamond High Council on deliveries
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and those of individual countries’ production. For more on this issue from the
South African perspective, see also Marsh, 71-7.
However, more recently tanzanite has also become more prominent in illegal
transactions. For instance, traders and various other middlemen dealing with
tanzanite have been linked with al-Qa’eda smuggling networks. This gemstone,
found only in one 13-square kilometer area of Tanzania, has seen a considerable
rise in demand over the past several years. As the uncut stones move toward
finishing centers such as Jaipur, India, where they are cut and polished, they
allegedly pass through the hands of Muslim extremists, particularly in Kenya and
the United Arab Emirates. See Robert Block and Daniel Pearl, “Rampant
Smuggling of Blue Gem Helps Bin Laden Loyalists,” Wall Street Journal, 19
November 2001, A l, A9.
Moreover, even beyond diamonds and tanzanite, the trade in various other types
of precious stones can also be observed fulfilling a similar function throughout the
world. For more on the smuggling of gemstones focused on specific regions, see
also Lisa Gubemick, “You Die For Sure,” Forbes, 26 October 1987, 94-6, which
deals with Burmese rubies; and “Gem wars,” The Economist, 21 July 1990, 40-1,
which examines the illegal trade in emeralds from Colombia.
(13)

Gold has a long history of involvement in smuggling. An overview of this
activity can be found in Timothy Green, The New World o f Gold, rev. ed. (New
York: Walker and Company, 1984), 186-97. For a more focused national
perspective, see also “High taxes spur gold smuggling in South Korea,” American
Metals Market 103, no. 182 (21 September 1995), 9. For an analysis of this
phenomenon closer to a major source, see Marsh, 66-7.
The stimulus for illicit trade in this case may be linked directly to heavy taxes on
imported gold, including a customs duty, a value-added charge and an additional
education tax. Avoiding these costs in turn generates the smuggler’s profit. The
utility of gold in laundering large sums of criminally derived funds is also
discussed in U.S. Department of State, INL, INCSR 1999, “Money Laundering,”
4. Chapter V of this study also notes the traditional prevalence of gold smuggling
throughout the Persian Gulf.
Further examples of large-scale metals smuggling, particularly on the part of
Russian organized crime, include aluminum, copper, titanium, and even scrap
metal. For instance, during the early 1990s, Estonia rose to become the sixth
largest exporter of non-ferrous metals, despite the fact that not a single ton of
metal was being produced in its factories. See Handelman, 243-7; and Fialka, 7786 .

(14)

While a discussion of all of the various types of commodities under this heading
are too numerous and varies to examine in extensive detail, generally speaking
any good that is either highly taxed or otherwise strictly regulated may be targeted
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for smuggling efforts. As a result, diversion of commodities from either the open
market or state-controlled channels often occurs. In the latter case, this
phenomenon is highly correlated with public-sector corruption. Moreover, close
proximity to a cross-border area where a given good is available at either a much
higher or lower price will encourage smuggling in the direction that will maximize
profit.
An excellent example of this can be found in the large-scale smuggling of oil
from Nigeria, as discussed in Chapter VII and noted above. Another case can be
found in Tanzania, specifically with respect to avoiding the officially-set buying
price for cloves through the state-owned monopoly, the Zanzibar State Trading
Company, which has in turn led to increased smuggling of the spice between the
clove-growing islands and the Tanzanian coast. See “Zanzibar’s Bid to Curb
Clove Smuggling,” African News Service, 18 January 2001. For another East
African example, see also “Sugar Shortage Due to Smuggling,” African News
Service, 5 September 2000.
Other popular markets that are serviced by smugglers include those for high-value
goods such as designer clothing or computer components, as well as easily
disposable goods such as foodstuffs and household items not readily available
elsewhere. Moreover, the growing international demand for stolen vehicles has
led to wide-ranging networks to meet these market preferences, as noted in U.S.
Interagency Working Group, International Crime Threat Assessment, Ch. I, 19.
Though difficult to estimate, it may be argued that in some regions of the world,
black market consumer goods account for an even larger portion of illegal
economies than more traditional smuggled commodities. For instance, for a
regional assessment see Stephen Ellis and Janet MacGaffey, “Research on SubSaharan Africa’s Unrecorded International Trade: Some Methodological and
Conceptual Problems,” African Studies Review 39, no. 2 (September 1996), 1942.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

467

APPENDIX B
HEROIN - A TIMELINE

1805

Morphine first synthesized

1839-42

First Opium War

1856

Second Opium War

1898

Heroin first synthesized in Germany by the Bayer Company, though by
some accounts it was discovered as early as 1874 by a British chemist

1909

U.S. government convenes Philippines Opium Commission, closing down
the opium trading monopoly set up by Spanish colonial authorities and
banning opium dens

1909

International Opium Commission held in Shanghai, China, the first
international conference to discuss the issue of the illegal drug trade

1912

Hague Opium Convention formulated, with follow-up meetings in 1913
and 1914; largely mooted by advent of First World War

1914

Harrison Narcotics Act passed in the United States, restricting the trade in
opiates, as well as a number of other categories of drugs, by requiring a
doctor’s prescription for their distribution

1921

League of Nations sets up Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium
and Other Dangerous Drugs

1924-5

Two conferences, collectively know as the International Opium
Conference, held in Geneva, Switzerland

1931

Geneva Conference on the Limitation of the Manufacture of Narcotic
Drugs held, following an abortive attempt to convene two years earlier

1936

Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs

1948

Paris Protocol, under U.N. auspices, providing for new drugs to be
included under international control measures

1961

U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, seeking to incorporate all nine
international drug agreements formulated since 1921
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1971
1972

U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, followed by a related
protocol the next year
First U.S. “war on drugs’ commences during the Nixon administration, a
cause taken up in earnest later beginning with the Reagan administration

1986

U.S. legislatively mandates annual certification of other country’s drug
control efforts by amendment to Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

1988

U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances

1989

G-7 established the Financial Action Task Force in an attempt to control
money laundering, since expanded to include twenty-six members

1991

G-7 establishes Chemical Action Task Force in an attempt to control
access to precursor chemicals used in drug processing

1995

Clinton administration issues Executive Order 12978, allowing U.S.
federal authorities to either freeze or block all assets held in the U.S. by
known foreign nationals engaged in international narcotics trafficking

1997

Multilateral Chemical Reporting Initiative proposed under U.S. auspices

1999

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, adopted by U.N. General Assembly in Resolution 54/109

2001

In addition to other consequences, events of September 11 herald a radical
reassessment of security issues relating to the control of international
borders
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APPENDIX C
HEROIN ACTIVITY MODEL

This model is derived from a Cocaine Activity Model developed by the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA), and encompasses a parallel structure in terms of stages and
sub-stages. As such, within this generic model each stage represents a series of events
that may occur during the production, processing, transshipment, distribution and
consumption of heroin (diaceyltmorphine or diamorphine).
Opium P oddv Stage
01 - Grow Opium Poppy
0 1 .1 - Clear Land (often slash & bum)
01.2 - Purchase / Acquire Seeds
01.3 - Plant Seeds
01.4 - Cultivate (weeding, etc.; +/- 3 months to maturity)
Opium Gum Stage
0 2 - Harvest & Store Opium Gum
02.1 - Harvest Opium Gum (once flower petals have fallen)
02.1.2 - Shallowly Cut (‘score’) Bulb
02.1.2 - Scrape Off Sap (‘gum’)
02.1.3 —Collect Opium Gum for Drying (several days)
02.1.4 - Repeat Scoring of Bulbs (3-5 times or until no more produced)
02.2 - Prepare for Subsequent Cultivation
02.2.1 - Cut Bulbs from Stem
02.2.2 - Dry Bulbs
02.2.3 - Collect Seeds from Bulbs (for use in next year’s planting)
02.3 - Prepare Opium Gum for Storage
02.3.1 - Collect Opium Gum for Drying (several days)
02.3.2 - Press Opium Gum into Bricks
02.3.3 - Wrap Opium Gum for Storage
02.4 - Deliver Opium Gum to Storage Site
02.4.1 - Establish Route Security
02.4.2 - Move Opium Gum to Storage Site
02.5 - Store Opium Gum (if properly stored, it has a relatively long shelf life)
02.5.1 - Establish Site Security
Morphine Stage
03 - Refine Opium Gum into Morphine (alternatively, use of opium ‘straw,’ or stalks &
bulbs; more common in licit production of opiates)
03.1 - Prepare Processing Site
03.1.1 - Establish Site Security
03.1.2 - Acquire Necessary Equipment / Supplies
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03.3 - Set Up Equipment
03.2 —Purchase / Collect Opium Gum from Storage
03.2.1 - Negotiate Purchase / Coordinate Collection
03.3 - Deliver Opium Gum to Processing Site
3.3.1 - Establish Route Security
3.3.2 - Move Opium Gum to Processing Site
03.4 - Process Opium Gum into Morphine (ratio of approx. 10:1)
03.4.1 - Dissolve Opium Gum in Boiling Water
03.4.2 - Filter Liquid (burlap sacks commonly used)
03.4.3 - Collect & Discard Precipitate (organic waste)
03.4.4 - Reheat Liquid
03.4.5 - Add Concentrated Ammonia
03.4.6 - Collect Precipitate (morphine)
03.4.7 - Dry Morphine
03.4.8 - Press Morphine into Bricks
03.4.9 - Wrap Morphine for Storage
03.5 - Deliver Morphine to Storage Site
03.5.1 - Establish Route Security
03.5.2 - Move Morphine to Storage Site
03.6 - Store Morphine
03.6.1 - Establish Site Security
Heroin Stage
0 4 - Refine Morphine into Heroin
04.1 - Prepare Processing Site
04.1.1 - Establish Site Security
04.1.2 - Acquire Necessary Equipment / Supplies
04.1.3 - Set Up Equipment
04.2 - Procure Precursor Chemicals (acetic anhydride is most common)
04.2.1 - Move Precursor Chemicals to Site
04.3 - Deliver Morphine to Processing Site
04.3.1 - Collect Morphine from Storage Site
04.3.2 - Establish Route Security
04.3.3 - Move Morphine to Processing Site
04.4 - Process Morphine into Heroin (chemically binding acetic anhydride to
morphine molecule to produce CnH i 7N 0 (C2H302 )2)
04.4.1 - Add Equal Quantities of Morphine and Acetic Anhydride
04.4.2 - Heat Mixture (six hours at 85°C recommended)
04.4.3 - Add Water & Chloroform (to precipitate impurities)
04.4.3 —Collect & Discard Precipitate
04.4.4 - Drain Solution
04.4.5 - Add Sodium Carbonate (to precipitate heroin)
04.4.6 - Filter Heroin Out of Solution (with activated charcoal)
04.4.7 - Add Alcohol (to purify heroin)
04.4.8 - Gently Heat to Evaporate Alcohol
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04.4.9 - Collect Heroin (most commonly as a white or brown powder,
though less refined ‘black tar’ heroin also found)
04.5 - Deliver Heroin to Storage Site
04.5.1 - Establish Route Security
04.5.2 - Move Heroin to Storage Site
04.6 - Store Heroin
04.6.1 - Establish Site Security
04.7 - Transship Heroin
04.7.1 - Establish Route Security
04.7.2 - Move Heroin via Logistical Channels
04.7.3 - Repeat Transshipment as Necessary (including multiple
iterations across national borders if applicable)
Distribution / Consumption Stage
0 5 - Repackage Heroin and Deliver to End User
05.1 - Clear Customs into Target Country
05.2 - Deliver Heroin to Storage Site
05.2.1 - Establish Route Security
05.2.2 - Mover Heroin to Storage Site
05.2 - Store Heroin
05.2.1 - Establish Site Security
05.3 - Dilute (‘cut’) Heroin
05.3.1 - Procure Dilutants (preferably some form of non-lethal powder)
05.3.2 - Add to Heroin (purity will decrease, bulk will increase)
05.4 - Repackage Heroin (into progressively smaller parcels)
05.5 - Introduce Wholesale Heroin into Retail Marketing Channels
05.5.1 - Establish Route Security
05.5.2 - Allot Wholesale Heroin to Retailers
05.6 - Retail Heroin to Consumers
05.7 - Consume Heroin (inject / inhale)
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